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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses twenty years of fiscal policy coordination under Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) – its genesis, implementation courses and changes. 
It does so by resorting to the construct of learning as an ontological trait of 
policy making and employing modes of policy learning (intended as distinct 
causal mechanisms) to operationalise this ontology for the sake of empirical 
investigation. To this end, a “policy learning measuring instrument” has been 
constructed allowing for the categorisation of each case study in terms of their 
prevalent mode of learning and then for the testing of mode-specific expected 
implications. From a methodological point of view, the thesis relies on theory-
testing process tracing and evidentiary eclecticism to verify mode-specific 
observable implications. 
Throughout its history, the supranational coordination of fiscal policies under 
EMU has been characterised by three distinct regimes. The first one was 
substantiated by the fiscal criteria of Stage II of EMU (in force during the period 
of 1994-1998). The prevalent mode of learning under this regime was 
hierarchical. In terms of outcomes, that mode led to instrumental learning that 
sustained the process of convergence. The launch of the euro and the adoption 
of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) substantiated a new fiscal policy 
coordination regime that lasted until 2010. Under the SGP, learning took place 
as a by-product of bargaining and reinforced strategic and opportunistic 
implementation. The financial crisis of 2007/2008 led to a de facto abeyance of 
the SGP and to its overhaul from 2010. Within this episode of policy change two 
case studies were distilled, one of emergency-driven, intracrisis management 
and one of long term, institutional change. While the first case was explained 
through a mechanism of contingent learning, the second one was crucially 
found to be driven by epistemic forces.  
The findings arising out of this study are conversant with different strands of the 
literature and, in particular, seek to contribute to the political economy of the 
E(M)U and to integration theories at large. 
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Chapter 1. Scope, motivations and research design of the thesis 
 
1.1 Introduction: Economic and Monetary Union and fiscal policy 
 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), intended as the set of institutional 
arrangements governing the differential delegation of powers to the European 
Union (EU) in a number of economic policy domains, represents a high-stakes 
experiment in sovereignty pooling that took and is still taking place “in a 
province of public policy that has traditionally been closely guarded by national 
politicians” (Hodson 2015, p. 158). Such province, broadly labelled as “the 
macroeconomy” (ibid.), includes vital policy areas (sometimes labelled as core 
state powers - Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2015) such as monetary policy, 
banking and financial supervision, budgetary, macroeconomic and structural 
policies. EMU is hence not merely a monetary union, but a coherent set of 
regimes for the supranational coordination of economic policy making. Within 
EMU’s complex and multi-layered architecture, originally designed in the 
context of the Maastricht Treaty (TEU 1992) and then progressively adjusted 
and reviewed through new treaties, treaties’ amendments and ad-hoc 
regulations, each policy area is subject to different governance arrangements.  
In more detail, the decision to integrate national monetary policies by delegating 
them to a unified actor represents the very core of Maastricht ideational 
convergence and the raison d'être of EMU (McNamara 1998; Dyson and 
Featherstone 1999). Against this background, for other economic policy areas 
that are highly interdependent and whose sound functioning is hence also 
essential for the correct working of the monetary union, different hybrid 
frameworks of supranational governance have been devised, all aimed at 
coordinating rather than fully integrating these domains. Namely, fiscal and 
budgetary policies have been governed through a series of regimes mixing 
“hard coordination with sanctions” and soft rules and tools, while 
macroeconomic and structural policies have been largely managed through 
“soft coordination by guiding rules” (Collignon 2004, p. 916), at least until recent 
changes occurred in the area of the monitoring of macroeconomic imbalances. 
The complex institutional architecture sketched above, whereby supranationally 
integrated policy areas (i.e. monetary policy) coexist with decentralised (hard 
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and soft) coordination regimes is rightly considered as a “pioneering attempt at 
policy coordination among national governments” (Hodson 2015, p. 158). 
Dismissed by some observers as basically useless - if not damaging (see, for 
instance, Tabellini 2003) - a rule-based framework for the coordination of 
domestic fiscal and budgetary policies meant to guarantee their sound conduct 
and in turn avoid negative spillovers stemming from unilateral action has 
instead been a pivotal aspect of EMU’s framework and has proved essential 
(though not always effective) to preserve the sustainability of the common 
currency and internalise potential and actual externalities (Detken et al. 2004; 
Morris et al. 2006; Schuknecht et al. 2011). As the recent sovereign debt crisis 
has plastically and clearly shown, having EMU also greatly increased the level 
of economic interdependence among its member states (and hence risks of 
asymmetric imbalances and shocks), the absence or malfunctioning of a 
credible regime able to discipline the conduct of domestic fiscal policies can 
indeed threaten the whole EMU and EU construction. 
This doctoral thesis consists of a learning-informed, diachronic account of fiscal 
policy coordination (its regimes, their implementation and reform) under EMU. 
Starting in 1994 in the context of Stage II of the Maastricht convergence 
process that would have led to the adoption of the common currency by eleven 
countries in 2001, the coordination of national fiscal policies via a series of rule-
based policy regimes based on multilateral monitoring has represented one of 
the most complex and contested policy domains of EMU and the whole EU. 
Moreover, this area of EMU has recently witnessed impressive changes due to 
the financial and sovereign debt crises. All these considerations make fiscal 
policy coordination a central theme of investigation for EU integration and EMU 
scholars and international political economists. Hence, against the background 
of the delegation of monetary sovereignty implied by EMU, the central object of 
analysis of this thesis is the functioning and evolution of supranational fiscal 
policy coordination. 
In detail, the aim of this thesis is to investigate and explain the implementation 
and change of the different regimes of fiscal policy coordination that gradually 
emerged under Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) through the analytical 
lens of modes of policy learning. From the empirical/temporal point of view, the 
study consists of a diachronic account covering roughly twenty years, that is, 
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since the inception of fiscal policy coordination in the context of Stage II of EMU 
convergence process (1994) until recent events (i.e.: the entrance into force of 
the so-called Two-Pack Rules in May 2013). 
In the course of its relatively young (yet turbulent) history, the coordination of 
domestic fiscal and budgetary policies under EMU has been regulated through 
different institutional arrangements. For the sake of distilling a number of distinct 
and self-contained empirical case studies, the different institutional 
arrangements that have governed the coordination of decentralised fiscal 
policies among EMU member states are considered in the remainder of the 
thesis as full-blown policy regimes. According to the classic definition of 
Krasner, “regimes are set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations” (Krasner 1982, p. 2).  
This parsimonious definition, if applied to the different typologies of coordination 
that gradually emerged under EMU in the realm of fiscal policy, allows treating 
each of them as individual (though interconnected) case studies. Conversely, a 
holistic approach to EMU whereby a single multi-layered policy architecture is 
the key object of analysis, although useful, would not allow full appreciation of 
the specific nature of the collective action problems triggered by decentralised 
fiscal policies, the different features of the regimes gradually devised to address 
these problems and their shifts over time.1    
Before delving into these regimes and into the analytical framework employed 
to investigate them, it is important to better elucidate the rationale for their 
creation, that is, to answer the following question: Why are policy coordination 
regimes needed within the integrationist architecture of EMU? To simplify an 
issue that will be central in the following analysis, there are two main drivers of 
the establishment of policy coordination regimes within EMU:  
1. The unification of monetary policy under a centralised supranational authority 
that governs a common currency brings about a collective action problem 
                                                          
1 In this light, in the context of my investigation, EMU is the background whereupon different regimes of 
fiscal policy coordination have emerged. Taking the background seriously allows for a better 
contextualization of these regimes, yet the latter are considered in my investigation as independent 
case studies equated to international policy regimes defined in more general terms by Krasner and 
International Relations scholars. 
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specifically related to the conduct of decentralised domestic economic policies 
in general and fiscal and budgetary policies in particular. The latter in fact have 
the potential, when run inconsistently, to generate negative spillovers that 
jeopardise the sound and neutral conduct of monetary policy. 
2. The textbook recipe to internalise such spillovers (that accrue as negative 
externalities stemming from unilateral action) is centralisation/full integration 
(Oates 1999). Nonetheless, centralisation is feasible and beneficial only 
inasmuch that the preferences of the decentralised actors are homogeneous 
and time-consistent (Tabellini 2003; Collignon 2004). Moreover, beyond the 
economic principles of optimal task allocation, politics plays a crucial role: in 
order to pool/cede sovereignty in an extremely delicate domain like that of fiscal 
policies, ideational and political convergence need to be achieved. Whereas this 
has been the case for monetary policies (McNamara 1998), the degree of 
preference convergence in the realm of macroeconomic policies and most of all 
fiscal and budgetary policies has never been such to allow for full integration 
(Buti and Van den Noord 2004). As a result, rule-based decentralised 
coordination emerged as a necessary second best.  
The lack of preference convergence to allow for full integration in the presence 
of a collective action problem arguably explains the emergence of coordination 
regimes, but we still need to unearth the nature of the collective action problem. 
What is therefore the nature of the collective action problem prompted by 
monetary unification? Why does there exist a need for economic policy 
coordination within EMU in the first place? The answer is straightforward, 
though articulated.  
Under a unified monetary policy (conducted by a delegated independent actor), 
other economic policy domains that are not subject to centralisation (fiscal and 
budgetary policies in particular) have the potential to generate negative 
externalities that can affect other member states and the monetary union as a 
whole. Negative spillovers stemming from unilateral actions are not automatic, 
they emerge because different autonomous actors have disjunct and time-
inconsistent preferences and hence have a tendency to act inconsistently and 
unilaterally (Begg et al. 2003). These negative spillovers may accrue, for 
instance, in the form of heterogeneous budgetary stances (assuming that 
compliance with rules mandating fiscal restraint is politically costly for national, 
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governments) that generate macroeconomic imbalances, differentiated 
creditworthiness and asymmetric economic trends – and potentially shocks. A 
government running high budget deficits needs a much different monetary 
policy with respect to a government pursuing fiscal consolidation. How should a 
unified monetary decision maker react to these asymmetries and imbalances?  
Moreover, a government may be subject to deficit bias or electoral business 
cycles and therefore might try to exploit the beneficial effects of monetary 
unification on interest rates to free ride, for instance running persistent deficits 
without getting punished by harsher borrowing conditions (Collignon 2004, p. 
918). Indeed, to avoid risks of moral hazard, heterogeneous policies, undue 
pressures on the independence of the European Central Bankk (ECB) and 
coordination failures, spillovers have to be internalised. Economic theory 
indicates that the most efficient way to internalise spillovers is full 
delegation/integration at the central level, granted that actors’ preferences are 
fairly homogenous (ibid, p. 233; Oates 1999). Nonetheless, this was far from 
being the case when EMU was negotiated (Dyson and Featherstone 1999; 
Verdun 2002; Buti and Van den Noord 2004) and it is fair to argue that the 
same holds true now. In other words, preferences for fiscal policy remained 
largely heterogeneous across EMU Member States and this prevented (and 
prevents) full sovereignty cession at the central level. Once centralisation is 
ruled out due to preferences’ inconsistency, rule-based hard coordination is the 
second best device to internalise potential negative externalities and that was 
the pathway chosen in the Maastricht treaty and in the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) by EMU decision makers. 
To summarise, the way in which EMU decided to deal with the potential 
negative externalities stemming from unilaterally conducted economic policies 
has been based (since 1997/1998 until the 2010 crisis – with only marginal 
changes) on the following logical chain and set of provisions, in a word, by the 
following paradigm: 
• A common currency and a unified monetary policy bring about diffused 
benefits to participating member states in the form of increased overall 
creditworthiness and lower borrowing and transaction costs; 
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• These benefits (that once the monetary union is formed are not 
excludable) can be reaped if one or more member state decides to free ride, 
that is, if they do not contribute, through disciplined and homogenous fiscal and 
macroeconomic positions, to the overall sustainability of the new currency and 
to the sound, non-inflationary conduct of monetary policy by the new central 
bank;   
• Economic and fiscal policies in particular are hence to be “conducted as 
a matter of common concern” (TEU, Art. 103, Par. 1) and, although fully falling 
within national governments’ responsibility, they have to be coordinated and 
monitored at the supranational level to avoid negative externalities stemming 
from unilateral action; macroeconomic and most of all fiscal policies are in fact 
part of a larger economic policy mix whereby their conduct, for sound 
macroeconomic outcomes to emerge, has to be broadly coordinated with the 
conduct of monetary policies (in line with the “sound money” paradigm 
underpinning the mandate of the ECB and the whole EMU construction, see 
also Chapter 4). 
• Recognising the (political) unfeasibility of centralisation, effective policy 
coordination can be achieved through a hybrid regime including both hard and 
soft rules and tools that are meant to first prevent and then punish non-
compliance within a multilateral surveillance setting;   
• To curb moral hazard incentives and foster compliance with a non-
profligatory, fiscally-conservative and sustainable conduct of budgetary policies, 
beyond the system of rules mentioned above (the full-blown policy coordination 
regime), other disciplinarian provisions can be set out to discourage rules’ 
defection, namely: 
o The newly established central bank can be barred from acting as 
lender of last resort and engaging in monetary financing of member 
states’ debts, even when they risk being insolvent;  
o To further reinforce the prohibition of monetary financing, an 
explicit no bail out clause can be established in the form of a prohibition 
of sharing liabilities among governments;  
17 
 
The final coordination mechanism of national fiscal policies is not under the 
control of regime’s actors (i.e. monitoring supranational institutions and 
monitored Member States), but it is external and decentralised. In a way, it is 
both an external disciplinarian constraint and the potential key driver of negative 
spillovers, that is, private market discipline in the form of differentiated risk 
premia on sovereign bonds – that under perfect information and foresight 
should be strongly dependent on macroeconomic fundamentals and public 
finance stances (Schuknecht et al. 2010).  
These combined arrangements ensure that EMU’s Member States are subject 
to internal multilateral monitoring on the one hand (based on hard binding 
provisions and peer pressure) and external market discipline on the other. In 
particular, the no bail out clauses guarantee that Member States, through EMU 
membership, are not shielded from but are actually fully exposed to external 
market discipline that is openly seen as a welcome exogenous incentive to 
successful coordination and compliance (Van Riet (ed.) 2010). 
To sum up and proceed, the regimes that have coordinated fiscal policies within 
EMU can be broadly characterised as “quasi-hard coordination regimes” 
whereby sanctions and (supposedly)2 coercive enforcement mechanisms 
coexist with softer rules, which are all aimed at incentivising compliance. The 
preference for rule-based methods of coordination in this field of EMU policy 
making, instead of more integrative provisions, besides the various motives 
highlighted above, has also rested on the fact that budgetary policies are 
perhaps the most delicate levers of power for national political actors – most of 
all after EMU Member States have pooled monetary sovereignty and assigned 
the control of exchange and interest rates to a centralised authority.  
Against this background, the institutional solutions chosen to guarantee 
stringent coordination without full delegation has consisted of “using rules when 
institutional bodies at the supranational level are unattainable due to preference 
                                                          
2 Throughout the study, the continuous tension existing between rules and political discretion/flexibility 
underpinned by the hybrid governance arrangements chosen to coordinate decentralised fiscal policies 
will be a central theme of inquiry. To dramatically simplify this complex hiatus, it does not seem 
inappropriate to claim that political discretion has largely prevailed over rules, even under the new 
coordination regime that is supposedly geared toward sanctions’ automaticity in cases of non-
compliance, but that in the practice is still governed by hard bargaining practices and political discretion 
in rules’ implementation (see Hallerberg et al. 2011; Dunlop and Radaelli 2016; Boggero and Annicchino 
2014 on the Italian case). 
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heterogeneity and contentious advantages of centralisation” (Heipertz and 
Verdun 2010, p. 203). Noticeably, the presence of such explicit enforcement 
and sanctioning mechanisms makes these regimes unique within the broad 
institutional landscape of EU integration (ibid., p. 101), further increasing the 
salience and degree of scholarly interest toward these hybrid governance 
frameworks. 
 
1.2 Three policy coordination regimes (and four case studies) 
 
So far, at least three distinct fiscal policy coordination regimes have emerged 
and are analysed in depth in this thesis. The necessity of coordinating national 
fiscal policies via a set of multilaterally monitored rules and parameters first 
surfaced during the negotiations for Maastricht and materialized in the so-called 
fiscal criteria of Stage II of EMU convergence process. The “fiscal side” of EMU 
convergence process is hence the first coordination regime/case study tackled 
by my investigation. Back then, the rationale for coordinating budgetary policies 
strongly drew on the paradigm of “sound money” that underpinned the whole 
EMU project (see, inter alia, McNamara 1998 and Chapter 4 of this study) and 
on the pervasive policy and economic interdependences that were foreseen to 
be prompted by monetary unification. In short, in order to facilitate the new 
central bank in the pursuit of neutral monetary policies meant to support non-
inflationary economic growth, the EMU paradigm foresaw a very limited role for 
domestic fiscal discretion (in line with a German economic policy making 
paradigm that strongly rejects the “typical pitfalls of discretionary fiscal policy” - 
Buti and Van den Noort 2004, p. 5).  
Building upon concepts such as the benefits of “tying governments’ hands”, the 
need to “keep the fiscal houses in order” and the advantages of vincolo esterno 
(see Schelkle 2006 for a retrospective review of these concepts), deficit-biased 
budgetary policies (which were commonplace in a number of EMU candidates) 
were seen as a serious source of disturbance for the sound conduct of 
monetary policy and of potential negative externalities and asymmetric shocks 
within the currency union. With the aim of internalising those potential negative 
spillovers, but also to test the capacity of EMU candidates to steadily pursue 
sound economic policies, Maastricht signatories built, under Stage II of the 
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convergence process, a temporary, transitional rule-based coordination regime 
for fiscal policies (namely, the fiscal criteria of EMU convergence process) and 
made EMU membership conditional on compliance with the rules of such a 
policy regime.3 
Stage II of EMU convergence process, as a result, witnessed one of the largest 
and fastest exercises in supranational fiscal retrenchment and macroeconomic 
convergence ever experienced after World War II (Freitag and Sciarini 2001; 
Fatás and Mihov 2003; Briotti 2004), and in 1997 led to the landmark decision 
to move to the final Stage of EMU convergence process, i.e. the adoption of the 
common European currency by eleven Member States starting from January 
1999. 
With the full integration of monetary policy and the creation of the ECB, the 
need for fiscal policy coordination proved even more acute as early signs of 
“consolidation fatigue” started to emerge (Fatás and Mihov 2003) and the threat 
of exclusion from the Euro club could not function anymore as disciplining 
device (Hughes Hallett and Hougaard Jensen 2012). Moreover, having closed 
the monetary/currency stabilisation channel, EMU brought fiscal policies to the 
fore as a key leverage of macroeconomic adjustment/stabilisation and a crucial 
arena of domestic and supranational political bargaining. In order to guarantee 
that fiscal policies were really regarded as a matter of common concern also 
after the establishment of the monetary union and conducted in a prudent way 
so to avoid undue pressures on the new-born ECB, EMU decision makers 
negotiated and agreed on a new arrangement for the coordination of budgetary 
policies. This new arrangement crystallised the transitional fiscal provisions of 
the Maastricht treaty into binding, secondary EU legislation, that is, into the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The coordination regime based on the SGP 
hence represents the second case study analysed in my thesis. 
The SGP was reviewed in 2005 due to an acute compliance crisis and survived 
until 2010, when the effects of the financial and sovereign debt crisis led to a 
substantial overhaul of the key tenets, overall paradigm and governance 
                                                          
3 Such a high-stake experiment in economic integration and sovereignty’s pooling was carefully 
regulated in the transitional provisions of the TEU that set up a conditional process of economic and 
policy convergence based on Member States’ gradually compliance with a set of criteria and 
benchmarks. 
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architecture of EMU (Ioannou et al. 2015). The last two cases investigated in 
my thesis revolve around the hectic process of policy change undergone by 
EMU as a result of the financial and sovereign debt crises. In particular, I put 
forth an argument whereby the policy and regime change originally spawned by 
the Greek quasi-default of 2010 can be understood and analysed as a two-
pronged process: in the short term, under the extreme existential pressure of a 
potential sovereign default, key EMU decision makers found themselves 
groping in the dark (Jones 2010a; Van Esch and Swinkels 2015) and enacted 
fast-brushed policy change as an adaptive contingent strategy. Lacking time to 
engage in reflexive paradigmatic learning and change, these actors made a 
virtue out of necessity and accidentally saved the euro area (Kamkhaji and 
Radaelli 2016). Once the markets were reassured of the steadfast backing of 
EMU to its imperilled Member States, a more canonical process of policy 
change took place whereby the paradigmatic overhaul enacted in 2010 was 
anchored and locked in through the creation of a full-blown new regime of 
economic policy coordination (Schwarzer 2012 and 2015). This latter process is 
the object of my fourth and final case study.  
Table 1.1 below details the case studies/regimes tackled in the remainder of the 
study and their temporal scope. 
 
Table 1.1 Case studies within EMU-based fiscal policy coordination 
Case study Temporal scope 
Stage II of EMU convergence process 1994-1998 
Stability and Growth Pact 1999-2007 
Abeyance, crisis and contingent 
paradigmatic change 
2008-2010 
A season of policy change: the construction 
of a new paradigm 
2010-2013 
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1.3 Research design 
 
1.3a Gaps in the literature, original contribution and motivation 
 
At present, scholars interested in EMU, and in economic and fiscal policy 
coordination specifically, have provided numerous and fairly different causal 
accounts of the genesis and design features of the TEU, the SGP and the new 
coordination framework that arose in response to the sovereign debt crisis. In 
other words, a great deal of scholarly contributions have addressed the 
negotiation stages leading to the establishment of EMU and the various policy 
coordination regimes that have gradually emerged since 1993 under its 
umbrella (Dyson 1994 and 2000; McNamara 1998; Dyson and Featherstone 
1999; Hosli 2000 and 2008; Verdun 2002; Heipertz and Verdun 2004, 2005 and 
2010; Sadeh and Verdun 2009; Buti and Carnot 2012; Salines et al. 2012; 
Kamkhaji and Radaelli 2013; Menz and Smith 2013; Ioannou et al. 2015). 
When they have looked at the implementation and sustainability of these 
regimes, scholars have mainly dealt with the domestic level of analysis tackling 
primarily two sets of research questions: What kind of impact, if any, has the 
EMU macroeconomic framework had on the conduct of national fiscal policies 
and on their outcomes (Artis and Buti 2000; Freitag and Sciarini 2001; Fatás 
and Mihov 2003 and 2010; Heipertz 2003; De Haan et al. 2004; Annett 2006; 
Enderlein 2006; Hughes Hallett and Lewis 2008; Fonseca Marinheiro 2008)?; 
and, are single European member states endowed with sufficient incentives, 
capacity, appropriate rules and institutions, and compatible economic and 
political fundamentals to comply with the rule-based regimes devised at the 
supranational level (Jones et al. 1998; Dyson 2002; Buti and Pench 2004; Buti 
and van den Noord 2004; Hallerberg 2004; Ardy et al. 2005; Hallerberg et al. 
2007 and 2009; Blavoukos and Pagoulatos 2008; Von Hagen 2010)?  
In sum, the main strands of the literature have so far investigated the “EMU 
effect” on the one hand, and the “goodness of fit” on the other hand, but always 
with a marked focus on the national/domestic level of analysis and presuming 
opportunistic and strategic compliance with fiscal rules as a baseline. Scholarly 
efforts focused on and aimed at gauging the independent impact of collective 
action problems under supranational coordination regimes have in turn been 
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less numerous (Savage 2001; Collignon 2004; Pisani-Ferry 2006; Schelkle 
2006; McNamara 2006; Heipertz and Verdun 2005 and 2010). 
My study seeks to overcome the limitations, in terms of foci and levels of 
analysis, of the prevailing literature on EMU-based fiscal policy coordination. My 
investigation broadly contributes to theory-building in this field but from a 
different perspective: in fact, it explicitly engages with the supranational level of 
analysis by focusing on the iterated interactions among actors (and collective 
action thereof) taking place in the process of implementation and change of the 
various regimes that progressively emerged for fiscal policy coordination. The 
argument supporting this specific focus is that the creation of disciplinarian, 
rule-based regimes based both on soft law means - peer pressure and 
multilateral oversight - and binding legal obligations to coordinate decentralised 
policies determined the emergence of a collective and supranational interactive 
dimension that cannot be ignored as an explanatory driver of the regimes’ 
outcomes, stability and change.  
Furthermore, the objectively complex nature of the process of implementation of 
these regimes, involving policy dialogue, regular exchange of data, formal and 
informal monitoring, peer pressure, potential sanctions, exposure to the 
public/media sphere (Meyer 2004), etc., arguably prompted a socialization of 
domestic fiscal policies by creating a collective governance system (MArcussen 
2000; Heipertz and Verdun 2004; Howarth 2004) where networked actors 
(Member States, supranational institutions, epistemic communities, domestic 
actors) both power and puzzle (Heclo 1974), or behave strategically and 
engage in collective problem solving/learning at the same time. As a result, a 
distinct focus on supranational collective action and interactive problem solving 
as explanatory drivers is seen as both necessary and original.  
Further, acknowledging early on that these motives are relevant, but that they 
coexist with more power-based ones, also serves the purpose of stressing that 
in seeking for explanations that can account for the heterogeneous and erratic 
record of the regimes for fiscal policy coordination observed since 1994, I do not 
want to underestimate the importance of domestic-level and strategic 
explanations detected in the studies mentioned above. Nevertheless, a policy 
learning/puzzling perspective focused on the supranational interactive 
dimension of regime implementation is suited to provide a more comprehensive, 
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parsimonious and externally valid account, while integrating other equally valid 
explanatory interpretations. This is mainly because tackling the puzzle of fiscal 
policy coordination through the domestic perspective of almost 20 EMU 
Member States would unavoidably lead to the idiosyncrasies of the different 
national political systems, posing concerns about external validity of such 
explanatory variables.4 The advantage of my approach with respect to country 
studies is that it is parsimonious, does not rely only on the specificities of the 
different national political systems, and hence can complement extant 
scholarship by shedding light on the collective problem solving dimension of 
fiscal policy coordination and not only on the strategic one. 
As aforementioned, in light of the fact that accounts concentrating on the 
powering and bargaining dimensions of fiscal policy coordination (while largely 
underplaying the puzzling one) and on the domestic factors influencing its 
outcomes are certainly not lacking in the literature, the distinctive analytical 
focus of my investigation is posed on the supranational interactive and problem 
solving dimension of fiscal policy coordination regimes. As a result of this focus, 
I further maintain that employing a learning and puzzling-informed analytical 
perspective centred on the policy interactions taking place at the supranational 
level in the context of regimes’ implementation and change can improve and 
enrich our understanding of the dynamics of EMU and coordination regimes and 
also provide a fresh contribution to the most recent debates on the future of EU 
integration after the crisis (Ioannou et al. 2015; Jones et al. 2016 – see 
conclusive chapter).  
 
1.3b Theoretical framework 
 
The theoretical infrastructure to which I resort to implement my distinctive 
approach and analyse policy making, implementation and change in fiscal 
policy coordination regimes is that of modes of policy learning (Dunlop and 
Radaelli 2013 and 2017). 
                                                          
4 “[…] country studies allow a nuanced look at specific forces and interests that gave birth to EMU and 
help sustain it, but their weakness is of course their external validity” (Sadeh and Verdun 2009, p. 288). 
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Although policy learning belongs authoritatively to the European integration 
theory mosaic (Radaelli and Dunlop 2013; Zito and Schout 2009) and although 
some authors have gone as far as defining the EU as a learning organization 
(ibid.), policy learning has not yet been properly exploited to address cases of 
“high-politics” of E(M)U policy making (Niemann and Ioannou 2015, p. 197), like 
fiscal policy coordination. As far as I am aware, no study has focused on the 
supranational interactive dimension of hard policy coordination regimes by 
explicitly resorting to the construct of policy learning as an overarching 
theoretical lens.5 Learning theories have been customarily applied to lower 
order policy domains and to governance arrangements typically governed by 
soft rules and voluntary agreements but not to “high stakes” policy realms. As a 
result, while little or no attention has been devoted to the puzzling dimension of 
hard policy coordination, learning has been and still is one of the key motives of 
the literature on voluntary and soft instruments of coordination like the Open 
Method of Coordination (Radaelli 2008; Sabel and Zeitlin 2008). This is perhaps 
due to the conventional idea that compliance to supranational hard rules in 
quasi-hierarchical settings is strongly driven by the logic of interstate bargaining 
and distributive conflict (Schelkle 2006).6  
My analytical approach does not want to underrate this important and strongly 
empirically corroborated insight, but to complement it with a puzzling-informed 
ontology. Although they do not belong to an analytical perspective based on 
policy learning and they do not necessarily focus on EMU, a number of 
authoritative studies on EU integration (Jupille et al. 2003; Heipertz and Verdun 
2005 and 2010; Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2012; Jones et al. 2016) have 
highlighted and proved that a variety of causal forces and motives 
systematically overlap in the explanation of EU integration outcomes. This 
stance not only fully chimes with the idea that EU studies are underpinned by 
the resort to a mosaic of theoretical positions that are capable of explaining, 
from different angles, complex aspects and outcomes of EU integration, but 
also implies that different theoretical frameworks and causal mechanisms are 
                                                          
5 For two exceptions see Schwarzer (2015) and Dunlop and Radaelli (2016).  
6 In more general terms, i.e. outside the scope of EU studies, the collective puzzling nature of 
supranational/international coordination regimes, most of all in the realm of hierarchic and quasi-
hierarchic settings with disjunct preferences and high potential for distributive conflict, also represents 
an understudied area in the International Political Economy tradition. This work aims to fill that gap, 
besides contributing empirically to the scholarships of policy learning and EU political economy. 
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often complementary, rather than rivals, in explaining EU integration 
(Schimmelfennig 2014a) and public policy outcomes in general (Cairney and 
Heikkila 2014).  
Much of the meta-theoretical debate on the EU has so far focused on its 
presumed unicity as a case of supranational integration or sui generis 
international organization. This debate has in turn spawned case-specific 
puzzles, research designs and ad-hoc theory building. Although strongly 
guarded by several somewhat partisan scholars, the grand-theories of EU 
integration (liberal intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism and their numerous 
variations) are by design incapable of wholly accounting for a multi-faceted 
phenomenon like EU integration (Wiener and Diez 2009). While it is often the 
case that in a specific empirical context one logic of EU integration carries more 
explanatory weight than the other, arguing for exclusive explanatory leverage is 
hard, even within in-depth, individual case studies. Even phenomena/outcomes 
that are confidently established as following or another logic of integration, if 
seen outside of that theoretical perspective, seem to include traits predicted by 
the (supposedly) rival explanatory infrastructure. For instance, in the thorough 
study of EMU genesis conducted by Kathleen McNamara (1998), ideational, 
functional and intergovernmental explanations ecologically co-exist in providing 
a convincing account of the different aspects of EMU (although ideational 
convergence seems to prevail as the causal driver).  
With specific regard to fiscal policy coordination, Heipertz and Verdun (2010) 
employ both mainstream theories of EU integration (intergovernmentalism and 
neo-functionalism) and two of their most popular variations (domestic politics 
and ideational approaches) to tackle the politics of the SGP. Their key finding is 
that all of these four lenses are able to make sense of certain outcomes, while 
they are silent on others. In practice, the four lenses complement each other 
and can offer a satisfactory overall explanation only inasmuch they are taken 
together (p. 196).  
To provide another important and fitting example, the institutional overhaul 
prompted by the financial and sovereign debt crisis has been interpreted, with 
arguably equally compelling arguments, as a resurrection of the 
intergovernmental logic of integration (Schimmelfennig 2014a and 2015), the 
beginning of a new intergorvernmentalism characterised by integration without 
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supranationalism (Bickerton et al. 2015), an example of the Commission’s task 
expansion (Bauer and Becker 2014) and a case of increased integration 
through spillover effects (Niemann and Ioannou 2015). Banal as it may seem, 
none of these accounts are factually or empirically wrong, but neither do any 
carry exclusive explanatory leverage on the same observed outcome. They are 
simply complementary and at times mutually reinforcing vis-à-vis the 
explanation of multi-faceted and complex policy outcomes. Jones et al. (2016) 
have grasped this aspect and coined the “failing forward” argument that 
dynamically intertwine intergovernmental and functional causation (see the 
conclusive chapter for a discussion of their argument in relation to the findings 
of this thesis).   
Put more generally, “cases are always too complicated to vindicate a single 
theory” (Evans 1995, p. 4). This insight does not just call for a resort to multiple 
theoretical approaches in tackling a case study with explanatory purposes, but 
crucially it implies the idea that causation processes and mechanisms can also 
be multiple and mutually reinforcing: “processes are multiple, not singular. In 
fact, there are multiple types of processes that can play a role in generating an 
outcome.” (Waldner 2012, pp. 80-81; original emphasis). As we shall see in the 
following section, this vision is essential in motivating the use of modes of 
learning as complementary, non-mutually exclusive causal mechanisms of the 
outcomes of supranational fiscal policy coordination under EMU.7  
As a result, I infer that an assortment of analytical lenses informed by 
theoretical eclecticism can (and should) be employed to unearth the empirical 
puzzles stemming from EMU and provide a more compelling overall explanatory 
picture. By resorting to modes of policy learning as theoretical explanatory 
devices (and to policy learning as a stand-alone ontology of the policy process – 
see below), I seek to demonstrate two points. First, that learning is also at work 
and carries causal and explanatory power in more controversial, bargain-driven 
fields such as that of fiscal policy coordination and its implementation; second, 
                                                          
7 My own causal mechanisms (modes of policy learning) are admittedly non-exclusive and are thought to 
belong to a broader set of causal explanations and mechanisms that are complementary and not rivals. 
This digression about my understanding of causation is also meant to clarify that my theorized causal 
mechanisms (modes of policy learning) are far from being all-encompassing and all-explanatory. For 
instance, in my study domestic factors are largely set aside for the sake of theoretical parsimony, but my 
own explanatory accounts do not rule them out, they simply integrate them from a different analytical 
angle. See the next section for a more detailed discussion of these points. 
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that systematically gauging learning-based implications on policy processes and 
outcomes can enrich the set of causal accounts of EMU and fiscal policy 
coordination outcomes.8 To this end, modes of policy learning will be 
conceptualised and employed as self-contained causal mechanisms – as the 
following section will elucidate. 
 
1.3c Analytical framework 
 
To sum up the previously presented arguments, the analytical lenses of my 
investigation are modes of policy learning (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013 and 
2017). As the empirical manifestation of one of these modes is considered to be 
contingent on the nature and features of the regimes whereby they are at work 
(ibid.; Falleti and Lynch 2009; Heikkila and Gerlak 2013), they represent 
epistemological keys aimed at causally connecting a certain policy outcome (the 
dependent variable – Y) to the particular features of the policy regime (the 
independent variable – X) whereby the outcome occurs. From both a theoretical 
and methodological point of view, I rely on process-tracing scholarship (Beach 
and Pedersen 2013; Bennett and Checkel 2014) to inform the construction of 
my analytical framework and to empirically investigate the case studies of EMU 
regimes of fiscal policy coordination – employing modes of learning as causal 
mechanisms (Falleti and Lynch 2009; Dunlop and Radaelli 2017).  
 
This view on learning is in line with the position of Heikkila and Gerlak (2013, 
pp. 486-491) who interpret policy learning as a process including different 
successive and interlocked components/phases that are suited to bring about 
specific products: “the phases of the process can be understood as the 
mechanisms for the products of learning because it is though these phases that 
learning products [outcomes] are activated” (ibid., p. 487, emphasis added). 
The resulting empirical strategy for tackling the case studies hence includes two 
stages. First, I seek to identify what mode of learning (i.e. causal mechanism) is 
at work within a given regime; and second, I appraise whether and how it 
                                                          
8 Moreover, learning mechanisms, considered under an actor-centered perspective (see the measuring 
instrument described below and developed in Chapters 2 and 3) are robust, consistent and explanatory 
even within more conflictual policy interactions and hard rule-based regimes, whereas learning is 
normally thought of as invariably cooperative (Dunlop and Radaelli 2017). 
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causally impacts on the policy processes and outcomes (see the following sub-
sections for a more detailed discussion). 
 
Beyond this epistemological position, in light of the pervasiveness and 
hypothesised explanatory relevance of the interactive and problem-solving 
dimensions that characterise the regimes for fiscal policy coordination under 
EMU, my thesis relies on the overarching construct of learning as an ontology of 
policy making and on modes of policy learning as analytical 
lenses/epistemological instruments to be applied to the policy process.  
The starting point of my theoretical reflection is that the puzzling and learning 
dimensions inherent to policy interactions are not just potentially suited to inform 
and influence the process of policy making (and its outcomes) but also 
represent one of its ontologies. This is even truer in the context of empirical 
domains characterised by actors’ dense and iterated policy interactions 
explicitly devoted to cooperatively solving a collective action problem, such as 
the case of EMU self-disciplinarian regimes of fiscal policy coordination. To 
quote Dunlop and Radaelli’s approach to the micro-foundations of learning 
(2017, p. 6), “within learning as framework, Homo discentis – the learning, 
studying and practicing person – is at the heart of all policy-making. No matter 
what policy environment we operate in, what our role or standpoint, whether we 
work alone or in a collective, learning is the governing dynamic of our activities. 
Learning is how people make sense of the world”. 
 
Learning in policy making is therefore conceptualised as a collective interactive 
process (that is, a collective process which takes place through communicative 
interaction – Stern 1997, p. 70) occurring among policy actors/stakeholders 
embedded in formal or informal institutional frameworks whereby knowledge is 
acquired, accumulated, exchanged, and processed, prompting an update or 
change in the beliefs of the actors involved and possibly a change in their 
behaviour and policy outcomes thereof. In line with Dunlop and Radaelli (2017) 
and with Dunlop (2009, pp. 296-297), I also maintain that “…while policy 
change can be the effect of learning, learning can be present when outcomes 
appear to remain stable and not alter at all.” Hence, according to the ontological 
perspective, in every domain of policy making and in every policy process and 
interaction, new knowledge is always created by and diffused among actors. 
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The creation and exchange of knowledge spawned by policy interactions, in 
turn, is not an extrinsic feature of the policy process but an immanent one. 
Building upon Dunlop, learning takes place systematically, regardless of its 
causal effect on the policy process.9 According to this vision, the presence of 
learning processes ceases to be an epistemological puzzle and becomes an 
overarching, pervasive characteristic of policy making, an ontology that 
complements the classic power-based understanding of politics and political 
science as a study of power in society (Lasswell 1950). This reasoning is far 
from being ground-breaking, as it is broadly drawn from Heclo’s (1974) seminal 
understanding of politics as powering and puzzling on society’s behalf.  
 
The difference of my approach lies in the fact that it scales up the puzzling (and 
learning thereof) dimension to a full-blown ontology of politics, which is seen as 
complementary (rather than alternative) and intertwined with the power 
dimension.10 In this way, the classic epistemological question about the 
presence of learning in a given empirical domain (see May 1992 as a prominent 
example of this epistemological thinking) loses relevance, as some form of 
learning is inherent to every policy process. Given this ontology, the novel 
epistemological questions about learning do not revolve around its presence, 
but rather around its nature and causal influence. In other words, under this 
novel approach, one shall ask “what mode of learning did take place and to 
what effect?” Modes of policy learning - defined as the different ways in which 
new knowledge is accumulated, processed, disseminated, and finally used in 
the policy making process – therefore become epistemologies whose 
typological classification and effects are subject to empirical testing.  
 
To summarize and proceed, I intend to build upon the ontological insight that all 
interactive policy processes are characterised by a learning dimension that can 
be investigated empirically resorting to case-specific modes of learning, which 
are in turn contingent on actors, institutional conditions and on the (dialectic) 
interplay of these analytical dimensions – that is, broadly speaking, on the 
“context” (Falleti and Lynch 2009) within which the different modes manifest 
                                                          
9 In other words, each policy process involving dense and iterated interactions of actors is characterised 
by an implicit learning dimension, regardless of its causal/explanatory influence. 
10 See Chapter 2 for an in depth discussion of these points. 
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themselves. Based on this premise, modes of policy learning are therefore 
considered as epistemological typologies/categories that allow systematizing 
agent-based and structural features of a policy process within a single coherent 
construct11 that works as a causal mechanism - as intended in process-tracing 
methodologies.12 
The conceptualisation of modes of policy learning as theoretical causal 
mechanisms represents the central tenet of my research design and 
methodological approach toward the investigation of regimes of fiscal policy 
coordination under EMU. In fact, modes of policy learning are the theoretical 
causal mechanisms that I hypothesize work as casual connectors between the 
independent variable X (iterated regime-specific policy interactions within self-
disciplinarian cooperative arrangements aimed at solving a collective action 
problem) and the dependent variable Y (outcomes of policy coordination that 
are informed by puzzling/learning dynamics). This is strongly in line with the 
prescriptions of process-tracing methodologies, most of all its theory-driven 
typologies (Beach and Pedersen 2013, pp. 34 and 56). Understanding and 
employing modes of policy learning as causal mechanisms also implies the idea 
that each mode of learning is characterised by a series of concatenated 
analytical components whose empirical variation (in terms of scope conditions) 
substantiates different case-specific modes of learning. 
Causal mechanisms have been defined in many different ways. I resort to the 
pragmatic and reductionist approach of Beach and Pedersen (2013) that is 
geared toward understanding causal mechanisms as epistemological devices to 
be employed in the context of case study investigations analysed through 
process-tracing. In this light, a causal mechanism can be parsimoniously 
defined as “a complex system, which produces an outcome by the interaction of 
a number of parts” (Glennan 1996, p. 52) or, similarly, as “a set of interacting 
parts – an assembly of elements producing an effect not inherent in any one of 
them” (Hernes 1998, p. 78).  
                                                          
11 Modes of policy learning stem from regime-specific conditions and impinge on their process of 
implementation and outcomes (including policy change). In other words, in my view, modes of learning 
are both contingent on the policy process (that is, on the interaction of actors in their specific 
institutional framework) and influences it and its outcomes.  
12 “Methodological approaches that use the tools of process tracing […] may also be employed to 
identify how the phases unfold [and] their interrelationships” (Heikkila and Gerlak 2103, p. 502).  
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In particular, modes of policy learning are intended as mechanisms whereby 
variously certified and organized learning actors (part/analytical dimension 1) 
face and tackle differently tractable policy problems (2) within various typologies 
of venues of interactions (3) across different time-frames (4) and influence, as a 
result of this causal sequence, the observed outcomes (5). The figure below 
provides a graphic visualization of the hypothesized mechanism of causation. 
 
Figure 1.1 Modes of learning as causal mechanisms 
 
 
My ontological stance superimposes that one case-specific mechanism/mode of 
policy learning is immanently underlying every regime-specific set of policy 
interactions (regardless of its explanatory influence on outcomes), whereas 
process-tracing scholarship does not share such an ontological underpinning 
(“in theory-testing process-tracing, a causal mechanism is hypothesized to be 
present in a population of cases of a phenomenon” – Beach and Pedersen 
2013, p. 11). Nonetheless, my own understanding of modes of policy learning 
as depicted above fits fairly well with the indication of intending and 
conceptualising causal mechanisms as composed by interlocked 
parts/components whose joint presence activates the mechanism and transmits 
causal force to the outcome. Moreover, as noted by a prominent and recent re-
conceptualisation of policy learning, “if interested in zooming in on the ways in 
which learning processes lead to learning products, scholars may need to 
undertake process-based research” (Heikkila and Gerlak 2013, p. 502).  
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From the operational point of view, the empirical variations observed within 
these analytical components/parts of modes of policy learning inform us about 
the specific modality of learning at play in a given set of regime-specific policy 
interactions. The third chapter of this thesis is specifically devoted to review the 
literature on modes of policy learning in order to systematically unpack these 
shared analytical components and pin down for each modality its specific scope 
conditions/expected empirical manifestations (Beach and Pedersen 2013, p. 33) 
– i.e. the empirical value that each of the dimensions of variation needs to take 
to substantiate one mode or another. 
Slightly anticipating and summarizing the analysis of Chapters 2 and 3, drawing 
on a recent systematization of the policy learning literature based on a meta-
analysis of the scholarly contributions on the topic produced up to 2011 (Dunlop 
and Radaelli 2013), four major modes of learning have been detected: 
1) Reflexive social learning; 
2) Epistemic learning; 
3) Learning via bargaining; 
4) Learning in the shadow of hierarchy. 
According to Dunlop and Radaelli, these modalities are explanatory devices that 
can be applied to and tested against different sets of empirical policy 
interactions; in other words, they are lenses to be applied to the policy process. 
In Dunlop and Radaelli’s systematisation, these modes of learning are 
organised according to an explanatory typology featuring two dimensions: 
actors’ certification and problem tractability. Capturing the variation of these two 
dimensions for each mode of learning is useful to reduce complexity and come 
up with a categorical systematisation of modes of learning – See Table 1.2 
below. 
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Table 1.2 Modes of policy learning 
 
Source: Dunlop and Radaelli 2013, p. 603 
 
Namely, the two analytical dimensions constituting the explanatory typology 
answer the questions: “Who learns/who teaches?”13 and “What is learned?”. 
Nonetheless, as recognised by the authors, these two components are a 
parsimonious selection of analytical dimensions of variation of modes of 
learning. My own framework builds upon Dunlop and Radaelli’s explanatory 
typology and enlarges it by adding further analytical dimensions (i.e. 
components/parts of modes of learning intended as causal mechanisms – See 
Table 3 below) drawn from the review of the scholarly contributions focused on 
individual modes of learning in action. Once having derived in this inductive way 
a set of analytical components that are relevant to qualify different modes of 
learning, a “policy learning measuring instrument” is constructed with the aim of 
setting out the specific empirical scope conditions for each different mode of 
learning to be typified in an empirical setting, fully implementing the following 
methodological indication: “Th[e] theorized causal mechanism needs to be 
operationalized, translating theoretical expectations into case-specific 
predictions of what observable manifestations each of the parts of the 
mechanism should have if the mechanism is present in the case […] we draw 
on existing empirical work to make case-specific empirical predictions about 
                                                          
13 Actors’ certification is clearly dependent on the way actors are hierarchically located within the 
institutional framework in which the policy interaction takes place. This dimension of agency, as will be 
clarified in Chapter 3, is more usefully subsumed within the construct of “actor constellation”. 
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what evidence we should see if the theory is valid” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 
p. 14). 
 
Although this approach does not possess the quality of parsimony of 2X2 
explanatory typologies, it better lends itself to an in-depth, within-case empirical 
analysis, typical of and indispensable for a theory-testing process-tracing 
investigation and its stepwise empirical analysis of the scope 
conditions/expected empirical manifestations of each part of the hypothesized 
causal mechanism.14  
 
The measuring instrument hence relies on the causal mechanisms depicted in 
Figure 1.1 and builds upon the following set of analytical 
dimensions/components of modes of learning (remember that for each mode of 
learning specific scope conditions, i.e. answers to the following questions, are 
derived – see Table 3.3 – constituting the measuring instrument). 
 
Table 1.3 Analytical dimensions of variation of the “Policy Learning Measuring 
Instrument” 
1. Variously certified and organized learning actors… 
Who learns? And who teaches?  Who are the learning actors, which is their certification and 
role in the learning process? How is the actor constellation shaped? What is the prevalent 
mode of interaction among actors? 
2… tackle differently tractable policy problems…  
What is learned?  What is the tractability of the problems faced in the policy interaction? 
What is the aim of learning? And, what is the content?15 
                                                          
14 The overall objective of my theory-building effort and one of the key theoretical contributions that my 
research seeks to accomplish is to come up with a systematic template (the “policy learning measuring 
instrument”) setting forth key analytical components and mode-specific scope conditions related to 
different modes of policy learning. From the operational point of view, the measuring instrument allows 
the empirical cases to be qualified, but the scope of its application is potentially larger. The 
systematization of scope conditions for modes of policy learning (both structural and agent-based) in a 
single framework results in fact in a tool meant to address empirical analysis. Hopefully such a tool could 
also inform future research in the field, somehow easing the difficulties posed by the measurement of 
learning. 
15 This latter category can be extremely varied, spanning from new ideational repertoires and paradigms 
to technical knowledge, instrumental competences, increased strategic sophistication, etc. 
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3… within various typologies of venues of interactions…  
Where does learning take place? What is the venue and mode of interaction among actors? 
Is it formal (hierarchically organized) or informal (horizontal and deliberative)? 
4...across different time-frames… 
When does learning take place? Are the interactions one-shot or iterated? How frequent 
and formalized are the iterations of the interactions? How much time is given to the actors 
to engage in the learning process? 
5…and influence, as a result of this causal sequence, the observed outcomes.  
What are the observable empirical implications of different modes of learning on the policy 
process and outcomes? 
 
The last analytical component of the “policy learning measuring instrument” 
directly hinges on the causal influence of different modes of learning on the 
policy outcomes. In fact, each mode of learning, besides common variable 
analytical components/parts, is also characterised by a set of mode-specific 
expected observable implications on the policy outcomes. These observable 
implications, like the mode-specific scope conditions of the above presented 
analytical dimensions, are also inductively derived from the review of the 
literature and serve the essential purpose of working as mode-specific 
hypotheses that are to be tested (again in terms of presence/absence) in the 
empirical analysis in order to verify the actual explanatory/causal influence of 
modes of learning on policy outcomes. In other words, the final step of my 
theorization involves drawing again on the literature to infer mode-specific 
empirical implications for each of the four typologies of learning, so to test them 
when analysing the case studies: “the empirical analysis proceeds stepwise, 
testing [at the outset] whether evidence indicates that each part of the 
mechanism was present [and then] whether the expected case-specific 
impactions of its existence are present in a case” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 
pp. 14-15). The final part of each case study analysis will be hence devoted to 
evaluating the goodness of fit between the theoretical expectations and 
observed outcomes: “…the deductive theory-testing side of process tracing 
examines the observable implications of hypothesized causal mechanisms 
within a case to test whether a theory on these mechanisms explains the case” 
(Bennett and Checkel 2014, pp. 7-8). 
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Before moving to operational issues, and in the light of the arguments put forth 
in the last two sub-sections, it is worth briefly summarizing the set of original 
contributions that this thesis seeks to achieve. They are mainly six. The first 
three are at the theoretical level, while the second three are at the empirical 
one.  
First is the conceptual shift that envisions learning as an immanent trait of policy 
making alongside (and not in opposition to) classical power-based ontologies. 
Second is, building upon such a conceptual shift, the change in the 
epistemological posture that requires not (only) to verify empirically the 
presence of learning, but to qualify its mode/typology. Third is the construction 
of a systematic measuring instrument that interprets different modes of learning 
as distinct causal mechanisms and that allows the singling out of: the analytical 
dimensions of variation of modes of policy learning, their mode-specific scope 
conditions and a set of expected empirical implications on policy outcomes 
linked to different modes of learning. 
From the empirical point of view, the key contributions are the following. First, 
the focus on the interactive and learning dimensions of EMU-based fiscal policy 
coordination allows for new empirical findings that complement and enrich 
existing scholarship. Second my learning-informed explanations depart from 
two key misconceptions that affect the current debate on the effects of policy 
learning: the one that posits that the occurrence of learning implications is 
systematically connected to policy change and the one that interprets learning-
informed outcomes as unequivocally functional to policy making. With regard to 
this latter point, one of the key findings and arguments of this thesis is that the 
effects of learning, most of all when they manifest themselves as a by-product 
of hierarchical or strategic policy interactions, have the potential to be 
dysfunctional and to strengthen negative dynamics that can potentially lead to 
policy failure. As we shall see in Chapter 5, this perverse effect of learning has 
arguably occurred in the context of the implementation of the SGP. Third, the 
empirical findings about the influence of learning in EU and EMU policy making 
have the potential to open a fruitful conversation with mainstream integration 
theories and, also in light of the agnostic take on the functionality of learning 
causal effects and on the openness to multiple causation, to appraise how 
different modes of learning intervene in strengthening or weakening one or 
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another logic of integration and their outcomes. 
 
1.3d Methodology, empirical sources and logic of inference 
 
From the operational point of view, each empirical case study is analysed 
through a two-pronged theory-testing process-tracing methodology. In the first 
step, the case-specific scope conditions of each analytical component of modes 
of policy learning are traced in order to adjudicate the case/regime to a given 
mode of learning. This operation is stepwise16 and practically based upon the 
inductive detection of the observable implications derived in the “policy learning 
measuring instrument” for each analytical component within each mode of 
learning. The second step involves verifying whether the expected implications 
on the policy outcome relative to the detected, case-specific mode of learning 
have been borne out empirically, so to evaluate the influence of the causal 
mechanism on the policy outcomes. Importantly, I draw on the literature review 
to ex-ante assign a number of expected empirical manifestations to each causal 
mechanism/mode of learning, thereby limiting the risks of confirmation bias and 
storytelling typically related to theory-testing process-tracing (Schimmelfennig 
2014b).  
Drawing again on process-tracing scholarship and best practice, the selection of 
empirical sources for the sake of theory-testing needs to be theory-driven. I 
therefore adhere to evidentiary and sources’ eclecticism to verify the 
manifestations of mode-specific expected implications - both in terms of scope 
conditions of each component of the causal mechanisms and of the theoretical 
implications of modes of learning on policy outcomes. This is because “the 
evidence necessary to test whether the different parts [of a mechanism] are 
present can be very different, making evidence for the parts noncomparable 
with each other” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, p. 14). As a result, “different types 
of evidence are gathered, depending on what is best suited to enable us to 
update our confidence in the presence/absence of a mechanism” (ibid., p. 33). 
                                                          
16 “Process-tracing case studies should […] usually be presented as a stepwise test of each part of the 
causal mechanism” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, p. 5). “The researcher looks for a series of theoretically 
predicted intermediate steps” (Checkel 2008, p. 363). 
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In particular, since the mode-specific observable implications stemming from 
the four modes of learning causally impinge on different aspects of the 
observed policy regimes, the thesis employs a mix of functional empirical 
sources to come up with a rigorous testing of each causal mechanisms’ 
implications. For instance, the first analysed regime (Stage II of EMU) is 
characterised as a case of learning “in the shadow of hierarchy”. The main 
implications of the highly regulated and formal policy interactions typical of 
hierarchic learning relate to the emergence of instrumental learning, that is, to 
the compliance with regime’s rules and thereby to outcomes/implications such 
as “learning how to comply” to new targets and procedures. Therefore, in order 
to prove the presence of the key implications of hierarchic learning, the most 
appropriate empirical sources are the official acts and documents produced by 
the actors in the implementation of the coordination regime leading to monetary 
unification. The SGP case study, on the other hand, is characterised as a case 
of “learning via bargaining” and, given the highly strategic nature of the policy 
interactions inherent to this specific modality, the empirical testing of the 
expected empirical manifestations takes the form of and relies on sources 
suited to come up with a narrative form of validation, which is customary for 
bargaining arenas (in line with analytic narrative scholarship – Bates et al. 1998; 
Levi 2004). The measures adopted in the period 2010-2013 to reform the 
regime for fiscal policy coordination in response to the sovereign debt crisis are 
characterised as an instance of “epistemic learning”, therefore to validate the 
expected expertocratic implications of that mode of learning I look at the 
scientific production of EU actors (namely, the Commission and the ECB) to 
evaluate whether and how the epistemic lessons produced internally influenced 
the path taken by the reform.17 
The third case study, tackled in Chapter 7 and revolving around the intracrisis 
emergency measures taken in 2010 to rescue Greece and the Eurozone, 
departs from process-tracing methodologies. This is because case-specific, 
empirical circumstances do not allow us to fully posit the subsistence of 
condition X, that is, the presence of “iterated regime-specific policy interactions 
within self-disciplinarian cooperative arrangements aimed at solving a collective 
                                                          
17 In all the case studies, I rely heavily on official primary sources in the form of publications of EU actors. 
Official documentary sources abound in the EU, making them a natural choice. Moreover, as the first 
two surveyed regimes date back several years, interviews could be ineffective.  
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action problem”. As we shall see, the nature of the interactions taking place in 
the context of the abrupt regime and paradigm shift prompted by the existential 
risk of a sovereign default within EMU, and most of all of the traits of acute 
uncertainty and problem intractability generated by the explosion of a long-
shadow crisis tackled necessarily through intracrisis management, do not 
provide for the activation of conventional policy learning mechanisms (Kamkhaji 
and Radaelli 2016). To address this case study an innovative mechanism of 
learning is conceptualised (“contingent learning”), theoretically developed and 
tested through a plausibility probe (more on case-specific theorization and 
methodology in Chapter 7). 
When it comes to the logic of inference related to the use of different types of 
evidence in the testing and validation of expected observable manifestations, I 
rely on so-called prima facie evidence to evaluate the goodness of fit between 
theorized and observed implications. I rely on this arguably loose confirmatory 
strategy for three reasons. First, it is typical of policy learning scholarship (see 
the seminal contribution of May 1992, largely followed by subsequent 
scholarship).18  
The second reason is that the resort to supposedly decisive inferential tools 
(e.g. doubly-decisive or smoking gun tests) works well for those designs that 
posit exclusive causal leverage for their mechanisms (whose empirical testing is 
also geared toward ruling out alternative explanations) but this is not the case 
with either of my own mechanisms (that are designed and conceptualised to be 
non-exclusive and complementary) or of the theory-testing process-tracing 
understanding of causality: “The belief that theory-centric process-tracing can 
be used to test two competing theories against each other is widespread but 
erroneous in most situations. In the complex social world, most outcomes are 
the product of multiple mechanisms acting at the same time. The inference that 
can be made with theory-testing process-tracing are therefore restricted to 
claiming that a mechanism was present in the case and that ii functioned as 
expected. No claims can be made about whether the mechanism was the only 
factor the resulted in outcome Y occurring – in other words, we cannot claim 
sufficiency based on a single theory test” (Beach and Pedersen, p. 89). 
                                                          
18 See also Chapters 2 and 3 for a discussion of the use of the empirical methodology and its rationale. 
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Moreover, I abide by a view that causal mechanisms, most of all macro-level 
ones like modes of policy learning emerging in collective action regimes, are 
largely unobservable: “We theorize about mechanisms. Such mechanisms are 
ultimately unobservable, but our hypotheses about them generate observable 
and testable implications” (Schimmelfennig 2014b). 
Third, in line with Dunlop and Radaelli (2017), a certain degree of under-
theorization has to be acknowledged with regard to policy learning, most of all in 
terms of its causal effects on policy change and related observable implications. 
Theories of policy learning have “provided testable propositions about how to 
identify one type of learning or another, or sequences of learning. Here, 
however, the literature has just begun to operationalize concepts, hence 
measurement is a challenge. When we turn to learning as independent variable, 
we have conjectures about when we should expect or not expect policy change, 
and its causal drivers under different modes of learning.” Employing strong 
logics of inference like Bayesian analysis to weakly validated implications and 
conjectures would be inappropriate. Indeed, the empirical measurement of 
learning, or better put, the distinction of the causal influence of 
mechanisms/modes of learning on the policy outcomes is widely considered as 
an Achilles’ heel of policy learning studies. Although I try to overcome this 
weakness by resorting to rigorously derived ex-ante theoretical observable 
implications, the latter are somewhat too general (and too much subject to 
multiple explanations) to lend themselves to decisive inferential tests. 
A few further considerations about modes of learning as causal mechanisms 
are in order. First, although a number of scholars insist on limiting the scope of 
causal mechanisms at the micro, individual level of analysis, a more pragmatic 
(and realistic) approach allows for mechanisms that are thought to operate at 
different levels of analysis (Beach and Pedersen 2013, pp. 40-43). In particular, 
modes of policy learning, as intended in my analysis, work distinctively at the 
macro/system-level (Heikkila and and Gerlak 2013). This is because the 
outcomes of the collective action regimes I investigate are “collaboratively 
created by individuals yet are not reducible to individual action” (Sawyer 2004, 
p. 266).  
Second, as already hinted above, my interpretation of modes of learning 
departs from the commonplace view according to which the effects of learning 
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on policy outcomes are invariably positive and functional. Although May’s 
political learning (1992; see also Gilardi and Radaelli 2010) is an established 
conceptual category and includes instances of actors learning and refining 
opportunistic and self-interested practices, more recent learning scholarship 
seems to be affected by a bias that tends to interpret the effects and outcomes 
of learning as solely contributing to better policy making. I reject this normative 
stance and instead posit that actors can also learn in ways that are 
dysfunctional and this can ultimately lead to policy failure. As Chapter 5 will 
show in detail, the implementing parties of the SGP learned over time how to 
twist the policy regime toward their political interests and goals, thereby making 
non-compliance a systematic trait of fiscal policy coordination under the Pact.19  
Third, and most importantly, as extensively highlighted above, I embrace a 
vision of policy outcomes as fruit of potentially multiple, non-rival causal 
mechanisms. This vision has important practical implications. In fact, the choice 
of a methodology informed by theory-testing process-tracing also draws on this 
understanding of non-exclusive causation processes. This is because in theory-
centric studies informed by process-tracing methodologies “causal mechanisms 
[…] are not theorized as sufficient causes of [the outcome] by themselves” 
(Beach and Pedersen 2013, p.12), or, to put it differently, “analysis seeks to 
determine whether a single mechanism such as learning or policy drift is 
present in a particular case, but given that most social outcomes are the 
product of multiple mechanisms, no claims of sufficiency are made” (ibid., p. 
34). 
 
1.3e Research questions 
 
The measuring instrument presented above represents the key building bloc of 
my analytical framework and allows me to achieve two key empirical goals. 
First, it allows me to map the case studies onto one of the modes of learning 
through the systematic analysis of its scope conditions across the four analytical 
                                                          
19 In other words, the implications/expected empirical manifestations of the four modes of policy 
learning (and of hierarchical and bargaining-driven modalities in particular) are not necessarily oriented 
toward improved compliance or improved coordination outcomes but are also suited to reinforce non-
cooperative and opportunistic dynamics. 
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dimensions tackled in the “policy learning measuring instrument”. 
The second goal to be achieved through the instrument is to empirically test the 
explanatory leverage of the case-specific mode of learning through the 
verification of the occurrence of its expected observable implications/empirical 
manifestations.  
In light of the theoretical and analytical infrastructures I decided to employ and 
sketched above and in order to account for the understudied puzzling/learning 
dimension of fiscal policy coordination under EMU, the research questions 
addressed in each of the case studies of this thesis are the following:  
1) What are the scope conditions of each analytical component of modes policy 
learning specific to the different fiscal policy coordination regimes that emerged 
historically under EMU?  
2) In light of the detected case-specific scope conditions for policy learning, 
which is the prevalent mode of learning observed in each different regime?  
3) How do case-specific modes of learning impact on the policy process and 
outcomes of the regimes? 
With a view to systematically tackle these questions through the research 
design and analytical framework detailed above, let us now move on to some 
conclusive remarks about this introductory chapter.  
 
1.4 Conclusions and overview of the thesis 
 
This introductory chapter has elaborated on the nature and empirical scope of 
the thesis, that is, a diachronic account of more than 20 years of EMU-based 
fiscal policy coordination subdivided in three policy regimes and four case 
studies. It then tackled research design issues starting from detecting a gap in 
the literature and thereby motivating a distinctive analytical focus centered on 
the interactive supranational process of policy coordination and its 
puzzling/learning dimension. A brief discussion has also been devoted to the 
other original contributions this study tries to achieve. Stemming from the 
proposed new foci of analysis, the chapter then presented the theoretical 
framework that will be employed to investigate the empirical cases, a framework 
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based upon different modes of policy learning intended as non-exclusive causal 
mechanisms. To qualify case-specific modes of learning a “policy learning 
measuring instrument” has been introduced and it has been proposed to 
employ it empirically in the context of a two-staged process-tracing 
methodology. The final sections of the chapter have been devoted to justifying 
the eclectic choice of empirical sources and the logic of inference underpinning 
the case studies and to present the research questions.  
The remainder of the thesis can be summarized as follows. Chapter 2 is 
devoted to navigating the policy learning literature and to further motivate and 
explain the ontological and epistemological stances sketched in this chapter.   
Chapter 3, drawing on recent systematizations on modes of policy learning, 
aims to derive a set of analytical dimensions/constitutive elements common to 
different modes of learning in policy making. Thenceforth, through the review of 
the scholarly contributions (at times implicitly) devoted to and focused on these 
different modes of learning, the chapter qualifies the previously derived 
analytical dimensions in order to come up with a set of scope conditions for 
each mode of learning to be prevalent in a given set of policy interactions. 
Policy learning analytical components and mode-specific scope conditions 
(along with mode-specific expected implications on policy outcomes) are meant 
to constitute the bulk of the “policy learning measuring instrument” presented in 
this chapter and to be employed to categorize the empirical cases. 
As already hinted, both literature review chapters are theory-building oriented, 
that is, geared toward the construction of an inductively derived “policy learning 
measuring instrument” that will work as a key epistemological device to 
empirically investigate my case studies. 
Chapters 4 to 8 are devoted to addressing the four case studies (see Table 
1.1). In greater detail, Chapter 4 is dedicated to the investigation of the 
coordination regime stemming from the provisions on fiscal policy included in 
Stage II of EMU convergence process (1994-1998). The empirical analysis 
(based upon the “policy learning measuring instrument”) indicates that the 
implementation of the fiscal criteria of the TEU substantiated a form of learning 
in the shadow of hierarchy. The key implications of this form of learning are 
verified (and confirmed) in the context of an empirical analysis of the process of 
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implantation that relies on primary official sources of the convergence path 
undertaken by EMU candidates toward the adoption of the common currency. It 
finds that the key implication of hierarchic learning (instrumental learning) has 
supported the process of fiscal retrenchment that made the launch of the Euro 
viable. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the erratic implementation course of the SGP (1999-
2008) and qualifies the regime stemming from the Pact, again by resorting to 
the “policy learning measuring instrument”, as characterised by a mode of 
learning via bargaining. Given the eminently strategic nature of the regime, the 
key implications of learning via bargaining are verified through a narrative 
validation that indicates how a dysfunctional process of learning increased the 
strategic sophistication of the actors involved in the Pact’s implementation, 
contributing thereof to its negative record, failure and reform. 
Chapter 6 serves the purpose of introducing the global financial and sovereign 
debt crises as key intervening variables to the framework of fiscal policy 
coordination under EMU. Furthermore, building upon an original interpretation 
of the crisis, the chapter proposes to investigate the change undergone by the 
fiscal policy coordination regime as a result of the Greek quasi-default of 2010 
as a two-pronged process, one of short-term intracrisis management and one of 
long-term reform. 
Chapter 7 investigates the first of these two reform processes, that is, the short-
term intracrisis policy change experienced by EMU in 2010. Due to the intrinsic 
contextual features of the case study and their impact on learning processes, 
the chapter puts forth an ad-hoc mechanism of learning under crisis conditions 
called “contingent learning “ and successfully tests it empirically through a 
plausibility probe. The key finding of the chapter is that under acute crisis 
circumstances the conditions for canonical modes of learning to emerge are 
often not given and that under change-or-die scenarios policy change can take 
place as an adaptive strategy that precedes a more classical (and time-
consuming) process of learning. 
Nonetheless, once critical circumstances are somewhat relaxed, classic 
processes and modes of learning revamp and anchor the adaptive strategy 
accidentally chosen to cushion potential short-term disruptive effects of the 
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crisis. In light of this, Chapter 8 analyses the process of reform (2010-2013) that 
led to the approval of four key reforms to EMU fiscal framework (namely, the 
European Semester, Six-Pack Rules, the Treaty on Stability Convergence and 
Governance and the Two-Pack Rules) through the “policy learning measuring 
instrument”. The analysis shows that an epistemic mode of learning has been 
prevalent and validates the mode-specific implications on outcomes of policy 
change by scrutinising the scientific production of the internal epistemic actors 
of the EU (namely, the ECB and the Commission). The key finding is that the 
role of internally produced epistemic lessons has been critical and instrumental 
in justifying and fostering the emergence of the new austerity paradigm 
underpinning the conduct of fiscal policies under EMU. 
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes by systematizing the key empirical findings, 
discussing them, spelling out the limitations of this study and proposing future 
avenues of research. In particular, besides summarizing substantive empirical 
findings, the chapter tries to put them in the broader context of European 
integration theories and to reason on the functionality/dysfunctionality of 
different modes of learning for the sake of policy coordination. 
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Chapter 2. Navigating the literature: between ontology and epistemology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Over the last decades, learning has been one of the most employed concepts in 
the social sciences. Almost no academic discipline has been spared by the kind 
but robust offensive of learning-oriented approaches. Political and policy 
sciences have not differed in embracing, more or less explicitly, learning-
oriented perspectives to analysis. As a result, a relatively broad and diversified 
body of learning-informed literature is currently available (for recent overviews, 
see: Freeman 2006; Grin and Loeber 2007; Zito and Schout 2009; Heikkila and 
Gerlak 2013; Dunlop and Radaelli 2013). To better grasp the motivations 
underlying the interest towards the concept of learning in political science and 
hence the nature of this wide-ranging scholarship, it is worth elaborating briefly 
on the genesis of and seminal contributors to this literature. In order to achieve 
this preliminary clarification, I begin by reasoning on several definitions of policy 
learning featured in early pivotal contributions and review articles. This will not 
only illustrate the nature of the concept of policy learning, but will also serve as 
a much needed contextualization of and introduction to the theory-building 
literature review presented in Section 3 and then conducted in Chapter 3. 
As commonly acknowledged, the first conceptualisation of learning as an 
overarching trait of policy making is by Karl Deutsch (1957 and 1966). In the 
context of his research on political systems, Deutsch advanced the idea that 
these systems work similarly to cybernetic (evolutionary) structures. Cybernetic 
systems are understood as dynamic models suited to produce decisional 
sequences on the basis of new inputs from the environment and to review such 
sequences on the basis of exogenous and endogenous feedback information 
on the prior course of action. Under this perspective, political decision-making 
organizations are interpreted as being involved in a knowledge-intensive 
communicative process within themselves and with the external environment. 
Their policy outcomes are not seen merely as the fruit of static, one-off 
reactions to inputs from the environment but rather as the result of a dynamic 
process whereby the information input “includes the results of its own action in 
the new information by which it modifies its subsequent behavior” (Deutsch 
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1966, p. 88). Hence, according to this characterisation, a “learning system is in 
principle equipped to pursue changing goals” (Radaelli and Dunlop 2013, p. 
931). Such an approach stood in contrast with those theories of policy making 
built upon a view of politics as a struggle for power (Lasswell 1936), going as far 
as explaining policy outcomes and change through the communicative and 
puzzling dimensions of political systems, rather than through the pursuit of own 
goals and own preference attainment of self-interested actors. 
A few years later, drawing on the seminal work of Deutsch, Hugh Heclo coined 
the famous and successful definition of policy making as “a form of collective 
puzzlement on society’s behalf” (Heclo 1974, p. 305). Within the process of 
collective puzzlement, Heclo characterises the phenomenon of learning in 
policy making as something that “can be taken to mean a relatively enduring 
alteration in behavior that results from experience” (Heclo 1974, p. 306). This 
early and seminal account, heavily refined and reworked by subsequent 
scholarship, puts the crucial tenet of the then-emergent policy learning 
scholarship under the spotlight: the importance of experience to bring about 
durable policy change within a framework whereby policy making is seen as a 
knowledge-intensive collective problem solving (puzzlement) exercise – broadly 
in line with Deutsch’s cybernetic approach to political systems. 
In a later attempt to provide a clearer definition to the phenomenon of learning 
within policy making (most of all with respect to the problem of who the learning 
agents are, a central one in the policy learning literature, as we shall see later 
on), Peter Hall (1993, p. 278) puts forward the following account: “We can 
define social learning as a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques 
of policy in response to past experience and new information. Learning is 
indicated when policy changes as the result of such a process”. This definition 
qualifies Heclo’s picture by adding three further elements: the attempt to 
produce experience-based change needs to be deliberate, the change resulting 
from learning can invest both broad policy objectives as well as policy 
instrumentation, and the driver of this change is not limited to the accumulation 
of experience but also involves the processing of new information. 
Notwithstanding these differences, overall Hall’s account strongly chimes with 
Heclo’s early interpretation since it underpins the same causal mechanism: 
experience/learning-driven policy change. Moreover, Hall further elaborates on 
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the nature of change brought about by experience and new information, arguing 
that depending on the nature of policy change - whether investing policy tools or 
broad policy paradigms - learning processes “may take different forms” (ibid.).  
This latter idea is picked up by another seminal contribution dating back to the 
nineties - the golden age of policy learning theorizations. In his article “Policy 
Learning and Failure” (1992), Peter May in fact distinguishes between three 
typologies of learning building upon the idea that learning processes vary 
according to what their object is. Like in Hall’s framework, policy makers can 
learn about policy tools (instrumental policy learning) or more broadly about 
policy paradigms (social policy learning) but, differently to Hall, that learning can 
also be political in the sense that under this typology learning agents do not 
learn for the sake of increasing their problem solving capacity but rather for the 
sake of better attaining their deeply engrained policy goals through increased 
strategic sophistication and advocacy capacity. Learning hence ceases to be an 
invariably positive phenomenon and starts to be intertwined with the power-
based dimension of policy making.  
Yet again, we see how the seminal idea of Heclo gets refined through the 
expansion of the concept of learning but along with the increased analytical 
sophistication stemming from the construction of different typologies of learning, 
we observe in May the same approach to causality of Heclo and Hall that 
learning is seen as having a causal effect on policy. 
The same tenet is featured in the early review article by Colin Bennett and 
Michael Howlett (1992). Along with the brilliant intuition, seemingly developed 
independently from May, that the scholars operating within the policy learning 
framework are not conceptualizing different phenomena but are rather 
elaborating on different typologies of the same broader phenomenon, they are 
the most explicit authors in approaching learning as the (causal) source of 
policy change (ibid., p. 276). 
With a leap of about twenty years, we get to the review article by Anthony Zito 
and Adriaan Schout (2009, p. 1103) in which the following definition is provided: 
“Learning in policy analysis can be defined as a process of exercising a 
judgment based on an experience or some other kind of input that leads actors 
to select a different view of how things happen (‘learning that’) and what 
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courses of action should be taken (‘learning how’)”. Like in earlier works, we see 
the acknowledgement of variation in the content of learning processes and their 
inputs and, crucially, a similar outcome: the selection, by those actors involved 
in learning processes, of a different view, that is, an alteration in their beliefs 
and behaviours, potentially leading to policy change. 
There are three key takeaways of this brief overview (that will be expanded in 
the following sections). First, increasing and increased experience, 
knowledge/information accumulation, and eventually learning are pervasive and 
ubiquitous traits of policy making (most of when the latter is intended as 
collective problem solving/puzzlement), hence the need to take them seriously 
when trying to explain policy outcomes. Second, depending on different 
contextual factors, learning processes can come in different types, allowing 
room for original concept formation. Third, and most importantly, learning 
processes may have a causal impact on policy and policy change. Policy 
learning is hence an attractive construct because it brings within the right hand 
side of the equation (along with or in opposition to power-based factors) ideas, 
paradigms, policy objectives and, crucially, their variation according to 
experience accumulation in the context of problem solving/collective 
puzzlement (whether endogenously generated or due to external inputs). In 
other words, the interest toward learning as an explanatory construct can be 
seen as the operationalization, possibly spawned by the scholarly trend toward 
more solid behavioural micro foundations of collective action, of the everlasting 
phenomenon of accumulation of experience faced by individuals, and in 
particular by groups of individuals, engaged in policy making intended as a form 
of collective problem-solving. 
As a result of its conceptual and epistemological attractiveness, the body of 
literature dealing with learning in policy making is at the present time mature, 
vast and varied, including both theoretical and research/empirical contributions 
(Heclo 1974; Argyris and Schön 1978; Etheredge 1985; Sabatier 1988; Rose 
1991; Haas 1992; May 1992; Hall 1993; Radaelli 1995 and 2009; Checkel 2001; 
Weyland 2005; Sabel and Zeitlin 2008; Meseguer 2009; Gilardi 2010; Radaelli 
and Dunlop 2013), along with review pieces that try to systematize previous 
theories and findings in order to produce cumulative knowledge (Bennet and 
Howlett 1992; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Freeman 2006; Grin and Loeber 2007; 
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Zito and Schout 2009; Gilardi and Radaelli 2012; Dunlop and Radaelli 2013 and 
2017; Heikkila and Gerlak 2013). As is often the case, debates, controversies 
and challenges abound within this relatively young scholarship - see Lodge and 
James (2003) for a well-known critique of the policy transfer scholarship, a 
critique that can be extended to account for the limitations and issues, 
conceptual and practical, of the policy learning literature at large.  
The aim of this chapter is not to set out all of the scholarly disagreements and 
intellectual controversies that have progressively emerged in the literature but 
rather to propose a novel way of thinking about learning within policy making 
and thence, thanks to the review of selected contributions, construct a reliable 
tool for empirical typological analysis.20 Admittedly, the literature review featured 
in this chapter is hence not a canonic one where the investigator quite 
agnostically engages in the effort of classifying various relevant contributions 
according to different analytical criteria. This kind of endeavor is already 
featured in excellent review essays, like those of Freeman (2006), Grin and 
Loeber (2007) and Gilardi and Radaelli (2012). Each of these contributions 
engages with the review of the literature from different positions and with 
different purposes. Freeman (2006) looks, in an historical perspective, at the 
“founding fathers” and main contributors to the development and refinement of 
the concept; Grin and Loeber (2007) tackle their review by focusing on the 
constructivist/interpretivist angle; Gilardi and Radaelli (2012) look at how 
learning has been employed as a mid-range mechanism/process, shedding light 
on its usage in policy diffusion and transfer studies. Taken together, these 
contributions provide a very complete overview of the policy learning 
scholarship. 
The present chapter, therefore, restrains from telling a story already repeatedly 
told in the field, a story of increasing engagement with and use of the concept, 
but also of definitional elusiveness, weak empirical measurability and debatable 
explanatory leverage (James and Lodge 2003). What this and the following 
chapters aim to do instead is to review the literature with a theory-building aim. 
This is to be achieved firstly through the resort to a novel ontological approach 
                                                          
20 Please notice that the present literature review and the one featured in the following chapter are 
limited to the theoretical framework of the dissertation, that is, they engage (with a theory-building 
purpose) solely with contributions on policy learning. The scrutiny of the literature related to the case 
studies is instead performed in the introductory sections of each of the empirical chapters (from 4 to 8).   
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to learning in policy making, and secondly through the creation of an informed 
tool for empirical analysis, a “policy learning measuring instrument” constructed 
around different typologies/modes of learning, their analytical components and 
expected empirical manifestations (in terms of scope conditions and observable 
implications on policy outcomes – see also Chapters 1 and most of all 3). In 
short, the present and the following chapters engage in a theory-driven 
literature review ultimately aimed at deriving a tool for empirical typological 
analysis.  
In the remainder of this chapter I first discuss two outstanding and interrelated 
issues related to the use of the notion of policy learning: how to conceptualise 
and empirically “measure” it (Section 2). Then, by dwelling upon the ontological 
and epistemological levels, I tackle the modelling challenge. In particular, I 
discuss the four typologies/modes of learning21 featured in Dunlop and 
Radaelli’s 2013 systematic review, with a view to expand their theoretical 
foundations so to derive a comprehensive “policy learning measuring 
instrument” apt to carry out empirical categorization and analysis (Section 3). 
Section 4 briefly concludes.  
 
2.2 What is policy learning? How can we measure it? Definition and locus 
of policy learning 
 
One of the key puzzles arising out of the specialized literature is that the notion, 
and hence the definition, of policy learning are conceptually contested (Bennett 
and Howlett 1992), generating ambiguity regarding its empirical measurability 
and independent explanatory value (Lodge and James 2003). As a matter of 
fact, and as shown in the introductory section of this chapter, it is quite difficult 
to find two different contributions belonging to the policy learning scholarship 
whereby the latter is defined univocally. This definitional ambiguity is clearly 
acknowledged in both early review articles on policy learning (see the already 
quoted Bennett and Howlett 1992) and in subsequent attempts at 
systematization (Freeman 2006; Dunlop and Radaelli 2013 and 2017).  
                                                          
21 Note that the expressions “modes of learning” and “typologies of learning” are utilized 
interchangeably. 
52 
 
Arguably, the main conceptual problem that makes the notion and definition of 
learning in policy making contentious is represented by the fact that learning is 
eminently an individual, micro-level process, whereas the kind of phenomena 
that inspire political science scholars in general, and public policy scholars in 
particular, are, generally, collective ones (Zito and Schout 2009; Heikkila and 
Gerlak 2013). This is termed somewhere as the problem of aggregation (Levy 
1994) or the problem of who the learning actors - i.e. the agents and units of 
analysis of policy learning processes - are (May 1992; Hall 1993; Stern 1997). 
In other words, can learning as an analytical concept be profitably applied to 
collective actors and decision making? And, if so, how and where are we to find 
evidence of the occurrence of learning within groups of individuals or 
institutions? 
To cope with these problems, I argue that if the interest devoted to learning as 
an explanatory construct of policy making outcomes is to be confined to the 
individual cognitive processes taking place within the black box of single 
decision makers’ minds, learning would be both of little interest for political 
scientists (i.e. merely subsumed by individual agency) and hardly measurable. 
Yet, there exists a number of studies interested in mapping individual political 
leaders’ belief systems (see for recent examples Van Esch 2014 and 2015; Van 
Esch and Swinkels 2015), as well as studies focused on the micro and meso 
effects of policy narratives on policy learning (Jones and McBeth 2010). I 
contend, nonetheless, that the object of analysis of such studies is a 
paradigmatic/ideational change of key individual decision makers, possibly the 
fruit of different forms of individual learning and/or use of policy narratives. One 
can talk in those instances of individual learning influencing politics but not of 
policy learning.  
I maintain instead that the kind of phenomena that spur the conceptualisation of 
the category of “policy learning” (as opposed to “learning” only) are those 
phenomena of knowledge accumulation, exchange and utilization that arise out 
of the policy-specific interactions among different collective actors involved in 
the policy making process (see among others: Heclo 1974; Sabatier 1988; Rose 
1991; Sanderson 2002). As Heikkila and Gerlak (2013, p. 484, original 
emphasis) put it, “it is not just how individuals learn in policy processes that is 
important but also how groups of individuals in collective policy contexts learn 
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that is critical for understanding policy issues and solutions and translating that 
knowledge into policy change”.  
In other words, the focus of the policy learning scholarship has typically shifted 
from the individual level common to psychology, educational research and 
political elite studies, to the collective level of analysis - whether the meso-level, 
i.e. involving learning actors like civil servants and elected politicians 
(sometimes termed as agents of “government learning” - Etheredge 1985) or 
the macro-level, involving political, bureaucratic and societal actors at large 
(sometimes termed as agents of “social learning” - Hall 1993). This suggests 
that when employing the concept of policy learning, the focus should rest on 
group learning and collective intelligence.  
Once intuitively established that the for the notion of policy learning to be 
appropriately operationalized collective actors need to be the units of 
analysis/agents of learning, a further conceptual conundrum summarized by the 
following question emerges: can these collective actors (groups of individuals, 
organizations, institutions, etc.) actually learn, or is such a collective form of 
learning is merely a metaphorical construct which in reality is simply the sum of 
individual learnings? In other words, is learning within (political) organizations a 
discrete phenomenon which results in a simple aggregation of individual 
learning processes, or is it a group phenomenon, often mediated by institutions 
and rules, where actors learn both individually and collectively, with 
multiplicative, non-incremental effects on the organization’s experience and 
intelligence, and hence resultant behaviours and policy outcomes? 
In line with the seminal contribution of Mary Douglas (1986) on institutional 
thinking, and drawing on converging findings about group learning and 
collective intelligence stemming from educational research (Ashman and Gillies 
2003), organizational theory (Hayes and Allinson 1998; Dixon 1999; Lawson 
and Lorenz 1999; Akgün et al. 2003), and social and cognitive psychology 
(Stein 1997; Reed et al. 2010; Jeong et al. 2013), I argue that learning at the 
collective level is not a metaphorical expression as suggested by Sabatier 
(1988). Indeed, learning as a group and socially, under determined conditions, 
brings about multiplicative effects on the group’s cognition and intelligence 
(Woolley et al. 2010). This suggests that the aforementioned problem of 
aggregation can be solved by focusing on groups and collective actors as valid 
54 
 
and fully legitimate units of analysis/agents of policy learning phenomena. 
Nonetheless, this is not enough to delimit the scope of policy learning. Even 
understanding the latter as a collective process arising out of and resulting in 
group intelligence, the realm in which to observe its emergence remains 
controversial: “Organizations are not merely collections of individuals, yet there 
is no organization without such collections. Similarly, organizational learning is 
not merely individual learning, yet organizations learn only through the 
experience and actions of individuals” (Argyris and Schön 1978, p. 9).  
What does this ambiguity concerning the appropriate level of analysis of 
learning within organizations suggest to policy analysis? Fundamentally, I think 
that it calls for policy learning scholars not to look for evidence or proof of 
learning through the static observation of individual or group behaviours (i.e. 
policy outcomes) but rather to concentrate on the dynamic processes that 
connect individuals to groups and groups to other groups, that is, to focus 
explicitly on policy-specific processes of interaction (Dunlop and Radaelli 2017). 
In fact, “within any given collective structure, individuals interact and 
communicate. Their interrelationships and communication patterns or social 
dynamics can play a key role in promoting and inhibiting learning” (Heikkila and 
Gerlak 2013, p. 497). This view is also in line with Deutsch’s early intuition 
interpreting policy systems as evolutionary systems responding both to 
environmental and endogenous inputs and feedback, and with Heikkila and 
Gerlak’s (2013, pp. 485-486, emphasis added) approach: “we acknowledge that 
learning can emerge at multiple levels and that these levels interact. Therefore, 
we emphasize the features and processes that define and influence learning at 
the collective level”, that is, “the [features of the] collective contexts where policy 
decisions are debated, devised, implemented, and enforced”.  In other words, in 
agreement with the literature, I argue that the locus of learning in policy making 
is the policy process, in particular the contextual, case-specific interactions of 
collective actors within the policy process. This insight is strongly engrained 
within the policy learning literature but results somehow in being obfuscated by 
the endeavor of causally connecting learning to policy outcomes and policy 
change in particular (Sabatier 1988; Bennett and Howlett 1992. See below for a 
discussion of this issue).  
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A recent and valuable view expressed in an already quoted review article about 
policy learning in the European Union suggests we focus on the “myriad of 
‘micro’ processes of civil servants and politicians interacting concerning 
problems, hopes, norms, symbols, et cetera” as these “exchanges [i.e. the 
process-specific interaction] generate changes in information, goals, values, 
behaviours, structures, policies and outcomes” (Zito and Schout 2009, p. 1103). 
I fully embrace this stance and therefore proceed to define policy learning as: 
A collective process taking place among policy actors/stakeholders 
embedded in formal or informal institutional frameworks whereby 
knowledge is interactively acquired, accumulated, exchanged and 
processed, prompting an update or a change in the beliefs of the 
involved actors and possibly a change in their behaviour and policy 
outcomes thereof. 
It follows that policy learning happens within and is contingent on the 
interactions specific to the policy process (as also suggested in some ways by 
Heikkila and Gerlak 2013 and Dunlop and Radaelli 2017). Hence, whatever the 
epistemological role attached to learning (dependent, independent variable or 
causal mechanism – ibid.), the systematic investigation of the features 
(structural and agent-based) of the policy process, i.e. of policy-specific 
interactions, is necessary (if not at times sufficient) to gauge the nature of those 
collective learning phenomena at work in a specific empirical case and the 
scope of their explanatory leverage. The advantage of this perspective is that it 
does not only provide a suitable and well delimited domain for empirical 
investigation, but it also allows us to appreciate the mutual dialectic relation 
between the puzzling/learning, process-based dimension of policy making and 
its powering and institutional nature (in line with Heclo’s seminal framework).  
In this regard, learning-oriented approaches have been seen, to a certain 
extent, as a remedy or a “partial corrective” (Bennet and Howlett 1992, p. 290) 
to theories of policy change built upon ontologies like power and conflict. For 
this perspective to be viable, the underlying assumption needs to be that these 
two ontologies are not exclusive and alternative to each other but 
complimentary and interdependent (see Chapter 1 and following section). 
Accepting this ontological interdependency implies also that the 
puzzling/learning dimension deploys its most observable effects and is 
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dependent on the policy process and its interactions. Hence, focusing 
specifically on the policy process and its inherent interactions before opening 
the box of policy outcomes achieves two goals: first, it helps fix some the 
conceptual ambiguity of learning by giving it a clear empirical perimeter; and 
second, it makes it compatible and integrable with other theoretical and 
explanatory frameworks (whether as a non-exclusive causal mechanism or as 
an intervening variable – Dunlop and Radaelli 2017). In fact, if learning is 
contingent on policy-specific actors’ interaction, the interaction itself is 
contingent on institutional traits and on actors’ interests (Arminen 2005; Ostrom 
2005).  
In other words, the nature and effects of learning in a given policy domain 
depend on the features of the observed interaction but the way in which policy 
actors interact is organized and conveyed through institutional structures and 
constrained by actors’ roles and interests. It follows that the study of learning 
processes cannot be disentangled by the scrutiny of the systemic influence of 
institutions and interests, or to put it differently, of the powering and institutional 
dimensions of policy making (most of all, as we shall see in Chapters 4 and 5, 
when the prevalent mode of learning is hierarchical or based on bargaining). 
Nonetheless, the opposite also holds true. Actors’ behaviours and policy 
outcomes within institutional frameworks also emerge interaction (whether 
horizontal, pluralistic, or hierarchical and based on formal delegation) but the 
interaction is the locus of learning as well as the locus of powering. Under this 
ecological understanding of policy making, one dimension cannot be 
understood and analysed without the other, hence the proposed argument for 
their interdependence. 
 
2.3 Policy learning as an ontology of policy making and the benefits of 
typological analysis 
 
In the previous sub-section, I have put forth a definition of policy learning 
focused on collective problem solving and intelligence. Furthermore, I 
suggested that we understand policy learning as a process taking place within 
and across groups of policy (collective) actors and, due to this view, concentrate 
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on policy-specific, process-based interactions among these actors as the 
empirical locus of policy learning.  
Now we ought to achieve a conceptual clarification about learning and its role in 
policy analysis and then, building upon that clarification, come up with an 
empirical strategy and tool to operationalize it (see Chapter 3). In particular, this 
sub-section is meant to elaborate on these issues with a view to motivate the 
choice of organizing the review of the field around modes of policy learning 
(intended as causal mechanisms – see Chapter 1) and to explain the 
explanatory and empirical merits of typological analysis. 
In the theoretical/methodological and empirical domains, the indications 
stemming from the literature on how to employ policy learning are diversified 
and not conclusive, reverberating the non-conclusiveness of theoretical 
conceptualisations. Along with a handful of studies, mainly belonging to the 
policy diffusion scholarship, that operationalize policy learning as an 
independent variable and are quantitative (Volden 2006; Volden et al. 2008; 
Gilardi 2010; Meseguer 2009; Escribà-Folch and Meseguer 2011), the large 
majority of empirical works are qualitative in nature, i.e. focused on in-depth 
case studies (see, among hundreds: May 1985 and 1992; Haas 1992; Hall 
1993; Eising 2002; Weyland 2005; Nilsson 2005; Radaelli 2009), and mainly 
resort to learning as an independent variable or causal mechanism (Dunlop and 
Radaelli 2017). 
Both of these approaches have merits and drawbacks. On the one hand, 
quantitative studies are extremely helpful in taking stock of phenomena like the 
diffusion of similar policies across different constituencies or the transfer of 
policies from international organizations to state actors and in attributing these 
phenomena to policy learning processes but the operationalization of learning 
utilized in these works is rather simplistic. In particular, and despite the resort to 
sophisticated statistical techniques (Gilardi 2010), these studies still fail in 
clearly distinguishing different drivers of diffusion/transfer processes, very often 
resulting in a confusion of learning with other neighboring explanations like 
imitation, emulation, adaptation or heuristics (see also Heikkila and Gerlak 2013 
for a similar critique). 
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On the other hand, qualitative studies, emphasizing internal validity, are better 
suited to distinguish among the different ideational phenomena that can 
underpin policy change, resulting in a more nuanced account of the distinctive 
features of learning processes. Nonetheless, they also have several limitations. 
These latter are mainly related to the use of indirect evidence22, to problematic 
falsifiability, and to the fact that case selection often appears skewed in favor of 
those instances where policy change took place (i.e. no variation in the 
dependent variable), hence resulting in a lack of attention for those cases where 
learning takes place but policy stability, rather than change, is observed. But 
beyond their specific limitations and methodological/empirical diversity, the key 
problem of these contributions is that they invariably cast policy learning as an 
epistemological problem.  
“The problems of epistemology are problems of how we can possibly 
know certain kinds of things that we claim to know […] In general, given 
the statement that P, we can ask, ‘How do you know that P?’ This is the 
general form of an epistemological problem. The question ‘How do you 
know that P?’ is a challenge – a demand for justification. The task of the 
epistemologist it to explain what justifies us in believing the things we do” 
(Pollock 1968, p. 183). 
 
Mutatis mutandis, May (1992, p. 343, italics added), one of the noble fathers of 
qualitative policy learning analysis, faces this kind of epistemological challenge:  
“The strategy for analysis of these cases is to look for prima facie 
evidence of policy learning. At best this evidence is indicative of learning 
for which further investigation of primary materials is necessary to 
establish whether learning in fact occurred. Nonetheless, such analysis 
helps to delimit the frequency of and types of situations for which learning 
may have occurred”. 
 
May’s epistemological perspective is taken here as the typical example of the 
empirical cut of the ensuing policy learning scholarship whose key research 
question has so far been whether it is possible to find evidence for the presence 
or absence of learning processes within specific case studies on the basis of 
prima facie evidence and expected implications of learning on policy outcomes. 
In this perspective, it follows that when process-based evidence of policy 
                                                          
22 “[A]s with most constructs, policy and political learning cannot be directly observed” (May, 1992, p. 
351) 
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learning is detected in a case study, the observed change in the policy 
outcomes is causally connected to it. In other words, although not explicit, a 
direct link between the presence of learning phenomena/processes and their 
causal effects on policy is clearly underpinned by such approaches: “Most of the 
authors argue that learning does not actually occur unless there is some kind of 
policy change which results from that learning process” (Bennett and Howlett 
1992, p. 285). Under such a epistemological stance, if a researcher 
hypothesizes that a certain policy change is informed by a process of, say, 
epistemic learning, their main task is first to prove the presence of epistemic 
dynamics (e.g. appointment of expert panels, involvement of academics in the 
policy debate, etc.) and then to causally connect the policy outcome to those 
epistemic manifestations. The finding would thus be that a process of epistemic 
learning explains the change observed in the policy.  
This research design, whether implemented quantitatively or qualitatively, is 
common to the large majority of policy learning contributions and has its merits 
but it has also been criticized for various reasons. First, casting the empirical 
presence of policy learning as an epistemological problem does not fully allow 
for supplementing it with complementary sources of causation that can also 
explain policy change (Heikkila and Gerlak 2013, pp. 491-493). Second, as the 
concept of policy learning is considered overly broad and elusive, too many 
phenomena can be conceptualised as instances of learning, resulting in a 
potential confusion or conflation between policy learning and the policy process 
itself (ibid.; James and Lodge 2003).Third, the policy learning scholarship 
attached to this epistemological perspective has so far failed to produce 
cumulative knowledge (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013). Fourth, and crucially, the 
typical empirical validation of policy learning - based on the proof of the 
goodness-of-fit between generic theory-driven expectations and prima facie 
evidence stemming from the policy outcome - may result too vague and not 
enough systematic (Dunlop and Radaelli 2017). This is even truer when the 
researcher seeks to unpack the causal mechanism connecting the policy 
process (and learning dynamics taking place within it) to its outcomes. In other 
words, the link between the detection of the presence of learning processes and 
their causal effects on policy is not problematized enough in mainstream 
studies.  
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The assumption of learning as “the source of policy change” has led to a 
situation whereby policy learning advocates find it hard not only to complement 
learning with other causal explanations of change, but also to account for those 
instances where learning processes take place but policy does not change 
accordingly (Dunlop 2009). Heikkila and Gerlak (2013, p. 491) also 
acknowledge this problem when elaborating on two distinct products (read: 
outcomes) of learning: cognitive change (that does not necessarily imply policy 
change) and behavioural change (that does). Yet, besides a general indication 
of concentrating on the process-based dimension of policy making, they do not 
put forth an operational solution to the conundrum of empirically recognizing 
and distinguishing between these two products. 
In order to sort these puzzles out, I propose to abandon the epistemological 
perspective and assume instead an ontological view which considers learning 
as a systemic and ubiquitous trait of policy making, implicit and inherent to any 
form of social interaction, and even more so to any set of policy interactions. Let 
us recall that policy making (and, most of all, economic policy making, the realm 
of my empirical investigation – see Chapter 1), is commonly intended as “a 
knowledge-intensive process, long associated with concepts of learning.” (Hall 
1993, p. 277). So far, we have seen that the puzzling/learning dimension of 
policy making has been employed as an epistemological lens. Let us then shift 
the discussion to the ontological level by accepting the banal truism of learning 
being a legitimate overarching and immanent aspect of knowledge-based social 
interaction in general, and of a markedly knowledge-intensive process like 
policy making in particular (in line with both Deutsch’s and Heclo’s early 
frameworks).  
The main implication of this approach is that the investigator does not need to 
prove the presence (or absence) of learning within a specific case. The fact that 
a certain process of learning takes place within any policy domain is taken for 
granted, with learning being considered an ontological trait of policy making. 
This strong assumption, in turn, has two main consequences on the nature of 
the empirical investigation. First, the acknowledgement that policy learning is a 
pervasive, omnipresent trait of policy making calls for a categorization of the 
policy processes according to modes/typologies of learning (that hence become 
the epistemological tools of the learning-informed ontology – see also Chapter 
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1); and second, it requires the investigator not to generically prove the presence 
of learning and as a result claim explanatory leverage, but, once a case is 
qualified as being characterised by a specific mode of learning, to concentrate 
on mode-specific implications on policy outcomes. This approach involves and 
calls the researcher to problematize and unpack the causal path going from 
learning typologies (and not learning per se) observed in the policy process to 
policy outcomes.  
This is also because an ontological perspective on learning, unlike an 
epistemological stance, does not take for granted that learning processes, when 
present, have unequivocal causal effects on policy and policy change, also 
allowing the null hypothesis of a lack of causal effects of learning to be tested.  
Put differently, if learning is a legitimate ontology for the investigator, the central 
question shifts toward its leverage in providing explanatory accounts. In fact, as 
already said, taking learning as an ontology means to work under the 
assumption that there is always some learning process going on in a given 
social or policy interaction, but what type of learning? The problem now is no 
longer to discriminate learning from the other explanatory variables but to 
qualify it, that is, engaging in concept formation: how many learning types exist? 
Which are the analytical components common to these typologies? And how do 
these components vary (in terms of scope conditions) within different 
typologies?   
These considerations hopefully clarify and motivate the use of typologies/modes 
of learning as causal mechanisms that characterise empirical cases. This 
analytical approach is a direct consequence of the ontological perspective: 
there is always learning, but what type? But this does not extinguish the scope 
of the empirical investigation. In fact, even if categorizing a case study, a policy 
process, as being underpinned by one or another mode of learning is important 
per se, it does not answer the question revolving around the specific causal 
effect of learning – better, of different types of learning – on policy outcomes. To 
answer this question a further analytical step is needed, namely a comparison 
between expected and observed effects of modes of learning on policy 
outcomes.  
This empirical strategy can resemble May’s but this is only partially true. In fact, 
my design follows a methodology for empirical validation similar to that 
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proposed by May, but only after having engaged in a thorough typological 
analysis of the policy process. Unlike May’s, the bulk of my own goodness-of-fit 
validation is hence not centered on loose evidence of policy learning emerging 
within the policy process. Under my approach, the latter is in fact systematically 
investigated through typological analysis, that is, through the tracing of the 
case-specific scope conditions. Similarly, prima facie evidence of learning within 
the policy process (the key step of May’s empirical strategy) is subsumed within 
a more systemic and theoretically justified analytical framework (the “policy 
learning measuring instrument”).23 As Heikkila and Gerlak (2013, p. 485, 
emphasis added) argue, “without linking the outcome to a process of learning, 
we cannot rule out the [the policy outcome] was simply the result of mimicry or 
good timing”. The resort to typological analysis, i.e. the identification of a case-
specific mode of learning through the analysis of scope conditions observed 
within the policy process, is exactly geared toward this aim, also allowing us to 
rule out “false positives” (ibid.). In other words, focusing on the policy process 
through typological analysis allows for the validation of the causal path I 
hypothesized for my own case studies, which, as already argued in Chapter 1, 
reads as follows:  
Modes of policy learning are the theoretical causal mechanisms that I 
hypothesize work as casual connectors between the independent 
variable X (iterated regime-specific policy interactions within self-
disciplinarian cooperative arrangements aimed at solving a collective 
action problem24) and the dependent variable Y (outcomes of policy 
coordination that are informed by puzzling/learning dynamics). 
In practical terms, the resort to systematic typological characterisation plus the 
comparison between expected implications of the identified typologies and 
observed outcomes (the two-pronged empirical strategy – see Chapter 1) 
serves the purpose of validating the causal connection between the 
independent variable and the observed outcome.  
                                                          
23 Also notice that the typological analysis realized through the measuring instrument allows for a 
broader view on the policy process because the analytical dimensions of the measuring instrument not 
only cover the puzzling dimension but also embed key powering/institutional elements of the policy 
process itself. See Chapter 3, Section 3 for a more extended account of the interrelation between 
puzzling and powering dimensions. 
24 I.e. “conditions associated with policy-making environments” (Dunlop and Radaelli 2017, p. 4).  
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May’s empirical approach is used within my design to investigate the connection 
between the policy process (informed by a specific mode of learning) and the 
policy outcomes, that is, to explicitly unpack the connection between modes of 
learning and their mode-specific causal effects - the second step of my 
empirical strategy. Therefore, also from the methodological point of view, this 
research design allows for an improvement with respect to previous empirical 
approaches. This is because it enables us to appraise the causal effects of 
learning typologies (intended as causal mechanisms) on the policy outcomes, 
not only through the analysis of expected manifestations and implications of 
learning, but also through a systematic, theory-driven measuring instrument that 
seriously engrains power-based and institutional aspects within a learning-
informed template. In other words, this represents also an attempt to tackle and 
embed alternative and supposedly rival explanatory dimensions within the 
learning ontology. It is in this way that this approach also sheds light on those 
learning processes which are not directly connected to policy change (with the 
latter potentially being absent or stemming from different drivers). Too often 
these two concepts - policy learning and policy change - are conflated, as 
already posited. My approach, by concentrating on the policy process and its 
interactive dimension, allows us to grasp what is termed by Heikkila and Gerlak 
(2013) as cognitive change emerging as a product of policy learning, even when 
this change does not go as far as triggering behavioural and hence policy 
change. 
A further problem of the conventional analytical stance on policy learning, 
beyond its elusive empirical verifiability due to its manifold effects on both 
processes and outcomes, is that it sees the effects of learning as 
uncontroversially positive, that is, invariably leading to constructive policy 
change. Nonetheless, as many have argued but few understand, actors can 
learn for the best – but also for the worst (Deutsch 1966; May 1992; Gilardi 
2010). This means that a theoretical framework that conceptualises learning as 
unvaryingly leading to change, and in particular positive change, only tells part 
of the story. But, on the one hand, different processes of learning can occur 
without being visible in terms of change, hence learning can also explain 
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stability;25 and, on the other hand, a learning-driven policy change can also 
entail endarkenment, that is, learning-informed policy changes that result 
dysfunctional (Radaelli 2009; Dunlop and Radaelli 2016 and 2017).  
To sum up and proceed, the ontological stance allows us to account for the 
criticism related to the difficulty of policy learning studies (and qualitative studies 
in general) to take stock of multiple causation. In fact, the ontological 
perspective does not claim that learning is the only legitimate ontological key, 
yet it attaches a systemic, overarching nature to learning dynamics, bringing 
about several advantages. First, it is in line with the long term behavioural turn 
of social sciences seeking for more solid micro foundations to explain collective 
and institutional action (Thelen 1999). Second, it allows us to move the typical 
(and elusive) research question of policy learning studies from asking whether 
learning has taken place at all in a given empirical domain, to asking what 
typology of learning has taken place. This, in turn, allows for better 
understanding of the connection between typologies of policy learning and 
policy change (or lack of it), that is, the explanatory effect of learning over 
outcomes. Third, as also argued previously, through the acknowledgment of 
learning being contingent on interactive policy processes and these latter being 
contingent on the institutional dimension and actors’ interests, the ontological 
stance and its epistemological consequence (i.e. the resort to modes of policy 
learning as pluralistic causal mechanisms) allows us to put learning in a broader 
explanatory context, creating a connection between the puzzling and 
powering/institutional dimensions of policy making. Fourth, it allows us to also 
focus on cases where the dependent variable is not always “policy change” and 
to qualify implications of modes of policy learning as negative in terms of policy 
outcomes. 
 
 
                                                          
25 As already discussed, within an empirical case (a set of regime-specific policy interactions) learning 
processes can contribute to explaining both change and stability: “while policy change can be the effect 
of learning, learning can be present when outcomes appear to remain stable and not alter at all” 
(Dunlop, 2009, p. 296-297). This insight is also in line with the large number of contributions belonging 
to the game theoretical tradition which stress the effects of learning in iterated form, such as replicator 
dynamics, on institutional stability (Cheung and Friedman 1998; Mailath and Samuelson 2006). 
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2.4 Conclusions 
 
This chapter, drawing on the discussion of seminal contributions, has dealt with 
a number of conceptual and analytical issues related to the definition, venue, 
use, and explanatory nature and leverage of policy learning. It has highlighted 
that the locus of learning is the policy-specific interaction among actors and 
proposed to point the theoretical and empirical foci on it. It has then come up 
with a characterisation of learning as an ontological trait of policy making 
emerging in the context of policy specific interactions. Furthermore, it has 
posited that in order to investigate this ontology, typological analysis is 
necessary, that is, that modes of policy learning can work as epistemological 
keys of a learning-based ontology. The following chapter, looking again at the 
literature and drawing on the conceptual takeaways of this chapter, will build a 
measuring instrument based upon analytical dimensions of modes of learning 
and their scope conditions. The measuring instrument will then be employed to 
conduct typological analysis of the empirical case studies. 
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Chapter 3. Building on the literature: learning types and operationalization 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
After having provided a definition of policy learning and having elaborated on 
the related issues of how to conceptualise and measure learning in the previous 
chapter, the next challenge is how to model and then empirically investigate 
different typologies of policy learning. Within this domain of enquiry, the 
literature provides a recent and robust answer: Dunlop and Radaelli’s 2013 
systematic review. In Dunlop and Radaelli (2013), in fact, four major modes of 
learning (called also typologies, varieties, or genera) are clearly detected and 
analysed. That article goes beyond systematically reviewing the literature; the 
authors, in fact, also engage in an exercise of conceptual systematization which 
allows them to come up with the said set of four modes of learning. These 
modes of learning are abstract theoretical categories which, on the one hand, 
build upon the systematic analysis of previous contributions, and, on the other 
hand, are defined within a theoretically justified property space. Let us see how 
these modes are developed and how they lend themselves to the operational 
analytical framework conceptualised in the previous chapters and put forth in 
this one. 
As already argued in Chapter 1, my analytical strategy relies on these four 
modes of learning for cases’ specification, hence the need to come up with a 
“policy learning measuring instrument” as a tool for systematic typological 
analysis and empirical categorization. The question in this regard is how to 
demonstrate whether a case (i.e. a set of regime-specific policy interactions) 
presents one prevalent (underlying) mode of learning or another. The 
measuring instrument used to this end lists all the relevant components of 
modes of learning and sets out, for each mode, the specific scope conditions 
attached to it. As the research questions of this dissertation revolve around the 
detection of the case-specific modes of learning as a clue to read through the 
interactive process of regime implementation, the contribution of Dunlop and 
Radaelli provides me with a minimum set of analytical categories. However, to 
support in-depth, within-case empirical analysis, I will also have to enlarge their 
property space to allow it to cover other key constitutive dimensions. 
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For Radaelli and Dunlop (2013, p. 602) “there are two dimensions with which to 
construct a mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive explanatory typology of 
policy learning”. The first dimension is problem tractability (intended as a proxy 
of the level of uncertainty observed in the policy process), while the second is 
actors’ certification (intended as the legitimacy and authority of the actors 
involved in the policy process). The 2x2 property space generates four main 
learning types where scholarly contributions developed thus far in the field are 
plotted. The two dimensions that generate the four modes of learning are 
actors’ certification and problem tractability. These dimensions seemingly 
answer, respectively, the following questions: “who learns?” and “what is 
learned?”. They represent classical learning definitional elements and are also 
featured in the seminal review article from Bennett and Howlett (1992). 
These dimensions are indeed crucial. Nonetheless, they are only two out of 
many analytical components of modes of learning. Moreover, they were 
admittedly chosen by the authors for the sake of theoretical parsimony but 
cannot possibly subsume all the determinants of modes of learning. Thus, I 
seek other dimensions to enrich the overall picture. The key insight that drives 
me to this choice of learning dimensions/components is that learning is 
contingent on interaction and policy interaction is contingent on institutional 
features and actors or, to put it differently, that policy learning is mediated by 
the institutional structure within which policy interactions take place.  
To start with, the certification of actors informs us about who are the learning 
(and teaching) agents of a learning process. Beyond this aspect, I complement 
the agency component by further investigating the constellation and mode of 
interaction of the agents (see Table 3.1), following Heikkila and Gerlak (2013, p. 
491): “the social dynamics of a group, will shape whether, what and how 
information is disseminated [i.e. the typology of learning]”. But this does not fully 
inform about the “venue” of the learning process, that is, the (institutional) 
setting in which policy-specific interactions and learning processes take place. 
Hence, a further key aspect to consider when sorting out key analytical 
dimensions of modes of learning is the “where” question, that is, how the venue 
of the policy-specific interactions among actors can be characterised, or at 
which level the interaction is occurring (Jobert 2003; Borràs 2011; Heikkila and 
Gerlak 2013). Moreover, the venue of the policy interaction (whether horizontal 
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and informal or hierarchical and formal) also informs us more clearly about the 
mode of interaction of the actors – a crucial element of the learning process 
intended as an interactive phenomenon. 
Furthermore, the time dimension is also critical for learning processes, most of 
all under low tractability of policy problems (Stern 1997; Boin et al. 2009; 
Dunlop 2010). The resulting analytical dimension to be investigated embeds 
questions like the following: are the interactions mainly one-shot or iterated? 
How frequent and formalized are the interactions and their iterations? How 
much time is given to the actors to engage in the learning process? 
Finally, the “why” question has a prominent place in the literature (see for 
instance Gilardi and Radaelli 2012), but it loses salience in the light of the 
ontology depicted above. In fact, if learning is a pervasive, implicit, and at times 
even unintended dimension of policy making, what is the benefit of asking which 
factors move actors to learn? First, this dimension is arguably subsumed by the 
dimension of problem tractability, and second its relevance is significantly 
diminished by the usage of an analytical framework that sees both puzzling and 
powering as intertwined ontological dimensions of the policy process. Asking 
why actors learn would be like asking why actors engage in power and conflict. 
If these are ontologies of policy making they should be taken as axioms.  
To sum up, the property space of Dunlop and Radaelli is expanded by adding 
up the “where” and “when” questions and by qualifying more specifically (i.e. by 
focusing on interactive features) the “who” and “what” questions. This results in 
the five analytical dimensions portrayed in Table 1. 
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Table 3.1 Analytical dimensions of variation of the “Policy Learning Measuring 
Instrument” 
1. Variously certified and organized learning actors… 
Who learns? And who teaches?  Who are the learning actors, which is their certification and 
role in the learning process? How is the actor constellation shaped? What is the prevalent 
mode of interaction among actors? 
2… tackle differently tractable policy problems…  
What is learned?  What is the tractability of the problems faced in the policy interaction? 
What is the aim of learning? And, what is the content?26 
3… within various typologies of venues of interactions…  
Where does learning take place? What is the venue and mode of interaction among actors? 
Is it formal (hierarchically organized) or informal (horizontal and deliberative)? 
4...across different time-frames… 
When does learning take place? Are the interactions one-shot or iterated? How frequent 
and formalized are the iterations of the interactions? How much time is given to the actors 
to engage in the learning process? 
5…and influence, as a result of this causal sequence, the observed outcomes.  
What are the observable empirical implications of different modes of learning on the policy 
process and outcomes? 
 
Before we fill in each of these components with its mode-specific scope 
conditions, let us illustrate the four modes of Dunlop and Radaelli. Once we 
have done that, we will be able to introduce a proper “policy learning measuring 
instrument” with mode-specific scope conditions and expected implications.  
The four genera (henceforth, modes of learning) arising out of the property 
space built upon actors’ certification and problem tractability are shown in the 
following table. 
 
 
                                                          
26 This latter category can be extremely varied, spanning from new ideational repertoires and paradigms 
to technical knowledge, instrumental competences, increased strategic sophistication, etc. 
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Table 3.2 Modes of learning 
 
Source: Dunlop and Radaelli, 2013, p. 603 
 
Because different modes of learning may overlap at times, that is, a set of policy 
interactions that can be characterised by different underlying modes of learning, 
we should speak of a prevalent mode of learning for each of the empirical 
cases.  
 
3.2 Mode-specific scope conditions and empirical implications 
 
The following sections are devoted to filling in the analytical components of 
modes of policy learning sketched above with empirical scope conditions and 
expected implications specific to each of the modes of learning. 
 
3.2a Reflexive social learning 
 
This mode of learning has a prominent position in the literature. The majority of 
the earlier conceptualisations of learning arguably elaborate on some sort of 
social reflexive learning, in fact. The key references are Heclo’s political 
learning (1974), Hall’s social learning-third order change (1993), and May’s 
social policy learning (1992). Nonetheless, the interest toward this particular 
form of learning has not been limited to early conceptualisations. More recent 
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scholars also elaborated on typologies of learning that eventually belong to the 
variety of social reflexive learning (Checkel 2001; Grin and Loeber 2007; Sabel 
and Zeitlin 2008). 
To derive the scope conditions for reflexive social learning to be prevalent within 
a set of policy interactions I stick to the analytical dimensions developed and 
discussed previously. The same will be done for the other three modes of 
learning.  
To start with, who are the agents of learning under this mode? What is their 
certification? How is their constellation shaped?  
There seems to be little ambiguity on the fact that processes of social reflexive 
learning invest the macro-level of society-wide interactions and societal forces - 
especially in Heclo (1974), where learning is crucially driven by social forces. 
According to Bennett and Howlett (1992, p. 278), in social learning “state 
officials and societal actors are locked in a life-long and somewhat complex 
embrace in which they both determine each others’ activities, including 
learning”. Under this mode, then, learning is a process involving both political 
actors (politicians and bureaucrats) and societal groups (pressure/interest 
groups, advocacy groups, scientific experts, the media, etc.) that interact with 
each other in both specialized fora for discussion and in the public sphere at 
large (Hall 1993, p. 286-287). To understand actors’ certification, note that no 
actor enjoys the role of teacher: the process of knowledge exchange and 
elaboration takes place in a deliberative and argumentative manner and through 
efforts aimed at constructing preferences and identities through the learning 
process itself (Checkel 2001). Hence actors’ certification is low: each actor can 
learn from the other as there are no differences in certification that can lead to 
hierarchical roles within the learning process, nor pre-set rules for the 
production and utilization of knowledge (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013). Given the 
varied set of actors taking part in the learning process and their low certification, 
the actor constellation is hence horizontal and can even resemble a directly 
deliberative polyarchy (Cohen and Sabel 1997). Often the learning agents can 
also be conceptualised as being networked (Freeman 2006).  
What is the tractability of the problems tackled under reflexive social learning? 
What is the aim of learning under reflexivity? And, what is the content?  
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The policy problems typically faced by society-wide actors under reflexivity are 
characterised by low tractability. The horizontal and varied actor constellation 
described above originates in the uncertainty over the policy problem. In fact, 
when facing highly tractable policy problems, policy making actors have distinct 
preferences, they can clearly calculate the payoffs of different courses of action 
(Moravicsik 1999) and hence get engaged in distributive bargaining over policy 
outcomes. This restricts the learning process within political arenas organised 
around the power resources of the actors or actors’ coalition involved in the 
decisional process (Sabatier 1988). On the other hand, when decision making 
actors suffer of a knowledge gap with regard to a policy problem (i.e. when they 
face low problem tractability), the payoffs related to different policy options blur. 
Under these circumstances, political actors can be pressured or are willing to 
open their arenas to different social actors in order to create collective fora for 
problem solving (Checkel 2001; Jobert 2003). The aim of this constellation is 
then to produce non-incremental knowledge and discursive legitimacy to cope 
with the uncertainty stemming from the policy problem. In Hall’s third order 
change (1993) and in Heclo’s template, the society-wide processes of puzzling 
and problem solving generate new paradigms. The key is a shift in preferences, 
long-term goals, core beliefs, and even policy paradigms (Hall 1993, p. 283-
287; May 1992, p. 334) resulting from society-wide interactions aimed at dealing 
with ambiguous policy problems. Hence, the policy lesson that is collectively 
taught and learned under reflexivity, that is, the content of the learning 
interaction, is typically a new policy paradigm or, in less abstract terms, a 
change in “the hierarchy of goals behind the policy itself” (Hall 1993, p. 279), or 
a “new social construction of a policy or problem, […] a rethinking of the 
dominant view about fundamental aspects of a policy” (May 1992, p. 336-337), 
or, at a minimum, “a relatively enduring alteration in behavior that results from 
experience” (Heclo 1974, p. 306). 
A suitable example of reflexive social learning is the process of ideational 
convergence that led to the signature of Maastricht in 1992. For McNamara 
(1998), the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) core paradigm levitated 
during a period of twenty years in the context of a long-term switch from 
Keynesian ideas to varieties of monetarism, two devastating oil crises, the 
experience of the currency snake and a new global geopolitical equilibrium. 
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McNamara rightly observes that new ‘core ideas’ and paradigms are not a mere 
product of the mind. They have to be deployed in concrete historical 
experiences to solidify and be accepted through a process of wide ideational 
convergence. Moreover, unlike incremental and instrumental policy 
modifications, they have to go and actually went through a progressive learning 
process whereby the new paradigm emerges as a progressive refinement or 
rejection of the old one based on new knowledge production and exchange (in 
line with May’s social policy learning conceptualisation – 1992, p. 337-338). 
Reverting to the dimension of problem tractability, and again with regard to the 
EMU case, the policy solution to the monetary turbulences and instability 
following the collapse of Bretton Woods surely counts as an ambiguous policy 
problem (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). In the process that led to the 
convergence toward a monetarist and ordo-liberal paradigm that underpinned 
and substantiated the new Maastricht architecture, different domestic and 
supranational actors interacted in social and political fora to produce a paradigm 
shift (McNamara 1998). When the new paradigm finally emerged, the process 
of ideational convergence that led to it has been depicted as a fruit of collective 
puzzlement, trial-and-error dynamic (the experiences with the monetary snake 
and the European Monetary System), political entrepreneurship exerted by new 
learning agents (like the Delors Commission – see Verdun 1999), and opening 
opportunity windows (ibid.). In short, as a fruit of social learning. 
These considerations take us to the next components of the measuring 
instrument, that is, the time dimension and the venue of learning. In fact, we 
have just seen that reflexive social learning requires a long time horizon to take 
place (McNamara 1998; Dyson and Featherstone 1999). The actors must be 
free to iterate their interactions and to learn reflexively from them. The process 
of reflexive social learning is normally characterised by repeated interactions 
and subsequent reflection over these interactions and over the new knowledge 
produced and exchanged. Hence, besides a varied set of learning agents 
organized horizontally and dealing with ambiguous policy problems, the 
timeframe is also important for reflexivity to appear in collective decision-
making. 
The venues of these iterated interactions, due to the nature and certification of 
the actors involved, are extremely varied. They encompass informal preparatory 
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meetings among bureaucrats to inform formal negotiations, ad-hoc venues like 
committees and study groups filled by experts, public consultation exercises 
with policy stakeholders, conferences and debates featuring societal groups 
and decision makers, policy dialogue, and governance settings open to the 
public spheres (Hall 1993 p. 286). Importantly, the puzzling exercise must not 
be limited to experts, bureaucrats, or politicians but also has to involve 
organized interest groups and the public at large. The crucial and common 
features of these venues is that they do not configure as closed arenas for 
political conflict but rather as socially inclusive fora for open for discussion and 
mutual persuasion (Jobert 2003). 
Finally, what are the expected implications of a process of social reflexive 
learning over the policy outcomes? Arguably, a policy change investing 
technical details of instruments of a policy is not enough to attach an 
explanatory power to the reflexive learning process. For this to be claimed, in 
line with the content of this mode of learning, a major preference and paradigm 
shift, and a value change, have to be observed (Hall 1993; Bennett and Howlett 
1992; Gilardi and Radaelli 2012). Furthermore, the more the new paradigm is 
informed by the knowledge produced in the context of the policy interactions, 
the more the mode of learning can be accounted for as a relevant explanatory 
mechanism of policy change (May 1992). 
Another likely effect of a reflexive social mode of learning is experimentation 
and policy innovation (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008). The policy area invested by such 
modes of learning can be subject to paradigmatic change, but can also involve 
innovative and experimental policy tools. It follows that an observable 
implication of reflexive social learning is that it is often accompanied by and/or 
brings about non-hierarchical governance arrangements that are supportive and 
fruits of social experimentation and grassroots innovation (Radaelli 2008). 
Hence, we also expect a change in the institutional structure of a policy, besides 
in its key goals and paradigms. An example of the type of governance 
arrangement consistent with social reflexive learning is the architecture of the 
Open Method of Coordination in the EU (Radaelli 2003; Borràs and Radaelli 
2010). 
To sum up, under reflexivity learning takes place through a horizontal process 
of argumentative and discursive socialization that involves a varied set of 
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political and social actors generating and exchanging knowledge within formal 
and informal fora for collective problem solving. In this type there is low problem 
tractability, hence the prevailing ambiguity about the policy problem and content 
of learning, and low actors’ certification. The nature of the actors’ constellation 
is horizontal and polyarchic. The mode of interaction is cooperative and 
deliberative. The content of this mode of learning, what is learned, is typically a 
novel policy paradigm (sometimes accompanied by specific institutional 
vehicles) and/or a stable re-orientation of core policy values and goals. 
 
3.2b Epistemic learning 
 
Learning through epistemic communities is the classic model of top-down, 
expertocratic learning seminally conceptualised by Haas (1992). Also Rose’s 
lesson drawing (1991), in its non-coercive version, counts as an epistemic 
mode of learning, as well as May’s instrumental learning (1992, p. 335-337), 
which arguably belongs to this variety. More recent studies employing the 
concept of epistemic learning are Radaelli’s article on informed policy transfer 
(2000), Dunlop’s and James’s principal-agent model (2007), and Stone’s 
investigation of transnational networks (2008). 
Again following on from the analytical dimensions of Table 1 above, let us 
discover who the agents of learning of the epistemic mode are, how their 
constellation is shaped, how they interact, what sort of policy problems are 
typically faced, and what the resulting content of the learning process is. 
To start with, this mode of learning involves low problem tractability, like the 
reflexivity mode, but the ambiguity of the policy problem and subsequent 
uncertainty are not framed within a horizontal actor constellation but rather in a 
vertical one where knowledge is mainly controlled and produced by highly 
certified, epistemic, knowledge-based actors and exchanged with non-epistemic 
(mainly political) actors: “knowledge is deployed by a limited set of expert actors 
to narrow discussion” (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013, p. 603). Typically, the set of 
experts is embedded in the policy interaction through a direct appointment by 
political actors. The agents of learning are hence both political actors (politicians 
and bureaucrats) as learners, and policy experts or scientists - often coming 
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from the academic world - as teachers. Under Rose’s (1991) lesson-drawing 
paradigm, in its non-coercive form, epistemic communities offer expert advice. 
They are the key certified agents through which lessons from international or 
domestic experiences are conveyed to the policy makers. The constellation 
resulting from this “division of labour” is hence vertical and hierarchical as for 
the control and production of knowledge (Dunlop 2009). The typical mode of 
interaction is top-down, resembling teacher-learner or principal-agent relations 
(Dunlop and James 2007). To draw a parallel with reflexivity, problems under 
epistemic learning are also ambiguous, but the outcome of this ambiguity is not 
socialization but rather specialization. Epistemic actors also feature in the set of 
learning agents typical of reflexivity, but in that setting they are just a voice 
among many and they do not enjoy a specific and higher certification that 
locates them within an authoritative position with respect to other actors. Under 
the epistemic mode, such certification for expert actors exists, resulting in a 
vertical, top-down constellation deliberately set up by the political actors.  
What does lead political actors to open the policy process to non-
political/bureaucratic specialized actors? Following Dunlop (2009), they key 
driver of the specialization of the policy process is that political and bureaucratic 
actors face a knowledge gap with respect to some aspects of a policy. 
Epistemic actors are called in to fill that gap. Another key driver of the 
involvement of epistemic actors in the policy process is the emergence of a 
crisis (Stern 1997; Boin et al. 2009). In practice, political actors do not know 
which course of action to choose (low problem tractability) and hence “hire” 
epistemic actors as teachers to collect new evidence, disclose cause-effect 
relations, inform policy instrumentation, and ultimately provide legitimacy to the 
decisional process (Haas 1992, p. 15). Under reflexivity, the main reasons for 
socialization are ambiguity, the overarching nature of the policy problem and the 
need to seek for new paradigms arising out and legitimated by public discourse. 
Instead, under the epistemic mode, the policy problem remains ambiguous but 
its nature is arguably less all-encompassing. Dunlop (2009, p. 294) rightly 
elaborates on the difference between problems revolving around substantive 
policy detail (i.e. the technical/instrumental aspect of a policy) and policy 
makers’ beliefs (the ideational paradigm underpinning that policy). Drawing on 
this distinction, epistemic actors are characteristically called in to inform 
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instrumental aspects of a policy problem rather than policy makers’ deep beliefs 
about that policy. This is reflected in a content of learning that is sometimes a 
technical solution to a specific problem (like in Hall’s second order change and 
in May’s instrumental learning), rather than a paradigmatic shift. Nonetheless, 
the change of substantive and technical aspects of a policy may also underpin 
(or trigger) paradigmatic change, hence we need to be cautious about the 
scope of the impact of epistemic lessons and processes on policy outcomes.  
This leads us to the content of epistemic learning. New knowledge, typically in 
the form of ‘lessons’, is produced by epistemic actors on the grounds of 
scientific authority and evidence-based arguments. At times, as already pointed 
out, what is learned is not a new paradigm but rather a new instrument 
underpinning an ad-hoc evidence-based expertocratic lesson that is drawn by 
political actors. In Rose (1991, p. 3) it is also argued that the members of the 
(transnational, in this case) epistemic communities are fully responsible for any 
learning observed in the process. Indeed, a great deal of the literature on policy 
transfer implicitly deals with an epistemic mode of learning, most of all when 
non-coercive transfer is involved (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). As already 
argued, these lessons are characterised by a technical and instrumental nature 
but at times, under specific circumstances, they can also feed a new overall 
policy paradigm (most of all under crisis conditions). As proved by Dunlop 
(2009), vis-à-vis the ideal typical Haasian stylization of an epistemic learning 
where the teaching actors not only inform the whole policy process but 
somehow legitimate it normatively and steer it filling an overarching policy 
makers’ knowledge gap (Haas, 1992), instances where the role of epistemic 
communities is more limited are also common. In fact, given the 
multidimensionality of policy domains and of the related puzzles, epistemic 
actors can be called in to fill more limited and specific knowledge gaps resulting 
in a lesser influence on the overall aspect of a policy and a focused impact on 
substantive policy details. 
The specialized venues of the knowledge production and exchange processes, 
the classrooms where the policy lessons are drawn by non-epistemic learners, 
have been conceptualised as “policy laboratories” (Volden 2008), as opposed to 
arenas suitable for bargaining (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013 and 2017) and open 
horizontal fora typical of reflexivity. Stark instances of these laboratories and of 
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their working are experts’ consultation under Regulatory Impact Assessments 
(RIAs), study groups/task forces appointed on ad-hoc terms by political 
principals (for a topical example concerning the EU see the role of the De 
Larosiere High Level Group in shaping the new framework of financial 
regulation – Savona and Oldani 2011), delegation of power to independent 
authorities and agencies, and the policy dialogue taking place between states 
and international organizations of technical nature such as, to a certain extent, 
the International Monetary Fund (Meseguer Yebra 1999) and the World Health 
Organization (Kickbush 2002). 
Nonetheless, epistemic communities can be called in to fill larger existential 
gaps in political actors’ knowledge or understanding. In those cases, the content 
and venue of the epistemic learning process can resemble one of reflexivity, 
hence a major shift in the paradigm underlying the policy developed in social 
fora is expected as a product of the learning process, as well as a new 
institutional arrangement. This can be the case of policy making under acute 
crises. In these instances, the “crisis” can work as crucial intervening variable 
and trigger epistemic learning processes, as we shall see in Chapters 6 and 7, 
and much more so in Chapter 8. 
The time dimension of this mode is shorter vis-à-vis reflexive learning. Often the 
interaction between learning and epistemic actors is confined to a limited 
number of experts’ consultations (whether formal or informal) and to the 
discussion of white books and reports produced by the epistemic communities 
within workshops, policy dialogue events, and hearings of experts. The policy 
interactions can be iterated, but the time for reflexivity is not fully available due 
to an urgent need to cope with a substantive policy problem. This configures a 
shorter time horizon for epistemic learning. 
Finally, what are the expected implications of a mode of epistemic learning on 
the policy process and outcomes? If the aim of the epistemic learning process is 
often an evidence-based increase in learners’ intelligence aimed at solving a 
concrete policy problem, an innovative policy instrumentation, largely drawing 
on the process of expert knowledge accumulation and elaboration, is the 
expected outcome of the epistemic mode. In Rose’s interpretation, program 
goals remain stable and the quest for new policy lessons does not involve the 
adoption of new goals and value changes (Rose 1991). Instead, epistemic 
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learning involves an instrumental growth in intelligence and effectiveness (ibid.; 
Etheredge, 1985). It follows that epistemic learning can influence the policy 
outcomes informing the development of innovative technical or institutional 
solutions which are discovered and legitimated by a quasi-scientific, evidence-
based process of learning. Hence, implications of epistemic learning can be 
found in both the process and the policy outcomes (also in terms of new 
institutional arrangements).  
To sum up, epistemic learning implies a clear differentiation between low 
certified political/bureaucratic actors and highly certified expert actors, 
configuring a vertical actor constellation and teacher/learner mode of interaction 
(Haas 1992; Dunlop and James 2007). The “principals” of learning are both 
political actors (politicians and bureaucrats) in the role of interested learners, 
while the “agents” are policy experts or scientists - often coming from the 
academic world - in the role of teachers. Although there is variance within the 
epistemic mode (depending on whether the policy puzzle is overarching or more 
limited in scope), a common trait is that the policy problem is particularly 
ambiguous and its tractability low, hence the need to (sort of) “hire” experts and 
involve them in the policy process. 
Combining these two elements, the resulting content of learning typically 
revolves around technical, albeit sophisticated, policy solutions or instrumental 
policy tools. This content eminently aims to improve the problem solving 
capacity of the decision makers though newly acquired, evidence-based 
knowledge. Yet, at times, and most of all under crisis conditions, the content of 
learning can also consist in more profound and paradigmatic lessons. The 
timeframe of the epistemic interactions is shorter that that allowed in reflexivity, 
and the venues of such interactions are specialized and ad-hoc laboratories as 
opposed to the open fora observed under reflexive social learning. Finally, the 
key expected implication of this modality on policy processes and outcomes is 
that of a phenomenon of lesson-drawing. This means that the content of the 
learning process is expected to strongly inform and substantially shape the new 
policy instrumentation and/or the new institutional setting. 
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3.2c Learning via bargaining 
 
Learning via bargaining is the mode of learning under which knowledge 
production and exchange take place as a by-product of strategic interactions of 
self-interested actors (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013, p. 610). This mode leads us to 
policy domains characterised by high problem tractability, hence to ordinary, 
“every day policymaking” (Hall 1993, p. 279), as opposed to the policy areas 
characterised by ambiguity typical of reflexive and epistemic modes of learning. 
The domains of bargaining, due to high problem tractability, are also 
characterised by stable and predictable payoffs related to the different courses 
of action available to the decision making actors, crucially bringing about the 
strategic interplay of the latter. 
Whereas for the reflexive and epistemic modes the learning process is an 
intended product of the policy interaction, which is informed by and builds upon 
the problem solving imperative spawned by low problem tractability, as for 
learning under bargaining and under the shadow of hierarchy, learning is 
principally a by-product of the policy process. The latter, being contingent on 
unambiguous policy problems and choices which lead to assured distributional 
gains or losses for the actors, is eminently strategic, rather than oriented toward 
the policy problem. Hence, broadly speaking, the learning process within this 
kind of interaction revolves around increasing the strategic knowledge and 
sophistication of the actors (see: Sabatier 1988, p. 144-146 and 151; May 1992, 
p. 339) rather than being oriented at problem-solving. 
In the literature, modes of learning characterised by high problem tractability 
and strategic interactions among actors are often conceptualised as instances 
of political learning, as opposed to policy learning (May 1992; Gilardi 2010). The 
key reference in the political science literature is indeed May’s political learning 
(1992) but also Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework (1988) and Hall’s first 
and second-order changes (1993) can be seen instances of learning via 
bargaining. Moreover, the learning processes taking place within strategic 
landscapes are also the explicit object of evolutionary and behavioural 
economics and of game theorists (Fudenberg and Levine 1998; Friedman 1999; 
Mailath and Samuelson 2006).  
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Learning under bargaining (and under the shadow of hierarchy, as we shall see 
in the following sub-section) is an implicit by-product of the policy interaction 
rather than a constitutive component of it. This, as we shall see, has striking 
consequences most of all on the content of learning and on its observable 
implications over the policy outcomes. This is because of the eminently 
strategic and power-based nature of the policy interaction under bargaining 
(and under the shadow of hierarchy). As a result, the observable implications of 
these learning mechanisms will crucially be mediated by the preponderance of 
the strategic, powering content of the policy-specific interactions. 
To follow the key analytical dimensions of the “policy learning measuring 
instrument”, under learning via bargaining problem tractability is high, as 
already pointed out above. The actors involved in this form of learning include 
both political/bureaucratic agents with high official and formal certification, as 
well as informally certified actors entitled to take part in the bargaining. Given 
the high problem tractability of the policy problem, they are fully informed about 
the distributive consequences of the various policy options (i.e. about the 
different payoffs), and hence bargain over them with the other policy 
stakeholders. As exposed by Dunlop and Radaelli (2013, p. 611), “the actors 
involved in the process set their own goals – they are strategic about where 
they want to go with their learning process”. The certification of these self-
interested, fully informed actors is hence low as the policy interactions and 
processes neither take place within an explicit hierarchical structure, nor within 
a teacher/learning relationship where an actor enjoys legitimate control of 
knowledge production and dissemination. Therefore, diverse sets of actors 
(sometimes conceptualised as advocacy coalitions embedding 
political/bureaucratic actors, interest groups, social players and informal actors) 
fully engage in horizontal distributional bargaining and in “loosely coupled” 
learning. The lack of a hierarchical structure leads actors to explore the Pareto-
frontier and update their beliefs when new information is generated within the 
bargaining process (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013 and 2017). Nonetheless, 
different actors and groups of actors are endowed with different resources and 
bargaining power and their distribution can work as an implicit hierarchical 
power structure. The resulting actor constellation is asymmetric and strategic 
and the mode of interaction, depending on actors’ resources, preferences, and 
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iterations of the policy interactions, can span from cooperative to purely 
adversarial.  
A well-known conceptualisation of these bargaining actors, their constellation, 
venues of interaction and content of learning is the advocacy coalition 
framework (Sabatier 1988). Advocacy coalitions are broad clusters of agents 
kept together by the sharing of a common beliefs’ system. Even though this 
framework also covers those (rare) instances when core beliefs of the learning 
agents (i.e. the advocacy coalitions) change as a product of social learning, the 
key mechanism underpinning the working of an advocacy coalition is that of 
strategic bargaining. Under this paradigm, actors value their core beliefs, seek 
to advance them in the policy outcomes and, while bargaining over them, learn 
about and update “near core beliefs” and secondary aspects of the policy rather 
than adopting new core beliefs, echoing Hall’s distinction among different orders 
of change. Near core beliefs and secondary aspects of a policy hinge on the 
political strategy and on the policy tools that allow actors to achieve their deep 
core beliefs - indeed, “policy-oriented learning is an ongoing process of search 
and adaptation motivated by the desire to realize core policy beliefs” (ibid., p. 
151, emphasis added). This interpretation, as already said, strongly chimes with 
Hall’s orders of change and, most of all, with May’s characterisation of policy 
learning as opposed to political learning. The latter, in fact, like Sabatier’s 
policy-oriented learning, involves a process aimed at improving the strategic 
sophistication in advocacy of the policy actors (May 1992, p. 336 and 339). 
Under this mode of learning, problem solving incentives are curtailed by high 
problem tractability, hence the content of learning is not based on substantive 
features of the policy problem but rather on improving the attainment of own 
goals (Sabatier 1988, p. 133 and 149-150). It is in this sense that the content of 
this mode of learning can hence be accounted for as political learning (May, 
1992), that is, an increase strategic sophistication, a heightened capacity to 
explore the Pareto-frontier, or a strategic update determined by the iterated 
nature of the policy interactions (as suggested by the game theory literature).  
This form of learning typically takes place within both institutionalized and 
informal policy arenas (May 1992, p. 339), arguably characterised by 
cumulative distributive conflicts (Dunlop and Radaelli 2016, p. 112). One can 
think of tripartite bargaining, the negotiations over the EU budget, and 
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intergovernmental deals as fitting examples of the actors typically involved and 
their venues of interaction. 
The time frame of the interactions taking place under bargaining is salient. In 
fact, given the strategic nature of the policy process, actors will act and react 
very differently on the basis of the fact that their interaction is a single-shot or a 
repeated one. Single-shot interactions provide incentives for non-cooperative 
strategies and exploitation, whereas the iteration of the interactions provides, in 
theory, incentives for evolutionary stable strategies based on mutual adaptation 
and long-term cooperation under the shadow of time. These latter outcomes 
can resemble those of partisan mutual adjustment (Lindblom 1965). Typically, 
learning via bargaining can be observed in the context of repeated interactions. 
This is because the most likely effect on the policy outcomes of the mode of 
learning vie bargaining is mutual strategic adaptation, and hence stability or 
incremental change that are not observable in one-shot games.  
According to May (1992, p. 339), “the prima facie evidence for political learning 
consists of policy advocates’ change in political strategy”. Sabatier (1988) has a 
slightly more nuanced view as regards to the implication of this form of strategic 
learning. Under his paradigm, in fact, the key implication of learning via 
bargaining is not limited to the increase of strategic capacity of the actors in the 
bargaining phase but also extends to new techniques and processes learned by 
the advocacy coalition to improve the policy. Nonetheless, the improvement of 
the policy is only partially substantive and objective as it is always mediated by 
the coalition’s aim to effectively implement core beliefs. This also suggests that 
this modality of learning is suited to account for dysfunctional learning seen as 
“endarkenment” (Dunlop and Radaelli 2016 and 2017).  
To sum up, learning via bargaining is a form of unintended learning observed 
when political and non-political actors bargain over policy options that lead to 
certain distributional consequences due to the high tractability of the policy 
problem. These actors are not framed within a power or learning vertical 
structure, hence their constellation is horizontal and their mode of interaction is 
strategic. Learning emerges as a by-product of repeated strategic interaction 
within political arenas and consists in political learning intended as increased 
advocacy and strategic sophistication, that is, an increased capacity to attain 
own core policy goals. The effects of this mode of learning on the policy 
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processes and outcomes point toward incrementalism, mutual adaptation and 
partisan adjustment (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013 and 2017). 
 
3.2d Learning in the shadow of hierarchy 
 
Learning in the shadow of hierarchy is strongly contingent on the strategic and 
coercive nature of the policy interactions and on institutional rules and 
procedures. In fact, it is the shadow of hierarchy itself that structures the 
interactions among actors and this has obvious impacts on learning. First, also 
under the shadow, the actors’ focus on puzzling/learning is not explicit, as the 
powering dimension is the salient one (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013 and 2017). 
Second, like under bargaining, learning is a by-product of actors’ mutual 
adaptation within strategic interactions over highly tractable policy problems but 
the presence of a hierarchical institutional structure also creates further 
pressure for actors to “learn how to comply” to rules, targets and procedures 
(Chayes and Chayes 1993). The shadow of hierarchy, in fact, can be 
conceptualised as a normative power structure mandating behaviours within 
which the actors are locked in by consent or coercion (ibid.). International policy 
regimes are suitable and common examples of the hierarchical setting. Under 
this setting, actors are not placed horizontally but their constellation is vertical 
and organized around the aforementioned rules of the policy regime and the 
roles mandated by the hierarchy, hence they cannot fully engage in distributive 
bargaining. 
The literature dealing with the shadow of hierarchy and its effects is now mature 
(see, as key references, Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008; Börzel 2010), but the 
learning processes taking place under the shadow have been understudied, to 
be generous. Nonetheless, it is possible to consider some conceptualisations of 
policy learning as implicitly moving within that shadow. I refer, namely, to 
Etheredge’s “government learning” (1985) and to the part of the lesson-drawing 
and diffusion literature dealing with coercive or quasi-coercive policy transfer 
(Marsh and Dolowitz 1996; Radaelli 2000; Weyland 2005). 
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To characterise the empirical scope conditions that we expect to qualify the 
analytical components of learning under the shadow of hierarchy, I begin by 
elaborating on the “what” and “who” questions.  
Policy problems in the hierarchal mode are highly tractable and actors are 
clearly detected in terms of roles and resource availability thanks to the 
presence of formal and hierarchical institutional structures and rules. Under this 
mode, high problem tractability means, similarly to the bargaining modality, that 
the actors are fully informed of the consequences and payoffs of the different 
courses of action they can take in the policy process (Moravcsik 1999). 
Nonetheless, their constellation is not horizontal like under bargaining, but 
vertical and organized around institutional roles and rules. This constrains the 
set of actors solely to governmental, highly certified political actors (Etheredge 
1985) or to a set of institutional actors clearly indicated by the policy regime’s 
rules. Under extreme hierarchical conditions, the participation of the actors can 
even be compulsory (Scharpf 1988). Within this framework, “there is a kind of 
teacher-learner relationship, but this has less to do with specific actors (such as 
the experts, the scientist, etc.) and more with the content of institutional rules. 
Institutions ‘teach’ roles via socialisation and/or are channels through which 
rules are taught to the actors in the system of interaction” (Dunlop and Radaelli 
2013, p. 612).  
Arguably, another feature of the hierarchical actor constellation is that it involves 
the presence of agents posed at different levels, like in a multilevel governance 
system. Within this constellation, we observe the presence of highly certified 
actors who stay at both the top and at the bottom of the hierarchical structure, 
with the former commanding the rules of the game and often working as 
monitors. Importantly, the shadow and the implicit vertical constellation it 
determines must not necessarily be fruit of the presence of courts or of the 
embedment of the policy process within the delegation chain. Indeed the 
shadow refers more generally to “political institutions that, when present, can 
either provide ‘rules of the game’ (in the sense of the rational-choice version of 
the shadow articulated by Scharpf) or codes, identities, collective memories, 
lock-in mechanisms and roles.” (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013, p. 612). One can 
think of the role of the European Commission in economic policy surveillance, of 
the role of international organizations imposing legal obligations or 
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recommendations to independent states, or of domestic policy makers 
implementing EU legislation. The resulting mode of interaction, therefore, 
resembles that of a monitoring game (Mailath and Samuelson 2006) based 
upon conditionality and potential sanctioning of non-compliant behaviours. It 
follows suit from this line of reasoning and from the high tractability of the policy 
problems that the content of learning can be either an increased strategic 
sophistication in breaching the rules of the institutional policy interaction (most 
of all when compliance is costly and the incentive structure is insufficient to 
induce it) or an increased capacity to follow the rules, i.e. learning how to 
comply to conditionality requirements (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). 
The venues of this mode of learning are typically formal and strongly 
institutionalized. Again, a suitable example is the annual submission of 
information regarding fiscal policy performance from EU Member States to the 
Eurogroup and the EU Commission. This submission of information results in a 
mutual monitoring exercise carried out first informally (i.e. behind the closed 
doors of the Eurogroup meetings) and then formally (i.e. within the structures 
and official procedures of the Commission, and eventually of the Ecofin 
Council). Nonetheless, these arenas are only open to internal contestation and 
do not foresee any presence of a role for non-political social or epistemic actors. 
As for the time frame, these policy interactions are customarily iterated and 
framed with the shadow of time besides that of hierarchy (Mailath and 
Samuelson 2006).  
As for the expected implications of this mode of learning, they strongly depend 
on the incentive structure attached to the hierarchical arrangement. Thus, on 
the one hand, with sound incentives that sustain a cooperative mode of 
interaction, conditionality and hierarchical traits of the policy interaction, they 
can become healthy and imply learning to comply to rules and cope with 
instructions. On the other hand, compliance can be systematically curtailed by 
improper strategic incentives leading to the defection of rules, joint-decision 
traps and political/strategic learning or learning how to defect without retaliation. 
It follows that the key expected implication of a process of learning in the 
shadow of hierarchy, depending on the nature of that learning, is yet again 
institutional continuity or change.  
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To sum up, learning under the shadow of hierarchy takes place as a by-product 
of rule compliance and thanks to systemic pressure exerted by conditionality 
requirements. The learning actors are fully political and are organized in a 
vertical hierarchical constellation. Depending on their preferences and structural 
incentives, they can equally be pushed to learn on the process of compliance or 
to learn how to defect to the rules of the policy regime. Problem tractability is 
high as the rules of the game are broadly shared and fully known. The content 
of learning, as well as its impact on the policy outcomes, is improved process-
based capacity to “play the game”, whether to defect or to comply with its rules. 
Again, the learning process does not involve learning about substantive, 
ideational aspects of a policy but learning about its process of implementation. 
The most likely observable effect of learning is on the grounds of institutional 
continuity or change due to the “lessons” learned or, to put it differently, on the 
grounds of reinforced, instrumental process-based compliance or sustainable 
defection. 
 
3.3 Powering over puzzling? 
 
Whereas under the reflexive and epistemic modes learning is an intended 
product of the policy interaction (which is informed by and builds upon the 
problem solving imperative spawned by low problem tractability), in learning 
under bargaining and under the shadow of hierarchy learning is principally a by-
product of the policy process. The latter, revolving around unambiguous policy 
problems and choices which lead to clear distributional gains or losses for the 
actors, is eminently strategic, rather than oriented toward puzzlement and 
problem solving. As a result, learning within these kinds of processes is mainly 
about increasing the strategic knowledge and sophistication of the actors. In this 
light, the analytical components of actor constellations and modes of interaction 
(see analytical component 1 in Table 1) gain particular prominence. Their 
characterisation, in fact, serves the purpose of shedding light not only on the 
puzzling/learning dimension of the policy interaction but also on the strategic 
one. Like this, modes of learning can also be considered as mechanisms able 
to successfully subsume strategic, institutional and ideational features (Beach 
and Pedersen 2013, p. 53) in a single template. This, as we shall see diffusely 
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in chapters 4 and 5, has important implications for the degree and typology of 
explanatory leverage of modes of learning in strategic settings. Since 
mechanisms of learning are in fact contingent on and sensitive to actor 
constellation and problem tractability, it can be anticipated that they will be able 
to properly subsume the strategic implications of policy arenas characterised by 
distributional conflict within the modality of “learning in the shadow of hierarchy” 
and, of course, “learning via bargaining”. These modes of learning indeed 
predict instrumental and hierarchical learning on the one hand, but also 
dysfunctional learning (e.g. learning how to defy rules or how to comply with 
them formally, but not substantially) on the other. In other words, the 
implications/expected empirical manifestations of hierarchical and bargaining-
driven modes of learning are not necessarily oriented toward improved 
compliance or better a regime’s outcomes, but are also suited to reinforce 
powering dynamics (see for instance the unsatisfactory implementation of the 
SGP as a case of “learning via bargaining”, where actors learned how to escape 
and overturn the regime’s rules). 
In more general terms, the fact that the measuring instrument is constructed to 
also carefully account for the strategic nature of agency allows the achievement 
of the supposedly arduous blending of two analytical dimensions that seem to 
be far from each other in ontological and epistemological terms. This is to be 
seen as a fruitful attempt to overcome the limitations and shortcomings of both 
ideational and interest-driven literature, according to a classical view that 
interprets the puzzling and powering dimensions of policy making as intertwined 
and interdependent (Heclo 1974). 
Like this, my analytical infrastructure, that puts the ideational/puzzling 
dimension of policy making at center stage but does not disregard its powering 
and institutional nature, is suited to also account for complementary causal 
forces – like those that most likely emerge in policy regimes characterised by a 
prevalence of the strategic dimension. This is because this study 
conceptualises learning as one potential explanatory trait of the policy process 
but it equally acknowledges the causal importance of the strategic dimension, 
posing powering and puzzling in a dialectic mutual relationship. Scope 
conditions for different modes of learning in fact emerge from the complex 
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interaction between different analytical components that revolve around a 
comprehensive understanding of the policy process.  
 
The common claim that rational-choice, power-based explanations are mutually 
exclusive with respect to ideational and learning-based ones is to be rejected. In 
fact, this view disregards both scholarship and common sense. With regard to 
the former, for instance, the whole rationale and experimental findings of 
behavioural economics draws extensively, yet within game theory models that 
are driven by rationality assumptions, on the concept of variable preferences 
due to game repetition and underlying learning processes (Fudenberg and 
Levine 1998; Cheung and Friedman 1998). The same can be said with regard 
to the literature on Bayesian learning. In a seminal contribution from Herbert 
Simon (1955), the latter is elegantly integrated within a rational choice paradigm 
spawning an extremely rich strand of the literature that is still flourishing now 
(Weyland 2005; Braun and Gilardi 2006; Meseguer 2009). As for the latter, the 
idea that assumptions of full rationality and learning processes (that can be as 
much ideational as they are instrumental) are not only “reconcilable” concepts 
but are even germane constructs, should be commonsensical: what is more 
rational (and self-interested) than learning from previous experiences, from 
other agents, from new evidence, whether to better achieve own goals or to 
improve problem solving capacities?  
 
Finally, merging rational-choice explanatory motives with a learning-informed 
perspective can benefit both rational-choice and policy learning scholarships. 
As for the former, embedding learning in rational accounts allows us to make 
sense of shifts in the preferences of the actors, easing one of the major 
limitations of rational-choice institutionalism (Checkel 2001). It also induces us 
to focus more on agency, whereas rational-choice theorizations are blamed as 
being overly deterministic and centered on structural traits (Schmidt 2006). With 
regard to the learning literature, conceptualising scope conditions of modes of 
policy learning as also being contingent on the strategic dimension allows us to 
depart from a normative-laden vision whereby learning systematically improves 
policy outcomes. 
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3.4 Conclusions 
 
Table 3 below, drawing on the review of the four modes of learning performed in 
Section 2 of this chapter, characterises the specific scope conditions attached 
to each analytical dimension of the four modes of policy learning, hence 
constituting the “policy learning measuring instrument”. This table represents 
the key analytical tool for the sake of the empirical analysis of the case studies 
which is grounded in a design based upon policy learning as an ontology of 
policy making and modes of policy learning (intended as causal mechanisms) 
as the epistemological key underpinning that ontology. 
 
Table 3.3 Scope conditions of the “Policy Learning Measuring Instrument”  
 
 Who What Where When Expected 
implications on 
policy outcomes 
Social 
reflexive 
Societal and 
political actors 
with mixed 
certifications 
organized 
horizontally and 
mainly through a 
cooperative/delibe
rative form of 
interaction 
Complex 
and 
uncertain 
policy 
problems 
Social fora 
for 
deliberation 
Repeated 
interaction 
over long 
periods of time 
Experimentation, 
third-order and 
belief/paradigmati
c change 
Epistemic Expert and 
political actors 
with high 
certification 
organized 
vertically in a 
teacher-learner 
relation 
Complex 
and 
uncertain 
policy 
problems 
requiring 
expert 
advice 
Technical/ins
titutionalized 
policy 
venues 
Normally 
taking place 
over limited 
time-frames 
Epistemic inputs 
shape policy and 
policy making 
prompting both 
first, second and 
third-order change 
Bargaining Actors with low 
official 
certification, but 
using their 
resources to 
interact 
strategically, 
hence 
reproducing 
different degrees 
of certification and 
potentially both 
“Every day 
policy 
making”27 
Arenas for 
multilateral 
bargaining 
Potentially 
infinitely 
iterated 
interactions 
Increased 
strategic 
sophistication, 
mutual partisan 
adjustment, first 
and second order 
change 
                                                          
27 Hall (1993). 
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horizontal and 
vertical 
constellations 
 
Hierarchical Highly certified 
actors organized 
vertically and 
interacting 
through 
formalized rules 
“Every day 
policy 
making”28 
Rule-based, 
institutional 
venues 
Potentially 
infinitely 
iterated 
interactions 
Instrumental 
learning, learning 
“how to comply” 
(or defect), first 
and second-order 
change 
 
To summarize and proceed with the case studies, this chapter has dealt with 
the task of constructing an analytical tool to categorize different modes of 
learning according to a number of analytical components and predicted scope 
conditions. It has done this inductively, that is, by reviewing established modes 
of learning and key empirical contributions in the field of policy learning. In 
particular, drawing on modes of learning developed in the context of a recent 
systematic review (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013), the chapter has come up with a 
series of analytical components of modes of learning and with a systematic 
“policy learning measuring instrument” characterised by mode-specific scope 
conditions and observable implications on policy outcomes. The four modes of 
learning - systematized with the help of the measuring instrument’s approach - 
will be the key epistemological tools used to categorize the empirical cases and 
to “measure” the influence of different modes of learning (intended as causal 
mechanisms – see Chapter 1) in terms of their effects on policy outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28 Hall (1993). 
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Chapter 4. Fiscal policy coordination in Stage II of EMU: Learning in the 
shadow of hierarchy 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The Treaty of Maastricht, officially known as the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), is an international agreement negotiated between 1989 and 1992 by the 
then twelve Member States of the European Communities (EC). Entered into 
legal force in 1993, it was and still is commonly considered as the most 
substantial leap of the EC toward a fuller economic and political integration 
(Baun 1995; Dyson and Featherstone 1999). The TEU, besides creating a 
brand new supranational institution (the European Union – EU) which legally 
substituted the Communities, also inaugurated the so called three pillars 
structure of the EU. Most importantly for this investigation, it set up a process of 
economic and institutional convergence meant to lead, through successive 
stages, to a monetary union.  
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the supranational regime subsuming the 
set of economic and administrative criteria, soft and hard rules, and institutions 
established by the TEU and successive treaties to achieve and govern the EU’s 
monetary unification and the broad economic convergence among the Member 
States, is the unavoidable starting point of any investigation concerning fiscal 
policy coordination within the EU. Although the nexus between stricter 
economic integration, monetary coordination/unification, and domestic fiscal 
policies had surfaced several other times in the history of European integration 
(most prominently in the famous 1977 MacDougall Report), the TEU, and in 
particular the convergence criteria established for the convergence process, 
represents a strong lever for a stricter coordination of national fiscal policies at 
the EU level. This is the key motivating reason for starting the empirical 
investigation by looking at the policy regime stemming from the fiscal criteria 
embedded in the EMU convergence process. EMU convergence process is 
therefore my first case study.  
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The empirical scope of the present chapter covers, from the temporal point of 
view, the period from the inception of Stage II of EMU (January 1994)29 until the 
Council Decision of May 1998 that inaugurated the third and final stage of EMU, 
establishing that eleven EU Member States “fulfilled the necessary conditions 
for the adoption of the single currency” (ibid. Article 3) starting from January 
1999.  
As we shall see and discuss below and in Chapter 5, there are two fundamental 
reasons to delimit the scope of the first empirical case to 1998. First, toward the 
end of the second stage of EMU, with the signing of the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP), a new legal basis was laid down for fiscal policy coordination, 
bringing about a new policy regime. Second, with the adoption of the common 
currency and the achievement of the monetary union, Member States were not 
engaged anymore in the conditional joint production of a public good (the 
monetary union) but rather in its multilateral maintenance or exploitation 
(Cornes and Sandler 1996; Furubotn and Richter 1997; Begg et al. 2003; 
Collignon 2004). This circumstance, as we shall see when comparing the 
regime pre- and post-SGP, has had relevant consequences on the policy 
process and outcomes of fiscal policy coordination and leads me to put forth a 
clear-cut distinction between the two arrangements.  
To sum up, the empirical case of this chapter focuses on Stage II of EMU 
convergence process. To investigate it, I will draw on the “policy learning 
measuring instrument” developed in the previous chapters. The explanans will 
be the learning dynamics taking place among actors when they interact in the 
implementation of the policy coordination regime. The explanandum will be the 
outcomes observed under the regime, or, to be more precise, the observable 
influence of learning processes on regime implementation and policy outcomes.  
In terms of case-specific research questions, this chapter addresses the 
following: 
1) What are the scope conditions for policy learning within the regime for fiscal 
policy coordination prompted by the fiscal convergence criteria of Stage II of 
EMU?  
                                                          
29 The transitional provisions regulating the first stage of EMU (operating in 1993) did not include 
specific provisions on fiscal policy. 
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2) Are these conditions conducive to a specific, prevalent mode of learning 
within that policy regime?  
3) Does the prevalent mode of learning engrained within the policy regime 
contribute to explain the observed outcomes? In other words, do the expected 
implications of the case-specific mode of learning bear out empirically and 
explain actors’ interactions and regime’s outcomes? 
Thus, first I identify the mode of learning specific to the case study and, second, 
I verify the expected effects of the detected mode of learning on policy process 
and outcomes.  
In the background lie some of the classic research questions revolving around 
the economic rationale underpinning EMU and its sustainability (Eichengreen 
1992 and 1996; Eichengreen and Von Hagen 1996): the seemingly endless 
debate between economists and monetarists (Mongelli 2008), the nexus 
between fiscal and monetary policy (Uhlig 2002; Canzoneri et al. 2006), and the 
monetary criteria of the EMU convergence process. Although these issues will 
be explored to a certain extent, the key focus of the chapter lies in the 
interactive and dynamic process of implementation of the fiscal policy 
coordination regime and on its learning dimension. 
Also the issue of why and how EMU happened at all (for a review see Sadeh 
and Verdun 2009) is to be dealt with in this chapter but only inasmuch as it 
hinges on and provides explanatory leverage with regard to the process of 
implementation. In fact, unlike the prevailing literature on EMU, this 
investigation is not primarily interested in explaining how the regime for fiscal 
policy coordination came about through iterated bargaining and negotiations, 
but rather in how it has been implemented at the systemic, supranational level. 
On the one hand, the simple argument for the distinction between negotiation 
and implementation phases is that arrangements on fiscal policy coordination 
are not self-enforcing contracts and they require ex-post commitment from the 
actors involved to be successfully executed (Begg et al. 2003; Schuknecht 
2004). On the other hand, my investigation focuses specifically on the 
supranational dimension of the implementation process of fiscal policy 
coordination because it seeks to overcome the weaknesses of domestic-based 
explanations. In fact, these explanations draw on idiosyncratic national patterns 
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and, to a certain extent, fail in making sense of a controversial, yet 
homogeneous, path of policy convergence (Fatás and Mihov 2003). Policy 
learning is hence seen as a unifying framework that goes beyond domestic-
level variables and provides a systemic-level explanatory account of regimes’ 
implementation. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a 
static, descriptive account of the key structural features of the policy regime for 
fiscal policy coordination, stemming from the fiscal convergence criteria under 
Stage II of EMU. This description feeds into Section 3 that takes care of 
characterising the case’s scope conditions for learning according to the 
previously developed “policy learning measuring instrument”. This, in turn, 
allows us to portray the implementation of Stage II of EMU as a case of learning 
under the shadow of hierarchy. As I argued in Chapter 3, each mode of learning 
comes with a set of observable implications. Section 4 tests the previously 
detected observable implications about the policy regime, hence working as an 
empirical validation of the theory-driven expectations. Section 5 briefly 
concludes by summarizing the key findings. 
 
4.2 The fiscal “side of the moon” within the EMU convergence process 
 
Before exploring in detail the specific TEU provisions concerning fiscal policy 
coordination within the convergence process (i.e. the legal basis of the fiscal 
policy coordination regime), it is necessary to take stock of the general 
framework within which those provisions were laid down. Although my focus is 
on the fiscal side of the EMU convergence process, fiscal coordination did not 
take place in a vacuum but within a broader frame of economic convergence. 
The fundamental tenet of this frame is expressed in the well-known Article 103 
of the TEU that states in its first paragraph that “Member States shall regard 
their economic policies as a matter of common concern and shall coordinate 
them within the Council” (TEU, Article 103, 1). Besides establishing this general 
principle, Article 103 also introduces two procedural mechanisms aimed at 
governing the coordination of domestic economic policies at the supranational 
level. The first mechanism foresees that the Council, acting by a qualified 
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majority upon the Commission’s recommendations and the European Council’s 
conclusions, adopts broad guidelines for the economic policies of the Member 
States (TEU, Article 103, 2). Moreover, the Council is also responsible for 
monitoring economic developments in each Member State and the consistency 
of domestic economic policies with the aforementioned guidelines (TEU, Article 
103, 3). Using the same expression of the Treaty, Article 103 set up a system of 
“multilateral surveillance”, the aim of which was to achieve both procedural and 
substantive coordination of Member States’ economic policies (in the meaning 
conceptualised by Andrews 2006).  
When it comes to the enforcement mechanisms of this surveillance system, 
Article 103 limits referral to the issuing of recommendations by the Council to 
non-compliant Member States (both in private and public form, if non-
compliance persists). This has led many analysts to characterise the system of 
multilateral surveillance laid down in Article 103 as based on peer pressure and 
soft rules, rather than on coercive legal means (Begg et al. 2003).  
If this conclusion holds true as for the coordination and monitoring of economic 
policies in general and their framing within broad guidelines formulated by the 
Council (that is, it is always worth recalling it, the most intergovernmental forum 
of the EU), the picture changes consistently when we look at Article 104c of the 
TEU, which is the article expressly dealing with the coordination of fiscal and 
budgetary policies of the Member States. Article 104c does not in fact limit its 
spelling out of the rules for Member States to “avoid excessive government 
deficits” (paragraph 1) but also establishes a complex, yet clear, coercive 
implementation mechanism purportedly able to effectively enforce the legal 
requirement of sound budgetary policies, even through hard rules such as 
economic sanctions in the forms of fines issued to non-compliant Member 
States. Moreover, the transposition of Article 104c within the transitional 
provisions regulating the convergence process (TEU Article 109j) made it not 
only the legal acquis of the regime I survey as first of the four cases of fiscal 
policy coordination but also a “living” article, or, to put it more clearly, an 
immediately effective legal obligation for Member States. In fact, in slight 
anticipation of what will be discussed in the following sections, right after the 
launch of Stage II of EMU, Article 104c (transposed in Article 109j) started to 
bite, as did its coercive weapon, the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). This is 
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exemplified by the noticeable fact that during Stage II of EMU all Member 
States incurred at least one EDP (see Section 4, Table 2). 
To be more specific about the disciplinarian dimension of Article 104c, it 
stipulates that: 
“The Commission shall monitor the development of the budgetary 
situation and of the stock of government debt in the Member States with 
a view to identifying gross errors. In particular it shall examine 
compliance with budgetary discipline on the basis of the following two 
criteria: (a) whether the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit 
to gross domestic product exceeds a reference value […] (b) whether the 
ratio of government debt to gross domestic product exceeds a reference 
value, unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the 
reference value at a satisfactory pace” (TEU, Article 104c, 2).  
These values are then specified in an annex protocol to the TEU and are the 
well-known 3% for the deficit/GDP ratio and 60% for the debt/GDP ratio.  
In case a Member State reveals that it is incapable of fulfilling these criteria, it is 
subject to a set of corrective procedures eventually resulting in an Excessive 
Deficit Procedure. The provisions established in case Member States do not 
fulfilling these criteria (TEU, Article 104c, 3-13) can be summarized as follows. 
The Commission is the first mover as it is the institution not only entitled to 
monitor Member States’ fiscal policies but also to report any case of defection 
under one or both of the aforementioned criteria. If the Commission finds that 
an excessive deficit in fact exists, it has to address an opinion to the Council. 
This latter body has then the responsibility of taking action against the defector.  
The Council’s actions vis-à-vis an excessive deficit reported by the Commission 
are principally three: to decide about the actual existence of an excessive deficit 
“acting by a qualified majority on a recommendation from the Commission”, to 
issue recommendations (first confidentially, then, if the Member State’s 
corrective measure is deemed insufficient, publicly) and, if no satisfactory 
actions are taken by the breaching Member State to halt the excessive deficit, 
to initiate a sanctioning procedure (the EDP), potentially leading, eventually, to 
a fine (TEU, Article 104c, 6-12). It is crucial to note that, as for the issuing of 
warnings to the concerned Member State and for the potential sanctioning, “the 
Council shall act on a recommendation from the Commission by a majority of 
two thirds of the votes of its members […] excluding the votes of the 
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representative of the Member State concerned” (TEU, Article 104c, 13). 
The Council, according to the postulate of the TEU, therefore works as a third 
sanctioning party in a monitoring game that sees Member States acting under 
the oversight of the Commission. Alongside these institutions, in Stage II of 
EMU, two further bodies take part in the fiscal criteria implementation, namely 
the European Monetary Institute (EMI), that is, the transitional predecessor of 
the European Central Bank (TEU, Article 109f), and Eurostat, in its technical 
capacity.  
The above reported provisions of Article 104c represent the general framework 
for fiscal policy coordination regardless of the EMU convergence process (in 
fact, they were almost literally transposed in TEU’s successive amendments 
and in the SGP). In order to understand how these provisions were in effect put 
at work within the process of the conditional economic convergence necessary 
to get to the third and final stage of EMU, that is, to achieve the adoption of the 
common currency, one has to look at TEU’s transitional provisions, particularly 
the already mentioned Article 109j. These can be considered the “rules of 
engagement” for the Member States within the second stage of EMU and differ 
slightly, but importantly, from the above described set of rules, generating a 
specific regime for fiscal policy coordination, the object of my empirical 
investigation. 
To start with, the transitional provisions regarding Stage II draw on the 
fulfillment of a few conditions that had to be achieved under Stage I, that is, the 
full liberalization of capital markets, the implementation of Community Law 
regarding the Internal Market, and the preparation by Member States of 
multiannual programmes that paved the way for the economic convergence 
process foreseen by Stage II, with particular regard to price stability and sound 
public finance. In any case, the monitored implementation of fiscal policy 
discipline as laid down in TEU’s Articles 104c, 109j and in the dedicated 
Protocol on EDP started, from the legal point of view, with Stage II, which was 
set to begin in January 1994.  
Within the transitional provisions laid down in Article 109j, there are two key 
differences with respect to the framework established by Article 104c. The first 
one is that the corrective provisions designed to address Member States’ non-
compliance with the fiscal policy criteria are relevantly watered down. Namely, 
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paragraphs 9, 11, and 14 of Article 104c (those dealing with the enforcement 
options that the Council has against non- compliant Member States) are not in 
place during Stage II, prompting a much less coercive role of the Council in the 
case of excessive deficits. Secondly, the set of relevant actors under Article 
104c (the EU Member States, the Commission, the EMI, and the Council) is 
enlarged; in fact, the final say over the fulfillment of the necessary conditions for 
Member States to proceed to Stage III is no longer at the disposal of the 
Council in its normal formation, but it is left to the Council of the EU, that is the 
Council in the composition of the Heads of State or Government – a body that is 
of an even more pronounced intergovernmental nature. Aside from these 
noteworthy differences, the framework of implementation for fiscal policy 
coordination during Stage II follows the provisions of Article 104c and the 
protocol on EDP. 
The working of fiscal policy coordination under the regime in place under Stage 
II of EMU is summarized as follows. From 1994 to 1998 Member States were 
into Stage II of the EMU convergence process. To abide by its rules on fiscal 
discipline and hence be able to access to Stage III, Member States were 
requested to interact with the Commission, the newly established European 
Monetary Institute (EMI), Eurostat and, crucially the Council, in both its 
formations. The format and rules of this interaction were formally prescribed by 
binding and conditional convergence criteria and enforcement procedures. In 
particular, these latter took the form of biannual submissions of detailed reports 
about the state of Member States’ public finances to the Commission. This 
institution was tasked with carrying out an evaluation of those reports, with the 
aim of detecting potential excessive deficits. If the Commission found that a 
Member State was not respecting the ceilings with regard to one or both of the 
fiscal criteria, and hence detected an excessive deficit, they had to report it to 
the Council.  
On the basis of the reports of the Commission, the Council in its normal setting 
was called to evaluate, through a qualified majority voting, whether the Member 
State was actually running an excessive deficit or not, and, in cases where it 
did, act accordingly by first issuing reserved, and then public, 
recommendations. It is worth recalling again that under Stage II the Council was 
deprived of those coercive powers stemming from paragraph 11 of Article 104c 
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and could simply issue recommendations for the correction of excessive 
deficits. Nonetheless, under Stage II of EMU the Council enjoyed the relevant 
power to refuse the access to Stage III for those countries that were still 
engaged in an EDP, according to the input provided by both the Commission 
and the EMI. In fact, by 1996 and 1998 the transitional provisions imposed an 
obligation for all Member States to be subject to an assessment leading to the 
detection of those countries eligible for Stage III. To proceed toward it, at least 
with regard to fiscal policy criteria, a Member State needed to not be involved in 
an ongoing excessive deficit procedure. The ball then rolled into the yard of the 
Council in the composition of the Heads of State or Government that again, via 
a qualified majority, was tasked to give its official imprimatur to those Member 
States eligible for the last stage of EMU. 
When it comes to a preliminary evaluation of the policy regime, notwithstanding 
the preference for qualified majority voting instead of unanimity within the 
Council and besides the sit-out provision for Member States involved in EDPs, it 
is clear that the third evaluating party is not impartial but structurally partisan, 
given that the Council is, by definition, the intergovernmental organ of the EU 
(Schuknecht 2004). This configured a “sinners judging sinners” situation that 
eventually undermined the credibility of the sanctioning arm of fiscal policy 
discipline, as the 2004 conflict between Germany and France and the 
Commission clearly showed (Heipertz and Verdun 2010; see Chapter 5 for an 
in-depth discussion). Moreover, during Stage II, we have seen that some of the 
tools stemming from Article 104c, and such to allow the Council to coerce 
Member States to comply with the fiscal criteria, were not in force.  
However, under the shadow of conditionality imposed by the convergence 
process, the rationale of monitoring and sanctioning appears somewhat 
different with respect to the well-known scenario spawned by EDPs after the 
adoption of the common currency. The key difference lies in the fact that an 
EDP, hence a breach of the regime’s provisions, has a noticeably different 
nature if framed within an already existing and working monetary union rather 
than within an emerging one. In fact, even within the above sketched “sinners 
judging sinners” scenario and notwithstanding the absence of effective coercive 
tools, the conditionality (read: threat of exclusion) implied by the convergence 
process and the highly salient perspective of the adoption of the common 
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currency implicitly made up for the lack of strong enforcement mechanisms. I 
shall elaborate on this point below, but for now it is important to stress that the 
role of an evaluating third party is crucially different when it acts within or 
without the scope of an already existing public good as a monetary union 
(Heipertz 2003; Collignon 2004). 
 
4.3 The “policy learning measuring instrument” in action  
 
As previously clarified, the first step of my empirical strategy, beyond the 
description of the formal characteristics of the surveyed policy regime featured 
in the previous section, entails filling in the policy learning measuring instrument 
developed in Chapter 3. This means, in practice, to characterise the various 
items of the measuring instruments that represent the key analytical dimensions 
of modes of policy learning. Unpacking these analytical dimensions allows for 
the characterisation of the scope conditions for learning and for the assignment 
of a prevalent mode of learning to the regime-specific policy processes and 
interactions taking place among the relevant actors.  
Then, once a prevalent mode of learning has been assigned to the policy 
regime, the conclusive step of my empirical analysis involves contrasting the 
expected implications of the case-specific mode of learning with the real-world, 
observed features of the policy regime. If these implications are supported by 
evidence, then the finding will be that learning processes have to be considered 
as one of the explanatory drivers of the observed outcomes, with the crucial 
caveat that learning dynamics are not an exclusive explanation but belong to a 
multi-causal explanatory account of the policy outcomes. Moreover, another 
important caveat which arises out of my ontological understanding of learning 
needs to be taken into account. In the case that theory-driven causal 
expectations about learning are not confirmed by empirical investigation, the 
conclusion is not that learning has not taken place at all but rather that learning 
processes did not contribute to directly explain the outcomes, being 
nonetheless at work within the policy interactions.  
That being clarified, and bearing in mind the static description of the structural 
features of the policy regime carried out in the previous section, let us start 
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characterising the first empirical case according to the analytical dimensions of 
the learning measuring instrument. 
 
4.3a Who learns? What are actors’ certification and role in the policy and 
learning processes? How is the actor constellation shaped?  
 
The first analytical dimension of policy learning revolves around actors and the 
nature of their agency. Policy learning is a dynamic interactive phenomenon 
contingent on the policy process. The cases I deal with are the implementation 
courses of different regimes of fiscal policy coordination, hence the learning 
dynamics to be characterised through the measuring instrument are contingent 
on the process of implementation. It follows that the actors who are called to 
implement a given regime, or that influence this process in both formal and 
informal terms, are the relevant actors of the underlying learning process that I 
seek to characterise. 
Bearing this in mind, the answer to the questions above lies in Article 109j of the 
TEU and in the observation of the substantive, historical developments of the 
convergence process. In particular, Article 109j (the one that I labelled as the 
practical “rules of engagement” of the policy coordination regime) not only 
imposed a binding timetable and clarified the successive procedural stages for 
the convergence process and for the eventual adoption of the common 
currency, but also singled out in clear terms the set of relevant actors, their 
roles within the policy regime, and their mode of interaction. Drawing on the 
very first line of that article and on the real-world implementation process 
observed under Stage II of EMU, we can easily detect the actors engaged in the 
implementation of the newly established regime: “The Commission and the EMI 
shall report to the Council on the progress made in the fulfilment by the Member 
States”. There are hence four relevant actors within the policy regime, with well-
defined tasks: the Member States that engage in the convergence process by 
complying with its various criteria (in our case the thresholds for the deficit/GDP 
and debt/GDP ratios), the Council that works as the final evaluator of Member 
States’ adherence to the convergence criteria, and two intermediate bodies, the 
Commission and the EMI, which work as monitoring parties by providing key 
inputs and advice on Member States’ fiscal policies to both the Council and to 
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the Member States themselves. Moreover, in order to harmonize Member 
States’ accounting standards, a fifth actor, Eurostat, was called to provide key 
technical input (European Commission 1996 and 1998). 
The division of labor among different institutions of the EU in the oversight and 
multilateral surveillance of Member States’ fiscal policies was not reflected only 
in the formal provisions of the TEU. The great deal of scholarly research 
devoted to the convergence process highlights the factual interplay among 
these institutions during Stage II of EMU, as demonstrated, for instance, by the 
timely exchange of high-quality data among actors during the convergence 
process, by the supportive role of the Eurostat in bringing about the 
harmonization of accounting standards, and, most of all, by the thick institutional 
dialogue between the Commission and the Member States (Schuknecht 2004; 
Hughes Hallett and Lewis 2005). 
Ostensibly, all the relevant actors singled out above enjoyed a high degree of 
certification with regard to their role in the learning processes underlying the 
regime’s implementation. This is because the legal machinery and substantive 
working of the regime clearly indicated which actors were “rule-givers” and 
which ones were “rule-takers”, both in the implementation process and within 
the implicit learning dynamic underpinning the process. Actors with low official 
certification, like societal groups, open public fora, or domestic interest/pressure 
groups, were not involved in the regime’s implementation courses, neither 
explicitly nor implicitly.  
These considerations induce to characterise actors’ certification for the learning 
processes within the EMU’s convergence regime as high. 
Moreover, the circumstance whereby actors’ roles and responsibilities in the 
implementation process were clearly mandated by the Treaty leads to 
characterise their constellation as hierarchical. At the top of the hierarchical 
structure we find the Council (in both its formations) right above its monitoring 
agents (the Commission, the EMI, and Eurostat), whereas the Member States 
are located at the bottom of this structure.  
As argued in Chapter 3, the hierarchical structure underpinned by the regime is 
suited to implicitly reproduce a top-down teacher/learner relationship, whereby 
the actor located at the top of the hierarchical structure mimics the role of the 
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teacher and the actors subject to monitoring and eventually called to comply 
with the regime’s rules represent the learners (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013). This 
is certainly the case under Stage II of the EMU convergence process, even 
though, owing to the complex nature of the EU’s institutions, it is more pertinent 
to assign the role of teacher to the Commission rather than to the Council. This 
is because of the supportive role assigned by the TEU to the Commission vis-à-
vis the role of monitor and the final evaluation assigned to the Council. 
Proceeding with the characterisation of actor constellation, Member States were 
embedded in a vertical structure that they consented on and that poses them in 
a subordinate position with respect to the monitoring parties (the Commission 
and the EMI) and to the final decision maker (the Council). Indeed, the way 
actors interact with each other is decisively structured by the shadow of 
hierarchy of the convergence process and by clearly demarcated roles and 
rules. This translates, in substantive terms, into a formal and vertical mode of 
interaction taking place via the exchange of official communications within 
institutionalized venues. Key empirical examples of this dynamic of interaction 
are the presentations of macroeconomic programmes and budgetary figures to 
the Commission by the Member States twice a year;30 the policy dialogue and 
exchange of information taking place under the EDP between the Council and 
the involved Member States; and the mandatory presentation by the 
Commission and the EMI of transitional reports (1996 and 1998) on the status 
of the convergence process. Most of all, these latter forms of institutional, 
coordinative communication (Schmidt 2008) can be seen as the key sources of 
empirical evidence of the interactive dimension of the policy implementation 
process, as they crystallized the continuous policy dialogue taking place 
between the evaluating/monitoring (the Council and the Commission) and 
implementing (Member States) parties (see Section 4). 
To sum up, Member States are subordinate (by their explicit consent) to the 
Council which is in charge of evaluating the progress made by the Member 
States (through the decisive input of the Commission and the EMI) on the path 
towards convergence. Under this regime, the Council works as an evaluator 
and its assessment turns out to be conditional on Member States’ compliance 
                                                          
30 In accordance with Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 3605/93. 
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with the rules set in the negotiation stage of the TEU by the Member States 
themselves.  
After having concluded that highly certified actors are hierarchically ordered in a 
constellation suited to generate compliance with mandatory rules through formal 
institutional interactions, there already seems to be evidence to argue that the 
prevalent mode of learning for this policy regime is very likely to be hierarchical. 
Nonetheless, we need to further verify whether the other scope conditions for 
learning go in the same direction, that is, if they also indicate that learning in 
Stage II of EMU took place under the shadow of hierarchy.  
The second set of questions revolves around problem tractability. In particular, 
by addressing this set of questions I seek to understand whether the surveyed 
policy regime is meant to deal with an obscure, ambiguous policy problem or 
with routine, everyday policy-making. 
 
4.3b What is the tractability of the problems tackled in the policy process? What 
is the content of the learning process?  
 
With regard to the specific empirical case, does the convergence process 
provide evidence that actors cope with elusive implementation 
issues/ambiguous coordination problems? Or does evidence point to fully 
informed actors strategically deciding over policy solutions/courses of action 
with known payoffs?  Remember that under the second circumstance, learning 
is not a direct, explicit aim of the policy process but rather an unintended by-
product of it or as the puzzling dimension of the implementation process is 
overshadowed by its powering nature (see Chapter 3.3). 
To begin with, the whole process of fiscal policy coordination and its 
implementation implies at least three distinct stages: the formulation of the 
“rules of the game” (taking place through supranational-level negotiations), the 
actual implementation at national domestic level of the negotiated agreements 
via (supposedly) compliant fiscal policies and the monitoring/assessment of 
compliance (that takes place again at supranational level) potentially entailing a 
sanctioning scheme for defectors, or in the case of the convergence process, 
the denial of access to the third stage of EMU. 
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My own investigation focuses mainly on the second and third stage of this 
process but when dealing with the very first legal regime regulating fiscal policy 
coordination we need to understand where this regime comes from, what its 
rationale is, and what coordination problem it means to address. Thus, I need to 
elaborate briefly on the question “why and how EMU happened” to draw 
conclusions about the problem tractability of the policy coordination regime.31  
Causal explanations of the process that led to fiscal policy coordination, and to 
the TEU’s and EMU’s genesis more generally, are all but clear and 
unproblematic (for a comprehensive review on EMU’s creation see Sadeh and 
Verdun 2009). Moreover, even for an investigation focusing solely on fiscal 
policy coordination, one cannot avoid to taking stock of the so called 
monetary/fiscal nexus. This means in practice that the motives explaining fiscal 
policy coordination mechanism(s) and regime(s) are inevitably functionally 
correlated to the overall rationale of EMU. This is because the establishment of 
different arrangements for fiscal policy discipline can be grasped, both 
conceptually and practically, as a reinforcement device of the macroeconomic 
paradigm underlying EMU and of its long-term sustainability (Alesina and Perotti 
1995; Buti and van den Noort 2004). It is hence plausible that several of the 
causal motives for EMU in general have been reproduced in the crafting of the 
fiscal discipline regimes. These causal explanations encompass both economic 
and political accounts.  
Specifically, economic accounts for fiscal policy coordination, following a 
functional logic with regard to monetary integration, highlight the need to reduce 
the likelihood of asymmetric shocks, as suggested by the theory of Optimum 
Currency Area (Mundell 1961).32 Moreover, the lack of a regime for fiscal policy 
coordination exacerbates the problem of collective action. In fact, it would 
increase risks of moral hazard brought about by deficit-biased Member States 
that profit from improved overall borrowing conditions without committing to a 
sound fiscal paradigm – an instance of free riding on a public good (Schuknecht 
                                                          
31 In the successive case studies this will not be needed because the shifts that lead form one regime to 
another are largely endogenous, that is, they are explained by the outcomes of the incumbent regime. 
Obviously, for the first case, there is no other way to grasp its ethos without getting back to the process 
that led to its creation. 
32 Asymmetric shocks emerge as divergent output gaps among member states of a currency union. As a 
unified monetary policy can adjust just one typology of shock, having member states with 
unsynchronized business cycles is risky for the overall sustainability of the currency area. 
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2004). Fiscal profligacy could then spill-over on to other Member States and to 
the whole monetary area, determining an externality problem. This situation 
would endanger the independence and credibility of the European Central Bank 
in respect of its no bail out clause and to its statutory - besides implicit - inflation 
targeting policy (Begg et al. 2003), potentially leading it to monetize the debt 
and failing to provide the common currency with a sound and coherent 
macroeconomic framework in terms of the economic policy-mix (ibid.). 
Furthermore, supranational fiscal policy discipline responds to the need to 
finalize a process of collective fiscal retrenchment (McKinnon 1997).33    
Political science explanations belong to different theoretical perspectives 
(Heipertz and Verdun 2010). Drawing on an intergovernmental approach, the 
introduction of EU-wide fiscal discipline can be unravelled as an outcome of 
national interests (i.e. of national-based cost-benefit calculations carried out by 
single member states – Hosli 2000 and 2008), of a Franco-German deal, and of 
large-scale bargaining driven by issue-linkage whereby Germany interpreted 
the role of de facto hegemonic power within the specific EU power constellation 
(Heipertz and Verdun 2004 and 2010). Under a more supranational explanatory 
approach, fiscal policy discipline would not only arise from conflicting national 
interests, issue-linkage motives, and hegemony, but crucially from a functional 
push determined by the Member States’ embeddedness in the EMU’s economic 
framework (Eichengreen 1994).   
Further explanations focus on domestic politics and interpret the emergence of 
fiscal policy coordination as the result of country-specific political dynamics (in 
line with comparative political economy scholarship) coupled with the underlying 
power relations among Member States (Heipertz and Verdun 2004, 2010 and 
Hallerberg 2004).  
Finally, another theoretical lens highlights the decisive role played by experts 
and ideas in determining a supranational ideational convergence towards a 
specific paradigm of economic and fiscal policy, namely that provided by the 
German pragmatic neoliberal template that crucially resulted in fostering the 
idea of “sound money” underlying EMU (McNamara 1998). According to 
                                                          
33 It is worth noting anyway that various authors, drawing on economic considerations, contest the case 
for fiscal policy coordination (for a seminal example see Alesina and Wacziarg 1999; for an insightful 
discussion on the desirability of fiscal policy coordination see Beetsma et al. 2001). 
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Heipertz and Verdun (2004), the causal explanations dealing with German 
hegemony and with ideational convergence (both belonging to the set of 
political science accounts of EMU) are the most relevant in making sense of the 
creation of the EMU and fiscal policy coordination mechanisms. Domestic-level 
explanations - as well as economic reasons - are in turn less prominent (ibid. 
and Dyson 1994).  
One can therefore argue, much in line with McNamara (1998), that EMU fiscal 
discipline stems from a process of EU-wide ideational convergence around the 
paradigm of “sound money”, which consisted, namely, of non-profligatoy and 
non-inflationary economic policies. This explanation of EMU is not just 
“ideational”, as it left questions revolving around the origin and advocacy of the 
paradigm unanswered. It therefore also points to German hegemony (most of 
all as a setter of sound policies – see below) and asymmetric bargaining power 
in steering Member States’ convergence towards its own policy paradigm. The 
case for ideational convergence lies in the following: without a consensus on 
the German policy paradigm of “sound money”, economic and classic interest-
driven accounts would not predict coordination (McNamara 1998; Dyson and 
Featherstone 1999; Marcussen 2000; Heipertz and Verdun 2004 and 2010).  
Crucially, however, Germany managed to emerge as the EU’s standard setter, 
owing not much to its asymmetrical bargaining power, that is, due to a resource-
based hegemony, but rather due to the credibility stemming from the twenty-
year success of its macroeconomic paradigm, or, to put it differently, due to 
policy-based output legitimacy (Kaelberer 2001). For Dyson and Featherstone 
(1999), the German example represented a successful archetype of sound and 
sustainable economic policy making. 
This conclusion about the establishment of macroeconomic coordination is also 
central for my post-decisional implementation analysis.  Again quoting 
McNamara (1998, p. 71), “a process of policy failure, policy paradigm 
innovation, and policy emulation transformed European policymakers’ ideas 
about the working of their political economies and thus their interests at both the 
domestic level […] and at the level of EC regimes”. The causal chain sketched 
above maintains that a process of social reflexive learning determined a change 
in beliefs, ideational convergence and interests’ reshaping during the 
negotiation phase. Relying on the concept of the “advantage of tying one’s 
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hands”, Member States converged on a specific paradigm of economic policy-
making and crafted an implementation regime suited to deliver on this objective. 
This is by no means a trivial finding for the purpose of characterising the 
problem tractability of my first case study. In fact, granted there was a lengthy 
process of ideational convergence (twenty years according to McNamara), EMU 
negotiations were meant to address the low problem tractability posed by the 
need to coordinate decentralised fiscal policies within a currency union. In other 
words, the ideational convergence over the German standard of non-
profligatory fiscal policy served to turn a low tractable policy problem of credible 
commitment and paradigm change into a “solvable” one, via the creation of a 
supranational regime. To sum up, during the negotiation stage of the TEU and 
EMU we observe low problem tractability, but once the German template 
emerged as the standard policy paradigm for EMU, the problem tractability of 
the implementation stage becomes high, as the example of German economic 
policy-making has been in place for over two decades.  
This leads me to conclude that, at least for the implementation of the fiscal 
policy constraints imposed by the TEU, the implementing parties were fully 
informed (although not fully expert and competent) on the rules of the game and 
on the tradeoffs implied by a conservative approach to fiscal deficits. This does 
not mean that the costs of implementing such restrictive policies were low, most 
of all for long-term deficit biased Member States, but yet the payoffs of the 
coordination game taking place under Stage II of EMU were by no means 
unknown by the actors, who even consented on these costs and payoffs in the 
negotiation stage that led to EMU. 
Having established that the problem tractability of my first case of regime 
implementation is high, I need to concentrate on the content of the learning 
processes. To address this puzzle, let us go back to the literature on learning in 
the shadow of hierarchy. This literature, as well as the substantive evidence 
regarding the convergence process (see Section 4 for a detailed discussion), 
tells us that under hierarchy and conditionality learning is a by-product of the 
policy process and is limited to a typology of instrumental learning, or “learning 
how to comply” with rules, targets, and procedures (Chayes and Chayes 1993; 
Dunlop and Radaelli 2013). Nonetheless, when dealing with highly strategic 
policy regimes characterised by a prevalence of the powering dimension over 
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the puzzling one, the content of learning and its aim must not necessarily be 
that actors are compelled to learn how to comply, as in theory they are also 
allowed to “learn how not to comply” and stay unpunished, or in other words, to 
learn how to increase their strategic sophistication and hence learn politically, in 
the sense intended by May (1992). That being said, I argue that the incentives 
implicit within the convergence process were such to guarantee, through high 
conditionality, that actors were reaching cooperative outcomes, hence learning 
(instrumentally) how to comply rather than learning how to defect.  
A final caveat is in order: “learning how to comply” is a different conceptual and 
substantive construct with respect to “learning to comply”. The “how” implies 
that learning invests primarily the process of compliance rather than its final 
outcome. Learning how to comply instead means that actors learn on the 
process leading to compliance, learn its rules and procedures, and develop a 
policy and regime-specific “know-how”.  
Moving on with the policy learning measuring instrument, the following 
analytical dimension concerns the time dimension of the policy interactions 
observed under the regime. The key questions posed in order to unpack this 
analytical component of modes of learning are the following. 
 
4.3c Are the policy interactions observed in the regime one-shot or iterated? 
How frequent and formalized are the iterations of the interactions?  
 
With regard to this set of questions, the answer lies once again in the formal 
provisions of the TEU, as well as in its substantive functioning. In particular, the 
fact that the format of the convergence process is based on three successive 
stages is highly informative. The policy interactions implied by the policy regime 
are, by design, to be iterative. Under Stage II, the implementing parties are 
asked to comply with the convergence criteria of EMU every year for a 
maximum of four years. Moreover, a first evaluation on convergence was 
foreseen amid the process, that is, by 1996. To be more specific, Member 
States are obliged to interact with the monitoring counterparts at least twice a 
year through the submission of national stability programmes and budgetary 
figures but the frequency of this policy dialogue informed by the transitional 
provisions of the TEU can be increased if a Member State is subject to an EDP. 
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Under these circumstances, the involved Member State is engaged in a dense 
exchange of information and dialogue with the Commission and the Council as 
its compliance has to be checked in the context of a quasi-sanctionative 
scheme. In fact, under an EDP, the involved Member State has to also abide by 
(and act with regard to) the corrective measures designed by the Council.  
Moreover, as a matter of fact, all Member States incurred at least one EDP 
during Stage II of EMU (see Table 2 in Section 4). This means that all the 
Member States interacted with the Council and the Commission intensively and 
through various iterations during the convergence process.  
Nonetheless, the time horizon of the iterated interactions was neither infinite nor 
indefinite, as it was set in legal/formal terms by the transitional provisions of the 
TEU - with strong conditionality. To put it bluntly but fairly realistically, Member 
States had four years to understand the “rules of the game”, to learn about the 
process of implementation and to deliver. Without this time frame, they would 
not be eligible to enter Stage III and would end up in derogation. Note also that 
the first formal evaluation by the Council foreseen in 1996 was not successful 
and that the enactment of Stage III was postponed, pending a new evaluation to 
be carried out in 1998. 
Again, to fully characterise this dimension of the measuring instrument we have 
to look back at the learning process that occurred during the negotiation that led 
to the TEU. This is because we need to make clear that Member States 
themselves are the parties who designed this policy regime in primis, and hence 
also its deadlines. They deemed the time span provided by the TEU sufficient to 
“learn how to comply” under the shadow of hierarchy and strong conditionality. 
In a way, we are back to the content of the learning process, a consideration 
that shows how interrelated the different dimensions of policy learning are.  
Nonetheless, even if I argued that the Member States considered the TEU’s 
time-frame adequate to achieve homogeneous cross-country compliance and 
proceed to Stage III of EMU, this does not mean that their calculation was 
correct – most of all in terms of long-term sustainability of the anti-profligatory 
fiscal framework. This is clearly demonstrated by the failure of the first 
assessment of 1996.  
112 
 
As we will see when dealing with the regime stemming from the SGP, fiscal 
policies are particularly sticky and domestic institutions are highly explanatory of 
fiscal outcomes – most of all of profligatory ones (Hallerberg et al. 2007). 
Although almost unthinkable achievements were realized during Stage II of 
EMU in terms of fiscal retrenchment (European Commission 1998, p.  87 and 
89; Freitag and Sciarini 2001; Fatás and Mihov 2003), these noticeable results 
were fruit of the strong conditionality and sound incentives of the EMU 
convergence process, and were therefore subject to potential consolidation 
fatigue, dynamic inconsistency problems and even reversals when the 
incentives for compliance became less stringent and no longer enabling, such 
as under the SGP (Heipertz and Verdun 2010).  
The (instrumental) learning process typical of Stage II might have been in a way 
not deep and lengthy enough - as the subsequent failure of SGP regime has 
epitomized. I tentatively argue that the time-frame of Stage II did allow Member 
States to learn how to comply beyond the coordination game for the joint 
production of the public good, that is, to learn how to make their compliance 
sustainable in the medium run via a substantial reform of their domestic 
institutional framework for fiscal policy or via structural reforms. The change of 
the incentive structure due to the SGP and the adoption of the common 
currency and the related problems of dynamic inconsistently halted and even 
reversed the learning process, casting doubts over the adequacy of the time 
frame under Stage II of EMU, that is, over the long run. 
Moving to the final dimension of the measuring instrument, we need to answer 
the following questions: 
 
4.3d What is the venue and mode of interaction among actors? Is it formal 
(hierarchically organized) or informal (horizontal and deliberative)? 
 
Actors interact eminently within formal venues featuring highly certified actors 
organized hierarchically through precise task allocation. Hence, the venues of 
this mode of learning are typically not only formal but also strongly 
institutionalized. In substantive terms, the venues of the regime-specific 
interactions are the programmed meetings between the Member States and the 
Commission in the context of the biannual presentation of economic 
programmes and budgetary figures. In case of EDPs, the venue is even more 
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institutionalized, consisting of formal iterated meetings between the Council and 
the Member States to verify the quality of the corrective measures implemented 
to adjust their deficits. As the formal provisions regarding the EDP clearly show 
(TEU, Article 104c, 3-13), the level of formalization of these venues is extremely 
high indicating that they are far away from fora and much closer to arenas 
suited for distributive bargaining. Nonetheless, the hierarchical, coordinative 
role of rules, mostly in the presence of healthy incentives and conditionality, 
decreases the potential for conflict, supposedly fostering the cooperative traits 
of the policy arena even when the venue of interaction is within the context of 
the Council’s evaluation of Member States’ eligibility for Stage III. 
A final consideration is in order about the “where” dimension of the 
implementation of Stage II of EMU. The formality of the venues surely 
constrains the openness of the learning process but does not nullify it. This 
means that the expected learning process within formal institutionalized venues 
will not have the format of an open discussion among actors in the context of a 
forum, but rather the format of an official exchange of mandated information in 
the context of a probation venue. Again this does not curtail learning; it simply 
restricts it to a variety of instrumental, process-based learning procedures. 
With the characterisation of the venues of policy interaction, the account of the 
case study according to the policy learning measuring instrument is complete. 
The findings are uncontroversial: the prevalent mode of learning under Stage II 
of EMU is hierarchical.  
The following table summarizes this conclusion by showing how the different 
analytical dimensions of the policy learning measuring instrument were 
characterised. 
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Table 4.1 The “policy learning measuring instrument” applied to the fiscal policy 
coordination regime under Stage II of EMU  
WHO 
Actor certification, 
constellation and 
mode of interaction 
WHAT 
Problem tractability 
and content of the 
learning process 
WHEN 
Timeframe of the 
policy 
interactions 
WHERE 
Venues of the 
policy interactions 
and their nature 
12 EU Member 
States, Commission, 
EMI, Council, 
Eurostat.  
 
High certification.  
 
Vertical, hierarchical 
constellation. 
 
Formal mode of 
interaction. 
Highly tractable 
implementation 
problem.  
 
Actors learn “how to 
comply “or “how to 
sustainably defect”.  
 
Learning is a by-product 
of the policy interaction.  
 
The aim of the learning 
process is to co-produce 
and use a public good 
(sustainable monetary 
union). 
From January 1994 
up to December 
1998.  
 
Iterated and 
formalized 
interactions.  
 
Pre-defined, 
conditional time-
frame with pre-set 
deadlines for 
evaluation. 
Hierarchical, 
vertically shaped, 
institutionalized 
arenas organized 
around formal rules 
and roles.  
 
Low room for 
comparative 
bargaining 
(constrained by 
conditionality and 
implicit/explicit 
sanctioning). 
 
 
4.4. Substantive policy process and outcomes  
 
4.4a Expected implications of hierarchical learning 
 
In the previous sections, I have gone through the theory-driven characterisation 
of the case study according to its scope conditions for learning. It found, quite 
un-controversially, that such scope conditions indicate that the typology of 
learning specific to stage II of the EMU convergence process is hierarchical. 
The following and final step of my investigation consists of verifying whether the 
expected implications of hierarchical learning occurred empirically. 
Under the shadow of hierarchy, learning is a by-product of policy/regime 
implementation, since the powering dimension of the coordination regime 
prevails over the puzzling one. Hence, we cannot expect that learning dynamics 
directly determine policy outcomes but rather we expect that they influence the 
process leading to the outcomes.34  
                                                          
34 In other words, as already pointed out, the “product” of hierarchic learning does not involve learning 
about substantive aspects of a policy but learning about its process of implementation. 
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With regard to the latter, the implementation scheme of fiscal policy 
coordination set up under Stage II of EMU is strictly conditional, i.e. based on 
binding criteria and deadlines. The actors themselves designed the “rules of the 
game”, the “contract” (getting engaged in a preceding ideational convergence – 
see previous section) and freely decided, in a second phase, whether to abide 
by the implementation scheme, i.e. whether to enforce the fiscal criteria, subject 
to third party monitoring. Such a scheme (conditional but binding only on 
consent) chimes with the indications stemming from optimum contract literature 
(Furobotn and Richter 1997; Inman 1997: Langlois and Langlois 2007), 
whereby the necessary conditions for successful compliance/enforcement are 
the presence of ex-post monitoring  and of means to sanction defections.35  
With regard to this last point, the power held by the third party (i.e. the Council) 
in allowing access to Stage III (i.e. to the common currency) replicates the 
effects of self-enforceable contracts whereby lost profits stemming from 
repeatedly interrupted cooperation make opportunistic behaviour unlikely and 
unprofitable. In a sense, the presence of conditional access to the monetary 
union makes the implementation scheme of Stage II of EMU nearly self-
enforcing: it is not possible for an actor to free ride, i.e. to reap gains from 
others’ compliance effort without delivering the effort in turn. Simply put, being 
the access to the gains related to the public good conditional to compliance, 
defection would not allow enjoying them.36 In theory, actors would prefer not to 
face the costs of compliance (restrictive fiscal policies are costly, most of all for 
those Member States further from the German standard of fiscal restraint), but 
acting non-cooperatively, that is, breaching the fiscal policy ceilings by the end 
of Stage II, would not have allowed Member States to reap the gains related to 
                                                          
35 To cite an influential publication of the ECB on the issue of well-designed contracts under soft laws 
like those imposed by the TEU’s transitional provisions: “Soft law reduces political transaction costs (by 
improving transparency and providing a forum for peer pressure). Moreover, if well-designed, such law 
can boost incentives towards making the rules ‘self-enforcing’. Evidence speaks in favor of this view: 
while EU fiscal rules were bent in a number of cases and compliance is undeniably of concern, major and 
rapid fiscal balance deteriorations have been largely prevented since the start of EMU” (Schuknecht 
2004, p. 5). 
36 In a nutshell, the benefits of being part of a working and sustainable monetary union, besides the 
reputational gain of being a “member of the club”, are the following: lower inflation (as the ECB pursues 
by mandate an implicit inflation-targeting policy), more stable exchange rates with respect to non-EU 
currencies (which is particularly beneficial for small open economies), increased international 
trustworthiness, lower interest rates for the whole union (with decreasing costs of financing on the 
sovereign bond markets), and lower transaction costs within the common market due to permanently 
fixed exchange rates. 
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the usage of the public good, as they would have been kept out of the monetary 
union.  
As a matter of fact, under Stage II of EMU and in particular in 1996/1997, that 
is, before the final deadline of the convergence process, compliance with fiscal 
discipline has been widespread, resulting in successful (and in some ways 
unexpected) fiscal consolidation (see Table 2 below). The process of 
retrenchment observed under Stage II of EMU is known as the “Maastricht 
effect” and it effectively paved the way to Stage III and to the adoption of the 
Euro (Freitag and Sciarini 2001; Hughes Hallett and Lewis 2005). 
To sum up, the Maastricht built-in conditionality and design under a hierarchical 
actor constellation largely account for the outcome of the regime, that is, 
compliance with the criteria for fiscal policy coordination. The challenge now is 
to explore the substantive policy process that led to this outcome in order to test 
the key expected implication of hierarchical learning, that is, in this case, that 
actors have instrumentally learned how to comply.37  
To perform this empirical test, according to the theoretical posture put forth in 
Chapters 1 and 3, I concentrate on the policy interactions that have taken place 
along the process of implementation. As already argued when exploring the 
mode of interaction of the policy regime, the latter can be characterised as 
formal and based on institutionalized interactive procedures and documents. 
These circumstances orientate my methodological choice of empirical scrutiny 
toward document analysis (in line with Bowen 2009). Moreover, elaborating 
further on my methodological strategy, resorting to the policy learning 
measuring instrument has configured a deductive/inductive loop whereby 
theoretical and empirical historical analysis are strongly intertwined, in line with 
the seminal examples provided by the analytic narratives project (Bates et al. 
1998) and by historical institutional scholarship (Thelen 1999).  
Among all the policy documents produced by the actors within their hierarchical 
interaction, the Convergence Report drafted by the Commission in 1998 
                                                          
37 With sound incentives that sustain a cooperative mode of interaction, conditionality can become 
healthy and induce learning to comply with rules and cope with instructions (Chayes and Chayes 1993). 
On the other hand, improper strategic incentives leading to rules’ defection is likely to bring about 
effects of learning in the form of political/strategic learning, learning how to defect without retaliation 
or joint-decision trap. 
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(Commission 1998), due to the legal obligation stemming from Article 109j(1) of 
the TEU, can be seen as the key text subsuming and summarizing the overall 
four-year process of interactive implementation of fiscal discipline. Focusing on 
the content of that document can hence disclose whether instrumental 
hierarchic learning has indeed taken place in the process of implementation.  
 
4.4b The technical, instrumental aspect of hierarchical learning 
 
The first element substantiating the claim of an instrumental learning dynamic 
concerns the efforts made by the Member States, the Commission and by 
Eurostat for the establishment of “comparable time series for budgetary data in 
all Member States” (European Commission 1998, p. 87, 144-150). Without 
reliable data and homogenous accounting standards, budgetary surveillance 
would simply be unfeasible or symbolic. Apart from the Greek case (see Von 
Hagen and Wolff 2006), the process of harmonization of national budgetary 
figures has been extremely successful under Stage II of EMU, bringing about 
both equal treatment of Member States and effective enforcement of fiscal 
discipline. Learning how to comply has undeniably a technical dimension and 
the emergence of sound accounting techniques for the purpose of regime 
implementation can be seen quite unequivocally as an effect of learning 
dynamics. In particular, within this dynamic the Member States acted as 
learners and the Commission, and most of all Eurostat, worked as teachers. 
The content of this learning process has been substantiated in the 
establishment of the European System of Economic Account (ESA). To cite the 
Commission Convergence Report (European Commission 1998, p. 146): “The 
obligation by Member States to report ESA based budgetary figures twice a 
year in a timely way has put more focus on the technical aspects of the 
production of data. In this respect, it has been necessary to review closely the 
statistical quality of the figures reported to the Commission and their 
methodological compatibility with the accounting rules of the ESA system. This 
task has been performed by the Statistical Office of the European Communities 
(Eurostat) […] Member States and Eurostat have clarified accounting 
treatments and made sure that the ESA framework is correctly applied. A large 
number of methodological issues have been resolved and special attention has 
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been given to areas where differing interpretations of the required accounting 
treatment could have had a significant quantitative impact on the size of 
budgetary variables”. The indications that a process of “learning how” has taken 
place in this technical domain is eventually supported by the conclusion drawn 
by the Commission’s Report: “A dynamic process has taken place whereby the 
technical provisions of the excessive deficit procedure have provided a strong 
incentive for Member States to set their respective practices of monitoring 
budgetary developments and of deciding budgetary priorities into a common 
framework” (ibid., p. 150). 
 
4.4c The nature of fiscal consolidation 
 
The second typology of evidence of a process of hierarchic instrumental 
learning is far less technical and fully substantive. In fact, it addresses the 
quality and nature of the domestic fiscal retrenchment processes that led to the 
adoption of the common currency. To prove my claim about learning, I adopt an 
analytical perspective already featured in Weyland (2005) whereby the 
implementation or diffusion of a policy can be explained via various cognitive 
phenomena like emulation, symbolic/opportunistic compliance, heuristics, or 
rational learning depending on the nature of the policy process that brings them 
about (pp. 268-271). 
To start with, Member States faced a legal obligation to abide by the provisions 
of the TEU and its protocols in order to be eligible to progress to Stage III of 
EMU. These legal foundations of the policy regime, as we saw, set precise 
quantitative targets for fiscal policy coordination within Stage II of EMU. In any 
case, the exact nature of the budgetary reforms needed to comply with the 
quantitative criteria was not established in the treaties, leaving room for one-off, 
temporary measures, and for opportunistic, non-sustainable compliance. 
Indeed, the definition of sustainability is not clearly featured in the TEU or its 
protocols (European Commission 1998, p. 100). It is true that according to the 
letter of Article 104c, paragraph 3 “the report of the Commission [as regards a 
potential EDP] shall also take into account whether the government deficit 
exceeds government investment expenditure and take into account all other 
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relevant factors, including the medium-term economic and budgetary position of 
the Member State” and that the transitional provisions for Stage II encapsulated 
in Article 109j, paragraph 1, state that “the [Commission’s and EMI’s] reports 
shall also examine the achievement of a high degree of sustainable 
convergence”. Nonetheless, when it comes to the substantive evaluation of 
Member States’ eligibility for Stage III, at least for budgetary discipline, the only 
binding requirement is that Member States enjoy “sustainability of the 
government financial position; this will be apparent from having achieved a 
government budgetary position without a deficit that is excessive as determined 
in accordance with Article 104c (6)”, that is, being compliant with the reference 
value of the 3% of deficit/GDP ratio.  
Indeed, Member States, rather, were free to comply with the fiscal policy criteria 
(outcome) through different policy processes of retrenchment (McKinnon 1997). 
Nonetheless, the scrutiny of the course of implementation of these domestic 
retrenchments indicates that the Commission and the Members States, within 
the formal interactions and exchanges of data and inputs contingent on fiscal 
discipline enforcement, did not limit themselves to dealing with the quantitative 
dimension of the fiscal criteria, but openly and cooperatively dealt with the 
qualitative dimension of the retrenchment needed for Member States to come 
up with a sustainable compliance with the budgetary provisions. Indeed, the 
process of retrenchment and budget consolidation that led to the Council 
Decision of May 1998 was by no means a perfunctory one, indicating that 
Member States, with the support of the Commission in its teacher’s capacity, 
realized a process of compliance through profound, structural budget 
adjustments that went beyond the mere letter of the TEU, crucially involving the 
acceptance of a new fiscal policy paradigm (European Commission 1998. pp. 
99-101, and 105-107). One-off budgetary measures provide a good example of 
opportunistic compliance: “One-off measures only temporarily reduce the 
government deficit, by concentrating revenue in one year or a limited number of 
years only, postponing expenditure or asymmetrically recording the receipts and 
expenditure aspects of a budgetary operation; one-off measures thus do not 
generally correct underlying public finance imbalances” (ibid., p. 104). Within a 
“learning how to defect” scenario, one-off measures would be the first empirical 
candidate, but as a matter of fact “even though one-off measures have made 
120 
 
some contribution to the deficit reductions achieved since the start of the 
second stage of EMU and several of them were concentrated in 1997, the scale 
of these measures can be regarded as small relative to the overall adjustment 
effort” (ibid.). 
Borrowing from Weyland (2005), such a process of policy implementation taking 
place through deep policy changes enacted by Member States at national level 
could not be explained by drivers like emulation or short-term 
opportunistic/symbolic compliance, and neither by cognitive heuristics 
(reminiscent of the reflexive learning process underpinning EMU), but rather by 
the commitment to a process of rational learning. To again cite the Commission: 
“The convergence criterion concerning the government budgetary 
position imposed by the Treaty has undeniably set off a genuine 
budgetary adjustment process in the Member States […] Even though 
the adjustment process has been difficult and gathered pace mainly 
towards the end of the period, it represents a genuine break with past 
budgetary behaviour and constitutes a major step towards budgetary 
discipline among Member States. The scale of the adjustment has been 
particularly important in those Member States which at the start of the 
second stage of EMU experienced the most serious public finance 
imbalances […] The budgetary targets set by the Member States in their 
convergence programmes indicate that Member States are committed to 
reducing their government deficit and debt ratios further in coming years” 
(ibid., pp. 89-90, emphasis added). 
 
The very fact that the monitoring party (i.e. the Commission) required stable 
budgetary adjustment, beyond the targets set in the TEU, and the fact that 
Member States agreed on this adjunctive effort, indicates the presence of a 
wish not only to comply but also to rationally and instrumentally “learn how to 
comply” in sustainable terms. Moreover, the Commission’s role in the 
implementation process of fiscal discipline was not as coercive and conditional 
as the Council’s one. Hence, the call of the Commission that “it would not be 
sufficient for budgetary adjustment efforts to concentrate solely on respect of 
this criterion in a single year, perhaps followed by a relaxation of budgetary 
policies and a renewed widening of budgetary imbalances” (ibid., p. 91) was not 
strictly binding and the fact that a large majority of Member States complied with 
it anyway is a tangible sign of dynamic learning having taken place, beyond the 
imperatives of interest-based compliance. This argument is further supported by 
the enthusiastic, yet formal, remarks of the Commission about the nature of 
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Member States’ fiscal adjustments featured in its fundamental 1998 report: 
“Budgetary adjustments strongly based on cuts in current primary expenditure 
are often more difficult to implement and their adoption is therefore a clear sign 
of the government's commitment to budgetary discipline and of its determination 
to maintain these efforts in the future” (ibid., p. 105, emphasis added). 
Such a dynamic, as well as the prediction of compliance, is further supported by 
the observation of fiscal developments throughout Stage II of EMU, as shown in 
the following table.  
 
Table 4.2 Government Surplus/Deficit to GDP ratios (percentage) under Stage 
II of EMU 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
B -7,1 -4,9 -3,9 -3,2 -2,1 -1,7 
DK -2,8 -2,8 -2,4 -0,7 0,7 1,1 
D -3,2 -2,4 -3,3 -3,4 -2,7 -2,5 
EL -13,8 -10 -10,3 -7,5 -4 -2,2 
E -6,9 -6,3 -7,3 -4,6 -2,6 -2,2 
F -5,8 -5,8 -4,9 -4,1 -3 -2,9 
IRL -2,7 -1,7 -2,2 -0,4 0,9 1,1 
I -9,5 -9,2 -7,7 -6,7 -2,7 -2,5 
L 1,7 2,8 1,9 2,5 1,7 1 
NL -3,2 -3,8 -4 -2,3 -1,4 -1,6 
A -4,2 -5 -5,2 -4 -2,5 -2,3 
P -6,1 -6 -5,7 -3,2 -2,5 -2,2 
FIN -8 -6,4 -4,7 -3,3 -0,9 0,3 
S -12,2 -10,3 -6,9 -3,5 -0,8 0,5 
UK -7,9 -6,8 -5,5 -4,8 -1,9 -0,6 
Source: European Commission 1998. 
Note: The shadowed cells represent those budgetary positions that prompted an EDP in the following year; Austria, 
Finland and Sweden were subject to EDPs starting from 1995. 
 
4.4d The influence of the economic cycle (or lack thereof) 
 
A further element indicating instrumental hierarchic learning spawned by 
hierarchical conditionality is the analysis of the influence of the economic cycle 
on the implementation courses of budgetary policies. The argument is the 
following: if compliance becomes non-costly due to an accommodating 
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economic cycle, it would be difficult to claim that actors have learned anything 
at all, as the enactment of compliant fiscal policies would stem from facilitating 
exogenous economic circumstances (e.g.: a “growth dividend” that leads to 
healthier budgetary stances without retrenchment and structural reforms).  
This has not been the case anyway under EMU, as is demonstrated by two 
interrelated circumstances. First, all Member States incurred at least one EDP 
during the convergence process, clearly indicating that retrenchment entailed 
fatigue and that the path to compliance has been costly (Von Hagen et al. 
2002). Second, throughout Stage II of EMU, the influence of the economic cycle 
on budgetary stances has been heterogeneous, hence ruling out automatic, 
costless compliance, even for Member States not burdened by large fiscal 
imbalances at the outset of the convergence process or by a long-term tradition 
of fiscal profligacy and inflation bias.  
This argument emphasizing the genuine efforts of Member States in fiscal 
retrenchment regardless of the economic cycle acquires even more strength if 
we look at those countries that had to exert major efforts to consolidate highly 
deteriorated budget positions at the beginning of Stage II (see again Table 2). 
For these Member States (e.g. Italy, Belgium), the fiscal convergence process 
has indeed been extremely costly, also because the economic cycle did not 
support the retrenchment (Hughes Hallett and Lewis 2005). This is because, 
ceteris paribus, during negative economic cycles the budget worsens. 
Nonetheless, actors have been able to stick to the standard set in the reflexive 
learning process and comply anyway, putting in place structural (as opposed to 
temporary, one-off) adjustments to government budgets (ibid.).  
Indeed, the case for a genuine and successful (at least in the short/medium 
term) EU-wide retrenchment effort - the so called “Maastricht effect” - is 
generally supported by economic literature (Freitag and Sciarini 2001; Von 
Hagen et al. 2002; Briotti 2004; Hughes Hallett and Lewis 2005) and single-
country studies. In particular, the latter work highlights how traditionally deficit-
biased Member States resolutely changed their attitude toward budget deficits 
and swiftly applied a full-blown U-turn to their budget process and institutions as 
a result of the convergence process (for Italy see Radaelli 2002, Hallerberg 
2004, p. 182-195 and Stolfi 2008; for Belgium see Von Hagen et al. 2001, p. 26-
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28; for southern Europe in general see Blavoukos and Pagoulatos 2008; for 
Britain, Greece and Spain see Dellepiane and Hardiman 2012).  
With regard to the influence of the cycle on the process of implementation, the 
Commission itself noticed that “the starting positions [of fiscal imbalances] 
differed markedly among Member States” (European Commission 1998, p. 93). 
Moreover, “during most of this decade, the cycle has had an adverse impact on 
Member States' government deficits […] With the recovery in 1994 and 1995, 
cyclical conditions improved slightly in most Member States and more than half 
of the deficit reduction in the Community as a whole during this period 
originated from improving cyclical conditions. Cyclical conditions worsened 
again, however, during the growth pause between mid-1995 and mid-1996 and 
held back the reduction in government deficits which took place in almost all 
Member States” (ibid., p. 101-99). This evidence tells us that the hypothesis 
whereby homogenous and successful fiscal retrenchment during Stage II has 
been the fruit of conducive exogenous economic conditions has to be ruled out. 
Member States complied with the fiscal criteria of Stage II through costly 
adjustments: “For most Member States, the largest part of the progress in 
reducing budget deficits which has been achieved over the period 1993-97 
results from discretionary tightening while only a minor part can be ascribed to 
the cyclical upturn since 1993” (ibid., p. 99). Hence, compliance with fiscal 
criteria, most of all if achieved through structural reforms, cannot be attributed to 
the effect of the cycle and, as we argued previously, neither to opportunistic, 
temporary budget consolidation. These arguments have a function ad 
excludendum. Ruling out exogenously driven and perfunctory compliance, the 
latter can only be explained in terms of sound incentives for successful 
coordination and conducive conditions for instrumental learning that fostered 
the implementation process. 
 
4.4e The SGP as a fruit of learning in the shadow of hierarchy and rules 
 
The last evidence concerning the implications of hierarchical learning on the 
substantive outcomes of Stage II of EMU revolves around the creation of the 
SGP that took place during the process of implementation. In order to present 
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such evidence, I need to introduce a new actor that did not exert a relevant role 
during the implementation process of Stage II but indeed resulted in being 
essential to the negotiation and the signing of the SGP, that is, the Monetary 
Committee.38 This body was established with advisory status by TEU’s Article 
109c. It was composed of two members appointed by each Member State plus 
two members nominated by the Commission, with the latter crucially hosting the 
Committee’s Secretariat. Its main tasks were to review, deliver opinions on and 
examine the monetary and financial situation of the Member States during the 
convergence process and then regularly (i.e. at least once a year) report its 
findings to the Council and the Commission. This advisory activity also fed into 
the Commission Convergence Reports, but what matters most from my 
perspective is the role it had in negotiating and passing (together with the Ecofin 
Council) the SGP regulations (Heipertz and Verdun 2004 and 2010).  
In 1995, there were already concerns about the future of fiscal policy 
coordination after the beginning of Stage III. The German government in 
particular, through its Ministry of Finance, in November 1995 put forth a 
memorandum for an intergovernmental “stability treaty” intended to establish, 
on the one hand, an independent authority for fiscal policy supervision and, on 
the other hand, a series of binding rules and automatic sanctions in case of 
non-compliance with a set of binding budget ceilings (Stark 2001). A large 
majority of Member States agreed in principle to the need to create a sort of 
fiscal pact to be at work once the monetary union was in place. Nevertheless, 
the German proposal was considered too sharp and rigorist for two reasons. 
First, the fact that the new pact as foreseen by the German memorandum was 
to be signed outside the scope of the TEU, that is, in the form of a new 
intergovernmental agreement, was viewed with suspicion. Second, and related 
to the first point, the proposed automaticity of sanctions was considered to not 
be in line with the broader EMU paradigm, both from the legal point of view and 
most of all from the political one (Heipertz and Verdun 2010, p. 32). In 
particular, less fiscally austere Member States (like France and the 
Mediterranean countries) were in favour of creating a multilateral rule-based 
regime for fiscal policy surveillance that acted as both a political counterpart of 
                                                          
38 The Monetary Committee belongs to the transitional bodies specific to the convergence process. After 
the inception of Stage III, it will become a steady institution called the Economic and Financial 
Committee.  
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the ECB and as an embryonic gouvernement économique of EMU. 
Nevertheless, they thought that Member States’ self-commitment within the 
EMU framework would have been enough to guarantee long-term fiscal 
discipline under the monetary union and was a more politically sensitive way to 
address EMU’s fiscal asymmetry (Costello 2001). 
In order to deal with these criticalities and contrasting views, Member States (in 
the context of the European Council of December 1995) tasked the Ecofin 
Council to come up with a proposal within the boundaries of the TEU, this is, in 
the form of secondary EU legislation. At that time, preliminary discussions on 
the will-be pact were already underway within the Monetary Committee, with the 
supervision of the Commission. What followed was a complex and multi-layered 
process of negotiation lasting from late 1995 until June 1997 and taking place 
parallel to the implementation of Stage II of the convergence process described 
above (see Costello 2001 and, most of all, Stark 2001 for a detailed and 
informed account of the negotiation process). This process finally led to the 
signing of the SGP in July 1997.  
Various theoretical lenses have been employed to make sense of the signing of 
the SGP (namely intergovernmentalism, domestic politics, functional spill-overs 
and the role of experts – see, inter alia, Heipertz and Verdun 2004 and 2010). 
Nonetheless, none of them is considered to be able to fully account for it as 
such. According to this multi-causal argument and reading the SGP creation 
through my analytical perspective, an important causal role can also be 
assigned to the implications of the mode of hierarchical learning observed 
during the implementation of Stage II of EMU. Indeed, that the SGP was 
designed to be part of secondary legislation and to broadly reflect the TEU’s 
provisions (hence partially departing from the original German proposal) can be 
considered as a sign that its signatories learned via hierarchical conditionality 
both the technical and substantive aspects of fiscal policy coordination and 
included them in a steady supranational agreement (strictly embedded in and 
drawing from EMU’s framework). In this regard, it is worth noting that the SGP 
was a highly technical document, the bulk of which was negotiated and agreed 
within the Monetary Committee acting in its technical (rather than political) 
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capacity.39 Only a few aspects of it (though of crucial relevance, as we shall see 
in the next chapter) were fruit of political bargaining, whereas its detail and 
broad paradigm fully belonged to the hierarchical tenet of EMU and of the 
convergence process. In a way, Member States, through the implementation of 
Stage II, learned the benefits of “tying hands” in the fiscal realm through 
hierarchical coordination and hence (self)committed to a long term pact 
reinforcing the stability paradigm underpinned by EMU.  
This learning-informed explanation borrows from both functional end 
expertocratic accounts of the SGP (Heipertz and Verdun 2010). To be more 
precise, “learning how to comply” (the key implication of hierarchical learning) 
fruitfully accommodates a functional explanation of the SGP whereby the latter 
emerged from economic and legalistic spill-overs engrained within EMU 
architecture. The latter was broadly considered asymmetric (that is, open on its 
fiscal flank, both from a legal and substantive point of view), hence the SGP 
would represent the fruit of actors learning (via the implementation of Stage II) 
the most suitable way through which to address these asymmetries. Similarly, 
the fact that a great deal of the SGP is fruit of expertocratic negotiations within 
the Monetary Committee is fully compatible with the technical implications of 
hierarchical learning. Further, and connecting the SGP to the ideational 
dimension, the SGP can be seen as the result of the resilience and reassertion 
of EMU paradigm due to the shadow of hierarchy of Stage II and the learning 
dynamics unfolding thereof (Princen and Van Esch 2015), as well as the 
continuation of ideational convergence that led to the creation of EMU (Heipertz 
and Verdun 2010, p. 83 and 105). 
This brief discussion of the SGP creation concludes the empirical validation of 
the expected implications of learning in the shadow of hierarchy. Moreover, it is 
also instrumental in completing the diachronic account of fiscal policy 
coordination under Stage II of EMU, allowing me to proceed to the following 
case-study that will be scrutinised in the next chapter: the implementation of the 
coordination regime emerging from the SGP.     
                                                          
39 “[M]ost of the content of the SGP, perhaps as much as 95 per cent of the text (estimated by some of 
our interview partners) was agreed to in the Monetary Committee without further discussion at the 
political level” (Heipertz and Verdun 2010, p. 41). 
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4.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter offers two conclusions. First, the analysis of the scope conditions 
shows that the mode of learning specific to Stage II of EMU was hierarchical. 
Second, the scrutiny of the substantive policy process points to evidence of 
instrumental learning in the form of “learning how to comply”. 
Namely, the key actors of learning (i.e. the Member States) were not limited to 
opportunistic, temporary compliance merely meant to reach the final reward (i.e. 
access to the common currency) but, drawing on a prior process of ideational 
convergence that crafted the regime, they showed instrumental rationality and 
learned how to comply in four main ways. First, they learned about technical 
aspects of the implementation process (with the support of Eurostat and the 
Commission as monitors/teachers); second, a portion of them learned how to 
comply in a sustainable way and beyond the formal requirements of the TEU; 
third, they complied with the regime’s arrangements, notwithstanding an 
unsupportive macroeconomic environment; and finally, they learned how to 
reinforce the disciplinarian paradigm and make it a stable aspect of EMU by 
agreeing on the SGP. In sum, a hierarchic learning dynamic informed the 
process of regime implementation and influenced its outcomes. That being said, 
it is always worth repeating that learning mechanisms, although present and 
empirically proved, were not the exclusive causal forces at work. The analysis 
of learning complements, rather than substitutes, other explanatory constructs.   
Substantively, the policy regime stemming from Stage II of EMU convergence 
process was robust enough to foster - via hierarchical and instrumental learning 
- the ideational convergence achieved in the design of the TEU. To quote an 
ECB researcher, “soft law can be a first step towards better enforcement/hard 
law when it helps learning and trust-building across politicians” (Schuknecht 
2004, p. 16, emphasis added).  
Thus, more generally, within hierarchical policy coordination regimes, conditions 
conducive to policy learning can emerge as a result of strong conditionality. In 
this first empirical case, actors learned to comply through conditionality.  
Learning under the shadow of hierarchy is naturally constrained by the 
presence of the hierarchy itself; it is hence a by-product of the policy 
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interactions and mostly explains the policy process rather than its outcomes. 
Nonetheless, drawing on the findings of this chapter, it is hard to deny that 
instrumental rationality and hierarchical learning participated in informing the 
process of fiscal policy coordination during stage II of EMU, even if learning was 
not the only causal driver. 
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Chapter 5. Fiscal policy coordination under the Stability and Growth Pact: 
Bargaining and learning thereof 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
On 1st January 1999, eleven Member States of the European Union (EU) 
entered Stage III of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).40 According to the 
Council Decision of 2nd May 1998, these Member States “fulfil[ed] the necessary 
conditions for the adoption of the single currency” and hence officially reneged 
on their monetary sovereignty in favour of a supranational authority – the 
European Central Bank (ECB) – that from then on became the only institution 
entrusted with the prerogative of the conduction of the unified monetary policy 
of the eleven “participating Member States”. The eurozone, or euro area, was 
born. 
The centralisation of monetary policy, its full integration at supranational level 
through power delegation to a unified authority, represents the very core of 
EMU’s architecture as devised in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). 
Nonetheless, already during the convergence process (see previous chapter) 
the overall EMU architecture, foreseeing a single monetary policy alongside 
different national macroeconomic policies, was increasingly considered as 
dangerously asymmetric on its “fiscal flank” (Dyson and Featherstone 1999; 
Dyson and Quaglia 2012). In particular, the lack of a clear tenet for budgetary 
restraint after the adoption of the common currency looked problematic, most of 
all for fiscally conservative Member States like Germany and the Netherlands. 
Their key concern was that outside the scope of the convergence criteria for 
budgetary policy of Stage II, idiosyncratic deficit-biased fiscal policies run at 
national level might have endangered the smooth functioning of monetary 
policy, resulting in higher interest rates for the currency union as a whole (Begg 
et al. 2003).  
In other words, a new collective action problem emerged that was similar, but 
clearly distinguishable, to the one tackled under Stage II. Key EMU Member 
                                                          
40 Namely, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Portugal and Finland. They were then followed by Greece (2001), Slovenia (2007), Cyprus (2008), 
Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014) and Lithuania (2015). 
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States (Germany in particular) grasped this new challenge and started 
reasoning on and putting forth several proposals for a possible institutional 
arrangement to be enforced after the adoption of the common currency (Stark 
2001). During the convergence process (i.e. in 1995), official negotiations for a 
fiscal pact were already being launched, first at the level of the Monetary 
Committee and later within the Ecofin Council. These negotiations revolved 
around the approval of a new legal mechanism meant to permanently entrench 
supranational fiscal policy coordination within the architecture of EMU (ibid.), or, 
to put it differently, to steadily “tie governments’ hands” in the realm of 
budgetary policies in order to avoid risks of moral hazard and free riding on the 
common good (i.e. monetary union) by single Member States (Larch et al. 
2009). This process, that was analysed in the previous chapter, eventually led 
to the signing of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in 1997.  
From a legal point of view, the Pact took the form of two regulations based on 
the TEU provisions that established, respectively, a preventive and a corrective 
arm for the supranational coordination of domestic macroeconomic and 
budgetary policies. The signing of the Pact and its format were fruits of the 
acknowledgement that a coherent set of multilateral (soft and hard) rules to lead 
to sound government finances across the new-born Eurozone was not simply a 
pre-condition for the viability of the monetary union to be pursued during the 
convergence process, but also a crucial means to guarantee its proper 
functioning and long-term sustainability, which can be considered the new 
coordination problem (Breuss 1998).  
The causal motives that led to the approval of a pact substantiating a 
permanent regime of multilateral discipline and coordination in the realm of 
macroeconomic and budgetary policies were various. According to Heipertz and 
Verdun (2004 and 2010), an eclectic approach drawing on different theoretical 
lenses can provide a coherent and complete casual account of the genesis of 
the SGP. Namely, they focus on four different lenses to explain the 
institutionalization and stabilization of fiscal policy coordination within EMU’s 
framework via the SGP: intergovernmentalism and domestic politics, and 
functional spill-overs and the role of expert and ideas. In the previous chapter, I 
drew on the two latter explanatory constructs to argue that the emergence of 
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the SGP can be considered as one of the implications of the mode of learning 
specific to the regime in place under the convergence process.  
Analysing once again the forces that led to the genesis of the SGP is not, 
however, the aim of this chapter. It instead seeks to explain the process of 
implementation of the Pact and the learning dynamics that unfolded thereof. In 
fact, the contemporaneous entering into legal force of Stage III of EMU and of 
the SGP inaugurated a brand new regime for fiscal policy coordination. This 
regime was in a way similar (i.e. drawing on an analogous paradigm, rationale 
and overarching objective) to, but totally distinguishable from, the one based on 
the transitional convergence criteria of the TEU. This regime shift, legally based 
on the adoption of the common currency and on the entering into force of the 
SGP, can be conceptualised as the passage from a phase of production of a 
public good (the monetary union) to a phase of usage and multilateral 
consumption.  
In particular, while under the production phase (Stage II of EMU) the key 
incentive for compliance with fiscal discipline was represented by the threat of 
exclusion, under Stage III the latter simply became unfeasible since no 
mechanisms for exclusion after the adoption of the common currency exist in 
the TEU. The establishment of a rule-based enforcement regime for 
macroeconomic policies therefore emerged as a necessity if budgetary restraint 
was to be safeguarded and maintained under the monetary union (Hughes 
Hallett and Lewis 2005; Hodson and Maher 2004).  
Both regimes - Stage II of EMU and SGP - shared a common overarching goal, 
that is, sound government finances and Eurozone-wide budgetary discipline. 
Nonetheless, in the first case the objective of sound fiscal positions in t was a 
conditio sine qua non for becoming a member of a club entitled to use a co-
produced public good in t+1. In other words, non-compliance with costly fiscal 
adjustment in t was posed to lead to the exclusion from the benefits generated 
by the consumption of the public good in t+1 (as happened to Greece in 1998). 
On the other hand, in the second case, i.e. after the club is established, the 
benefits arising from the monetary union are no longer excludable in t+1, while 
the same policy objective of budgetary restraint becomes functional to the 
sustainability of the common good. 
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Since compliance with fiscal discipline remained costly for implementing parties 
and exclusion was ruled with the launch of the Euro, the only way to guarantee 
proper incentives was to establish a legally binding, rule-based policy regime 
based on multilateral monitoring and sanctions. The SGP, in particular its 
corrective arm, served this purpose and constituted a brand-new paradigm of 
fiscal policy coordination, and more. Noticeably, in fact, a sanctionative 
infrastructure including substantial fines to violators (up to the 0.5% of the GDP 
of the breaching country) represented a “fundamentally different instrument than 
any other instrument used thus far in the EU” (Heipertz and Verdun 2010, p. 
101). Nonetheless, the face value of such a binding, rule-based regime of policy 
coordination needs to be evaluated in practice rather than drawing solely on its 
legal/formal nature, which is the purpose of the present chapter.  
To sum up and proceed, the aim of this chapter is to account for the 
implementation course of the coordination regime for fiscal policy stemming 
from the SGP. This will be done by characterising the regime according to the 
key dimensions of learning featured in the “policy learning measuring 
instrument” (see Table 3.3). In terms of case-specific research questions, this 
chapter addresses the following: 
1) What are the scope conditions for policy learning within the regime for fiscal 
policy coordination generated by the preventive and corrective arms of the 
Stability and Growth Pact?  
2) Are these conditions conducive to a specific, prevalent mode of learning?  
3) How does the prevalent mode of learning contribute to explain the 
substantive implementation of the Pact? In other words, do the expected 
implications of the case-specific mode of learning bear out empirically? Do they 
help in explaining the poor compliance record of the Pact, its crisis and reform? 
The remainder of the chapter is organized, in terms of structure, like the 
previous one. In Section 2, I define the empirical scope of the case study and 
briefly describe and contextualize the SGP in the broader picture of EMU and 
macroeconomic coordination. In Section 3, the different dimensions of the policy 
learning measuring instrument are addressed for the new regime, with a 
detailed discussion of its agency covering much of the analysis. This allows a 
precise characterisation of the SGP regime as a case of learning via bargaining. 
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Then, in Section 4, I contrast the expected implications of the case-specific 
mode of learning with the substantive policy processes and outcomes. In 
particular, I find that the implications of learning via bargaining were markedly 
visible and explanatory of the policy outcomes. Section 5 concludes by 
summarizing the key findings.  
 
5.2 Scope, format and nature of the Pact 
 
5.2a Distinguishing among (and delimiting) different coordination regimes 
 
The policy regime based on the SGP has effectively been in place from January 
1999, that is, as soon as the Council Regulation 1467/97 entered into force, 
substituting the transitional provisions of the TEU for the application of the 
excessive deficit procedure (EDP) – i.e. the core of the so-called corrective arm 
of the Pact.41  By January 1999, Stage III of EMU officially began and hence the 
eleven Member States eligible to adopt the common currency were no longer 
under the conditionality typical of the convergence process, but were rather full-
blown members of the club. In the light of this, January 1999 is our starting point 
for the investigation of the SGP coordination regime. 
While it is fairly easy to detect the “date of birth” of the SGP regime, it is much 
harder to delimit its temporal scope. In fact, from a strictly formal point of view, 
the SGP is still legally in force at the time of writing. However, its present 
version bears very little resemblance to the original one. In fact, after its 
adoption the SGP underwent a number of major amendments. Aside from the 
2005 reform (discussed in Section 4), the transformations of EMU economic 
governance occurring as a reaction to the global financial and sovereign debt 
crises have been so profound and substantive that they have arguably altered 
the very nature of economic policy coordination under EMU, bringing about an 
innovative governance architecture and hence a brand-new regime (Buti and 
Carnot 2012; Kamkhaji and Radaelli 2013). These reforms are the object of 
analysis for my third and fourth case studies.  
                                                          
41 The first legal obligation related to the SGP imposed upon Member States, apart from the general 
obligation to avoid excessive deficits, was the submission to the Ecofin Council, by 1st March 1999, of 
national stability programmes (see Section 3). 
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Arguably, one could set as a “time limit” of the SGP regime the moment in 
which those crisis-driven reforms entered into legal force. Nonetheless, the 
SGP regime was substantially over, or in abeyance, well before a new legal 
basis for economic policy coordination was laid out in the period 2010-2013. 
This, as we shall see in more detail below and in the following chapters, is 
mainly because of two reasons. First, the 2005 reform of the Pact - spawned by 
German and French prolonged non-compliance and by the subsequent conflict 
between those countries and the Commission - provided for a severely 
weakened version of the EDP, calling into question the very existence of an 
effective policy coordination regime (Morris et al. 2006). Second, and 
strengthening the first point, the explosion of the global financial crisis in 
2007/2008 showed in practice how the renewed SGP was little more than a 
symbolic device at that time (Larch et al. 2010; Chang 2013). This circumstance 
is epitomized by the fact that in 2009 no Eurozone Member State was out of an 
EDP (except Luxembourg and Finland), yet no sanctions were issued vis-à-vis 
the objective slowness of the adjustments formally required under the EDP. 
This staggering situation leads me to consider the period 2009/2010 as a 
distinct case study whereby a new paradigm was emerging and the old one was 
only symbolically in place.  
To sum up, the SGP-based regime that I analyse in the present chapter covers 
the period 1999-2008. The third case study in which the SGP was effectively 
frozen and a new framework was suddenly developed spans from 2009 to 2010 
and is tackled in the two following chapters.  
 
5.2b Legal foundations and the nature of the Pact 
 
The legal base of the SGP is the same as the coordination regime that emerged 
under Stage II of the EMU, that is, the TEU articles dealing with economic policy 
convergence. Multilateral surveillance in the TEU is meant to address both 
economic policies broadly intended (Article 99) and budgetary policies (Article 
104),42 with the former governed by peer-pressure and the latter covered by a 
                                                          
42 The numbering of EU treaties’ articles is a thorny issue. In this chapter, I will often refer to Articles 99 
and 104 of the TEU, whereas in the previous I was using, for the same articles, were numbered 103 and 
104c. The articles are the same, but in the meantime the Treaty of Nice (signed in 2001 and ratified in 
2003) reshuffled their numbering. The choice to use the numbering 99 and 104 stems from the fact that 
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much more coercive set of hard enforcement procedures and binding rules. In 
other words, the coordination of macroeconomic policies under EMU as laid out 
in the TEU is governed by a mix of soft and hard provisions.  
During the convergence process, this dual nature of economic policy 
coordination was operationalized through TEU’s transitional provisions (in 
particular Article 109j). This article foresaw periodical multilateral assessments 
of domestic budgetary positions based on the one hand on non-binding 
recommendations and opinions, and on the other on the compliance with 
obligatory numerical criteria. Noticeably, the set of coercive mechanisms 
stemming from TEU’s transitional provisions was particularly watered down with 
respect to the original provisions of Article 104. Nonetheless, as we saw, the 
lack of sanctioning tools was effectively accommodated by the Council’s 
conditionality in the form of the threat of exclusion from Stage III. 
After the Council decision of May 1998 that called an end to Stage II of the EMU 
convergence process and established the beginning of Stage III, the transitional 
provisions of TEU were automatically substituted by the two SGP regulations, 
which in the meantime were agreed on in 1997 and entered into legal force in 
1998 (for the preventive arm) and 1999 (for the corrective arm). 
The SGP consists in practice of these two Regulations, namely Regulations 
1466/97 and 1467/97 (both amended in 2005 – see Section 4 of this chapter). 
They constitute the so-called preventive and corrective arms of the SGP. These 
Regulations are part of the EU’s secondary legislation and draw their legitimacy 
from TEU’s Articles 99, paragraph 5, and 104, paragraph 14, in which it is 
stated that the Council is entitled to adopt specific rules providing further detail 
to the multilateral surveillance procedures laid out in Article 99, paragraphs 3 
and 4, and to the corrective framework laid out in Article 104, paragraphs 1-13, 
and the related Protocol on the EDP, respectively.  
The fundamental difference between the framework stemming from the TEU’s 
transitional provisions and arising out of the SGP regulations is that the set of 
                                                          
for most of the period analysed in this chapter, this is how these articles were known. The same holds 
true for the numbering used in the previous chapter. The Treaty of Lisbon/Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (signed in 2007 and entering into force in 2009) changed the numbering once again, 
with Article 99 renamed Article 121 and Article 104 renamed Article 126. At the time of writing (2015) 
this is the legally valid numbering. 
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coercive enforcement options spelled out in paragraphs 9, 11, and 14 of TEU’s 
Article 104 (those dealing with the sanctionative options that the Council has 
against Member States that repeatedly do not comply with the measures 
proposed to correct an excessive deficit) is brought back into full legal force 
under the SGP.  
This legal/formal difference might seem marginal, but it actually underpins one 
of the key problems that characterised the whole implementation of budgetary 
discipline after the adoption of the common currency, that is, the problem of 
credible commitment and effective enforcement vis-à-vis supposedly binding 
and quasi-automatic rules.  
Compliance and implementation research, both in general (Chayes and Chayes 
1993; Langlois and Langlois 2007) and specifically applied to the EU (Collignon 
2004; Falkner et al. 2005), has conceptualised and empirically proven the 
existence of a key problem of dynamic consistency and credible commitment in 
the context of multi-lateral policy coordination. In fact, in the presence of 
autonomous parties with heterogeneous preferences (mixed motives), a regime 
aimed at coordinating decentralised policies is effective only inasmuch that 
actors are credibly threatened by exclusion from common benefits or sanctions 
in the case of non-compliance (Collignon 2004; Schuknecht 2004). In such a 
setting, soft or voluntary rules theoretically fail in internalising the externalities 
due to disjunct preferences. Binding rules and sanctions, whether in 
kind/automatic or administered by a third party, hence become necessary. 
However, even with the presence of a third party to sanction non-compliance, 
the issue of its credibility emerges. If an independent third party credibly 
administers sanctions to defectors in a quasi-automatic way, the coordination 
problem can successfully be solved through hierarchy and coercion. If instead 
discretionary enforcement is established, implementing actors are incentivized 
to bargain over compliance, potentially leading to a coordination failure 
(Dimitrova and Toshkov 2009). 
The latter case is relevant for us as the SGP can be portrayed as a case of non-
enforceable rules (De Haan et al. 2004; Larch et al 2009). The fact that 
economic sanctions stemming from the EDP were never applied and the 
occurrence of a so-called period of abeyance (2003-2005) followed by a reform 
that made the whole regime much less stringent provide strong anecdotal 
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evidence in favour of this argument. To quote a successful and appropriate 
expression coined by Martin Heipertz and Amy Verdun (2004), the SGP was a 
“dog than never bites”.  
Next to these canonical accounts of the SGP’s failure, drawing on the problem 
of credible commitment and rules’ enforceability, I argue that the observed 
breakdown of the coordination regime was not only due to dynamic 
inconsistency and lack of means to internalise the externalities of disjunct 
preferences, but is also to flaws in its institutional and incentives’ architecture. 
Indeed, this outcome might have also occurred because the mode of learning 
underpinned by the regime has led the actors to learn in a dysfunctional way 
with respect to the objectives of budgetary discipline and sound government 
finances. In fact, a weakness in the incentive structure of a coordination regime 
cannot predict its failure per se. Even from a purely rational choice perspective, 
examples of successful coordination in absence of coercion abound, as well as 
cases of optimal contracts whose enforcement fail. A (non-exclusive) learning-
informed lens on the policy process can help us understand how the observed 
outcomes occurred as a sum of weaknesses in the structural and learning 
dimensions of the SGP regime.  
To evaluate this potential explanation (that would add up to and enrich the 
canonical ones in the context of a multi-causal and multi-ontological 
framework), in the following sections I explore, through the measuring 
instrument, the key dimensions and scope conditions for policy learning implicit 
to the SGP regime. Although the letter of the SGP and its formally rule-based 
nature would intuitively lead to envisaged implementation courses informed by 
fairly sound incentives for compliance and hierarchical learning dynamics, this 
has not been the case empirically. Let us wear our learning-informed lenses to 
see how and why this outcome occurred.  
 
5.3 The “policy learning measuring instrument” in action 
 
As we saw, the SGP coordination regime bears strong similarities with respect 
to its predecessor but also includes legal, institutional and substantive novelties 
that emerged most of all in its implementation. To unpack these novelties, let us 
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look at the different dimensions of policy learning featured in the measuring 
instrument to pin down the case-specific scope conditions of the regime.  
 
5.3a Who learns? What are actors’ certification and role in the policy and 
learning processes? How is the actor constellation shaped? 
 
In order to distinguish and characterise the actors involved in the 
implementation process of the SGP regime, their modes of interaction and 
constellation, it is worth looking first at the formal features of the regime as laid 
out in the regulations that represent its legal foundations. Then the focus will 
move on to the way these formal provisions have been translated into 
substantive implementation practices.  
 
5.3a1 Functioning and actors of the preventive arm 
 
Let us start discussing the agency by looking at the preventive arm of the SGP. 
According to the legal provisions substantiating the Pact’s preventive 
infrastructure (Regulation 1466/97 based upon TEU Article 99), the key actors 
were the Commission, the Council and the Member States. In more detail, the 
eleven Member States eligible for Stage III43 on the one hand and the 
Commission and the Council44 on the other were officially embedded in a top-
down constellation whereby the former were called to comply with a set of rules 
and formal procedures and the latter monitored and evaluated them. In fact, the 
SGP regulations emphatically reaffirm that Member States are “under a clear 
Treaty Obligation to avoid excessive general government deficits” (Regulation 
1466/97, Paragraph 3, italics added). Moreover, with the overt intent of linking 
the new framework and its tools to those of the previous regime, Paragraph 7 of 
Regulation 1466/97 highlights the “need to build upon the useful experience 
                                                          
43 This chapter, like the previous one and the whole study, focuses solely on Eurozone Member States, 
or, to put it in the jargon of the treaties, on “participating Member States”. 
44 Note that in the remainder of the section the terms “Council” and “Ecofin” are used interchangeably. 
In fact, I refer to the Economic and Financial Affairs Council, that is, the configuration of the Council of 
the EU  composed of the economics and finance ministers of the EMU Member States, both 
“participating” and “non-participating”. 
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gained during the first two stages of economic and monetary union with 
convergence programmes”.  
Convergence programmes remained in place for “non-participating Member 
States”, that is, for those EU countries that did not take part to Stage III (ibid., 
Par. 9), while for the “participating Member States” the new instruments of inter-
institutional communication with the monitoring authorities (Commission and 
Council) were called stability programmes (ibid., Par. 8).  
The reference values that operationalized the obligation to avoid excessive 
deficits under Stage II (the 3% deficit to GDP ratio and the 60% debt to GDP 
ratio) were complemented by a new benchmark in the form of a commitment to 
a “medium term objective [MTO] of budgetary positions of close to balance or in 
surplus [CTBOIS]” (ibid., Par. 2). The achievement of this new target was 
assessed by the Commission and monitored by the Council, in the context of its 
periodic evaluations of the stability programmes (ibid., Par. 6 and 8) that had to 
be submitted by Member States before March 1999 and thenceforth every year 
(ibid., Art. 4(1)).  
The content of the stability programmes, the new regime-specific form of 
institutional interaction between the parties, was then clarified in the remainder 
of Regulation 1466/97. In particular, Member States were required to include in 
their stability programmes: 
 MTOs for CTBOIS and expected path of debt/GDP ratio (Art. 3(2)a); 
 Detail on expected economic developments and important economic 
variables (Art. 3(2)b); 
 A description of budgetary and economic measures towards MTOs and 
an assessment of their economic impacts (Art. 3(2)c); 
 A sensitivity analysis (Art. 3(2)d). 
Moreover, the figures and estimates provided in the stability programme had to 
cover at least the following three years (Art. 3(3)).  
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The Council’s final opinion on these detailed stability programmes45 was based 
on a preliminary assessment provided by the Commission. In addition, Article 
5.1 also established a newly created body with advisory status, the Economic 
and Financial Committee (EFC). Drawing on the assessment of the EFC and on 
subsequent Commission’s recommendations, the Council in practice evaluated, 
for all the participating Member States, whether the MTOs featured in stability 
programmes allowed to avoid excessive deficits.46 The Council’s examination 
had to be carried out, and an opinion on the Commission’s assessment 
delivered, no later than two months after the submission of the stability 
programmes (Art. 5(2)). In the context of the evaluation of the stability 
programmes that eventually led to the Council’s opinion, the latter could also 
invite the Member States to adjust their programmes in case that “the objectives 
and contents of a programme must be strengthened” (ibid.). Updated 
programmes were then examined again by the EFC on the basis of new 
Commission assessments and, if necessary, by the Council (Art. 5(3)), before a 
final opinion was issued. 
The role of the Commission and the Council was not limited to an ex-ante static 
evaluation of the programmes submitted by the Member States but also 
extended to monitoring the progresses in the implementation of the measures 
featured in the stability documents, with particular consideration to the 
achievement of CTBOIS budgetary positions (Art. 6(1)). In case the Council 
identified discrepancies with respect to the MTOs, it was entitled, within its 
preventive prerogatives and always drawing on a Commission’s 
recommendation, to issue private recommendations (in the form of an early 
warning) regarding the necessary adjustment measures to the concerned 
Member State (Art. 6(2)). In case divergences between actual economic and 
budgetary developments and MTOs persisted, again with a preventive and 
moral suasion function, the Council could issue further recommendations in the 
form of a public early warning (Art. 6(3)). Early warnings were only issued by 
                                                          
45 Stability programmes were and are rather detailed and technical documents, spanning 15 to 35 pages. 
Following the instrumental learning dynamic conceptualised in the previous chapter, their format has 
become increasingly standardized over time. 
46 Moreover, the Council also assessed the stability programmes’ consistency with Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) that were inherited from Stage II and also remained in place for broad 
macroeconomic coordination under the SGP, adding up to the corrective infrastructure set up by 
Regulation 1466/97 (see Table 5.1 for more details on the BEPGs). 
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the Council but always drew on the Commission’s assessment of the 
information and budgetary developments provided by the Member States (Art. 
6(1)). 
These procedures constitute the preventive arm of the SGP as laid out by 
Regulation 1466/97. Crucially, its implementation involved the Member States, 
the Commission and the Council as the main implementing and, for us, learning 
actors. They were organized hierarchically, with clearly certified roles and tasks: 
namely, the Member States implemented the rules, the Commission assessed 
their performance, and the Council, drawing on the Commission’s 
recommendations, monitored and provided (non-binding) opinions. The mode of 
interaction was clearly a rule-based, formal one, relying on the exchange of 
official documents (stability programmes, recommendations and opinions) and 
inter-institutional official communications.  
The preventive arm of the SGP drew on the tenet that peer pressure, moral 
suasion and naming-and-shaming measures (mainly early warnings, i.e. soft 
law means) were necessary tools to nudge Member States toward compliance 
with budgetary discipline (Schuknecht 2004; Hodson and Maher 2004). 
Nonetheless, soft laws and preventive instruments were deemed insufficient to 
enforce budgetary discipline upon Member States. Due mainly to the concerns 
of Germany and other historically fiscally prudent Member States (Heipertz and 
Verdun 2004), soft laws and means alone were viewed as inadequate to 
provide credible safeguards and sound incentives for Member States to stick to 
fiscal discipline.  
The legal basis for more coercive enforcement instruments was already 
embedded in the TEU, in particular in Article 104 and the Protocol on the EDP. 
Drawing on them and on the experience developed during the implementation 
of Stage II (see Chapter 4), Member States and EU institutions decided to 
complement the preventive arm of the SGP with a further regulation 
strengthening the regime for fiscal and budgetary discipline through binding 
policy instruments and procedures. This corrective dimension of the SGP is 
detailed in Regulation 1467/97 that draws on TEU Article 104. 
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5.3a2 The functioning and actors of the corrective arm 
 
Before describing the corrective arm of the SGP in greater detail, it is important 
to take stock of the fact that whereas the tools available to the Council in the 
context of the preventive arm were not legally binding, hence belonging to the 
domain of soft law instruments (broad guidelines, recommendations, opinion, 
early warnings, public warnings etc.), the provisions featured within the 
corrective arm of the Pact had the nature of hard laws, that is, of binding legal 
obligations subject to financial sanctions in case of defection, a Copernican 
revolution for the EU. 
The key objective of Regulation 1467/97 was to impose rule compliance, that is, 
to bring about “prompt correction” (Reg. 1467/97, Art. 1) of excessive deficits, 
when preventive tools failed in averting budgetary slippages. Granted that “in 
stage three of EMU Member States remain responsible for their national 
budgetary policies, subject to the provisions of the Treaty”, CTBOIS budgetary 
positions were the central long-term criterion for effective compliance and sound 
budgetary policy (ibid., Par. 3 and 7), and hence stable and durable 
convergence such as to safeguard price stability (ibid., Par. 8) - i.e. effective 
monetary policy.  
Under this arm of the SGP, the role of the Commission was more significant 
than under the preventive one. The scope for this greater role was originally set 
out in TEU Article 104, paragraph 2: the Commission was in fact charged of 
monitoring budgetary developments of the Member States “with a view to 
identifying gross errors” with respect to the 3% deficit/GDP and 60% debt/GDP 
criteria (ibid.). In case a Member state did not, or even risked not to (ibid., Par. 
3), fulfil one of these criteria, the Commission had to prepare a report and 
address an opinion to the Council (ibid., Par. 5). This represents the potential 
beginning of an EDP.  
Building upon this Commission’s kick-off to the EDP, the corrective process 
followed that described in Chapter 4.2 based upon TEU’s Article 104, 
Paragraphs 6-13. To summarize it, the Council, constantly acting upon 
successive Commission recommendations, enacted a progressively harsher 
probation sequence whereby the concerned Member State was expected to 
correct its excessive deficit, first under the pressure of 
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recommendations/warnings (initially private and, if no effective responses 
emerge, public), and then, in the case of persistent non-compliance, under the 
pressure of economic sanctions (initially in the form of non-interest bearing 
deposits and then in the form of full-blown fines). Crucially, in issuing 
recommendations and fines (and also with regard to the required corrections 
and their timbering, and to the termination of the EDP), the Council took its 
decisions acting with “a [weighted]47 majority of two thirds of the votes of its 
members […], excluding the votes of the representative of the Member State 
concerned” (TEU, Article 104, Par. 13). 
Departing from the letter of the TEU, several technical “clarifications” were 
added by Regulation 1467/97, namely: 
 The definition of the circumstances that made an excessive deficit 
“exceptional and temporary” and was allowed to avert the Commission’s 
report and hence the commencement of the EDP. In particular, arising 
out of lengthy and complex negotiations between Germany and France 
(Heipertz and Verdun 2010, p. 101-99 and 121), Article 2(1) of 
Regulation 1467/97 established that government deficits above the 
reference value (i.e. the 3% of the GDP) were to be considered 
exceptional and hence not subject to an EDP when resulting from 
unusual events (e.g.: natural catastrophes) or from a “severe economic 
downturn”, whereby “severe” meant a fall in real GDP of at least 2% 
(ibid., Art. 2(2)).  
This apparently automatic criterion of exceptionality that apparently 
seemed to leave little room for Council discretion, was however 
immediately qualified and softened by the following indent (2(3)) in which 
                                                          
47 Qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Ecofin Council was a key aspect of the whole policy 
coordination regime. I will explore its effects on implementation in greater detail in the remainder of the 
chapter. For now, it is sufficient to briefly take stock of its functioning under TEU Articles 104 and 205(2) 
before 2005. First of all, within the out and out sanctionative mechanisms of the EDP (TEU Article 104(9) 
and following paragraphs involving repeated non-compliance and leading to fines) only “participating 
member states” (i.e. Eurozone members) were allowed to vote, acting upon a recommendation from 
the Commission. The Member State involved in the EDP could not vote. Votes were allocated to 
countries according to their population. In order to obtain a qualified majority it was necessary to reach 
at least two thirds of the votes in the Council (TEU Article 104(13)). After 2005, new treaties and the 
enlargement led to amendments to the allocation of votes in the Council and raised the threshold for a 
qualified majority to 74% of the votes, also including a provision whereby this qualified majority needs 
to represent at least 62% of the European population. This further strengthened the intergovernmental 
nature of the Council. 
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it is stated that the Council shall also take into account those cases in 
which GDP falls less than 2%, but the downturn was abrupt and 
determined an “accumulated loss of output relative to past trends” (ibid.). 
As we shall see below, this represented early inroads into Council 
discretion.  
 The complex timeline for the different successive steps of the EDP 
(Articles 3 to 10). 
 The nature and amount of the sanctions vis-à-vis persistent non-
compliance and lack/ineffectiveness of adjusting measures (Articles 9 to 
16). In this respect, it is crucial to stress that the passage from 
progressively stronger sanctioning measures had to be systematically 
ratified by successive qualified majority votes (QMV) by the Council. 
 
Other noteworthy aspects of the EDP were the reverse burden of proof for 
exemption clauses48 and its multi-layered, multi-actor nature. In fact, the Council 
was continuously backed, within the whole probation sequence, by the EFC, 
acting as an advisor, and most of all by the Commission, whose role was not 
simply one of initiating the EDP, but also of constantly monitoring its 
development by evaluating the adjustments recommended to the concerned 
Member State. 
This descriptive account of the SGP’s arms serves two purposes with regard to 
my investigation of policy learning. First, it allows me to identify the actors that 
officially took part in the implementing (and learning) process of fiscal policy 
coordination under the SGP. Secondly, and more importantly, it shows us how, 
from the narrow legal perspective of the letter of the two SGP regulations, the 
actor constellation and mode of interaction of the regime had apparently 
reproduced the hierarchical ones observed under Stage II of the EMU 
convergence process. 
Yet again, also under the corrective arm of the Pact, we see different highly 
certified actors organized hierarchically through clear tasks and roles. They 
interacted formally via the exchange of official documents within a multi-layered 
                                                          
48 “Regarding the excessive deficit, once it is identified to be excessive, the burden of proof is reversed. 
It would be up to the Member State to make a case for the need of the exemption clause” (Heipertz and 
Verdun 2010, p. 102, drawing on Costello 2001). 
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legal procedure. In more detail, Member States were called to comply with 
reporting procedures and numerical targets (MTOs of CTBOIS budgetary 
positions and the reference values). The Commission in turn was meant to play 
a crucial monitoring and watchdog role. It was the only actor endowed with the 
right to initiate an EDP. Moreover, each further corrective step foreseen by 
Article 104 always had to take the moves from a Commission assessment and 
subsequent recommendation to the Council. The latter actor, finally, both 
monitored, backed by the Commission, and discretionarily (i.e. by voting upon 
them) enforced the rules, applying increasingly harsher measures.  
It is worth noting that the Council was the only body entitled with effective 
sanctionative prerogatives if non-compliance emerged. Similarly, it was also the 
only body entitled to suspend, delay or nullify the corrective measures, even 
against the opinion of the Commission. These prerogatives, however, were not 
fully ‘autocratic’, meaning that the Council could not independently issue its own 
opinions on an ongoing EDP or close it without the assent of the Commission 
(as clarified by the 2004 ruling of the European Court of Justice - ECJ). In fact, 
each opinion of the Council was always to be issued “in response” (positive or 
negative, depending on the result of the vote) to a Commission’s 
recommendation. This, yet again, gives an idea of the crucial role played by the 
Commission under the corrective arm, a role that put that institution in the line of 
fire when conflict between commitment and discretion emerged within the 
Council (see Section 4 of this chapter). 
To sum up, the regime stemming from the SGP’s twin arms, from a strictly 
legal/formal perspective, seems to involve only highly certified (learning) actors 
organized in a hierarchical, top-down constellation whereby interactions are 
strongly formalized and regulated. The following table summarizes the 
functioning, actors, tools and legal basis of the coordination regime laid out in 
the SGP. 
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Table 5.1 Economic policy coordination under the SGP 
Policy area to be 
coordinated 
Legal basis  
(soft/hard law) 
Tool Means of 
implementation 
and actors 
involved 
Macroeconomic policy 
coordination 
Article 99 TEU 
 
Soft law 
Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines 
Country-specific 
recommendations 
issued by the 
Commission and 
examined by the 
Council 
Budgetary discipline 
(preventive) 
Article 99 TEU and 
Regulation 1466/97 
 
Soft law 
National stability 
programmes and 
MTOs for CTOBOIS 
budgetary positions 
herein provided 
Member States 
submit programmes 
subject to the 
Commission’s 
assessment and 
the Council’s 
examination. 
Recommendations 
can be issued by 
the Council in case 
of discrepancies 
with MTOs 
Budgetary discipline 
(corrective) 
Article 104 TEU, 
EDP Protocol of 
TEU and Regulation 
1467/97 
 
Hard law 
Excessive Deficit 
Procedure potentially 
resulting in economic 
sanctions 
Initiated by the 
Commission via the 
submission of a 
report to the 
Council. The latter 
enforces the 
procedure in 
successive steps, 
deciding via QMV 
upon successive 
Commission 
recommendations 
 
 
5.3a3 Beyond the SGP legal dimension 
 
The above characterisation of the actors and regime-specific mode of 
interaction of the SGP, although useful and based on a fair reading of the legal 
dimension, was not reflected in the substantive process of implementation of 
budgetary discipline. To understand why, we need to make the characterisation 
of the SGP more coherent with its real-world functioning. In other words, the 
discussion of the regime’s agency needs to be complemented and 
problematized, most of all in the light of the fact that hindsight allows us to know 
that the on paper features of such a hierarchical regime did not bear out in the 
policy process and outcomes.  
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In fact, the set of rules, procedures and related incentives stemming from a 
legalistic understanding of the SGP seem, in theory, to be coherent with the 
normative indications of optimal contract theory (Inman 1997; Furubotn and 
Richter 1997). In particular, the presence of a third monitoring party with 
sanctioning prerogatives in case of actors’ non-compliance would make the 
SGP contract a nearly self-enforcing one (Schuknecht 2004). Therefore, if fully 
and credibly enforced, the SGP regime was theoretically suited to successfully 
coordinate policy. 
Nonetheless, the portrayal of the SGP based on its legal foundations is fairly 
misleading, even without the hindsight of its poor record (Fatás and Mihov 
2003; Hughes Hallett and Lewis 2005; Marinheiro 2008). This is because 
several substantive and practical circumstances of the SGP concurred in 
making its actual work relevantly distant from the letter of its legal base. Let us 
then consider the elements that hinged on the nature, implementation record 
and learning dynamics of the regime.   
First, we need to integrate the set of actors participating in the implementation 
process of the SGP by adding to the picture a crucial institution that was kept 
out of the legal scope of the coordination regime, but that since its creation 
exerted a great deal of influence on implementation and the overall economic 
governance of EMU (Puetter 2004)49, that is, the Eurogroup. The Eurogroup 
was formalized within the EU legal corpus only in 2007.50 The single official 
reference to it before its formalization was the following:  
“The Ministers of the States participating in the euro area may meet 
informally among themselves to discuss issues connected with their 
shared specific responsibilities for the single currency. The Commission, 
and the European Central Bank when appropriate, will be invited to take 
part in the meetings” (European Council 1997, p. 44, italics added).  
 
The Eurogroup was agreed in the context of the negotiation of the SGP and 
was designed to function as an “informal forum for discussion among euro area 
finance ministers” (Puetter 2004, p. 854). There were mainly two reasons 
behind the creation of a new informal body with similar membership and tasks 
                                                          
49 “We can say that the Eurogroup is the core of EU economic governance” (Anonymous interview 
reported in Puetter 2004, p. 867, emphasis added). 
50 Treaty of Lisbon, 2007, Protocol on the Euro Group. 
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to those of the Ecofin Council. First, the need to have a forum whereby only the 
representatives of the Member States participating in the common currency 
could meet and discuss, hence focusing specifically on Eurozone issues rather 
than on the overall economic governance of the EU (it is not a case that the 
President of the Eurogroup was known as “Mr Euro”).  
Second, the need to mediate, in the context of the SGP negotiations, between 
German and French positions regarding the creation of additional institutions 
suited to counterbalance, in the fiscal policy domain, the authority of the ECB, 
hence representing its political counterpart. The point of equilibrium of these 
different pressures was found in the establishment of an informal (and 
secretive) body located outside the scope of EU official legislation and broadly 
tasked with pre-agreeing, among Eurozone members only, the official decisions 
of the Council in the field of fiscal policy coordination, that is, in the domains 
covered by the SGP.  
Vis-à-vis the well-known transparency of EU institutions and decisional 
processes, the nature, role and functioning of the Eurogroup was rather 
surprising. Indeed, as the primary legal sources regarding these issues are 
rather slim and vague, I turn my attention to secondary sources, in particular the 
valuable work of Puetter on the functioning and role of the Eurogroup (ibid. and 
Puetter 2006). Drawing on anonymous expert interviews with officers who took 
part in Eurogroup meetings (which are, by rule, private and confidential), 
Puetter was able to disclose crucial information on its actual functioning.  
To start with, the Eurogroup lacked formal decision making powers and as a 
result of this, voting within it simply did not take place. Regarding its structure, 
the Eurogroup was formed by the finance ministers of the Eurozone Member 
States. One representative of the Commission (usually the Commissioner for 
economic and monetary affairs) and the President of the ECB regularly 
attended the meetings as well. Other occasional participants were invited by 
single ministers. The Eurogroup met the day before the Ecofin Council 
sessions, hence roughly once a month. Its key task was to “pre-agree all critical 
Council decisions with relevance for the euro area member States” (Puetter 
2004, p. 854), including crucial decisions about early warnings, their publicity, 
and ongoing and new EDPs.  
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The impact of this mechanism of “informal governance” (ibid., p. 857) on the 
binding decisions and policy outcomes of the Council was critical, as the 
Eurozone Member States control the majority of the votes in the Council. This 
circumstance practically emptied the influence of the formal policy interactions 
taking place in the hierarchical context of the Council and the 
credibility/automaticity of its corrective powers in favour of behind-doors, 
confidential, informal agreements among Member States: “Consequently, 
agreement there [in the Council] is only a formality whenever euro area 
ministers reach a consensus among themselves prior to a Council meeting” 
(ibid.).  
Although this decisional format can be seen as suitable to foster open 
discussion, deliberation and consensus-building and although it might have 
worked in the first years as a means of mutual convergence and peer pressure 
(as argued by Puetter himself), with the benefit of hindsight (that is, drawing on 
the substantive effect of this form of confidential negotiations on rule-based 
multilateral surveillance and hence budgetary discipline), it is hard to deny that 
this informal setting worked as a perfect arena for multilateral horizontal 
bargaining and power politics.51  
It is hence no wonder that the interviewed participants to Eurogroup meetings 
praised its format, as it freed them from the hierarchical constraints (and 
publicity) laid out in the formal provisions of multilateral surveillance of the SGP, 
leaving room for political discretionary behaviour over the commitment to 
binding rules, often taking place on the basis of the so-called “escape clauses” 
and “unusual events” foreseen by the EDP and systematically exploited by 
Member States.52 A clear instance, among many, of this undue leeway that 
Member States created through “informal governance” mechanisms is the case 
                                                          
51 “Notably, ministers debate the euro area’s fiscal stance with a view to the formulation of country-
specific policy recommendations” (ibid., p. 862). 
52 “[…] the Eurogroup has also developed into the key handler of cases of non-compliant behavior. 
Formally, the decisions in the context of the reprimand mechanism of the SGP’s so-called early warning 
system are the prerogative of the ECOFIN. De facto, the discussions within the Eurogroup have rendered 
the ECOFIN debates less important. In addition, the Commission consults the Eurogroup prior to its 
decisions in the context of the SGP procedures. Under the Pact the Commission is obliged to initiate an 
early warning procedure whenever a country is at risk of breaching common rules and policy objectives. 
On the basis of a Commission recommendation, the Council then decides on an early warning for the 
respective member state. The Eurogroup pre-discusses each step of the formal proceedings informally” 
(ibid., p. 865). 
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of the pending early warning on Germany in January 2002, a case that I shall 
present and explore in Section 4 of this chapter. 
To sum up, the presence, features and role of the Eurogroup call into question 
the nature of the framework arising out of the SGP legal provisions. The 
Eurogroup was in fact the perfect venue for negotiating and bargaining over 
early warnings, their publicity and the various steps of the EDP (or lack thereof). 
Such horizontal bargaining, in the public and highly regulated context of the 
Council’s proceedings, would have been hierarchically constrained by the 
mandatory provisions of Regulation 1467/97 and by their arguably quasi-
automaticity character (Stark 2001) – always pending a QMV.  
Coupling this with its legal elusiveness, the key role played by the Eurogroup 
suggests that the certification of the actors taking part in the implementation 
process might not have been unequivocally governed by formal tasks and 
powers. Hence, the resulting constellation could not be considered fully 
hierarchical. Similarly, the mode of interaction in the Eurogroup more resembled 
the behind-door negotiations of bargaining arenas rather than the formal rule-
based interactions of a (quasi)court.  
The second element to consider beyond the formal SGP’s provisions is the 
nature and composition of its key enforcing actor, that is, the Ecofin Council. 
The question here is whether the sanctioning procedures embedded in the 
EDP, whose enforcement rested on the Council’s deliberation via QMV, were 
credible, that is, likely to be activated in cases of non-compliance.  
We saw how within the Eurogroup, owing to its behind-doors mitigation role, 
political discretion and compromise could easily prevail over automaticity and a 
commitment to rules. In the light of this, the credibility of sanctions vis-à-vis non-
compliant budgetary policies rested crucially and solely on the Council’s 
proneness to enforcing its coercive powers. And, in fairness, the expectations 
regarding the watchdog role of the Council were low since the beginning in light 
of its composition and intergovernmental ethos (see among others: De Haan et 
al. 2004; Morris et al. 2006; Seng and Biesenbender 2012) that made it, to be 
generous, an imperfect third party, even leaving aside the controversial position 
of the Eurogroup. This clearly emerges when looking at the development of the 
EDPs occurring under the SGP regime (see Section 4).  
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As a matter of fact, the Council was and is composed by the ministers of 
finance of the EU’s Member States who are the same actors that implement 
budgetary policies at national level. This configured a well-known situation of 
“sinners judging sinners” (Buiter 2003; European Parliament 2005). Looking 
more closely at the voting procedures of the EDP, it appears that, 
notwithstanding the sit-out provision for the Member State subject to it, it was 
extremely easy to form relatively small minorities that, in the light of the QMV, 
result in blocking minorities (Tsebelis 2002; Gros et al. 2004; Seng and 
Biesenbender 2012). In other words, large Member States or coalitions of one 
large Member States and a handful of small countries could easily block an 
EDP, like the German and French cases of November 2003 showed (more on 
this in section 4).  
Moreover, making things worse for credible enforcement, this blocking strategy 
could even take place secretively within the Eurogroup, that is, even before the 
EDP was formally and publicly discussed in the Council sessions. If it was clear 
that a QMV in the Council would have failed due to a private pre-agreement 
reached in the context of the Eurogroup or in the context of private negotiations 
among powerful (in terms of  the allocation of votes) Member States, it was very 
likely that voting in the Council would not have taken place.  
Section 4 will focus on some of these bargaining practices, but the role and 
credibility of the Council (on the grounds of its composition and vote 
distribution), along with those of the Eurogroup (on the grounds of its secretive 
practices and ambiguous role), can already lead us to argue that the binding 
profile and coercive nature of the EDP and of the whole coordination regime 
was seriously threatened by the nature of its agency and lack of credibility of its 
enforcer (Buiter 2003; De Haan et al. 2004). The hierarchical constellation 
previously hypothesized, drawing on the legal dimension of the SGP, hence 
seems to have existed only on paper.  
In contrast to these tendencies, it is important to note that the Commission grew 
increasingly more assertive about its role and powers (Heipertz and Verdun 
2004, p. 118, 133 and 141-142). In other words, this actor tried to expand its 
monitoring tasks and to limit the grand intergovernmental bargaining by means 
of its exclusive right of initiative in EDPs. Nonetheless, the way in which the 
ensuing inter-institutional conflict was resolved by the ECJ in 2004 and the 
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subsequent reform of the SGP (see Section 4 for details) marked a clear victory 
for the Council and the Member States over the disciplinarian stance of the 
Commission, providing further evidence of strategic implementation rather than 
a commitment to multilateral surveillance. 
All things considered, the hierarchical actor constellation implied by Regulations 
1466/97 and 1467/97 was strongly mitigated by the broad opportunities for 
bargaining provided by the ambiguous position of the Eurogroup and by the 
voting procedures of the Council in the EDP. The high certification of the actors 
implied by a purely legalistic reading of the SGP is hence to be rejected in 
favour of a low certification whereby actors’ legitimacy, roles and powers were 
determined by Member States’ powering resources rather than by legally 
binding (and quasi-automatic) procedures and rules. In other words, actors 
taking part in the SGP implementation were no longer highly and formally 
certified like they were under the conditional and hierarchical framework of 
Stage II. It follows that their constellation was also no longer vertical/top-down, 
but rather characterised by horizontal intergovernmental dynamics and 
bargaining. Furthermore, their mode of interaction no longer spoke the official 
language of formal, public evaluation within highly institutionalized venues, but 
rather the language of political concessions and strategic interplay, whereby the 
size of nations (i.e. their implicit power resources and number of votes in the 
Council) and their advocacy capacities shaped the implementation courses 
more than the legal framework (Buti and Pench 2004). 
Reasoning on the learning processes taking place among actors within this 
constellation and through this mode of interaction, the opportunities for 
instrumental learning which were fostered in the previous regime by 
conditionality and hierarchy inevitably look curtailed. In fact, the implementing 
and learning agents of the SGP regime were much closer to the strategic 
bargaining parties rather than the treaty signatories operating in the shadow of 
hierarchy.  
The above discussion of the agency governing the SGP inevitably hinged on 
other dimensions of learning, such as the nature of the venues of policy 
interactions. The preliminary findings point compellingly to a specific mode of 
learning, that is, learning via bargaining.  
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Therefore the remainder of the analysis will be kept short in order to leave more 
room for the scrutiny of those elements of the substantive implementation 
process that can be causally connected to the expected implications of learning 
informed by bargaining. 
 
5.3b What is the tractability of the problems tackled in the policy process? What 
is the content of the learning process? 
 
In a sense, the coordination problem tackled by the SGP and the one 
addressed by the convergence process were in nature the same (Begg 2002, 
pp. 3-4). Indeed, both the regimes drew on articles 99 and 104 of the TEU and 
on the EDP Protocol whereby it is clearly stated that the objective of 
coordination is that of avoiding Member States indulging in fiscal profligacy 
(“Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits”, TEU Article 104, 1) 
so to achieve, through economic policies coordinated at supranational level, a 
“sustained convergence of the economic performances” (TEU, Article 99).53 The 
two regimes simply sought to achieve the same policy objective through (and 
within) different institutional and legal infrastructures and instruments.  
The experience gained under Stage II of EMU made the Member States and 
their monitoring counterparts even more aware of the various challenges of 
policy implementation and coordination, due to a trivial, yet undeniable, process 
of experience-based learning-by-doing (Schuknecht 2004). This leads me to 
argue that the problem tractability of the policy regime has also remained high 
under the SGP. 
The lack of external discipline imposed by financial markets on sovereign debts 
(Mosley 2004) reinforces this conclusion. As a matter of fact, for almost a 
decade, fiscal and budgetary policies had no external market dimension, mainly 
remaining a disciplinarian problem of internal coordination among EMU Member 
States. This circumstance changed dramatically and abruptly as a consequence 
                                                          
53 The SGP Regulation 1466/97, Par. 1 reads: “The SGP is based on the objective of sound government 
finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable 
growth” chiming with TEU transitional provision 109e, 2(a) that reads: “Each Member State shall […] 
adopt […] multiannual programmes intended to ensure the lasting convergence necessary for the 
achievement of economic and monetary union, in particular with regard to price stability and sound 
public finances”. 
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of the financial crisis of 2008/2009. Only then did financial markets eventually 
start to discount the adverse effect of fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances 
that were left growing during the Great Moderation of the first decade of the 
millennium, and only then did high budget deficits and unsustainable debt 
stocks start to weigh on sovereign risk premia (see, among other, Barrios et al. 
2009.) But this is a story for another chapter.  
To conclude this line of reasoning, the coordination problem tackled by the SGP 
regime was not ambiguous, it did not require the creation of a new policy 
paradigm or tools, but rather it revolved around the well-established paradigm of 
sound money and on the instrumentation for coordination designed in the TEU. 
Having established that problem tractability under the SGP was high, the 
following question is: what is the typical content of learning under high problem 
tractability in general and under the SGP regime in particular? Like in the 
shadow of hierarchy of Stage II, when actors are called to implement a set of 
rules aimed at solving an unambiguous policy problem, learning does not 
revolve around the ideational paradigm on which the regime is based, but is 
limited to the procedural dimension of implementation.  
Under low problem tractability, the characteristic problem solving nature of 
policy interactions typically leads to paradigmatic change (Bennett and Howlett 
1992; Hall 1993). Actors puzzle and learn thereof, very often by changing their 
deep-rooted set of beliefs. On the other hand, under high problem tractability 
(and most of all under bargaining) the puzzling nature of policy interaction is 
much less salient and different courses of action belong to well-established 
repertoires with well-known payoffs. As a result actors tend to engage in 
strategic behaviours, with learning dynamics emerging as a by-product of 
strategic implementation (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013). However, while under 
hierarchy and vertical constellations actors find it hard to act strategically due to 
the retaliatory nature of the regime (like under Stage II of EMU), under 
horizontal bargaining (like within the setting having emerged in the Eurogroup, 
for instance, or in the presence of non-credible sanctioning) the implementing 
parties are less constrained and engage fully in horizontal distributional conflict 
and in the strategic attainment of their goals. The content of learning of such a 
process is hence advocacy and strategic sophistication and mutual adjustments 
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that can easily turn into political (and potentially dysfunctional) learning (May 
1992; Gilardi and Radaelli 2010). 
 
5.3c Are the policy interactions observed in the regime one-shot or iterated? 
How frequent and formalized are the iterations of the interactions? 
 
The policy interactions under the SGP were not only multi-layered but also 
iterated and governed by formal deadlines and timeframes. This circumstance 
is plastically demonstrated by the extremely detailed description of successive 
deadlines and time limits established in Articles 3, 4 and 5 of Regulation 
1467/97. 
Furthermore, whereas Stage II of EMU was a transitional regime, the SGP was 
instead meant to substantiate a virtually permanent regime of multilateral 
surveillance. The policy interactions taking place in its context were in theory 
subject to be repeated infinitely or at least indefinitely. In this scenario, actors 
were hence embedded in a stable coordination framework and their policy 
interactions were constantly iterated, by rule (e.g.: national stability programmes 
to be regularly delivered, EDP successive deadlines) and practice (e.g.: regular 
and extraordinary Eurogroup and Council sessions). Within iterated policy 
interactions, the expected outcome is mutual adaptation and adjustment, 
whether cooperative or conflictual, depending on the nature of the contract 
binding the parties 
In the SGP case, bargaining practices and strategic implementation could have 
been tamed by hierarchy and credible sanctions for defectors, leading to a long-
term cooperative equilibrium over time. Nonetheless, as already argued, the 
most crucial policy interactions among actors were mainly iterated in the 
informal and liquid context of the Eurogroup, rather than in the highly regulated 
and public context of the Council, with an increasingly negative impact on the 
iterations of the interactions, as suggested by the argument of cumulative 
distributive conflicts (Dunlop and Radaelli 2016). This leads us to reason on the 
last analytical dimension of the policy learning measuring instrument, that is, the 
nature of the venues of policy interactions.  
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5.3d What is the venue and mode of interaction among actors? Is it formal 
(hierarchically organized) or informal (horizontal and deliberative)? 
 
Owing to the dual nature of the Pact (preventive and corrective), the venue 
whereby regime-specific interactions took place was not unique. Within the 
preventive arm, governed by soft means of coordination, the key venues of 
interaction between Member States and the monitoring authorities were the first 
three Ecofin Council sessions of each year, a formal institutional venue 
resembling a court where roles and decisional prerogatives are given and 
hierarchically organized and monitored.54  
In short, the Council was the evaluator and its sessions were the formal venues 
of its assessment. If the opinion of the Council was that the stability programme 
of a country “should be strengthened” (Regulation 1466/79, Art. 5,2) and/or that 
its implementation would lead to divergences with respect to its MTOs, an early 
warning could be issued by the Council. Following a warning, the Council then 
further examined the implementation of stability programmes throughout the 
year, again in the highly formalized context of its regular monthly meetings. 
Under the preventive arm, therefore, national stability programmes were the 
mode/tool of interaction and the highly formal Ecofin Council meetings were the 
venue of monitoring and evaluation, always noting that the latter had to draw on 
the Commission’s recommendations and hence on continued exchanges with 
the officials of the Economic and Financial Affairs Directorate General of the 
Commission.  
Importantly, the Ecofin Council formation included the representatives (i.e. the 
ministers) of all the countries whose programmes were evaluated from time to 
time, making it the central forum for the implementation of fiscal coordination 
(along with its Eurozone brother, the Eurogroup). In that context, ministers 
personally interacted with their colleagues from other Member States and with 
the Commission throughout the whole cycle of evaluation of the national 
stability programmes that lasted for the whole year.  
                                                          
54 “The EFC [Economic and Financial Committee – the already mentioned advisory body] and the ECOFIN 
should examine the SCP [Stability and Convergence Programmes] updates in a maximum of three 
sessions. The whole process should be completed before the end of March each year” (Opinion of the 
Economic and Financial Committee 2001). 
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Moving to the corrective arm of the Pact, we note that the Commission played a 
more important role than simply submitting recommendations to the Council. In 
fact, it was tasked with the independent evaluation of Member States’ budgetary 
figures and, in cases when an excessive deficit was detected, was entrusted 
with the exclusive prerogative of issuing a report to the Council regarding the 
deviating Member State. The complex and multi-layered adjustment process 
foreseen by the EDP (described in Chapter 4 and in the first sections of this 
chapter) followed, providing that the Council agreed - by a QMV - on the 
existence of an excessive deficit for the concerned Member State and on the 
successive steps of the EDP. The venue of this hierarchical, rule-based 
decision was again the monthly sessions of the Council. In other words, all 
successive stages of a corrective action initiated by the Commission and 
approved by the Council were highly formalized and again took place in the 
context of Ecofin meetings and through formal communications between the 
latter and the concerned Member State.  
Yet again, the de jure setting of the venues of regime-specific interactions 
points toward a hierarchical decision making context. However, vis-à-vis a 
formal venue that looked as fully institutionalized and governed by rules we 
have to consider the two elements that questioned the hierarchical structure of 
the actor constellation: first the role of QMV and lack of sanctions’ automaticity 
and, second, the informal role of the Eurogroup, which in practice, drawing on 
the private and unregulated nature of its interactions, very often emptied the 
role of the formal set of procedures and potential sanctions in place within the 
Council's EDP (Heipertz and Verdun 2010, pp. 128-149).  
In this light, the assessment about the nature of the venue of policy interaction 
and learning of the corrective arm is that along with formal hierarchical settings 
like the Council sessions we also observe informal ones like the Eurogroup, 
which represents a bargaining arena governed by political discretion whereby 
actors’ roles were not certified but power politics and players’ resources broadly 
prevailed. 
The conclusion is hence that under the SGP the venues of interactions were of 
mixed nature. On the one hand there were highly institutionalized venues where 
formal, institutional communication and decision-making prevailed (but vis-à-vis 
the lack of binding enforcement instruments, like under the preventive arm). On 
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the other hand, where formally coercive procedures existed (like under the 
corrective arm and the EDP) they were watered down by behind-door political 
bargaining within informal venues (the Eurogroup) and QMV-based strategies 
within the Council. Therefore, the venues of SGP interactions were both 
formal/rule-based (though leading to typically vague recommendations to 
implementing parties, like under the preventive arm) and full-blown political 
bargaining arenas.  
With the above account of the venues of interaction under SGP 
implementation,55 the scope conditions of the different dimensions of the policy 
learning measuring instrument are now fully characterised.  The following table 
summarizes them and leads to the conclusion that the prevalent mode of 
learning under SGP implementation was indeed learning via bargaining. 
 
Table 5.2 The “policy learning measuring instrument” applied to the SGP regime 
WHO 
Actor certification, 
constellation and 
mode of interaction 
WHAT 
Problem tractability 
and content of the 
learning process 
WHEN 
Timeframe of the 
policy interactions 
WHERE 
Venues of the 
policy interactions 
and their nature 
Mixed certification: 
highly certified 
implementing 
(learning) and 
monitoring (teaching) 
actors along with 
differently certified 
bargaining parties 
Mixed constellations 
and modes of 
interaction: 
coexistence of 
vertical and 
horizontal 
constellations and 
formal (rule-based) 
and informal (power-
based) interactions 
High problem 
tractability: low 
puzzling dimension 
of the policy regime 
and interactions 
Content of the 
learning process: by-
product of (strategic) 
implementation 
investing the 
procedural 
dimension of 
implementation and 
near-core beliefs 
(potentially leading to 
“political learning” 
and increased 
strategic 
sophistication under 
horizontal 
bargaining). 
Formally iterated, i.e. 
taking place “under 
the shadow of time”. 
Potential for mutual 
strategic adaptation 
over time and 
cumulative conflicts. 
Mixed nature of the 
venues: both 
hierarchical and rule-
based official 
monitoring venues 
and horizontal 
power-based 
bargaining arenas. 
 
 
                                                          
55 The characterisation of the SGP carried out in the previous section draws on the pre-2005 non-
amended provisions of the Pact. The provisions stemming from the 2005 reform are not covered here as 
they reinforced the bargaining elements of the coordination regime, providing for a weaker version of 
the SGP (see below).   
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In the following section, we explore the observable implications of this mode of 
learning and provide empirical evidence of their presence and influence in the 
implementation of the SGP. 
 
5.4 Observable implications of learning via bargaining and substantive 
policy processes 
 
5.4a Expected and (anecdotally) observed implications of learning via 
bargaining  
 
What is the impact on a regime’s outcomes of learning mechanisms and 
processes informed by strategic implementation/bargaining? What is the nature 
of policy learning implications under cumulative bargaining over time? Only in 
an apparently tautological way, the key empirical manifestation/expectation of 
learning via bargaining is, indeed, bargaining. Or, more specifically, that actors 
learn how to bargain and refine strategic sophistication over time and mutually 
adjust. Substantively, after an initial period of uncertainty about the room for 
discretionary application of the common rules (1999/2001), Member States 
learned two things, and remember that under hierarchy and bargaining the 
puzzling dimension of policy making is not prevalent, the powering one is, and 
learning is a by-product of the policy process, not its key objective.  
First, they learned that bargaining over compliance was actually feasible, most 
of all for those actors with relevant political resources and weight in the 
Council’s voting system. In their reaction function, non-compliance, if not 
sanctioned but if it nevertheless allowed access to the benefits of monetary 
union, became a dominant strategy. Second, they learned, by doing it, how to 
bargain, that is, they learned how to pursue non-compliance in a sustainable 
way politically. The ideational convergence reached in the TEU for a paradigm 
of sound money and fiscal restraint, as the monetary union continued to 
function properly without widespread compliance with the supranational 
surveillance framework, inevitably became looser. As a matter of fact, Member 
States lost interest in the benefits of “tying one’s hands” and, besides starting to 
breach the rules of the game, even managed to negotiate a new, weaker 
arrangement for coordination. 
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The trigger of this shift lies in the changes that occurred in the agency and 
venue of the regime-specific interactions. The regime’s agency morphed from a 
rule-based, vertical constellation with high/formal actor certification into a 
horizontal constellation where political power resources (in the form of votes in 
the Council, capacity of forming blocking minorities, and the de facto disparity of 
influence between big and small Member States) substituted formal roles. We 
also observed a shift from a highly formalized and conditional venue governed 
by rules to bargaining arenas characterised by political compromise and 
discretion. In a nutshell, under such a scenario, we should not be surprised that 
the underlying learning dynamic tilted toward political learning outcomes rather 
than toward policy learning ones.   
One may argue that this account conflates learning and bargaining because it is 
predicated on and skewed toward a rational choice/power-based account of the 
policy process. This is in part true, but it is due to the fact that learning under 
bargaining is a modality whereby the strategic/powering dimension of the policy 
interactions admittedly prevails over the puzzling one. Drawing on Hall’s tri-
partition of learning outcomes (1993), learning via bargaining (comparable to his 
first and second-order change) does not entail policy actors puzzling over a 
reconsideration of the policy paradigm but, also in line with the advocacy 
coalition framework conceptualisation of Sabatier, it involves actors pursuing 
strategic adjustments over “near core beliefs” and secondary aspects of the 
policy. These latter clearly hinge on the strategy that allows the achievement of 
core beliefs in the policy process.56 As also argued by Dunlop and Radaelli 
(2013, p. 611), “the actors involved in the process set their own goals – they are 
strategic about where they want to go with their learning process”.  
Within this setting, neither hierarchy can fully nudge learning toward non-
political outcomes. In fact, hierarchy, high actor certification and top-down 
constellations (as we saw in the previous chapter) can mimic a teacher-learner 
relation: actors at the top (hierarchically entitled to monitor, enforce and 
sanction) can be seen as those detaining legitimacy and hence drive the 
process toward “learning to comply” outcomes that are functional to their core 
beliefs. However, if the constellation is horizontal and actor certification 
                                                          
56 “Policy-oriented learning is an ongoing process of search and adaptation motivated by the desire to 
realize core policy beliefs” (Hall 1993, p. 151). 
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uncertain, no one enjoys superior legitimacy, neither hierarchically/legally, nor 
substantively (except for bargaining resources and power), and hence actors 
fully engage in distributional bargaining and gradually learn how to make their 
advocacy more sophisticated and successful.  
A final aspect to consider is the gradual nature of the process, an empirical 
element that strongly corroborates the presence of a learning effect. Bargaining 
did not immediately emerge as the rule of the game during implementation. Let 
us recall that in 2001 the Pact was still termed a “quasi-automatic mechanism” 
by a key actors of EMU policy (and politics), like Jürgen Stark (ibid. 2001). 
Rather, the political nature of the SGP became a lesson gradually learned by 
both the larger Member States and supranational actors as a result of the early 
years of functioning of the regime. This gradual element will clearly emerge 
from the narrative account of the SGP provided below. 
Let us move now to the final part of the chapter where I show how the expected 
implications of a mode of learning based upon bargaining broadly apply to the 
empirical developments of the SGP regime. 
 
5.4b Substantive policy processes and outcomes: Presence of bargaining and 
learning thereof 
 
Producing a complete account of the implementation courses of the SGP from 
1999 up to 2007/2008 for all the Member States participating to the common 
currency clearly goes beyond the scope of my investigation and analytical aims. 
The objective of this section is instead that of resorting to the abundant 
empirical evidence available with regard to the SGP57 in order to verify whether 
and in what way the expected implications of learning via bargaining have 
manifested themselves within the substantive policy process of SGP 
implementation, influencing its outcomes. 
To this end, in line with the previous case study, I will focus specifically on a set 
of macro-level evidence that characterised the process of regime 
implementation. In line with the evidentiary eclecticism put forth in the 
                                                          
57 In particular, along with the official documents of EU institutions, I will resort in large part to the 
following secondary sources: Buti et al. (2001); Buti (2003); Gros et al. (2004), Morris et al. (2006); 
Leblond (2006) and Heipertz and Verdun (2010).  
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introductory chapter, I resort to different empirical aspects of SGP history58 that, 
matching the expected observable implications deduced from the policy 
learning measuring instrument, represent clear proofs of the fact that learning 
via bargaining not only took place during the SGP practice but also contributed 
in influencing its outcomes, reinforcing the strategic dynamic implied by 
bargaining. This interconnected substantive evidence is: 
 An overview of the poor record of Member States’ budgetary 
performances featuring a learning-informed narrative account of the 
grand bargaining that occurred between 1999 and 2003; 
 The 2005 reform of the Pact. 
 Finally, an overview of the developments that occurred after the 2005 
reform of the Pact. 
 
5.4b1 Budgetary performances and the “dog that never bites” – an overview of 
the SGP record 
 
As argued by the large majority of scholars that have analysed the pre- and 
post-Euro budgetary performances of the “participating Member States”, the 
contemporaneous entering into legal force of the SGP and of EMU Stage III 
determined an undeniable slowdown of the retrenchment efforts that 
characterised Stage II, a so-called “consolidation fatigue” (see, among others: 
Fatás and Mihov 2003). Whereas by 1999 all Member States were compliant 
with the deficit-to-GDP 3% rule, in 2000 we already observe initial pressures on 
this key parameter (that is the key reference value monitored under the EDP) 
and in 2001 we have the first actual violations of the deficit ceiling by Portugal 
and Germany (nonetheless, the first EDP would have been only enacted in late 
2002 and for Portugal only – see below). 
From 2001 until 2008, violations of the deficit ceiling became increasingly 
common, even though there was no direct correspondence between violations 
and enacted EDPs (see Table 3). In particular, in the period of 2002-2008, a 
                                                          
58 The form of empirical validation and logic of inference draw on narrative. This is in line with both the 
process-tracing tradition (Beach and Pedersen 2013) and the empirical methodology, typical for the 
investigation of strategic domains, of Analytic Narrative scholarship (Bates et al. 1998). 
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total of 8 EDPs were initiated.59 Throughout that period, France, Germany, 
Greece and Italy were involved in one EDP each for 4 consecutive years. The 
Netherlands was involved in one EDP in 2004 only and it immediately corrected 
its imbalance by 2005. The case of Portugal is remarkable as it incurred two 
consecutive EDPs in the period of 2002-2008 (and being under a third 
procedure from 2009 until 2013 - in practice, Portugal has never been 
complying with the 3% criterion).  
The only EDP closed due to the swift adjustments enacted by the concerned 
Member States was the Dutch one in 2004. All other EDPs run for a much 
longer period, calling into question the fact that the procedure was able to 
spawn “prompt corrections” and the commitment of the defecting Member State 
to adjust its imbalances according to the measures recommended by the 
Commission during the successive stages of the EDP. Yet, the truly 
sanctionative provisions of the corrective arm involving deposits and economic 
sanctions never entered into play. Moreover, several situations whereby the 
deficit ceiling was broken did not lead to EDPs but simply to early warnings. The 
tenet according to which EMU would work as a collective retrenchment device 
(McKinnon 1997), at least in the period of 1999-2008, clashed with a reality 
characterised by a Europe-wide lower than expected growth and mounting 
domestic political pressures against fiscal consolidation and restraint. This 
situation indeed led to widespread disregard of fiscal discipline. In more detail, 
the reversal of the positive macroeconomic trend observed in 1999/200060 
increased the internal political cost of budgetary consolidations for Member 
States that then started being increasingly weary of the paradigm of sound 
finance and gradually grew aware (and learned) of the possibility of preventing it 
in a sustainable way.   
 
                                                          
 59 It is important to note that the launch of an EDP is not a failure of the coordination regime per se 
because the EDP is there precisely to correct instances of failed coordination. The real failure of the 
coordination regime is when the EDP does not result in any correction, instead leading to protracted 
violations of the deficit ceiling. 
60 The higher than expected growth rates did not support moderation in the form of sustained 
consolidation processes but instead led to pro-cyclical policies that actually endangered the 
retrenchment efforts of Stage II and left too little room for fiscal manoeuvre when the cycle reversed. As 
we shall see in Chapter 8, this phenomenon was mainly due to revenue windfalls that were not used to 
cut the debt but to run pro-cyclical policies that increased expenditures.  
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Table 5.3 Euro area deficit-to-GDP ratios, 1999-2009 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Austria -2.6 -2.0 -0.6 -1.3 -1.8 -4.8 -2.5 -2.5 -1.3 -1.4 -5.3* 
Belgium -0.6 -0.1 0.2 0.1 -1.8 -0.2 -2.6 0.2 0.0 -1.1 -5.5* 
Finland 1.7 6.9 5.0 4.1 2.4 2.2 2.6 3.9 5.1 4.2 -2.5 
France -1.6 -1.3 -1.4 -3.1 -3.9* -3.5* -3.2* -2.3* -2.5 -3.2 -7.2* 
Germany -1.5 1.0 -3.1 -3.9 -4.1* -3.7* -3.3* -1.5* 0.3* 0.0 -3.0* 
Greece : : : : : : : : : : : 
Ireland 2.4 4.9 1.0 -0.3 0.8 1.4 1.3 2.8 0.3 -7.0 -13.9* 
Italy -1.8 -1.3 -3.4 -3.1 -3.4 -3.6 -4.2* -3.6* -1.5* -2.7* -5.3* 
Luxembourg 3.6 5.7 6.0 2.3 0.5 -1.1 0.2 1.4 4.2 3.3 -0.5 
Netherlands 0.3 1.9 -0.4 -2.1 -3.0 -1.8* -0.3* 0.2 0.2 0.2 -5.5* 
Portugal -3.0 -3.2 -4.8 -3.3* -4.4* -6.2* -6.2* -4.3* -3.0* -3.8* -9.8* 
Spain -1.3 -1.0 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 1.2 2.2 2.0 -4.4 -11.0* 
Source: Eurostat. The shadowed cells indicate a deficit-to-GDP ratio ≥ 3%. The asterisks indicate that an 
EDP was underway. The values for Greece are missing as the data extraction from the Eurostat dataset 
left them blank.  
 
Two early episodes that occurred in the context of the preventive arm of the 
Pact were highly indicative of the bargaining tendencies that will eventually 
unfold in full force in 2003. The first one already occurred in 1999 when the 
Council generously conceded to Italy a relaxation of the deficit target set in its 
BEPGs.61 That was the first hint that the policy regime was lenient on non-
compliant behaviour by large Member States. This episode, though occurring 
under a soft law instrument like the BEPGs62 and looking seemingly marginal, 
was in actuality a sort of original sin, most of all if contrasted with the case of 
the Irish warning of January 2001. On that occasion, the Council, acting upon a 
Commission’s recommendation again under the BEPGs, adopted a totally 
different position with respect to the Italian case. In fact, it issued an opinion 
explicitly advising Ireland to cut its budget by 0.5% of the GDP. The paradoxical 
element of this decision was that Ireland was projected to run a surplus for the 
                                                          
61 In May 1999, Italy had already been granted access to Stage III of EMU despite its impressive debt to 
GDP ratio and much doubt surrounding its conduct of economic policies. The relaxation conceded to 
Italy on that occasion took place under the preventive arm/BEPGs and consisted of allowing the country 
a higher deficit to GDP target for the following year (from 2 to 2,4 per cent deficit to GDP ratio). This 
happened because Italian Treasury Minister made clear reference to “adverse economic conditions” in 
the context of the Ecofin Council meeting. The decision was hence taken at the intergovernmental level 
and represented an early signal of the weakness of the soft preventive provisions of the Pact vis-à-vis 
discretion and political agreement reached within Ecofin. Moreover, it signalled that the preventive arm 
of the Pact would have been extremely hard to implement when adverse economic conditions emerged.  
62 See Table 5.1. 
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following year and that the Council’s opinion was issued in order to curb 
potential inflationary pressures rather than to correct a potential excessive 
deficit. The Irish reaction to the rather assertive position of the Commission, 
backed by the Council, was to rebut the requests for adjustment keeping its 
budget stance unchanged for the year to come.  
Another important aspect that emerged during the first two years of SGP 
implementation was that Members States, although increasingly dubious about 
the benefits of fiscal discipline and multilateral surveillance in general, were 
somehow reluctant to openly challenge the tenet underlying the reference 
values for the deficit ceiling that constituted the heart of the corrective arm and 
the EDP. Yet, through the enactment of pro-cyclical fiscal policies vis-à-vis the 
occurrence of revenue windfalls (Heipertz and Verdun 2010, pp. 113-117), they 
clearly signalled that they were not willing to abide by the MTO of CTBOIS 
budgetary positions during periods of accelerated economic growth, exploiting 
the asymmetry of the Pact during positive economic cycles. The corrective arm 
of the Pact was in fact the only one that Member States were taking seriously, 
initially. This was arguably due to the political/reputational and potential 
economic costs of an EDP, that is, due to the pressure of sanctions and 
coercion whose credibility was still not under question. Or, to put it differently, 
due to the fact that the bargaining lesson was still in the making.  
From these episodes and from the latter point, we can distil two aspects that are 
worth our attention. First, the failure of the preventive tools (which the BEPGs 
are part of) in inducing compliance to the supranational coordination regime. 
Second, the barefaced disparity of treatment between Italy (a large, influential 
country, already poised to be a potential sinner due to a reputation of 
preference for inflation and historically profligatory fiscal policies) and Ireland (a 
small, fast-growing country with a good record of compliance and no overly 
alarming tensions over its budgetary stance).63  
These interconnected episodes represented a noticeable “first blow” to the 
credibility and fairness of the SGP preventive architecture and to the tenet of 
commitment to rules over political discretion. The process involving the Member 
                                                          
63 It is also worth noting that whereas Ireland was in an extremely safe position with regard to its debt-
to-GDP position (36% in 2001), in 1999 Italy had a debt-to-GDP ratio of 116%. 
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States learning over the rules of the bargaining game underpinned by the 
coordination regime had started. 
The picture would darken relevantly during the course of 2001, with the 
pressure of stagnating GDP growth looming large. The relevant cases here 
were those of Portugal and, most of all, Germany, both of which managed to 
circumvent an early warning in February 2002. In January 2002, the 
Commission, according to its right of initiative and also due to discomfort with 
regard to the spreading of fiscal laxity (only partially caused by the reversal of 
the macroeconomic trend), advised the Council to adopt early warnings under 
the preventive arm for Germany and Portugal, whose budgetary stances were 
rapidly deteriorating. At this juncture, we appreciate empirically, for the first 
time, the influence of the Eurogroup intergovernmental logic on fiscal discipline 
implementation. In fact, the Commission’s recommendation did not even 
manage to reach an official vote in the context of the Council meeting as the 
Eurogroup succeeded in shunning it on the basis of a private intergovernmental 
pre-agreement. As a reported by Heipertz and Verdun (2010), a blocking 
minority against the Commission’s recommendations was unofficially formed 
during the Eurogroup meeting. At this point, the Commission decided to avoid a 
showdown in the Council and withdrew its recommendation in favour of vague 
commitments by the concerned Member States.  
After this critical episode, the situation worsened rapidly, with France added to 
the list of the potential sinners for 2002. At that time it was indeed already clear 
that the preventive infrastructure of the Pact had failed to bring about 
compliance to fiscal discipline. As a further proof of this, in June 2002 tensions 
between small Member States and the Commission on the one side, and 
France on the other, clearly surfaced. France, in fact, was granted a notable 
relaxation and postponement with regard to its MTOs for CTBOIS budgetary 
position under the BEPGs. This irritated many small Member States that were 
instead showing a high level of compliance to the rules of the multilateral 
regime. 
Subsequently the Commission, also owing to the fact that Portugal, Germany 
and France were swiftly approaching the deficit ceilings for enacting an EDP, 
finally resolved to put into action the corrective framework of the SGP. Portugal 
(a small country) was the first Member State to incur an EDP in July 2002. In 
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short, under the procedure, the involved countries “were expected to correct the 
excessive deficits within a year, and Portugal duly did” (Journal of Common 
Market Studies 2004, p. 1023, italics added).   
The cases of French and Germany instead followed a remarkably different 
trajectory. Although the budgetary situation of France and Germany was not in 
principle better than the Portuguese one, these two countries managed to delay 
a Council decision under the truly biting provisions of the corrective arm until 
late 2003. They achieved this in various ways. First, resorting, under the already 
weakened preventive arm, to non-credible growth forecasts that made their 
budgetary positions look less problematic (see Buti and Pench 2004). Second, 
by systematically “preventing the preventive arm” (Heipertz and Verdun 2004; 
2010, pp. 122-124) and in turn obtaining less harsh MTOs (that went neglected 
anyway). Third, by exploiting their political and voting power in the context of the 
Eurogroup. Fourth, by applying a “divide and rule” strategy that put small 
compliant Member States partially against the Commission that at that time had 
started reasoning on a general relaxation of the SGP, mainly to accommodate 
the desiderata of large Member States and to keep the coordination framework 
alive, notwithstanding the spreading of non-compliant behaviour. These 
episodes are all very much in line with the implications of learning via the 
bargaining process.  
During that period, it was clear to all the relevant actors and most of all to the 
increasingly distressed small Member States that France and Germany (and 
perhaps Italy too) should have been put under an EDP. France’s top politicians 
on different occasions even showed a challenging stance against the 
Commission, while Germany was more prudent and seemingly open to a 
compromise, that is, to consent to a “light” EDP. Nonetheless, from a learning 
perspective, a gradual (and dysfunctional) political learning process was already 
well underway, as the German position also stiffened pretty soon in a sort of 
bandwagon effect.64 In this regard, it is also interesting to take stock of the 
account featured in De Haan et al. (2004) about the presence of a herd effect in 
                                                          
64 “Observers noted that the French attitude not to honour European commitments seemed increasingly 
to influence a number of German actors, who became more used to the idea of relaxing the course of 
budgetary consolidation […] Both the German and the French courses reinforced each other to the 
extent that the ‘seriousness’ of Berlin’s opposition to Brussels became clear to Paris and vice versa” 
(Heipertz and Verdun 2010, pp. 134 and 150). 
168 
 
violations. According to their game theoretical conceptualisation of policy 
coordination under the SGP, the probability of being sanctioned decreases if the 
number of defectors increases. Put simply, sinners are more lenient with other 
sinners. This explanation also fits very well to a process of gradual learning via 
bargaining, involving an increasing number of actors. 
Amid this complicated situation, the stability programmes for 2003 of France 
and Germany showed a deteriorated budgetary situation. In fact, the Council 
meeting held in January adopted the Commission’s recommendation and 
issued an early warning to France (which it rebutted, saying it would have not 
abided by the adjustment measured proposed) and EDP to Germany (which 
instead consented on it, but simply under the “light” provisions of paragraph 3 of 
Article 104). In June 2003, an EDP was also launched against France, but 
again under the relatively light paragraph 3 of Article 104. Nonetheless, even in 
the presence of two ongoing EDPs against them, both France and Germany 
refused to correct their budgetary positions, with France even officially asking 
for a further postponement for adjusting its deficit. 
The showdown, within a situation including early warnings, lightly-worded EDPs 
and yet no real effort for corrective actions by the governments involved, took 
place on 25th November 2003. The Commission, backed by a coalition of small 
compliant Member States, came to the conclusion that the enactment of more 
coercive measures on France and Germany could not have been delayed any 
longer without threatening the credibility of the whole fiscal framework. The 
Commission explicitly recommended the Council to vote under the more 
coercive provisions of paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article 104 (those about iterated 
non-compliance and non-effective corrections - see above for details). A 
positive Council opinion under those indents would have implied substantive 
enforcement actions against the then long-term defectors, potentially leading to 
sanctions in the form of a non-interest bearing deposit.  
Before the vote took place, Germany and France “mustered the coalition for a 
blocking minority” (Heipertz and Verdun 2010, p. 143), resorting to both private 
bi-lateral contacts and to Eurogroup sessions. As a consequence of this 
strategy, the vote in the Council did not reach a qualified majority thanks to the 
efforts of the two countries in forming a blocking minority also involving Italy, the 
UK, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal. The two EDPs were officially 
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suspended, dropping the final bomb on the credibility of the Pact that from then 
on was punt in ‘abeyance’. This outcome represented the result of a gradual 
process of increasing bargaining sophistication whereby large Member States 
learned how to prevail over small ones and the Commission by means of the 
loopholes provided by the Eurogroup intergovernmental formula and through 
strategizing QMV.  
A key explanatory role of the events that occurred in the period 2002/2003 has 
to be attributed to domestic politics and intergovernmentalism. As for the latter, 
the November 2003 episode is to be attributed to “the arbitrariness of power 
politics seen in the behaviour of the large countries” (Heipertz and Verdun 2010, 
p. 151). As for the former, political and electoral motives were seen as central 
drivers of the behaviour of France and Germany (ibid.). My investigation 
acknowledges the importance of domestic explanations, yet it looks to 
complement them with the causal forces and learning mechanisms ensuing at 
the supranational level of policy coordination.  
From this perspective, it is clear that domestic politics explanations could not 
have exerted a great deal of influence outside the scope of a weakened 
coordination regime whereby sanctions gradually proved unenforceable. 
Moreover, these weaknesses did not come from outer space but were context-
specific, i.e. they arose out of the first three years of experience with the Pact’s 
implementation. In other words, the blows to the preventive arm observed in the 
period of 1999-2002 and the struggle between small and large Member States 
(resolved in favour of the latter) were thought to be important lessons to those 
Member States interested in defecting from the rules. 
When reasoning on the implications of learning via bargaining, I argued that the 
gradual increase of strategic sophistication was one of the key expectations and 
this aspect was clearly reflected in the implementation practice. Such a learning 
mechanism did not only regard the Member States but also the other key actor 
of the regime, that is, the Commission. In fact, in the first three years of 
implementation of the SGP, the Commission also gradually learned about the 
weakness of the preventive arm and when widespread defections by powerful 
Member States started endangering the whole fiscal framework, resorted to the 
corrective arm to attain its own goals. When it became clear that the key 
leverages of the regime were in the hands of large Member States endowed 
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with voting power within the Council, the Commission further “learned via 
bargaining” and tried to resort to the judiciary weapon in its capacity of 
watchdog of the treaties. This legal conflict, its result and the subsequent reform 
of the Pact represent the final set empirical evidence that corroborates the 
implications of learning via bargaining, a sort of smoking gun of the fact that 
actors bargained and learned thereof under the SGP. 
 
5.4b2 The reform of the Pact and its nature: a late son of 2003 grand bargaining  
 
The 2004 European Court of Justice pronouncement over the November 2003 
decisions of the Council reasserted the right of initiative of the Commission in 
EDPs, but also stressed that the final decision maker within the coordination 
regime was the Council and that its political discretion over the application (or 
lack thereof) of enforcement measures could not be challenged by the 
Commission. 
Already before the ECJ’s ruling, a process of reform had been enacted by the 
Commission and the Council. A detailed discussion of the reform process and 
of the features of the new SGP would go beyond the purpose of this chapter. 
Moreover, various sources, both in law and political science, have already 
comprehensively addressed the issue. Nonetheless, it is important to notice, 
and extremely telling of the nature of the new SGP, that almost all the informed 
observers (and even the ECB) agreed in considering the new Pact as a weaker 
version of the previous one that failed in bringing about sound coordination 
(see, among others: Calmfors 2005; Feldstein 2005; Morris et al. 2006; Heipertz 
and Verdun 2010; Schucknecht et al. 2011).65 To quote an occasional paper of 
the ECB,  
“the proliferation of escape clauses and the shift in emphasis towards 
conditional as opposed to unconditional compliance implies that the rules 
are now less well-defined and less simple. The new framework is also 
less transparent insofar as it is now harder for outsiders to assess 
whether or not decisions taken by the Council are consistent with a 
rigorous application of the rules. In addition, it has to be recalled that the 
reform has not changed the governance structure of the SGP in any 
fundamental way. The basic incentives for all parties involved and the 
                                                          
65 Quite obviously, the Commission and the Council endorsed the new Pact as a positive shift in fiscal 
policy coordination and economic governance of EMU. 
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voting rules in the ECOFIN Council remain as they were before the 
reform” (Morris et al. 2006, p. 23). 
 
The failed opportunity to reform the Pact in a functional way, that is, having 
regard for the overarching objective of sound policy coordination instead of 
allowing for even more discretion in implementation, can be considered as 
further proof of how the Member States (i.e. the most powerful actors within the 
strategic interplay arising out of the first years of implementation) effectively 
learned how to bargain and exploit the loopholes of EMU architecture to untie 
their hands. Whereas the 1997 version of the SGP arising out of the EMU 
convergence process was arguably the result of hierarchic instrumental 
learning, the reformed Pact was the result of the bargaining lesson from which 
Member States gradually learned how to regain relevant room for discretion vis-
à-vis the purported hard disciplinarian nature of fiscal policy coordination.   
 
5.4b3 After the 2005 SGP reform: smoothly sailing toward the storm 
 
The budgetary performances of the period of 2005-2007 and part of 2008 were 
considered by EU institutions, against broadly negative expert opinions about 
the reformed framework, as proof that the renewed SGP was a better, more 
flexible and sensible instrument of policy coordination than its much criticized 
predecessor. In fact, in its report on “Public Finances in EMU – 2008”, the EU 
Commission proudly states that “[i]n spite of the still significant differences 
across countries, last year the headline deficit in the euro area and the EU as a 
whole reached its lowest level in decades” and that this was due to the fact that 
“Member States subject to the dissuasive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact 
have made considerable advances toward correcting their excessive deficits” 
(pp. xiv and 1). Nonetheless, these noticeable budgetary performances were 
hardly comparable to the “genuine consolidation” of Stage II.  
As argued in Chapter 4, the genuineness of retrenchment efforts by Member 
States needs to be tested against a relevant “bad weather test”, that is, vis-à-vis 
an unsupportive macroeconomic environment. In other words, the strong 
economic growth observed over the period of 2005-2007 (bringing about so-
called windfalls and “buoyant revenue developments” – ibid. p. 1) made 
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compliance to the corrective provisions of the SGP quasi-automatic and did not 
allow evaluation of whether nominally healthy public finances were the result of 
Member States discretionary restraint and genuine implementation of the 
supranational framework or merely the fruit of a supportive business cycle. 
Indeed, although lacking final evidence on this point, there are reasons to 
believe more in the latter account.  
In fact, even without drawing on the staggering fiscal deterioration of 2009 to 
assess negatively the new SGP, one can argue that its inherent flaws were 
already apparent during the 2005 and 2007 honeymoons. These flaws were not 
reflected in widespread defections to the corrective arm’s ceilings, as we saw, 
but in a slightly more subtle circumstance, that is, the systematic postponement 
of MTOs of CTBOIS under the preventive, forward-looking arm of the Pact 
aimed at guaranteeing long-term sustainability of the fiscal framework.  
Like during the robust economic growth of the period of 1999-2001, the 
renewed SGP also proved unable to curtail pro-cyclical budgetary policies 
across the Eurozone. The Commission acknowledges this in its 2008 report by 
stating that: “If more progress had been made towards sustainable fiscal 
positions over the past years of high economic growth it would certainly have 
diminished potential risks to public finances in the medium term” (p. xiv). In 
other words, higher than expected economic growth was instrumental in 
keeping the fiscal houses in order vis-à-vis the hard provisions of the corrective 
arm, yet virtually no Member States succeeded in exploiting growth windfalls to 
build up credible buffers against future downturns or, in other words, to collect 
“rainy day funds” and consolidate their budgets while also lowering their debt 
stock, that is, to move toward long-term fiscal sustainability.  
Was that true glory then? Hindsight guarantees it was not, but already in 2010, 
Heipertz and Verdun (with a much more limited hindsight with respect to the 
one we can draw upon today) were able to argue that “most observers were 
adamant that it was not possible to assess the usefulness of the reformed SGP, 
given the ‘good times’ and the absence of a ‘bad weather test’” (p. 174). Such a 
“bad weather test” would have come soon, as early as late 2008, and by the 
end of 2009 its effects were more than apparent, with virtually the whole 
Eurozone (Finland and Luxembourg excluded) formally involved in EDPs, 
plastically showing that the renewed SGP was far from being more effective 
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than its predecessor in guaranteeing fiscal discipline regardless of the economic 
cycle.  
In the following chapter, I will pick up my diachronic account of fiscal policy 
coordination under EMU from the “quiet before the storm” of 2008. The 
introduction of the so-called “European Economic Recovery Plan” in late 2008, 
mainly consisting of a set of national anti-cyclical fiscal stimuli, literally put fiscal 
policy discipline in abeyance for good or, to use Council jargon, allowed the 
Member States to use the built-in flexibility of the SGP owing to “exceptional 
situations”. With a Stability Pact still officially in place but merely casually 
(Heipertz and Verdun 2010, p. 190), or symbolically applied and with the 
Eurozone on the brink of disintegration, we can safely move to analyse the rise 
of a new macroeconomic coordination framework and fiscal policy regime 
thereof. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
The analysis carried out in this chapter has accounted for the regime shift that 
occurred from Stage II to Stage III of EMU and for the corresponding shift in the 
mode of learning. Namely, under Stage II of EMU the prevalent mode of 
learning was hierarchical, whereas under Stage III and the SGP learning via 
bargaining emerged,  as demonstrated by the “measurement” of the different 
dimensions of policy learning. In more detail, I showed how the shift in the mode 
of learning was mainly due to changes in the venues of interaction and most of 
all in the agency of the new regime.  
When it comes to the implications of these two different modes of learning and 
their impact on the observed policy outcomes, it is fair to say that whereas 
hierarchical learning proved functional and instrumental to the objectives of the 
convergence regime, learning via bargaining reinforced the 
strategic/opportunistic nature of the policy interactions under the SGP, nurturing 
unilateral action. This, together with domestic factors, contributed to an 
increasingly poor degree of compliance with the rules of the policy regime. 
Indeed, the non-biting nature of the Pact was not only engrained in the regime’s 
structure, but was also socially constructed by a process whereby the Member 
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States gradually learned how to act strategically during the course of 
implementation and even, at a later stage, to reform the regime’s framework to 
make it conform more to their preferences by increasing the degree of political 
discretion in the enforcement. In light of this new weakened coordination 
framework, the financial crisis of late 2008, and the enactment of fiscal stimuli, 
eventually triggered the de facto suspension of the Pact.  
In both of the first two case studies it is important to stress that learning 
emerged as a by-product of the policy interactions, as the powering dimension 
was indubitably more salient. This circumstance gradually reversed with the 
diffusion of the financial crisis in late 2008 and, most of all, with the explosion of 
the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. These twin crises in fact brought EMU in to 
uncharted territory, prompting a process of emergency-driven policy making and 
change under acute uncertainty and pressing time constraints. In particular, the 
2010 Eurozone crisis added a crucial aspect to the puzzle of fiscal policy 
coordination, that is, the disciplining role of the external market on sovereign 
risk premia, transforming an internal and highly tractable disciplinarian problem 
in a hardly tractable one. At this critical juncture, a change in the paradigm of 
the policy regime and of EMU in general ensued, allowing us to enter a domain 
in which learning mechanisms are no longer a by-product, but rather a key 
product, of the policy interactions. 
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Chapter 6. The sovereign debt crisis as an intervening variable  
 
6.1 Introducing the beast: a primer on the eurocrisis 
 
The crisis faced by the EU, and EMU in particular, starting from 2008 has lent, 
and still lends itself nowadays, to a myriad of theoretical and empirical 
approaches. Already during the early, initial phases of the crisis, political 
scientists (both EU scholars and political economists) have acknowledged its 
role as a crucial driver of change for the EU and EU integration and have 
therefore dedicated a great deal of attention and publications to its nature and 
its short and long term effects (see, among others: Hooge and Marks 2009; 
Hodson and Quaglia 2009; Jones 2009, 2010a and 2010b; Hallerberg 2011; 
Scharpf 2011; Schelkle 2011; Marsh 2011).  
This earlier wave of research on the EU crisis, as well as the more recent one 
on which I elaborate below, was characterised by a great deal of internal 
diversity. Such a variety of perspectives is commonplace within a highly 
segmented discipline like political science. Yet, beyond the usual divides typical 
of the field, the deeper reasons for this diversity relate to the multi-dimensional 
and markedly exceptional nature of the crisis itself (Jones 2009 and 2010a; 
Matthijs 2014; Parsons and Matthijs 2015). As Copelovitch et al. (2016, pp. 17-
18) argue, “[…] the crisis has taken place - as no previous sovereign debt crisis 
had - within the unique economic and political context of an extensive yet 
incomplete regional integration scheme, where monetary and fiscal policy 
authority is divided between actors and institutions at both the supranational 
and national levels. While complicating the resolution of the crisis, these unique 
features make the Euro crisis a useful and fascinating case”.  
In fact, the crisis has constantly mutated during its progression, hitting new and 
different policy domains and involving, as a consequence, different subsets of 
domestic and supranational actors, institutions, structures, and policy areas and 
regimes. Moreover, and crucially, the euro area crisis has posed an 
unprecedented existential threat to the E(M)U. And, as rightly argued by 
Parsons and Matthijs (2015), inaction vis-à-vis that threat would have likely led 
to the end of the EU integration project as we know it.  
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In short, the ambiguity, pervasiveness and uniqueness of the crisis has, 
unsurprisingly, fascinated political scientists, inducing them to distil, 
conceptualise and analyse a vast number of case studies all broadly related to 
different aspects and impacts of the crisis. As a consequence, they have also 
deployed (and employed) an abundant variety of theoretical, methodological 
and empirical postures to answer very diverse research questions.  
Several authors have focused on the financial dimension of the crisis analysing 
the relevant changes it prompted in the realm of domestic and supranational 
financial regulation and banking supervision (see, among others: Begg 2009; 
Hodson and Quaglia 2009; Grossman and Leblond 2011; Howarth and Quaglia 
2013a and 2013b; Jones 2015). Other scholars, mainly belonging to the neo-
functionalist tradition, have looked at the EU economic governance architecture 
at large and at how the weaknesses and asymmetries latent within EMU’s 
original design have left the EU unprepared when hit by such a profound shock 
(Jabko 2011; Hall 2012; Dyson and Quaglia 2012; Vilpišauskas 2013; Lefkofridi 
and Schmitter 2014; Schimmelfennig 2014a; Niemann and Ioannou 2015). 
Hence, they explained the multifaceted policy changes that occurred in 
response to the crisis as being driven by path dependency and functional 
pushes and spillovers.  
Some other researchers, mainly belonging to the intergovernmentalist school, 
have taken a different perspective and have tried to explain how the EU has 
reacted to the crisis by focusing on its agency. They have therefore 
distinguished between instances whereby the measures adopted in response to 
the crisis have been fruit of the community method and supranational agency, 
and episodes where they have been approved in the context new treaties or 
treaties’ amendments laid out through different forms of intergovernmental 
bargaining (Chang 2013; Hodson 2013; Bauer and Becker 2014; Krampf 2014; 
Schimmelfennig 2015a).  
One of the (yet controversial – see Schimmelfennig 2015b) conclusions this 
scholarship draws is that a hybrid process of policy change labelled as 
“deliberative” or “new” intergovernmentalism has been at play (Puetter 2012; 
Bickerton et al. 2015), whereby integration-without-supranationalism has been 
steered by intergovernmental institutions like the European Council and the 
Eurogroup. The latter bodies, once informal and on the margins of the EU 
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institutional architecture, took centre stage as both fora for discussion and 
decision making venues, marking a relevant departure from both the community 
method and intergovernmental decision making. In a way, reflecting a common 
and decades-long divide, the functionalist approach has mainly focused on the 
role of the structure to explain failure and change, while the 
intergovernmentalist scholarship has dealt with the causal role of the actors 
involved in crisis management and in the subsequent wave of reforms. 
Institutionalist scholars have looked, perhaps more pragmatically, at the tasks 
covered by the EU and EMU before and after the crisis and specifically at the 
way in which these tasks have expanded and changed (Buti and Carnot 2012; 
Salines et al. 2012; Schwarzer 2012; Gocaj and Meunier 2013), concluding that 
the conceptual categories of historical institutionalism are fit for the purpose of 
explaining abrupt change after relative stability and of making sense of the 
nature of this change (Verdun 2015). 
Although political economists have been somewhat slower in developing a 
consensual understanding of the crisis’ causes and an explanatory account of 
policy change that occurred thereof (Copelovitch et al. 2016, p. 14), as of now 
we can also rely on a number of different studies focusing on the interplay 
between economic and political factors before, during and after the crisis (ibid. 
introducing a special issue of Comparative Political Studies on the political 
economy of the Euro crisis; Hughes Hallett and Jensen 2012; Blyth 2013; 
Matthijs 2014; Matthijs and Blyth 2015; Mabbett and Schelkle 2015; Howarth 
and Quaglia 2015; Jones and Torres 2015).  
It is hard to briefly condense the various findings of this literature. However, it is 
fair to say that political economists have broadly maintained that EMU faced an 
asymmetric shock characterised by a number of Member States undergoing a 
classic balance of payment crisis (swiftly followed by sudden stops and capital 
reversals), the effects of which were magnified by the specific and unique 
features of EMU: a decade of accumulation of public debt due to artificially 
favourable borrowing conditions, wasted tax revenue windfalls, the build-up of 
real imbalances that could not be offset by currency devaluation, limited 
credibility of the no bail out clause of Maastricht, diverging national preferences 
about the burden of the adjustment (that eventually took the form of internal 
deflationary adjustment), lack of a proper lender of last resort and of fiscal 
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solidarity (i.e. lack of a substantial EU budget able to partially ease and stabilise 
asymmetric imbalances), fragmented economic governance, etc. 
Finally, a share of EU scholars have looked forward, reflecting on the meaning 
and impact of the crisis on (economic) integration and integration, and 
integration theories at large (Hooge and Marks 2009; Habermas 2012; Majone 
2012; Moravacsik 2012; Overbeek 2012; Menz and Smith 2013; Tosun et al. 
2014; Jones et al. 2016).66  
To sum up, the crisis has generated a massive and diverse scholarship and it 
can be easily anticipated that its salience (and its termination, which is 
somehow still looming large) will continue to feed an impressive stream of 
research. 
My own analytical perspective builds upon modes of policy learning as casual 
mechanisms suitable to explain fiscal policy coordination regimes, processes 
and outcomes. In this connection, the crisis unavoidably adds to the analysis a 
case-specific layer of complexity. In fact, while it can be safely argued, even 
before carrying out a detailed investigation of the underlying process, that the 
regime for fiscal policy coordination has effectively undergone a major shift as a 
result of the crisis (in other words, the crisis has been a causal driver of policy 
change), it is much more difficult to gauge the exact relationship existing 
between the crisis, learning and change. This is also because, as far as I am 
aware, no scholar apart from Daniela Schwarzer (2015 – see the following 
sections for a detailed review of her article and arguments) has directly 
addressed the learning dimension of the responses to the crisis. That said, a 
learning-informed evaluation of causality within the “crisis-case-study” cannot 
be limited to the isolated influence of learning dynamics on the one hand, or 
crisis-related factors on the other. It is necessary that a complete explanatory 
account of policy and regime change draws on the dynamic relationship 
between crisis and learning.  
Hence, the aim of the present and the following chapters is to characterise the 
process and nature of such policy change(s) through the analytical lens of 
                                                          
66 The many scholarly contributions devoted to putting forth solutions to the euro area crisis are ignored 
here as they play a prescriptive, normative game that often lacks in analytical gravity. Those 
contributions that, along with solutions for the future, also propose a stringent analysis of the crisis (see 
Hallerberg [2011] and Hughes Hallett and Jensen [2012] as examples) are instead included in my review. 
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policy learning under crisis management. It follows that the strategy that I 
propose to employ, in line with the lessons and practice of process tracing 
methodologies based on causal mechanisms (see the introductory chapter), is 
to treat the crisis as a case-specific intervening variable and, hence, to carefully 
characterise it (according to specialised literature) and embed it within learning-
based causal mechanisms.  
This approach, admittedly, presents one major disadvantage along with several 
advantages that will become apparent in the remainder of the chapter. When it 
comes to the former, the key drawback of such an approach is that crises and 
their different typologies are not explicitly conceptualised/theorised within the 
“policy learning measuring instrument” and within the mainstream 
mechanisms/modes of policy learning systematized in Chapter 3. Variations in 
problem tractability are surely a good proxy of crises, yet they fail to fully grasp 
the specificities and idiosyncratic effects of a critical juncture of the proportion of 
that which hit EMU starting from 2008. In short, the key drawback of 
characterising the crisis as a case-specific intervening variable and using it to 
refine the explanation is the loss of generality of modes of learning as externally 
valid and broadly generalizable causal mechanisms. Nonetheless, failing to 
explicitly embed the crisis (actually, this crisis) and its specific features within 
the explanatory causal mechanism would lead to greater problems of internal 
validity.  
The 2008-20?? (2013, according to Jones 2014) crisis in fact impinged on EMU 
and on its overarching paradigm in an idiosyncratic way, that is, by showing 
variation in space (i.e. by hitting different policy domains) and time (i.e. by 
posing existential threats both to the short term survival of the euro area and to 
its long term sustainability).67 The latter circumstance, must not only be reflected 
in the construction of the causal explanatory mechanism, but also needs to be 
carefully considered in designing the strategy for case selection/construction. In 
the light of this, a specific section of this chapter (Section 3) is devoted to 
motivate and justify the need to include the crisis as an intervening, case-
specific variable within learning-based causal mechanisms, and the need to 
distil two separate case studies from the broader “crisis-case-study”, one 
                                                          
67 See Parsons and Matthijs (2015) for a highly provocative and original argument about the Euro crisis 
having been the only real crisis faced by the EU in its decades-long history. 
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related to short term effects and policy measures and another dealing with long 
term responses and regime change or, to put it like Schwarzer (2015, p. 605), 
one dedicated to the policy dimension of the crisis and one to the institutional 
dimension. The first of these cases will be the object of Chapter 7, while the 
second case will be dealt with in Chapter 8. 
This chapter, instead, does not revolve around a specific case study, but serves 
the purpose of preparing the ground and setting the scene for the analysis 
featured in the following ones. It does so by introducing and characterising the 
crisis. 
Hence, the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly connects the narrative 
of the previous chapter with the inception of the financial crisis in 2007/2008 
and with its gradual (yet rather fast) transformation in an economic and 
sovereign debt crisis. Once having sailed through the first two years of the 
crisis, where we will see that a de facto regime for fiscal policy coordination was 
only formally in place, Section 3 introduces the Greek crisis of autumn 2009. 
The section then elaborates on the deep and idiosyncratic effects of such a 
crisis on EMU’s paradigm and characterises it according to crisis management 
categories and literature. The multiple analytical tasks covered in that section 
allow us to motivate a specific focus on the crisis as a case study of policy 
change; split the “crisis-case-study” into two separate cases, one focused on 
the short-term, intracrisis measures adopted to guarantee EMU survival and 
another related to the long-term reforms undertaken to address the long-term 
effects of the crisis and strengthen EMU sustainability (dealt with in Chapter 8); 
and justify and put forth an argument for a novel, case-specific learning 
mechanism suitable to explaining the process and nature of policy change 
observed under the first of the two crisis case studies.  
Before proceeding with the chapter, a few words on the overall balance of the 
case studies within my dissertation are in order. Initially, that is, when designing 
and dealing with the “crisis-case-study”, my idea was to analyse it as a single 
case (by resorting to my policy learning measuring instrument) and then to 
proceed with the characterisation of the new coordination regime emerging 
thereof as a final case study. While working on this chapter, however, I came to 
the conclusion that the mainstream modes of learning discussed and 
systematized in Chapter 3 are unsuitable to explain how the observed crisis-
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driven policy changes really unfolded, most of all in the context of intracrisis 
management.  
Hence, I decided to reason more carefully on the nature and temporal sequence 
of such changes by crafting a two-pronged case study covering, respectively, 
short and long term policy changes that, according to my argument, were driven 
by distinct (yet complementary) learning mechanisms. This analytical strategy 
has its roots in my original, learning-based interpretation of the crisis, but it is 
also reflected in a number of recent contributions that distinguish between short 
term and long term impacts of and responses to the Euro crisis (Schwarzer 
2015, pp. 605-606; Copelovitch et al 2016, p. 16). 
As for the last (potential) case study, i.e. the implementation of the newly 
emerged coordination regime, two major facts militate against its salience vis-à-
vis the relevance of achieving a more thorough and complete account of policy 
change. Frist, the new regime is in a way still under construction, with recent 
uncertainties surrounding the management of the third Greek rescue package, 
the establishment of the banking union and the always-debated interpretation of 
flexibility in the enforcement of fiscal discipline (Dunlop and Radelli 2016 – 
eurozone). True, the European Semester and Six-Pack Rules are in place since 
and have been implemented for six years now, yet a number of EMU Member 
States have not been fully subject to the new policy regime, as they still were 
under the different discipline and rules stemming from the Memorandums of 
Understanding designed within their country-specific bail out packages. Second, 
the initial years of implementation of the new regimes cannot be considered as 
extremely telling when it comes to the influence of learning, as the regime was 
far from stable, that is, it was still undergoing further waves of reform until at 
least 2013, and even at the time of writing, it is hard to say whether the overall 
regime can be defined as stable, with the lengthy negotiations on the banking 
union being a strong point in case.68 Finally, the conclusive chapter will provide 
a characterisation of the new regime according to the policy learning measuring 
instrument. The conclusion of this categorization exercise is that the new 
regime (with its new disciplinarian paradigm based upon long term 
sustainability, budgetary consolidation and, arguably, rules prevailing over 
                                                          
68 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-14/sovereign-debt-conundrum-sets-up-eu-for-
banking-union-stalemate  
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discretion) is in a way a return to the (healthy) hierarchical conditionality of 
Maastricht. Anyway, given the idiosyncrasies in the implementation of the new 
regime and its short lifespan, an empirical analysis aimed at verifying the 
influence of hierarchical learning on implementation would unavoidably be 
incomplete. In other words, it might still be too early to call. 
 
6.2 Sailing toward the storm 
 
The narrative of the Stability and Growth Pact’s (SGP) history carried out in 
Chapter 5 roughly ended up with the first signs of the worsening of the 
macroeconomic environment due to the US financial crisis of 2007. Back then, 
EMU was in good shape, at least according to numerical benchmarks and to the 
qualified opinion of the Commission. The latter, although acknowledging the 
presence of wide margins of uncertainty with regard to short term prospects 
(mainly due to the ongoing US financial turmoil and to the aging EU population), 
stated in its Editorial to the “Public Finances in EMU” Report of 2008 that “[i]n 
spite of the still significant differences across countries, last year [i.e. 2007] the 
headline deficit in the euro area and the EU as a whole reached its lowest level 
in decades […] The general government deficit fell to 0.6% of GDP in the euro 
area and 1.0% of GDP in the EU. Structural fiscal deficits are estimated to be at 
their lowest levels since the early 1970s” (Commission 2008a, pp. xiv – 1, 
emphasis added). Moreover, with the abrogation of several Excessive Deficit 
Procedures (EDP) in June 2008, no euro area country was subject to the 
corrective discipline of the Pact. In general, compliance with Medium Term 
Objectives (MTO) and with the debt reduction criteria and budgetary 
consolidation plans included within the Stability Programmes was less 
satisfactory (ibid.), yet it is not unfair to argue that EMU reached its best record 
ever at the beginning of 2008. As already pointed out in the previous chapter, 
this was unlikely to be true glory (and the crisis largely proved it) since 
compliance with fiscal discipline was fostered by a supportive business cycle 
and temporary revenue windfalls (Morris et al. 2009; Barrios and Rizza 2010).  
This dynamic, in actuality, was also acknowledged by the Commission that, vis-
à-vis the generally positive picture, repeatedly urged Member States to exploit 
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the supportive macroeconomic environment to construct budgetary buffers (i.e. 
rainy day funds) such to guarantee bigger margins of manoeuvre in case the 
US crisis turned darker.69 In particular, the main recommendation was to run 
more consistent counter-cyclical budgetary policies, that is, to use unexpected 
revenue windfalls to reduce deficit and debt ratios. This indication was largely 
ignored, as in that period governments consistently run pro-cyclical polices by 
using extra revenues to further feed expenditure growth (Morris et al. 2009; 
Hauptmaier et al. 2010; Barrios and Rizza 2010). Nonetheless, all caveats and 
relative weaknesses considered, EMU looked robust in 2007 and early 2008 
and the prudent assessment of the Commission indirectly confirmed this fact 
since its key concerns, when it came to elaborating on potential ways to 
strengthen fiscal discipline, were oriented toward guaranteeing long term 
sustainability of public finances (i.e. improved adherence to MTOs) and toward 
limited, technical improvements to the SGP framework (Commission 2008a, pp. 
3-5).  
To sum up, in late 2007/early 2008 EMU looked in reasonably good shape and 
no big change in fiscal/economic policy coordination was either in sight or 
considered to be necessary. The US financial crisis was surely a source of 
concern, yet it remained somewhat in the background at the beginning of 2008, 
as the overall economic outlook in the EU was (moderately) optimistic. Matthijs 
(2014, p. 202) even documents a diffused sentiment of europhoria on the 
occasion of the ten-year anniversary of the Euro in January 2009.   
The critical juncture of Lehman’s default (October 2008) changed that picture 
dramatically. Although its actual impact would have been fully understood much 
later, most of all in terms of sovereign bonds’ risk premia differentiation 
(Schuknecht et al. 2010; Van Riet (ed.) 2010), the stress it sparked on a 
number of European financial institutions of “systemic importance” (Goddard et 
al. 2009) and its fast propagation to the real economy (European Central Bank 
2009, p. 61) were strong wake up calls for EU actors. The reaction to these 
calls was twofold (Commission 2009c, pp. 90-91). On the one hand, euro area 
                                                          
69 “While the fiscal position of the euro area and the EU attained in 2007 is the best in decades, the 
short term outlook is overshadowed by a number of downside risks which, if they materialize, could give 
rise to a setback on the way towards sustainable fiscal positions [anyway] assuming that current 
achievements are preserved, most Member States managed to narrow the budgetary gap to ensure 
sustainable public finances” (Commission 2008a, pp. 11-12). 
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governments decided to rescue endangered financial institutions and banks 
through a concerted “European Action Plan” agreed right few weeks after 
Lehman’s default (Commission 2008b). 
The massive implicit and explicit budgetary liabilities linked to the rescue 
measures were justified on the grounds of contagion risks stemming from 
banks’ defaults, potentially leading to dramatic bank runs and to the disruption 
of the whole EU financial system. On the other hand, faced with the crisis’ 
effects on real economy and output contractions, EU actors decided to imitate, 
to a lesser extent, the US response to the economic downturn by enacting a 
(mild) Keynesian discretionary fiscal easing – beyond that already guaranteed 
by the working of automatic stabilisers. Given the heterogeneity in fiscal 
positions, the room for manoeuvre for fiscal expansions differed sharply across 
different Member States. In short, those that could afford it (Germany, most of 
all) enacted relatively large discretionary fiscal packages, while other more 
constrained Member States (like Italy, for instance) solely relied on automatic 
stabilisers (Van Riet et al. 2010, p. 25). This new fiscal activism, although 
sparse and country-specific, was framed within a coordinated EU effort known 
as the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP – Commission 2008c).  
The EERP was proposed in November 2008 and adopted in December 2008, a 
few weeks after Lehman’s default and shortly following the action plan for bank 
bailouts. The overall size of the expansionary measures proposed in the plan 
was about 1,5% of the euro area GDP (ibid., p. 6). Given the little room for fiscal 
manoeuvre of a number of euro area countries and the limited epistemic 
consensus for Keynesian discretionary interventions (see Chapter 8 for a 
thorough discussion of the epistemic influence on EMU policy making and 
change), the EERP was rather timid, most of all when compared to its American 
counterpart, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of January 2009. 
Largely following new Keynesian lessons and due to the presence of relevant 
macroeconomic imbalances hidden within EMU’s public finances and 
heterogeneity in fiscal positions across countries, the EERP was not only timid, 
but was also designed to be temporary and swiftly reversed (ibid., p. 7). This 
approach reflected the typical fear (smoothly transmitted to EU policy makers) 
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of the dominant New Neoclassical Synthesis70 scholarship towards the effects 
of permanent or largely protracted fiscal stimuli on the so-called expectation 
channel.71  
To proceed, autumn 2008 represented a turning point with respect to 2007. The 
default of Lehman and the consequent transformation of the US financial crisis 
in a global (financial and economic) turmoil also intruding in the EU prompted 
two distinct reactions. First, the enactment of heavy public interventions in the 
financial system (negatively impinging on sovereign debts’ stocks) and second, 
the implementation of discretionary fiscal stimuli framed within the EERP 
(negatively impinging on government deficits). The combined effect of these two 
measures, together with the impact of automatic stabilisers on government 
budgets, determined a sharp and sudden deterioration of euro area public 
finances in 2009 (see Table 6.1 below).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
70 New Neoclassical Synthesis is the technical definition of the mainstream, orthodox approach that has 
dominated in the last fifteen years, and still dominates nowadays, the macroeconomic scholarship. In a 
nutshell, it is a “synthesis” as it integrates the key tenets of the New Keynesian School 
(imperfect/monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities) with those of the Real Business Cycle 
tradition (rational expectations and intertemporal maximization) to make sense of short and long-term 
fluctuations of the economy. Although pigeonholing scholars into narrow schools of thought is almost 
always inappropriate, it is hard to think of a more representative figure of the New Neoclassical 
Synthesis (most of all on methodological grounds) than Professor Jordi Gali of Pompeu Fabra University. 
71 In short, a permanent fiscal expansion would provoke an almost complete crowding out of the newly 
available extra income due to the anticipation of future raises in tax to balance the budget, making the 
stimulus itself less effective in terms of output growth and more burdensome in terms of long term 
public finance sustainability. See Chapter 8 for a thorough discussion of this macroeconomic paradigm. 
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Table 6.1 General government balance and gross debt as a percentage of the 
GDP in euro area countries 
 
Source: European Central Bank 2009, p. 76. 
 
The euro area sovereign debt crisis had officially begun. Although its 
conventional beginning normally corresponds with the update of Greek 
budgetary figures in October/November 2009 (see below), the key critical 
junctures for its inception were in actuality Lehman’s default (Schuknecht et al. 
2010) and the early EU response to its consequences.  
This situation notwithstanding, the Commission’s reports and Communications 
of that period neglected and largely failed to foresee that the above sketched 
mix of adverse factors would have triggered a strong reaction from market 
participants that would have put at serious and unprecedented risk the solvency 
of euro area members (first of Greece, the major fiscal sinner, then, shortly 
thereafter of Ireland and Portugal). The most staggering circumstance of this 
misconception is for sure the fact that the abrupt and massive fiscal 
deterioration of 2008 and 2009 (see Table 1 above) was deemed to be in line 
with the SGP discipline. In this regard, the Commission’s Communication 
endorsing the EERP stated: “Extraordinary circumstances combining a financial 
crisis and a recession justify a co-ordinated budgetary expansion in the EU. It 
may lead some Member States to breach the 3% GDP deficit reference value. 
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For Member States considered to be in an excessive deficit, corrective action 
will have to be taken in time frames consistent with the recovery of the 
economy. This is fully consistent with the procedures of the Stability and Growth 
Pact which guarantee that the excessive deficit will be corrected in due time, 
ensuring long-term sustainability of the budgetary positions” (Commission 
2008c, p. 9, emphasis added).  
Although the Commission foresaw that by 2009 a wave of new EDPs, involving 
virtually all EMU Member States, would have been enacted (Commission 
2009a, pp. 5-6), this was not considered too much of a long term threat. The 
EERP in fact stated that “restoring confidence will depend on Europe's ability to 
boost demand by making use of budgetary policy within the flexibility offered by 
the revised Stability and Growth Pact. In the current circumstances, budgetary 
policy has an even more important role to play in stabilising economies and 
sustaining demand” (Commission 2008c, p. 7, emphasis added). In other 
words, the need to sustain the financial sector and to stabilise the output via 
discretionary and automatic fiscal stimuli could rely on the flexibility (read: 
political discretion) embedded in the reformed version of the SGP. In substance, 
fiscal discipline was subordinated to political objectives and was only formally in 
place. 
This exploitation of the SGP’s flexibility, contrary to what was argued by Hodson 
(2010 and 2011), actually put fiscal discipline in abeyance, exactly when it was 
most needed. If it is true that from a formal point of view fiscal rules have been 
resilient (ibid., p. 239), their enforcement toward non-compliant Member States 
did not reflect their real aim, that is, to bring about a disciplined conduct of 
public finances such to guarantee EMU’s and Member States’ macroeconomic 
stability and sustainability (Van Riet (ed.) 2010; Schelkle 2011).   
In particular, given that in 2009 many Member States were facing a “severe 
economic downturn”, the corrections and deadlines recommended under the 
respective EDPs, far from including sanctions and harsh consolidation plans, 
were flexible, that is, unrealistically based upon overly optimistic growth 
forecasts and in general too timid to bring about a restrictive overhaul in the 
conduct of domestic budgetary policies (Hauptmeier et al. 2010) such to restore 
the market’s confidence in EMU public finances. When Hodson (2011, p. 239) 
claims that in 2010 “all countries concerned [in EDPs were] deemed to have 
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taken effective action with a view to restoring compliance with the EU’s fiscal 
rules” this reflects only a formal/legalistic reading of the enforcement of the 
(weakened) fiscal regime (needless to say, such understanding would soon be 
contradicted by the Greek crisis and by the Irish, Portuguese and Spanish bail 
outs of 2010 and 2011). 
The SGP’s substantial suspension did not in fact determine the actual 
suspension of the supranational monitoring procedures required by the Pact, it 
just emptied them from their disciplining aims. This circumstance is also 
acknowledged by Hodson himself when he deems the Greek and Irish solvency 
crises to be examples of the limits of EU fiscal coordination (2011, p. 240), 
when he refers to the SGP as bruised and muddled through rather than properly 
implemented (pp. 240-241), and when he implicitly attributes the failure of 
forestalling the sovereign debt crisis to the malfunctioning of the SGP (p. 241).  
To show how profound the mismatch between the expected effects of the 
SGP’s discipline and its real outcomes was, it is worth reporting the strongly 
held belief of the Commission – a belief stated in October 2008 and that 
remained virtually unchanged until the decision to bail out Greece in spring 
2010. This statement was part of a Communication released in October 2008, 
right after Lehman’s default and right before the EU officially launched its Action 
Plan to rescue financial institutions and then the EERP. Many detractors of the 
EU’s management of the crisis will find it illuminating to highlight the short 
sightedness of key decision makers right before the beginning of the storm:  
“The Stability and Growth Pact provides the right policy framework, 
balancing short-term stabilisation needs and long-term structural reform 
requirements, notably supporting the adjustment process. 
Implementation of the Pact should ensure that any deterioration of public 
finances is accompanied by structural reform measures adequate to the 
situation, while ensuring that sustainable positions are being restored. 
Budgetary policies should draw fully on the degree of flexibility permitted 
by the Treaty and the revised Stability and Growth Pact” (Commission 
2008b, p. 5).  
 
To sum up, at the beginning and during the course of 2009, the following risk 
factors were weighing on EMU’s sustainability: accumulation of non-performing 
loans within financial institutions and, as a consequence, shortage of liquidity in 
the financial and interbank sector and a credit crunch in the real economy; large 
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government interventions to rescue the impaired financial institutions, prompting 
a severe accumulation of debt in a number euro area countries; shrinking GDPs 
bringing about falling government revenues and growing expenditures due to 
the effect of automatic stabilisers and discretionary fiscal interventions; and a 
severe deterioration of public finances with growing deficit and debt ratios vis-à-
vis shrinking GDPs in several EMU Member States.  
How did the EU custodians of EMU and fiscal discipline (namely, the 
Commission and the Council) react to these multiple threats? The response lies 
mainly in the 2009 Commission’s report on EMU public finances (Commission 
2009a). This document is of particular importance because it epitomises once 
again the unpreparedness of the EU vis-à-vis the dramatic events that would be 
triggered by the disclosure of the disastrous Greek budgetary stance in October 
2009. This unpreparedness and genuine sense of surprise involving EU and 
domestic decision makers is also acknowledged in a number of scholarly 
contributions (among others: Jones 2010a; Gocaj and Meunier 2013; Matthijs 
2014; Parsons and Matthijs 2015). 
These studies agree in that the understanding of E(M)U actors of the above 
sketched risk factors, just few months before a concrete possibility of a 
sovereign default of an euro area member emerged, was still strongly inward 
looking.  
In other words, drawing on more than ten years of experience in bargaining in 
the shadow of the SGP, EU actors still perceived the policy coordination 
problem stemming from EMU as an internal disciplinarian one. They failed to 
see that the potential negative externalities for which a coordination regime was 
built in the first place would have soon materialized in the form of market 
discipline and sharp risk premia’s differentiation according to domestic 
budgetary stances and debt sustainability prospects. As a consequence, before 
the unfolding of the Greek crisis in autumn 2009, the fiscal policy coordination 
game was still driven by a bargaining rationale, whereby the implementation of 
the SGP did not serve its main statutory purpose but was actually adapted to 
the political imperatives of the moment. 
Reading this transition period through the lenses of modes of policy learning, 
EU actors failed to see the change in the tractability of the coordination problem 
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(see the following section for a detailed discussion of this point) and continued 
to bargain politically over the SGP’s implementation. At that juncture, the SGP 
(and the political approach toward its implementation) failed in internalising the 
negative spillovers stemming from the upcoming bonds’ risk premia 
differentiation in the euro area. Or, to use the words of the then Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Commissioner Almunia, it failed in coercing “[…] Member 
States [to] explicitly commit that they will reverse the deterioration of public 
finances as soon as we return to normal economic times so as to ensure the 
medium-to-long term sustainability of public finances” (Commission 2009d). 
Therefore, if one can say that the SGP’s formal implementation proved resilient, 
the opposite holds true for the substantial dimension of its enforcement. Hence, 
the politicisation of the SGP’s implementation did not bring about the desired 
outcome (sustainable public finances such to restore market’s confidence) but 
its exact contrary: widespread public finances’ deterioration that can actually be 
considered one of the con-causes of the sovereign debt crisis. 
Let me go back to EMU actors’ unpreparedness and short sightedness vis-à-vis 
future existential threats. A statement like the following, that praises the 
effectiveness of the framework for coordination of the reformed SGP exactly 
when the biggest crisis ever faced by the EU was in the making, looks 
impressively myopic:  
“Today's challenging times have also been a stress test for the Stability 
and Growth Pact. With the newly built-in flexibility of the reformed Pact in 
2005, the EU fiscal framework has allowed on the one hand, to provide 
the appropriate support to the EU economies in exceptional times while, 
on the other hand, set a clear path for future fiscal adjustments [sic!]” 
(Commission 2009a, p. xi, emphasis added).  
 
Moreover, when looking ahead and foreseeing possible improvements of the 
SGP regime, the only deficiencies detected by the Commission, as late as of 
June 2009, were:  
 its limited preventive effectiveness (ibid., p. 6); 
 its lack of attention to the growth of macroeconomic imbalances (ibid., 
pp. 6-7);  
 the lack of counter-cyclical provisions imposing more stringent discipline 
during positive business cycles (ibid., p. 7). 
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On the other hand, the (flexible) corrective arm of the Pact was considered fit 
for purpose and no strengthening of the coercive nature of the SGP was 
proposed or endorsed.  
Finally, recommendations regarding the sheer necessity to proceed with fiscal 
consolidation were put forward, yet they were mainly related to the benefits 
linked to enforcing swift exit strategies from fiscal expansions, rather than to the 
long term sustainability risks posed by the combined effects of deep budgetary 
deterioration and incoming market participants’ awakening (Schelkle 2011; see 
also European Council 2009). Yet again, sustainability risks were not seen as a 
potential threat to the short term solvency of euro area’s Member States but 
rather as long term challenges for which the SGP’s tenet was the right answer.72  
To conclude this section that introduced us to the events of October 2009-May 
2010, the EU came weak and unprepared to its meeting with the risk of a Greek 
sovereign default and the related threat of a euro area-wide contagion and 
collapse. The change in tone detectable in the report on 2010 EMU public 
finances (the publication of which was delayed to allow the consequences of the 
Greek bailout package to be embedded in its overview) tells it all:  
“The external financial support necessitated by the fiscal situation in 
Greece and the unprecedentedly high sovereign risk premia in other 
countries have underlined once again the importance of prudent 
budgetary policies […] High and rising public debt raise questions on 
governments' solvency and a credible commitment to a sustainable path 
for public finances is instrumental to durable output and employment 
growth” (Commission 2010a, p. xii, emphasis added).  
 
Over the course of a few months, the same Commission’s report passed from 
mildly praising expansionary fiscal policies as the key driver of economic 
recovery to advocating fiscal prudence and budgetary retrenchment as the new 
recipe for stabilisation and long term economic growth (see Chapter 8 for an in 
depth discussion of this change of sentiment).   
                                                          
72 “Preparing a coordinated exit strategy now, not only for fiscal stimulus, but also for government 
support for the financial sector and hard-hit industries, will enhance the effectiveness of these measures 
in the short term, as this depends upon clarity regarding their eventual withdrawal. The strategy must 
be comprehensive and ready to be implemented as soon as recovery is firm” (Commission 2009b, p. iii). 
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The following section attends to three main tasks. First, to introduce the Greek 
crisis. Second, to reason on the threat posed by that crisis on EMU’s short term 
survival, long term sustainability and overarching paradigm. Third, to 
characterise the crisis, seen as a case-specific intervening variable, according 
to the conceptual categories of crisis management literature. Dealing with the 
two latter analytical tasks will enable me to provide solid motivations for the 
construction of a case-specific causal mechanism (dealt with in Chapter 7) and 
for the subdivision of the “crisis-driven-policy-change” episode in two distinct 
case studies, one concerning the short term shock measures employed to halt 
the risk of EMU’s collapse and one covering the process of reform initiated 
shortly thereafter to strengthen EMU and guarantee its long term sustainability 
(dealt with in Chapter 8). Even without a thorough analysis of crisis 
management literature, it in fact looks reasonable (even commonsensical) that 
measures and decisions taken to guarantee survival during a crisis differ and 
have to be analysed separately from reforms meant to avoid and/or cushion the 
emergence of another crisis in the future and the former have a crucial influence 
on the latter (Schwarzer 2012). 
  
6.3 The Greek crisis, its impact on EMU paradigm and its characterisation  
 
6.3a The unfolding of the Greek crisis 
 
Against the uncertain and unarguably risky macroeconomic background 
described in the previous section, the first tensions on the sustainability of EU 
Member States’ public finances had already surfaced in late 2008/early 2009 
outside the euro area. In that period, the Ecofin Council approved Balance of 
Payments (BoP) assistance for Hungary, Latvia and Romania (respectively, in 
November 2008, January 2009 and March 2009).  
It is worth noting that BoP assistance is a form of financial support specifically 
for non-euro area Member States. Members of the euro area, on the other 
hand, cannot be directly supported as they are subject to the prohibition of the 
European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary financing and the no bail out clause 
of the TEU (Articles 123 and 125). The importance of this differential 
arrangement for ins and outs of the euro area became clear on November 2009 
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when the newly elected Papandreou government started to gradually disclose 
the increasingly problematic budgetary situation of Greece. By resorting to 
fraudulent accounting practices, Greece in fact managed to hide the real status 
of its public finances until then (Jones 2010a; Matthijs 2014). But with the 
election of the new government, new budgetary figures were soon released. In 
particular, in November 2009 the deficit-to-GDP ratio forecasted for 2010 was 
corrected, peaking to an astounding 12,7%, vis-a-via a previous figure of 6,5%. 
Shortly after this hefty correction, in December 2009 the three major rating 
agencies downgraded the Greek debt below investment grade. This swiftly led 
to a steep increase of the spread between risk premia of Greek and German 
bonds that traditionally worked as a key benchmark of solvability (see Table 6.2 
below).  
Table 6.2 Spread over German ten-year government bond yield, 2009-2011, 
selected countries 
 
Source: European Central Bank 2011, p. 90. 
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As early as January 2010, the Papandreou cabinet, strongly pushed by the 
Commission and the Council, enacted a vast consolidation plan based on a mix 
of tax rises and expenditure cuts (Commission 2010b, p. 8). In the period from 
January 2010 until May 2010, the sustainability of Greek debt was increasingly 
put under market scrutiny and the spread between Greek and German bond 
yields continued to grow (see Figure 1 above). This circumstance not only 
abruptly changed the tractability of the coordination problem arguably 
addressed by the SGP (as we shall see below), but also threatened the whole 
architecture of EMU and, in particular, the credibility of the so-called no bail out 
clause of the TEU.  
Faced by such a radically new policy problem (a potential sovereign default of 
an EMU member), EU and domestic actors reacted to this shock in a strongly 
inconsistent way, as vividly depicted by Jones (2010a and 2010c), Gocaj and 
Meunier (2013), Schwarzer (2105) and Parsons and Matthijs (2015), among 
others. The differentiation of sovereign risk premia in the euro area’s bond 
market had begun much earlier than the Greek crisis (i.e. right after the Lehman 
default of October 2008 – Schuknecht et al. 2010). In any case, the risks of a 
sovereign default due to the disciplining role of private markets on the borrowing 
conditions of a EMU member was at the end of 2009/beginning of 2010 still 
considered as a remote possibility rather than a concrete threat (Jones 2010a, 
p. 23). This uncertainty and unpreparedness was reflected on the one hand in 
the swinging position of the most important EMU member (Germany) and on 
the other hand in the lenient, almost impotent reaction of EU institutions to the 
Greek turmoil (see the lunar quotes in the previous sections). As for the former, 
Germany kept an extremely ambiguous position with regard to Greece’s 
deteriorating creditworthiness, playing on alternate days the role of the good, 
ready-to-bail-out cop and the role of the bad, no-bail-out-clause-enthusiast cop 
(Jones 2010a, pp.21-22).  
For some observers, this was a clear proof of German bargaining acumen and 
brinkmanship (Schimmelfennig 2015a), but according to a more realistic 
interpretation, this ambiguity was most of all the fruit of the emergence of a new, 
unknown and unprecedented policy problem (Matthijs 2014; Parsons and 
Matthijs 2015), which defied long-held preferences and blurred the payoffs 
related to alternative courses of action. A new preference formation, weighing 
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the costs and benefits of a sovereign bailout versus a possible Grexit, was 
underway (Van Esch 2015), making outright bargaining over policy measures 
both too risky and too uncertain. As for EU actors, all they could do and actually 
did was to reassert the role and importance of the corrective arm of the SGP 
(right after having de facto suspended it) and to urge and closely monitor, 
through almost monthly Commission’s and Council’s recommendations and 
assessments, a prompt and more ambitious Greek adjustment within the frame 
of its ongoing EDP (see, for instance, Commission 2010c). German and EU 
pressures coupled with market ones and painful consolidation plans were in any 
case insufficient to calm the markets down.  
On April 11th 2010 it became clear that Greece, under the pressure of 
speculative attacks and buoyant spreads on its debt issuances, was on the 
brink of a sovereign default. To deal with this existential threat, the EU and its 
key Member States resolved, under a Greek request, first to provide direct (and 
conditional) financial assistance (together with the IMF and with the support of 
the ECB), and then on 8th/9th of May, due to the persistent lack of confidence 
within private markets, to create a temporary euro area bail out facility. In other 
words, the EU reneged on its euro area no bail out clause, abruptly agreeing on 
perhaps the most substantial change of EMU since its creation. The following 
chapter will narrate these events in more detail in order to empirically 
corroborate a new learning and crisis-informed causal mechanism. For now, it is 
important to reason on the impact of such a crisis on EMU paradigm and to its 
characterisation according to crisis management literature.  
 
6.3b The Greek Crisis in the context of EMU regimes and regime changes. Why 
was this time different? Why focus on two cases of policy change? 
 
In the introductory chapter of this dissertation I stated that my investigation 
consists of a diachronic learning-informed account of fiscal policy coordination 
under EMU. To navigate through more than twenty years of EMU history, I 
conceptualised and proposed to analyse different empirical case studies, 
corresponding to the emergence of different fiscal policy coordination regimes 
within the larger picture of EMU economic governance architecture. Clearly, this 
subdivision of the EMU’s saga in discrete cases can be considered quite 
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fictitious and arbitrary, but it has actually drawn on a solid scholarly consensus 
about the transformations undergone by the initial framework for fiscal policy 
coordination (Morris et al. 2006; Heipertz and Verdun 2010; Buti and Carnot 
2012). Moreover, it has been instrumental in shedding light on the causal role of 
learning on regime implementation and regime change since, at least for the 
first two cases, a shift in the nature of the regime was accompanied by a clear 
shift in the learning dimension. Therefore, to achieve the explanatory goal of the 
thesis with regard to the first two cases (Chapters 4 and 5), I primarily focused 
on the interactive process of implementation of the coordination regimes. 
For example, with regard to the first case surveyed (Stage II of EMU 
convergence process), I analysed the origin and overall rationale of EMU and of 
fiscal policy coordination within it, but my empirical focus was on the functioning 
of that regime, not on its much studied genesis. Similarly, with regard to the 
second case study, I addressed both the emergence of the SGP and its 2005 
reform, yet the main analytical focus remained clearly oriented on the learning 
processes occurring in the context of regime implementation and enforcement. 
A question that might arise with regard to this strategy is why not conceptualise 
the signing of the SGP and its reform as distinct cases of policy/regime change. 
The answer lies in the fact that the regime shift from EMU Stage II to Stage III, 
based on the signing and entering into force of the SGP, has been interpreted 
as a distinct product of the implementation of Stage II (see Chapter 4). Since 
the SGP substantially anchored the fiscal criteria of the convergence process 
within Stage III of EMU, I argued that actors learned the benefits of tying 
governments’ hands in an instrumental way and hence agreed to sign the SGP 
to complement and complete the monetary union. In short, the emergence of 
the SGP and the SGP itself have been interpreted as empirical, observable 
implications of the hierarchical mechanism of learning observed in the first case 
study.  
Similarly, the 2005 reform of the Pact has been read as the outcome of the 
2003 internal crisis and more generally as the bitter fruit of the learning-via-
bargaining (and learning how to bargaining) that occurred in the context of the 
implementation of the SGP (see Chapter 5). Furthermore, the process of reform 
of the Pact did not give rise to a suspension of the old regime and hence to a 
new one, but rather to a loosened prosecution of the one that was already in 
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place (Morris et al. 2006). The reformed SGP did not hence represent a 
substantial change of the regime, but rather epitomized its politicization and 
weakening, in the form of political discretion prevailing over rules and hierarchy 
(resulting from a years-long process of learning how to bargain described in the 
last sections of the previous chapter).  
To sum up, the emergence of the two versions of the SGP in 1997/1998 and 
2004/2005 were both endogenous products of the coordination regimes and 
hence fully explainable through the analysis of their implementation courses. In 
light of this fact, I dynamically accounted for the shifts between a regime and 
the following one, that is, I did not disregard policy change. Nonetheless, the 
focus of the analyses has remained firmly on implementation, since regime 
shifts could be considered largely endogenous to implementation processes. 
On the other hand, the case studies I survey hereafter are full-blown episodes 
of regime/policy change. Why this change of focus? Mainly because the vast 
reforms of fiscal policy coordination that have occurred since 2010 not only 
determined the emergence of a new regime, but also prompted an overhaul of 
the paradigm underpinning economic policy coordination, something that did not 
occur in the context of the previous regime shifts. 
The emergence of a new EMU paradigm as a reaction to the existential threat 
posed by the crisis cannot be considered as endogenous to the implementation 
courses of the SGP. The sovereign debt crisis has surely been exacerbated by 
the flexible enforcement of the SGP, yet its root causes are far from being 
limited to poor fiscal coordination. In a recent contribution, Matthijs (2014) 
reviews seven interrelated causes of the Euro crisis, spanning from inadequate 
EMU institutional design and fragmented EU governance that did not allow 
timely and proper policy responses, to the accumulation of macroeconomic and 
real imbalances, markets’ mispricing of sovereign risk and poor fiscal 
coordination bringing about budgetary profligacy thereof. His conclusion is that 
all of these crisis’ narratives have some explanatory weight, yet the fiscal one, 
although highly influential in informing the design of crisis management, seems 
to not to be corroborated by the facts (ibid., p. 205). In short, the euro crisis had 
a prominent fiscal dimension, but it cannot be labelled as a fiscal crisis.73  
                                                          
73 The same argument is put forth in a more detailed way in Jones 2015. 
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In fact, before the US financial crisis started to impinge on the EU in 2008, 
public finances in EMU were substantially healthy, or at least were considered 
so by the European Commission and Member States (see Section 2). Major 
political tensions among different Member States and between Member States 
and EU monitoring institutions were eased by the 2005 flexibilisation of the SGP 
and by a growth bonanza that led to sustained compliance with the new looser 
fiscal framework. When the crisis turned from purely financial to economic and 
the public finances of several EMU members started to quickly deteriorate in 
late 2008, as we saw above, the coordination regime was not reformed but 
actually discretionarily suspended to allow fiscal easing in the form of the 
EERP, a mildly Keynesian move that would have been highly criticized, in 
hindsight, for its further negative consequences on fiscal positions (Rother et al. 
2010).  
Nonetheless, as a consequence of the liabilities determined by the rescue 
packages disbursed to bail out financial institutions, of automatic and 
discretionary expenditure growth and of the transmission of the financial stress 
to the real economy (a circumstance further depressing government revenues 
and hence fiscal positions), fiscal discipline, for a number of countries, quickly 
again became a priority in late 2009. In other words, the sudden 
acknowledgment of the adverse effects of fiscal deterioration swiftly sparked a 
new emphasis on fiscal discipline and consolidation. This novel awareness was 
finally reinforced by the awakening of the markets that started to strongly 
differentiate among risk premia of EMU countries’ bonds on the basis of the 
health of their fiscal houses. At this point, substantial compliance with the SGP 
again became necessary due to the fact that the externalities which the SGP 
was supposed to internalise eventually emerged due to exogenous causes. 
This reconstruction of the events converges with the argument of Matthijs 
(2014) and arguably demonstrates that fiscal laxity per se cannot be considered 
the cause of the crisis and of the regime change that followed.  
At the critical juncture in 2009, SPG substantial implementation resumed, and 
even stiffened (Commission 2010a). In any case, a renewed commitment to 
fiscal discipline (plotted against a deterioration of overall EMU debt-to-GDP ratio 
of about 20 percentage points in less than three years and buoyant bond 
spreads) was not enough to internalise market-driven negative spillovers and 
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shun the risk of the sovereign default of Greece. At that point, the violation of 
the no bail out orthodoxy was the only way to internalise the risk of default, 
together with a renewed commitment to a much stronger fiscal discipline that 
first implied compliance to the weak, existing SGP and, in parallel, a departure 
from the SGP’s flexibility/discretion in the form of its overhaul. Therefore, 
throughout the period covered in the next two chapters (2010-2013), regime 
implementation and the process of regime change mutually influenced each 
other. It can in fact be argued that implementation inconsistencies both dictated 
and were determined by the speed of progression of the crisis. In any case, the 
latter had its roots in a set of additional causes (mainly financial – Jones 2015), 
not just in a coordination failure. 
This considered, the fairly sudden and abrupt regime shift that occurred in 2010, 
solidified across the following three years of reform frenzy, cannot be 
understood solely within and through the analysis of regime implementation (or 
its lack thereof). In this light, the motivations for an ad-hoc focus on two case 
studies of crisis-driven policy change are the following:  
 The de facto suspension of the SGP regime that draws on the distinction 
between legal and substantive dimension of regime implementation. 
Recall that although SGP monitoring procedures were still in place in 
2009, virtually all EMU Member States were subject to (harmless) EDPs, 
yet were allowed to proceed with a massive financial rescue operation 
and to further their domestic fiscal expansions. 
 The change in the nature and tractability of the coordination/collective 
action problem. The sovereign debt crisis in fact undermined the very 
foundations of EMU, complicating the tractability of the economic 
coordination/collective action problem that policy regimes were called to 
address. In other words, in line with the argument of Parsons and 
Mathhijs (2015), the Euro crisis of 2009/2010 was a different, existential 
one that cannot be reduced to functional spillovers, asymmetrical 
institutional architecture, economic factors or poor fiscal discipline alone. 
The regimes for fiscal policy coordination that emerged under EMU were 
fundamentally geared to address a single, although big and pervasive, 
collective action problem: to curb fiscal profligacy and the perceived pitfalls of 
fiscal activism, enabling the smooth, non-inflationary conduct of monetary 
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policy. Granted this policy mix, the creditworthiness of the new currency would 
have been preserved, allowing to foster economic growth mainly via supply 
side, structural policies (condensed in the Lisbon agenda and Europe 2020) and 
minimal fiscal activism through automatic stabilizers. In other words, fiscal 
policy coordination regimes served the purpose of guaranteeing the smooth 
functioning of the German economic policy template at EMU level. How has this 
regime fared with regard to its main objective? It is fair to say that for almost a 
decade, although coordination was far from perfect, the problem that the policy 
regime was meant to deal with never emerged: spillovers from unilateral actions 
did not materialize, no related liabilities for other Member States emerged, no 
risk of short or long term sustainability of public finances showed up, no undue 
pressure on the ECB occurred, and no differentiated risk premia arose among 
Member States (Ioannou and Stracca 2011; Barta and Schelkle 2015). This 
happened notwithstanding the fact that almost all EMU Member States 
breached the deficit-to-GDP rule for at least one year (see Chapter 5.4b1), that 
the corrections were systematically slower than foreseen (but still no fines were 
ever issued), and that the debt dynamic, even before the crisis, was not under 
control and was systematically above the parameters and targets set in stability 
programmes. 
In the light of this set of circumstances, fiscal policy coordination under EMU 
before 2009 was mainly a problem of internal coordination among Member 
States, with no tangible spillovers but reputational and political ones. The proof 
of this is the almost total lack of responsiveness of market participants to public 
finances’ imbalances in the course of the first ten years of EMU (De Grauwe 
and Ji 2012). The crisis dramatically changed the whole coordination problem. 
Why? Because markets eventually awoke and transformed a problem of 
internal coordination to an external disciplinarian problem, whereby sanctioning 
took place through market dynamics rather than through multilateral 
surveillance. Private markets and their pricing of sovereign risk became the 
catalysts of the crisis (Chang and Leblond 2015; Schwarzer 2015). All the 
spillovers that the SGP’s discipline was meant to internalise emerged at once: 
heterogeneous and non-sustainable fiscal policies, asymmetric shocks driven 
by real imbalances, a necessity to bail out profligate countries and pressures on 
the monetary conduct of the ECB.  
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This situation is also acknowledged by one of the key involved actors, the ECB:  
“Country-specific macroeconomic imbalances and fiscal vulnerabilities 
which before the crisis were underestimated by policy-makers and 
financial market participants alike have now come to light as destabilising 
factors”; “[…] the financial and economic crisis has seen a resurgence of 
the role of fiscal fundamentals as key determinants of sovereign bond 
yields” (ECB 2001b, pp. 61 and 64). 
 
In short, the Greek crisis of 2009-2010 represented much more than a 
disturbance to the fiscal policy coordination regime with no further external 
consequences (like the Franco-German crisis of 2003-2005). It actually 
represented an existential threat for EMU, a crisis whereby “[…] inaction would 
have brought disaster” (Parsons and Matthijs 2015), a change-or-die scenario.  
This threat radically changed the level of tractability of the coordination problem 
of EMU and of its regime for fiscal policy coordination. It led its key decision 
makers in totally uncharted waters (ibid.; Jones 2009 and 2010a; Matthijs 2014 
and 2016). Moreover, the new threat impinged on two different dimensions of 
the EMU architecture, that is, on its short term survival and long term 
sustainability. This latter argument, already put forward in the introductory 
section drawing on Scwarzer (2012) and Copelovitch et al. (2016), strongly 
suggests that the complex process of policy change enacted to cushion these 
two problems and cannot be treated within a single case study (see also 
Commission 2011). A similar argument is advanced by Schwarzer (2015, p. 
605) that rightly distinguishes between a short term policy dimension of the 
crisis (emerging in the first months of 2010 and related to the decision to grant 
financial support to EMU members and to design such support) and a long term 
institutional dimension (emerging after the Greek bail out and related to the 
creation of new institutions, rules and paradigms designed to lock in and secure 
the initial “ad-hoc policy response”). 
Moreover, the unique nature and features of the existential threat delineated in 
this section preliminary indicates that the policy change emerging in response to 
the crisis could hardly be understood through a standard learning mechanism 
that treats the crisis as simply a change in problem tractability. Instead, a case-
specific causal mechanism able to embed the profoundly unsystematic nature 
of this crisis is necessary. This is partially in contrast to Schwarzer (2015), who 
202 
 
instead employs standard modes of learning and typologies of learning-driven 
change. Nevertheless, the contrast is only apparent as in that contribution (the 
findings of which largely converge with those of this study) the explanandum is 
rather different. In fact, whereas Schwarzer employs a learning lens to explain 
how the Greek bail out took place (its format, nature, key actors and technical 
features – in short, “the building of crisis management capacity”, ibid., p. 621), 
this thesis identifies a plausible decisional mechanism that explains why it 
happened. In a way, the two studies are complementary, with one exploring the 
causal dynamics explaining the revolutionary decision of EMU actors to get 
involved in a sovereign bail out and the other shedding light on how this 
paradigmatic change was implemented, i.e. translated into policy.   
 
6.4 Conclusions 
 
Proceeding with the diachronic account of fiscal policy coordination under EMU 
conducted in this study, in this chapter I have looked at the troubled period 
between the beginning of the US sub-prime crisis (2007) and the unfolding of 
the market’s and political turmoil over Greek sovereign debt (2009/2010). In 
addition to describing the events, the chapter has tried to factor the crises and 
their sudden idiosyncratic consequences into the EMU framework for fiscal and 
economic policy coordination.  
The main aspect that has arisen out of this (unavoidably incomplete) account of 
the crisis is that it has been exogenous with respect to EMU policy dynamics 
and should hence be treated as an intervening variable for the sake of the 
change it spawned in EMU. The unpreparedness of key actors and the many 
weaknesses and asymmetries of EMU framework have surely contributed to the 
development and progression of the crisis but could not explain it. 
The crisis hit in a moment in which EMU, after having turned 10, seemed to 
have reached its apex in terms of price stability, health of public finances and 
prospects for (moderate) economic growth. Noticeably, all this took place 
notwithstanding a substantial abeyance of fiscal surveillance occurring since the 
2005 reform and the growth of different macroeconomic imbalances in various 
economies of the Union. Against an overly optimistic outlook on EMU future 
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spelled out by EU actors and observers alike in 2007, the abrupt transformation 
of financial distress that emerged from the US mortgage market into a euro-
wide sovereign debt crisis that endangered the survival of EMU was a very 
sudden and cold shower for many decision makers. Let us now see how they 
reacted in the short run, and under unprecedented pressures, to this brutal 
awakening. 
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Chapter 7. Contingent learning and intracrisis policy change74 
 
7.1 Introduction: what is the relationship between crisis, learning and 
change? 
 
In this chapter I attend to the task of constructing and testing a case-specific 
learning mechanism that applies to, and tries to explain, the tumultuous events 
of the first half of 2010 that eventually led to the Greek bail out and to the 
establishment of successive crisis resolution facilities at the EU level.  
The first step toward the construction of this novel causal mechanism consists 
of the characterisation of the euro area crisis and of its policy responses. In 
other words, having in the previous chapter motivated the resort to a case-
specific variable (the crisis) outside the normal scope of modes of policy leaning 
- and outside the policy learning measuring instrument - the next step is to 
characterise the new intervening variable. To this end, I will turn my attention to 
the literature on crisis management. Through this body of literature I will first 
explore the nature of the crisis and characterise it according to established 
models. Secondly, after having come up with a clear characterisation of the 
2009/2010 crisis, I will investigate, again through that specialized literature and 
EU integration theories, the complex relationship between crisis and learning, 
coming up with a novel learning-informed causal mechanism. 
The chapter is hence organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to 
characterising the Greek crisis of 2010 and the policy responses to it as a case 
of intracrisis management. Section 3 then conceptualises a new case-specific 
mechanism (contingent learning) arguably at play during the key months of 
2010 that led to the fundamental decision of reneging on the no bail out clause 
of Maastricht. In particular, the section shows how causality is expected to work 
within the new causal mechanism and develops observable empirical 
implications stemming from the novel explanatory device. Section 4 proceeds to 
empirically test the key implications of contingent learning in the key months of 
the 2009-2010 Greek crisis. To this end, a plausibility probe is employed along 
with a critical conversation with the explanations of the crisis drawn from 
                                                          
74 Sections 4 and 5 of this chapter are largely based on Kamkhaji and Radaelli (2016). 
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mainstream EU integration theories. Finally, Section 5 concludes by arguing 
that contingent learning has passed the plausibility probe and is conversant with 
and complementary to other theories and explanatory mechanisms. 
 
7.2 Characterising the 2010 Greek crisis and its policy responses 
 
In the history of European integration, the presence of a major crisis (actual or 
politically constructed) has often been considered a necessary (yet not 
sufficient) condition for non-incremental change (for the classical argument, see 
Schmitter 1970; for more recent versions, see Tosun et al. 2014; Parsons and 
Matthijs 2015). Furthermore, crises are conventionally considered, in public 
policy literature, as important triggers of learning processes (Stern 1997). But 
what is the exact relationship that exists between crisis, learning and policy 
change? I will briefly unpack this complex relationship by starting from the first 
two elements – crisis and learning.  
In general terms, crisis conditions are thought to have the potential to 
accelerate policy learning (Deverell 2009, pp. 180-181; Birkland 2004). 
Nonetheless, the concept of crisis is far from being mono-dimensional. In fact, 
there are crisis-specific conditions and crises’ typologies that can indeed 
facilitate and accelerate learning, as well as factors that can hinder or even stop 
it (Smith and Elliot 2007). Different conditions of crisis development and 
termination, for instance, define its progression through time (fast or slow-
burning, cathartic or long-shadow) and hence influence learning and decision-
making processes unfolding thereof (‘t Hart and Boin 2001). In particular, the 
distinction between inter and intracrisis interventions has specific explanatory 
relevance with respect to the emergence of policy learning processes (Birkland 
2009; Deverell 2009). Intercrisis interventions occur when crisis management 
(i.e. policy making) takes place after a critical event and aims to prevent a future 
episode of the same kind. Although intercrisis learning processes are potentially 
hindered by increased media and public attention (Birkland 2004); the 
emergence of new lines of political conflicts, polarization and  status quo biases 
(Stern 1997); political exploitation, blaming games and opportunistic crisis 
framing (Boin et al. 2009); and lack of/excess political leadership (Nohrstedt 
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2009), intercrisis decision making can rely on a less constraining timeframe and 
lower levels of immediate pressure for policy learning (and change) to emerge 
(Deverell 2009).   
On the other hand, intracrisis interventions occur when a specific crisis is still 
ongoing. In those cases crisis management is critically focused on halting its 
effects (Moynhian 2009). On the top of the constraints to learning specific to 
intercrisis management, intracrisis situations pose additional limitations to 
decision makers’ policy learning, most of all due the restricted time available for 
sense-making and the unavoidability of policy interventions.  
Turning to the second component of the causal relationship - from learning to 
change - theories of learning in public policy (May 1992; Bennett and Howlett 
1992; more recently Biegelbauer 2013; Dunlop and Radaelli 2013) have long 
discussed the determinants of policy change, finding that social and 
organisational learning processes have causal effects on it (see Chapter 2 for a 
discussion of learning as a driver of policy change). Although the exact nature 
of the causal relationship between learning and change is still debated, the 
combination of integration theories with theories of crisis management and 
learning in public policy shows a possible pathway between crisis, learning and 
change. And the pathway follows more or less a sequence that goes from the 
crisis as a trigger for learning, provided that some scope conditions are met, to 
forms of policy learning as causal determinants of non-incremental change. 
Against this picture, the question for us is: does the causal sequence depicted 
above explain the processes and outcomes of policy change observed during 
the euro area crisis? More specifically, were scope conditions for learning (and 
hence change) in place during the euro area crisis?  
In this regard, Lefkofridi and Schmitter (2014) argue in a recent contribution 
that, on the basis of specific features of the crisis, policy learning was indeed 
hardly predictable. The stumbling blocks to crisis-induced learning they detect 
are, namely: (a) the crisis’ trigger was exogenous and most of the responses to 
this shock were completely outside of the control of EU policy-makers; (b) the 
impact of the crisis has been uneven, with cumulative effects in terms of North-
South cleavages that have hindered mutuality and solidarity among the Member 
States. If cleavages have cumulative effects, solidarity and trust are unlikely to 
lift the EU out of its collective action problems (see Jones 2012 for a similar 
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argument); (c) absence of epistemic communities operating under conditions of 
low politicisation; (d) lack of visionary leaders or a set of well-identifiable, 
entrepreneurial institutions that clearly point to the finalité politique, such as the 
federal or federalising EU.  
On the institutional side, there is not much to expect in terms of well-identifiable 
entrepreneurship/leadership and focal points for the causal effects of ideas to 
occur (Garrett and Weingast 1993; Niemann and Ioannou 2015). EU decision-
making is characterised by poly-centrism (e.g., Economic and Finance 
Committee; Eurogroup, European Central Bank, the President of the 
Commission; the German Chancellor), without a clear constitutional mandate. 
This leads to a “strongly fragmented governance structure” (Van Esch and 
Swinkels 2015, p. 1204) that negatively affects both sense-making during 
crises, the degree of beliefs’ compatibility and convergence in crisis 
management, and the presence and effectiveness of a clear visionary 
leadership.  
To sum up, Lefkofridi and Schmitter (2014) maintain that we do not live in times 
of cathartic crisis because the enabling conditions for policy learning are absent. 
Hence, according to them, the above sketched pathway between crisis and 
learning is blocked and non-incremental policy change should not have 
occurred during the sovereign debt crisis. Along with these EU-specific 
stumbling features, further hindrances to crisis-driven policy learning and 
change were posed by the very nature of the euro area crisis. According to the 
categorization of ‘t Hart and Boin (2001), the euro area crisis can in fact be 
labelled a long-shadow one, that is, a crisis characterised by a fast speed of 
development and by a gradual speed of termination. Drawing on this stylization, 
the euro area crisis prompted both inter and intracrisis interventions. In other 
words, due to the fast speed of the crisis’ development, a number of immediate 
measures were negotiated and undertaken to deal with the short term effects of 
the crisis (intracrisis management); on the other hand, due to the crisis’ 
persistence, a different set of interventions were enacted to cope with its long 
term effects (intercrisis management).  
This important distinction allows me to achieve two goals. First, to divide the 
“crisis-case-study” in two different cases, one focusing on short term, intracrisis 
policy change (covered in this chapter) and one devoted to the long term, 
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intercrisis regime shift (covered in the following chapter). Second, it leads to the 
preliminary conclusion that within the first case study learning is notably 
constrained as it has to occur while the turmoil is still ongoing (Moynhian 2009). 
In more detail, if crises are focusing events that open windows of opportunity for 
different forms of policy learning and change (Birkland 2004), it is clear that their 
occurrence and nature will strongly depend on the temporal, cognitive and 
substantive constraints that the crisis itself poses to policy making. And these 
constraints are notably magnified in cases of intracrisis management of a long-
shadow series of critical events. In these instances, as Moynhian (2009, p. 191, 
emphasis added) puts it, decision makers “must engage in sense-making under 
limited time, dynamic conditions, and intense pressure, evaluating the nature 
and scope of a crisis and searching for an appropriate response […] They 
cannot make vague recommendations of policy suggestions for a distant future, 
but must implement whatever changes they can immediately”.  
To wrap things up then, under these conditions (arising from both EU 
specificities and the crisis’ typology) we would not expect the crisis to generate 
learning and change. Nonetheless, the euro area crisis has indubitably led, 
contrarily to the above theoretical predictions and surprisingly for Lefkofridi and 
Schmitter (2014), to non-incremental change in the form of ‘more integration’, at 
least in the key domains of EMU (Ioannou et al. 2015). As already argued 
above, the critical decision to renege on the no bail out clause of EMU in 2010 
and to first implement ad-hoc recuse packages for financially distressed euro 
area members and then to establish a stability fund account by all means as a 
substantial paradigmatic, non-incremental shift occurred within an intracrisis 
setting. In other words, policy change occurred in absence of the (theoretical) 
scope conditions for this to happen. A further paradox arising out of this hardly 
predictable policy change is that the latter took place lacking an explicit 
quantum leap, not only in the ideational and discursive dimension of decision 
makers, but also in their sense of uncertainty, threat and urgency (Van Esch 
2015; Van Esch and Swinkels 2015).75 In short, key decision makers within the 
EU polity were not able, nor were willing, to articulate a clear vision and 
ideational paradigm to support non-incremental change, yet the latter took place 
                                                          
75 During the first six months of the crisis (November 2009 to May 2010), Van Esch and Swinkels (2015, 
p. 1220) argue that “rather than delving into the roots of the crisis, leaders predominantly discussed 
possible resolutions and the role they and others must play in them”. 
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(Ioannou et al. 2015) within a relatively short timeframe in the first months of 
2010.   
These twin paradoxes motivate a new reflection on the nature and functioning 
of the causal mechanisms between crisis and learning, and between learning 
and change. In fact, it is rather uncontroversial that intracrisis management 
occurring during the short period from November 2009 to May 2010 brought 
about a non-incremental, paradigmatic shift of EMU economic policy 
coordination framework. In any case, given the numerous constraints on policy 
learning delineated above, it at least seems questionable that the crisis induced 
learning processes that then led to policy change. This argument arises from a 
classic understanding of the relationship between learning and policy change in 
political science. As argued above and when reviewing mainstream modes of 
policy learning in Chapter 3, it was argued that in order to achieve change, 
actors have to learn in the first place, that is, they have first to acquire, 
accumulate, process and exchange knowledge and then alter beliefs and 
behaviour accordingly. In short, learning is the cause of change (May 1992; Hall 
1993). The textbook example applied to EU integration is the process that led to 
Maastricht. The road to monetary integration took more than twenty years to be 
paved. It involved the slow-burning Bretton Woods crisis as key trigger, 
instances of epistemic and social/reflexive learning, decisive political 
entrepreneurship, time, and ideational convergence toward a new paradigm of 
political economy (McNamara 1998; Verdun 1999). Leaders learned in various 
ways, including emulation, but the point is that they learned first and then 
change took place. 
This fully inferential mechanism of learning that generates change in any case 
works under well determined conditions and we already saw that such 
conditions were not met during the Euro crisis, at least during its intracrisis 
segment. It follows that the specificity of the crisis and of the EU institutional 
landscape motivate the construction of a novel, case- and crisis-specific 
learning mechanism, as the canonical mechanisms reviewed in Chapter 3 seem 
unable to provide a satisfactory account of the paradigmatic shift of April/May 
2010. In other words, “while the knowledge of policy-makers and advisers about 
the policy problem and the design of instruments substantially increased in the 
beginning of 2010, this instrumental learning did not occur in a planned and 
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structured way that the learning literature has identified as a frequent learning 
mechanism. The evaluation of policy instruments and implementation consisted 
in drawing conclusions in a trial-and-error approach under the severe pressure 
of the crisis” (Schwarzer 2015, pp. 612-613). 
The learning mechanism I will devise in the following section not only departs 
from the social/reflexive one that led, for instance, to Maastricht, but is also 
different from ‘adaptive learning’ in political science (which is the learning-based 
theoretical construct that better approximates the contingent learning framework 
developed below). Adaptive learning impact (Levy 1994, on foreign policy; May 
1992: 336-337) is in fact confined to policy re-design in response to contextual 
variations. Heritier (2001) talks about absorption in the sense of accommodation 
of requirements on domestic policy imposed by external actors like the EU. In 
the same vein, Radaelli (2002, p. 212) mentions adaptation as bamboo canes 
flexing in the wind to accommodate pressure, but ready to ‘revert to their 
original position’. May (1992) even doubts that re-design is a manifestation of 
learning. To paraphrase Checkel (1998, p. 546), in the adaptive mode, actors 
run into a new context, “go ‘ouch’, and then recalculate how, in the pressure of 
the structure, to achieve their interests”. Crisis management literature refers to 
such phenomena as mere “improvisation” (ibid, p. 181; Birkland 2009, p. 154) or 
“do something” in the immediate aftermath of a critical focusing event (Birkland 
2004, p. 342). 
The theory-building approach I propose in the following section goes much 
further than this vague portrayal of policy adaptation. I argue that in episodes of 
intrascrisis management characterised by “stress, uncertainty, time pressure 
and demands for rapid action” (Deverell 2009, p. 182), real-time change takes 
place through associative processes of contingent learning and that the nature 
of this change triggers post-hoc policy learning. To achieve this goal, I perform 
an exercise in causal identification, that is, I put forth a novel approach to the 
cause-and-effect relationships in processes of crisis management, learning and 
change. I argue that crises can produce sudden change via fast-paced 
associative processes of contingent learning; that change in turn triggers 
conventional policy learning, thus reversing the causal mechanism; and, finally, 
that feedback via conventional policy learning locks-in change and creates new 
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path dependence.76 To go through this task, I draw on strands of economics 
and psychology that are based on how individuals behave. This arguably 
provides strong micro-foundations to my theory-building effort. 
Before proceeding with the characterisation of the novel causal mechanism in 
Section 4 and with its plausibility probe in Section 5, it is worth briefly 
summarising the different arguments made throughout this section. First, in sub-
section (a) I introduced a stylised description of the unfolding of the Greek crisis 
in the period from autumn 2009 to spring 2010. Second, in sub-section (b) I put 
the Greek case in the context of EMU paradigm and coordination problem, 
showing that the nature of the Greek crisis crucially modified the tractability of 
the collective action problem of EMU and fiscal policy coordination. This led me 
to argue that to gauge how causality unfolded in the process of policy change 
spawned by the crisis, a novel, case-specific learning mechanism has to be 
conceptualised. In sub-section (c), by characterising the crisis according to 
public policy literature, I have begun to construct the novel mechanism and 
have been able to further motivate the division of the “crisis-case-study” in two 
distinct cases, a short term intracrisis one and a long term intercrisis one. While 
for the second set of effects canonical modes of policy learning still provide a 
strong and internally valid analytical template, as for the first segment of the 
crisis (the one treated in this chapter) a new, case-specific explanatory 
mechanism based on learning during intracrisis settings is needed. 
 
7.3 A new causal mechanism: Contingent learning in intracrisis 
management 
 
The fact that, when facing the reality of a potential sovereign default, EMU 
reneged on one of the key pillars of its paradigm is certainly hard proof of a leap 
– whether forward or backward is mainly a matter of value judgement. Faced 
                                                          
76 In other words, I further argue that conventional policy learning does not disappear, but that it occurs 
in the post-decisional and intercrisis phase working as a feedback mechanism of the enacted policy 
change, possibly anchoring it. Chapter 8, which focuses on intercrisis management and long term policy 
change as a reaction to the crisis, will put this implication to test. In the context of a more canonical 
account of this process that draws on a historical institutionalist perspective, Schwarzer argued (2012, p. 
39) that “crisis management decisions […] have clearly created path dependency which made euro area 
member governments start seeking a permanent solutions only weeks after the temporary [bail out] 
mechanism was created”. 
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with the first part of a long shadow crisis, EMU catharsis became not only 
possible but, most of all, urgent. Despite bargaining and brinkmanship over the 
nature of the bail out, the EU finally resolved to provide aid funding to Greece 
and to create a series of new institutions (initially outside the perimeter of EU 
treaties) working as lenders of last resort. The ECB, through a series of 
seemingly technical decisions over its refinancing instruments, de facto 
bypassed the prohibition of monetary financing and actively supported the 
Greek and other sovereign debts, while also abandoning the tenet of monetary 
neutrality and engaging in a persistent policy of low interest rates and even in 
quantitative easing. 
Notably, the input of such substantive overhauls of EMU paradigm was not a 
potential future threat (like when the SGP was established) or a political conflict 
over imlementation (like when the SGP was reformed) that in any case left the 
underlying paradigm intact. This time the need to reform was pushed instead by 
an existential threat which imposed a clear-cut choice beyond incremental 
change (Jones 2010a, Parsons and Matthijs 2015). Options for such change 
were rather binary, that is, whether to keep or renege on one of the key tenets 
of the previous paradigm. Crucially, the choice was to change paradigm and to 
save the Euro “whatever it takes”. The very emergence of this dilemma, 
however, signals that the tractability of the collective action problem that the 
SGP was called to cushion had switched from a highly tractable problem of 
internal discipline and distributive conflict to an unprecedented external problem 
triggered by financial markets questioning the whole sustainability of EMU. The 
aim of this section is to construct a mechanism that allows me to explain how 
actors reacted to that switch in problem tractability and rather swiftly agreed on 
the most substantial change undergone by EMU since its inception. 
To sum up our previous arguments, the euro area faced an exogenous crisis 
without the institutional, entrepreneurial and epistemic conditions that in the 
past proved indispensable to generate quantum leaps. The EU actors’ 
constellation, still characterised by multiple veto points and players and by 
fragmented governance, even increased the distributive costs of policy change 
(Lindner 2003). Finally, long shadow crises and their intracrisis management 
pose a serious time-constraint to lesson-drawing due to evidence making 
learning-based alterations of policy paradigms more unlikely. Against this 
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background, the occurrence of fast-brushed and substantial policy change as a 
response to the euro area crisis of late 2009/2010 is puzzling. Given that 
standard learning mechanisms could apparently not activate during the 
intracrisis part of euro area crisis, the puzzle that motivates the construction of a 
new, case-specific theoretical causal model is exactly to understand what kind 
of (still not modelled) learning mechanism may have been at work under the 
conditions shown above, whereby one would not normally expect learning and 
paradigmatic policy change to occur. 
To start building a novel causal mechanism able to capture the puzzling nature 
and role of learning during episodes of intracrisis management of long-shadow 
crises, hence explaining policy change, I now concentrate on the influence of 
contextual/contingent factors. To this end, I propose to resort to experimental 
findings in behavioural/evolutionary economics and psychology. Here I consider 
‘contingencies’ in two ways, that is, drawing on two distinct yet complimentary 
bodies of literature, namely human contingency learning (HCL) and the 
behavioural approach to contingent learning.  
At the outset, let us consider two distinct dimensions of learning. One dimension 
is cognitive. Learning is about an individual that, faced with exogenous 
changes, considers whether their preferences are still satisfied when the 
environment differs from the past. This individual deliberates whether to carry 
on with their current behaviour or choose something else. This involves 
cognition, or, to put it bluntly, something that goes on inside the mind. The other 
dimension is situational: the connection between events and expected 
consequences (or, to put it in HCL vocabulary, cues and outcomes)77 is not 
always the same. It depends on the characteristics of the situation. Hence, 
event X leads to Y or Z depending on what the situational context is. HCL and 
the behavioural approach to contingent learning work on two dimensions of 
learning. The former explores causality by investigating the dimension of 
                                                          
77 To use an accessible example, consider Pavlov’s experiment with dogs. In that, a cue consists of a 
conditioned stimulus (e.g. Pavlov ringing a bell). The outcome instead consists of an unconditioned 
stimulus (e.g. Pavlov feeding the dogs after having rang a bell). After several iterations of this 
cue/outcome dyad, dogs learn to associate the unconditioned stimulus (cue) to the conditioned 
stimulus (outcome), even when the latter is not present. In fact, Pavlov’s dogs start salivating (reaction) 
when the bell is rang (cue), that is, before the food is actually provided (outcome). The learned reaction 
defaults when the known cue/outcome relationship is blocked or modified, hence eliciting a different 
reaction that is triggered by contingent learning rather than by conditioning.  
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cognition. The latter looks at causality from the perspective of the situation. 
They are portrayed in Figure 7.1 below. 
 
Figure 7.1 Contingent learning loop 
 
Source: Slembeck 1999, p. 8. 
 
Starting with cognition, in policy learning theories (May 1992) we assume that 
an individual, when making predictions or choosing a behaviour on the basis of 
her understanding of cause-effect relations, reasons inferentially on what has 
happened (a series of cue/outcome relations) and chooses to confirm the 
prediction/action or turn to another type of behaviour available in her repertoire. 
This explicit inference-based process, granted bounded rationality, takes place 
gradually and is resource-intensive. It requires the deployment of inferential 
cognitive capacities and reflexivity. HCL raises the question: what is the role of 
surprise on predictions and actions? Surprise is a set of unexpected 
cue/outcome relations – decision-makers are typically confronting these 
relations in intracrisis management.  
HCL scholarship, and experiments in particular, address this puzzle in a way 
that contradicts the common wisdom of policy learning. Through the analysis of 
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blocking effects,78 HCL studies show that the likelihood of behavioural change 
and the type learning involving individuals strongly depend upon this kind of 
new (and surprising) causal associations, but in a much less resource-intensive 
fashion than that envisaged by standard learning theories. In particular, 
associative HCL models (Rescorla and Wagner 1972; Allan 1993; Shanks 
1995) connect lack of prior experience on novel causal relations (in terms of 
unexpected and confounded cue-outcome relations) with associative learning. 
For HCL theorists, it is exactly the lack of experience about the relationship 
existing between a given stimulus and an outcome that generates what we 
would call surprise. This surprise about the causal relationship, in turn, triggers 
learning in associative form. Note that associative HCL “…is thought to be fast 
acting, automatic, and would require little cognitive resources to act” (Morís et 
al. 2014, pp. 77-78). 
This depiction fits experimental reality much better than a predicate whereby 
prior sets of beliefs and paradigms about causation inform reasoned inferential 
behavioural change. Strikingly, this kind of “…learning of sound patterns can 
occur even without conscious attention” (Bannard and Tommasello 2012, 
emphasis added). Mutatis mutandis, this mechanism of behavioural adaptation 
seems to be a more appropriate portrayal of the learning processes occurring 
during intracrisis management rather than the classic take on cognition in policy 
learning models. Elaborating on this insight, it is possible to argue that the 
findings of HCL suggest that resilient belief systems may not be a major 
hindrance to change - and learning. Surprise may trump priors via self-
reinforcing mechanisms of association between new stimuli and outcomes.  
These propositions do not come without qualifications, of course. Within HCL, 
some have argued that contingency judgements and the actions that follow are 
not entirely driven by self-reinforcing, sometimes unconscious and automatic, 
associative mechanisms. For some (Cheng and Novick 1990; Cheng and 
Holyoak 1995), it is iterated statistical evidence and inference that reshapes 
responses to new cue-outcome relations. Thus, the discovery of new causal 
                                                          
78 Put simply, blocking in HCL experiments refers to difficulty in learning on cue-outcome relations when 
a specific cue is paired with an outcome in a single stage, and then in a successive compound stage of 
the experiment the same cue is paired with another one, producing the same outcome of the single 
stage (Morrís et al. 2014)     
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links between behaviour and consequences can also be led by inference rather 
than surprise-driven association (Allan 1993; De Houwer and Beckers 2002).  
Nevertheless, all HCL models broadly support the argument that effective 
changes in the responses to different stimuli (i.e. contingency judgments or 
actions) can be learned and refined in a relatively short amount of time (i.e. after 
only several trials) and in a broadly associative fashion. Moreover, the 
experiments indicate that when changes in response to new and unexpected 
stimuli (like those emerging during crises) take place, the key drivers of change 
have more to do with contextual association mechanisms and framing effects 
rather than with the updating of beliefs and conventional inferential reasoning 
(conventional for us, as political scientists). In other words, associative HCL, 
assuming bounded rationality and resulting in fast, low-cognition responses, is 
also suited to account for and explain several well-documented biases in 
decision making, a typical Achilles’ heel of standard learning models (see the 
use of heuristic shortcuts in Weyland [2005] for a notable exception). Focusing 
specifically on crisis-driven decision making within groups, the most commonly 
theorised biases concern attention (Rerup 2009) and groupthink (Choi and Kim 
1999), whether in the form of collective confirmation bias (resulting in 
polarization and/or threat-rigidity) or in the form of bandwagoning/herding 
effects (resulting in the convergence of beliefs).  
As for the former, it basically consists of increased attention to salient stimuli, 
while the latter refers to sub-optimal decision making outcomes observed in 
groups due to situational contexts and/or endogenous group dynamics. By 
assuming that a group of policy makers reacts to unexpected stimuli in 
associative fashion, rather than via fully inferential thinking, permits us to factor 
the effects of both typologies of biases in the decisional model. In particular, 
with regard to the rationale linking associative learning to attentional biases, a 
prominent review notes that “a loud noise is usually expected to capture more 
attention than a quiet noise. Associability refers to the ease or speed with which 
a stimulus can be learned about. It is further assumed that all else being equal, 
learning will be faster (associability will be higher) for more salient stimuli. Thus, 
the relationship between a loud noise and shock will be learned faster than 
between a quite noise and shock” (Mitchell and Le Pelley 2010, p. 1). 
Interestingly, attentional biases can also be smoothly integrated within 
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groupthink dynamics if we assume that the evaluation of the salience of a given 
stimulus can be subject to collective confirmation biases (that leads to 
irrationally select information on the grounds of their conformity with prior stimuli 
and beliefs) and that the faster (associative) learning triggered by salient stimuli 
can then subject to bandwagon effects, finally resulting in the convergence of 
beliefs and ‘group thought’ associative responses to crises.  
To sum up, experimental findings demonstrate that the degree and nature of 
change is greater the bigger the surprise and salience of a stimulus is, or in 
other words, the more unexpected, confounded and relevant stimuli are. This, 
applied to collective decision making, tells us that a shocking crisis allows for 
more and faster change than a smooth process whereby knowledge is 
accumulated and processed rationally/inferentially and change takes place 
upon lengthy reflection through policy learning. 
Now enters the behavioural approach to contingent learning. This allows us to 
explore the situational dimension of learning. Like in the previous case, we 
focus on the identification of causal relations. We do that by drawing on a strand 
of experimental findings reviewed, among others, by Tilman Slembeck (1998 
and 1999). His studies originate in frustration with equilibrium models of 
learning. These equilibrium models identify Nash equilibria but they do not tell 
us when a process of learning leads to a Nash equilibrium. Additionally, in 
practical, real-world situations the conditions for learning are not the 
unconstrained conditions of game-theoretical models based on Nash equilibria. 
To solve these problems, Slembeck has turned to experiments to explore how 
situational variables affect learning. The situational determinants of learning are 
both structural and interactive. Structural determinants refer to the complexity of 
the environment and/or complexity of tasks, the degree of inter-dependency 
among actors (often operationalized as number of players), and how much 
information is available about the environment, the resources and the actors. 
Interaction determinants involve uncertainty about the strategies and quality, 
quantity, content and timing of feedback.  
The findings of this approach complement (and converge with) those of HCL. In 
situations characterised by high structural and strategic uncertainty, fragmented 
information and poor feedback, even relatively small modifications of context 
nudge decisions effectively, triggering contingent learning (Slembeck 1998 and 
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1999). This is at odds with the conventional political science take on learning, 
where uncertainty, poor information and the wrong feedback hinder the 
mechanisms of learning. But they are not at odds with experimental evidence. 
The point is that learning in theory and learning in experiments diverge quite 
significantly. Theories of learning in the social sciences are in fact ad-hoc: when 
they are tested in experimental settings they function exclusively under narrow 
ideal-typical assumptions. Experiments (for instance the so-called ‘three-doors-
anomaly’ - Friedman [1998] - and the ‘endowment effect’ pioneered by Daniel 
Kahneman and colleagues [1991]) have indeed demonstrated that even 
marginally relaxing the initial conditions of a given real-world situation can have 
a dramatic impact on the ‘on-paper rational’ expectations of learning theories. 
Learning theories only work under narrow, often unrealistic assumptions that 
rarely match the empirical reality of decision making. These assumptions 
cannot cover all the potential contingent circumstances that can impact on 
learning outcomes in actual situations, even more so in the case of critical 
emergency-driven policy-making. Therefore we need to develop a framework 
where contingencies – and their relationship with observable outcomes – are 
properly factored in.  
Empirically, the contingent mechanism has the potential to explain the paradox 
of policy change during the euro area crisis whereby we observe both 
adjustments - i.e. evidence of single-loop learning - and full-blown policy 
change/paradigm shift - i.e. evidence of double-loop learning (Birkland 2009).  A 
similar causal mechanism is sketched in crisis management literature but, as far 
are I am aware, it has not been explicitly conceptualised under a theoretical 
construct possessing sound micro-foundations and features like contingent 
learning. Birkland (2009), elaborating on the impact of urgency and time 
pressures on intracrisis learning, rightly argues that actors “do not have a great 
deal of time to be reflective and, instead, must often improvise to find good 
interim solutions to problems that were unanticipated, or to problems that 
cannot be ameliorated through standard operating procedures” (ibid, p. 154). 
He refers to these kind of adaptive responses as mere “improvisation”, since he 
postulates that learning from crisis typically entails the sequential presence of 
cognition and behavioural change. First one cogitates about the event and then 
behavioural change takes place as a consequence of cognition (ibid.). 
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Contingent learning relates instead to behavioural change as a result of 
unescapable systemic pressures, contingencies and unexpected stimuli that call 
for an immediate response, even in the absence of proper cognitive inferential 
processing of the new information. Contingent learning is hence not learning 
from the crisis, but learning (via change) during the crisis. Paradoxically, the 
resulting behavioural change can resemble the effects of double-loop learning, 
but the emergence of new policy paradigms and cause-effect beliefs under 
contingent learning is not fruit of reflexive lesson drawing (for which time and 
knowledge accumulation are critical), but rather of adaptation or, to put it in the 
contingent learning jargon, of associative responses to unprecedented stimuli 
whose persistence and salience call for immediate action. The cognitive 
process behind change is therefore adaptive, improvised, contingent and 
associative (as opposed to fully inferential and reflexive), also allowing several 
cognitive biases in the modelling of the decisional process to be embedded (see 
above). Hence, contingent learning leads to outcomes typical of double-loop 
learning, but without reflexivity; such phenomena, although largely overlooked 
in the literature and treated as improvisation or policy re-design, instead 
deserve an explicit conceptualisation because they are typical of crises: “Both 
single- and double-loop learning presuppose cognitive reflection. But as prior 
research on the topic shows, and as this study reiterates, such critical and 
deeper reflection is not a conventional response to crises. Rather than engaging 
in reflective cognition and analytical investigations in response to crises, 
managers tend to resort to mechanic adaptation and reflex reactions in 
response to failures and external threats” (Deverell 2009, p. 185, emphasis 
added). 
These phenomena take place, according to the associative mechanism, 
because during intracrisis management, sense-making (cognition) and 
implementation of appropriate responses (behaviour) are conflated in a single 
process because ‘crisis responders seeking to engage in crisis learning do not 
have the luxury of carefully calculated decisions’ and because crises 
‘exacerbates cognitive biases […] tend to narrow focus and limit information 
processing. New, unexpected, and threatening conditions weaken the capacity 
of individuals to make sense of new contexts […] Rather than engage in even 
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limited comparison of options, responders under extreme pressure will pursue 
the first course of action that comes to mind’ (Moynhian 2009: 191-192). 
Our discussion leads us to the following observable implications. Under 
conditions of extreme surprise and uncertainty, we would expect the contingent 
learning mechanism to outdo priors and policy-makers to respond in fast-
associative ways. Policy-makers choose the (right) course of action absent of 
inferential policy learning (they do not need to understand the major cause-
effect relations at work in a situation to react) and without having to change their 
deeply rooted beliefs and paradigms. Sense-making and behaviour are a single 
process, as I just argued. I would expect these responses to be patterned by 
the cue-outcome dyads we described (see also below). Then I would expect 
inferential learning to take place after change, provided that feedback is 
sufficiently strong to anchor the lessons learned. 
 
7.4 Empirical analysis: a plausibility probe of contingent learning 
 
 
By developing a mechanism of contingent learning and devising a number of 
empirically observable implications derived from it, I hypothesised that the 
decisional process leading to behavioural change can take place before policy 
learning occurs, assuming the form of an innovative strategy selected in 
response, for instance, to radically reshuffled situational conditions determined 
by a crisis. Inferential learning is hence not a pre-condition for change, as 
surprise generates fast contingency judgments and actions that can be learned 
in associative fashion, and refined and enacted in a relatively short amount of 
time. This is fundamentally different from a fully inferential understanding of 
learning based on how new evidence shapes preferences gradually through 
reflection and rational cogitation, and eventually generates the new decision 
and actions. In my approach, inferential learning takes place ex-post (i.e. after 
change), as a reflection grounded in feedback information related to the 
previously deliberated decisional change. Once change has occurred, 
feedback, inferential/probabilistic reasoning, and reflexivity step in and bring 
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about the sort of conventional learning theorized in political science.79 This 
leads to the (apparently paradoxical) inversion of causality: policy learning 
follows change instead of determining it. If individuals operate under radically 
modified conditions with respect to the status-quo, for example because the 
political-institutional context has changed from fine-tuning policy-making to a 
scenario of emergency-driven decision-making, they will be prone to re-adapt 
the structure of their preferences due to situational and cognitive constraints. 
Such an approach has indeed proved to be in line with experimental results. Of 
course, experiments operate at the level of individuals under controlled 
conditions. Real-world politics operates at the level of complex organizations 
with multiple actors and, in the EU, different levels of governance, not in labs. 
The question then for EU theorists is whether we believe we live in times where 
the classic conditions of bounded rationality, inference and evidence-based 
learning apply (this requires limited contingent influences and low cognitive 
restrictions). Or, rather, we think we live in times where surprise can trump 
inference in the cognitive dimension of learning, and situational effects can 
leverage contingent learning. 
To recap: we theorized an original mechanism of contingent learning and made 
a plausibility argument for an alternative understanding of causality within it. 
Can I also present a plausibility probe, looking at evidence that seems to be in 
line with my theoretical expectations?80  
 
                                                          
79 As already hinted at in the previous section and as will be clarified below, conventional learning does 
not disappear, it simply takes place later on, that is, when intracrisis management leaves room for 
intercrisis policy making, that is, when the fast initial developments of the crisis are over and arguably 
addressed and policy makers can deal with its gradual termination through more forward-looking 
measures and reforms. 
80 Furthermore, in the conclusive chapter, I will draw on these empirical findings to enter a conversation 
with recent scholarship in integration theory inspired by Neo-Functionalism (e.g. Niemann and Ioannou 
2015) and Liberal Inter-governmentalism (e.g. Schimmelfennig 2015a), so to refine and enrich the 
explanatory account of the first phase of the euro area crisis. A similar approach, whereby a learning-
informed analytical lens is used to contribute to and enrich the explanatory leverage of classical EU 
integration theories, is also employed in a recent contribution from Schwarzer (2015, pp. 602 and 623): 
“The learning perspective […] complements the analysis of the conflict resolution process with a better 
understanding of policy choices, and to some degree, consensus-building processes among actors 
confronted with unexpected, complex and substantial challenges to the status quo of European 
integration […] Incorporating the concept of learning in the study of European institution-building and 
change hence allow[s] changes in institutional preferences in response to new information and a refined 
understanding of evolving policy challenges and power relationships”. I obviously endorse this claim and 
propose to contribute to the same explanatory goal.      
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7.4a Plausibility probe 
 
The plausibility probe is an empirical instrument employed to test the plausibility 
of a novel theoretical claim or mechanism. The aim is to prove that the 
mechanism is at least feasible. Plausibility probes are common in exploratory 
studies (Eckstein 1992; Levy 2008) that aim to test new theoretical claims. Such 
an exploratory probe is often a first step in a multi-stage research agenda. 
Practically, and similarly to theory-testing process tracing methodologies, I 
focus on testing the observable implications of the theorized mechanism. The 
probe is not a fully-fledged theory-testing exercise that can lead to strong 
inference and fully discriminate between rival alternative mechanisms. This is 
because, among other things, the expected implications/empirical 
manifestations of the novel mechanism are necessarily tentative and hence 
subject to further refinement. Moreover, also in the context of the full-fledged 
theory-testing exercises of the two previous chapters, drawing on an approach 
based on multiple causation (see Chapter 1), I refrained from adopting a view 
whereby causal mechanisms are systematically rival and exclusive. Similarly, in 
this chapter and in the conclusive one, when I criticize existing theories and 
explanations, the aim is not to contrast competing claims but to draw on the 
novel mechanism to fill the explanatory gaps of mainstream accounts, knowing 
that different causal mechanism may well have been at work at the same time 
and during different stages of the crisis. For me, the crucial episodes referring to 
the observable implications of contingent learning took place in the period of 
2009/2010, and feedback anchored policy change occurred later on, that is, in 
the course of the following case of long term, forward looking policy change 
(spanning from 2010 to 2013). This is not, therefore, a claim that contingent 
learning explains the whole crisis or is played out in all the crises of the EU.  
As previously seen, the dreadful situation of Greek public finances was publicly 
disclosed in early December 2009 when the new Greek Prime Minister George 
Papandreou announced that Greece’s budget deficit would have peaked to 
12.7% of its GDP – more than twice the figure previously announced. This is the 
equivalent to a cue/stimulus in an HCL experiment, whereby the cue was 
represented by the disclosure of the actual deficit.81 Under normal 
                                                          
81 See footnote 77. 
223 
 
circumstances, the decade-long experience of EMU actors in enforcing the SGP 
could have indicated the expected outcome arising out of this cue: a slight 
worsening of borrowing conditions for the interested country and the 
enforcement of the corrective discipline of the Pact. Indeed, the initial policy 
reaction of the EU to the Greek cue drew on the expectation of the emergence 
of that typical outcome and consisted of the enactment of the usual procedure: 
the issuing of an early warning by the Commission and the enactment of an 
excessive deficit procedure involving an adjustment path agreed with the 
Commission. Sticking to this standard corrective process, in the initial phases of 
the crisis Greece passed harsh consolidation measures and the Commission 
endorsed these policies arguing that they would have been effective (and 
sufficient) in restoring market confidence (Commission 2010b).  
In fact, in that early phase, the risk of a Greek default was looming but not 
totally concrete.82 To use the contingent learning vocabulary (see Footnote 77), 
the cue took place (that is, the coming out of the Greek government), but not yet 
its unexpected outcome (that is, the concrete risk of a sovereign default). Before 
that outcome was fully known (i.e. in April 2010), I concede that a conventional 
process of sense-making was underway, whereby Member States and EU 
actors were sticking to long-standing national preferences and status-quo-
biased solutions to explain the nature of the new cue to themselves and to their 
polities (Jones 2010a) and to go about them. In this in-between phase, lacking 
the clear emergence of the (unusual, surprising) outcome, the contingent 
reaction could not be triggered; hence Member States and EU institutions were 
                                                          
82 “At the beginning of 2010, Greece had little difficulty raising new debt. On 25 January it went to 
market looking to raise approximately €3-5bn and came home with €8bn, because it faced demand for 
its bonds worth roughly €25bn. The same thing happened in early March, when the Greek government 
looked for €5bn and found bids for just under three times that amount. Finally, it happened again in 
April, shortly after the European Union held out the promise of conditional support. Greece came to the 
market looking for €1.2bn in short-term credits, found close to €8bn in offers, and went home with 
€1.5bn instead. Nor was debt servicing the major problem. Although the Greek government complained 
loudly about the yields necessary to attract attention to these new issues, they were broadly 
comparable to much of the debt it was retiring and so would not create problems until well into the 
future as the stock of debt to be serviced continued to mount” (Jones 2010a, p. 28). What precipitated 
the crisis was not new financing or servicing, but the flow of old debt into new bonds. Specifically, 
markets worried that the Greek government would have trouble refinancing. Just under €8.1bn in bonds 
were to come due on 19 May 2010, with another €400 million maturing fewer than two weeks later. 
Both of these existing tranches of debt carried very high coupons (or fixed interest payments) of 6%” 
(Jones 2010a, pp. 28-29). 
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sticking to their beliefs and preferences. They engaged in what we call, in 
hindsight, denial.83 
However, when the cue (distressed public finances) was paired with its 
unexpected outcome (concrete risk of sovereign default), conventional sense-
making based on long-term preferences and core beliefs was defied and 
conflated within a single decisional process involving not only sense-
making/cognition, but also imposing behavioural change.  
The explosion of risk premia on Greek debt issues and the subsequent risk of a 
sovereign default due to external market discipline by all means represented an 
unexpected outcome that interrupted the well-known and expected 
cue/outcome dyad and led to a contingent response.84 The latter, in short, took 
the form, first of an ad-hoc rescue package and few days after of the 
establishment of a bailout fund (outside the acquis communitaire), a 
fundamental, paradigmatic departure from the original tenet of EMU. The 
chosen policy solution (the reaction) was contingent in that it did not belong to a 
set of predefined recipes drawn from conventional sense-making and long term 
preferences and beliefs. In other words, I argue that the observed change was 
not in line with the preferences of the actor with bigger power resources - a 
clear contradiction of Liberal Intergovernmental’s predictions - and that change 
occurred without relevant ideational pushes underpinning it - a contradiction to 
Neo-Functional accounts.85  
The initial, external trigger (Schwarzer 2012) of the crisis generated policy 
puzzles which were not fully covered by the functional understanding of EMU’s 
deficiencies and that did not allow, in the short-run, the straight formation of 
national preferences. Multiple market pressures on EMU (impinging on private 
banks, sovereign debts, single member states’ political and economic systems 
and supranational institutions) provided new unexpected cause-effect relations 
for the decision makers. My key argument is that contingent learning stepped in 
                                                          
83 “Few of the standard criticisms of Europe’s economic and monetary union expressed serious concern 
for this [default] prospect. Even the more extreme criticisms did not make it the focus of their attention” 
(Jones 2010a: 23). 
84 In fact, in the first decade of EMU, the many deviations from the SGP rules were never punished by 
the markets. In other words, risk premia were largely unresponsive to deviations from the SGP ceilings 
and the risks of sovereign defaults within the Eurozone never arose. 
85 See the conclusive chapter for a discussion of this mechanism vis-à-vis integration theories.  
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exactly in this phase. At the critical juncture of the crisis (from December 2009 
until late April/May 2010, when the Greek bail out was approved and successive 
versions of financial stability facilities were established), the context of urgency 
and “need to save the Euro” changed actors’ causal beliefs and led to a series 
of integrative reforms driven by associative learning mechanisms. This 
(contingent) learning process occurred without canonical inferential thinking and 
without a deep understanding of the paradigm shift it implied. Thus, the Euro 
was saved by a process of contingent learning fuelled by contextual features of 
the decision making scenario – a process that, in a way, happened accidentally. 
Only after these hallmark decisions were taken, reflexive learning, sense-
making, and neat preference formation took place, not before.  
Change occurred hence through associative contingent learning, possibly 
including cognitive limitations as attentional biases and groupthink. In fact, 
reneging on the no bail out clause of EMU and creating an external vehicle 
dedicated to the financial rescue of Member States strongly defied functional 
and incremental solutions as well as the long-term preferences of core EU 
Member States. By all means, in my opinion, this counts as a contingent 
reaction. 
Although in late 2009 Greek economic fundamentals immediately appeared to 
be extremely weak, it took several months before awareness of this weakness 
fully translated into the new, unexpected outcome, that is, the objective risk of a 
Greek sovereign default. Only then was the unanticipated cue/outcome dyad of 
the mechanism of contingent learning completed, leading to behavioural 
change.86 
The unexpectedness was characterised and corroborated in practice by: 
inconsistent and conflicting declarations and speeches given by key decision 
makers (triggering negative market reactions and highlighting cumulative and 
cross-cutting conflicts: between small and big Member States, between 
peripheral and core EMU members, between Germany and the Commission, 
etc.); open public disagreement over the feasible solutions to the crisis (also 
                                                          
86 Whereas in HCL experiments cue/outcome dyads are presented to subjects sequentially, triggering 
their immediate responses, the transposition of such sequence into crisis-based decision making allows 
for a slightly longer timeframe (weeks and months rather than seconds), but is still extremely rapid in 
terms of political time. 
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between actors belonging to the same political system – see the conflicting 
views on the nature of a possible European monetary fund emerged on March 
2010 between Angela Merkel and Wolfgang Schäuble – Gocaj and Meunier 
2013, p. 242; Schwarzer 2015, p. 608; Jones, 2010a, p. 24) and trial-and-error 
moves attempted and then swiftly repealed or modified due the reactions of the 
markets (Gocaj and Meunier, 2013, p. 244; Schwarzer 2015, p. 613). As for this 
latter point, the sequence of events of March/early May 2010 is highly 
illuminating. In fact, in the course of few weeks, the different positions on the 
enactment, as well as on the format, size and vehicle, of a possible Greek bail 
out shifted dramatically among key actors, including: no bail out at all (Jones, 
2010a, p. 29; Schwarzer 2015, p. 615); limited bilateral loans; a strictly 
conditional European monetary fund; a debt agency; a Commission-backed 
lending facility; and bilateral loans pooled by the Commission and including the 
IMF. This latter solution was actually endorsed on the 2nd of May 2010 by the 
European Council but proved immediately insufficient and unstable leading then 
to the creation of an intergovernmental special purpose vehicle (the European 
Financial Stability Facility - ESFF) on the 10th of May, a decision taken 
according to an internal source quoted by Gocaj and Meunier (2013, p. 243) 
“really in the middle on the night”. 
Thus, drawing on the vocabulary of contingent learning: when the cue 
(distressed public finances) was paired with its unexpected outcome (the 
tangible risk of sovereign default), we observed behavioural change, that is, a 
new and different reaction. This is exactly the moment in which the associative 
processes of contingent learning applied, quickly leading to non-incremental 
change (the refusal of the no bail out clause). Note that, exactly as predicted by 
the contingent learning mechanism, this change occurs without any 
paradigmatic modification of core beliefs. Indeed, Van Esch (2014 and 2015) 
documents ambiguity, a relative level of flexibility (most of all in secondary 
beliefs), and only a modest degree of ideational convergence in EU leaders’ 
views during the crisis. From her analysis, it appears to be clear that core 
beliefs were not fundamentally altered (Van Esch 2015), pointing to a mismatch 
between the lack of substantial variation in the ideational dimension of policy 
makers due to the crisis and the non-incremental change enacted. This is the 
core of my plausibility proof that leads me to argue that policy learning causality 
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was reversed and that another radically different typology of learning took place 
in the short term responses to the crisis.   
Crucially, the mechanism also explains how contingent factors leading to 
change made up for the lack of grand visions. Even ordinary leaders, with a 
short-term electoral horizon, may be forced into change if the context presents 
extraordinary pressures. In our case, when the very existence of integration and 
domestic state structures was questioned by an extremely challenging context, 
decision-makers learned in associative fashion about contingencies and chose 
non-incremental change that enabled them to survive, even if their core, 
established preferences would have suggested that they would go for more 
limited change. Surprise trumped priors and led to paradigmatic change in 
absence of belief change. 
The variable of surprise (unexpected cue-outcome relations) typical of HCL 
models is pertinent here. In emergencies, most of all in intracrisis management, 
decision-making is faster. The conventional, inferential conditions for learning 
via experience, alteration of preferences, and deliberation are absent or 
suspended. Accidental, unwilling heroes can change behaviour in a short time-
frame, under conditions of structural uncertainty (recall Slembeck’s conditions). 
Change-or-die choice architectures might well have nudged accidental 
federalists. Policy makers like Olli Rehn went on stage and made extraordinary 
commitments to do “whatever it takes” to save the Euro, well before Mario 
Draghi did (Rehn 2010). Merkel defied conventional political science wisdom 
about elections and short-term horizons: she outraged political opponents, 
foreign ministers and her own coalition partners, the central bank and even the 
constitutional court. This is what she did by reneging on the no bail out clause of 
EMU and agreeing on an EU-based rescue package for Greece in April 2010. 
That was the genesis of the changes in EU policy on acute financial instability. 
After the first Greek bail out, the European Commission was given extraordinary 
power to scrutinise the national budgets of Member States, even to impose 
fines and quasi-automatic sanctions (see the following chapter). The European 
Stability Fund, established later on, is federal in nature, since it overtly 
overcame the no bail out principle and was designed upon pro-quota national 
contributions. Under the pressure of the markets and in a classic trial-and-error 
dynamic, the instruments within the toolkit of the ECB have been enlarged, 
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allowing for a relaxation of the commitment to stable inflation in favour of a sort 
of new discretion conceded to the central bankers (Buti and Carnot 2012).  
To conclude, I have sketched a causal sequence based on contingent learning 
that is empirically corroborated in the context of a plausibility probe. The 
proposed mechanism, meant to explain the fast-brushed change observed in 
2010, also tells us something about the following case study, that is, the 
process of reform undergone by EMU after 2010. In fact, within the mechanism 
of contingent learning, an important role is played by Slembeck’s feedback 
conditions that lock-in the short-term effects of learning. Feedback re-organizes 
the beliefs of policy-makers, making them learn how to operate within the new 
circumstances that become the new taken-for-granted context. As we shall see 
in the conclusive chapter, these circumstances can also accommodate a Liberal 
Intergovernmental account of the crisis by bringing preferences (i.e. classically 
intended, long-held macroeconomic preferences that hold under normal times) 
to the fore in the post-hoc phase. In fact, let us recall one of the implications of 
contingent learning: inferential learning takes place after change, provided that 
feedback is sufficiently strong to anchor the lessons learned. Contingent 
learning brought about the crucial decision of breaking the no bail out orthodoxy 
of EMU. This happened in a way that went against long-held actors’ 
preferences and was indeed the right decision/lesson (it actually saved the 
Euro…). Therefore, the key implication for the subsequent process of EMU’s 
forward-looking reforms (started in 2010, right after the Greek bail out – see the 
following chapter) is that it shall be driven by more canonical mechanisms of 
policy learning (possibly including bargaining dynamics), so to lock in the 
change decided in the intracrisis phase. 
To anticipate an argument that will be made in the following chapter, reneging 
on the no bail out was in a way an unavoidable, though for many unpalatable, 
treatment employed to save the Euro. Yet such treatment was a short, not long 
term, cure. In order to make it permanent, EMU had to be changed accordingly 
and this is exactly what happened in the period of 2010-2013. The treatment 
was made permanent within a setting of intercrisis management that allowed for 
more canonical learning processes to emerge. This account might look abstract, 
but it actually corresponds to claims that austerity and expansionary 
consolidation (the long term treatments established after the bail outs) were 
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both the bargaining chips required (and then established) by those who were 
seen as the losers of the 2010 crisis management and a fruit of an epistemic 
process of policy change.  
 
7.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has introduced the sovereign debt crisis by looking at the short 
measures adopted by key EMU actors to cushion its immediate effects. Given 
the incapability of standard modes of policy learning to fully grasp the nature of 
intracrisis management, I have explored the cause-and-effect relationship 
between crisis, learning and change in novel ways. Essentially, I have drawn 
lessons from psychology and strands of behavioural and evolutionary 
economics to formulate new arguments about how cognitive and situational 
variables normally observed under long shadow crises characterised by a fast 
speed of development affect change. This has led to the construction of an 
original, case-specific casual mechanism (contingent learning) characterised by 
a set of observable implications. My novel mechanism explains short-term, fast-
brushed decision making involving and leading to abrupt change. Empirically, a 
plausibility probe has been employed to provide a preliminary test of such 
implications. We found that the effect of surprise, feedback, and uncertainty 
mattered in short term responses to the crisis. Interestingly, the analysis 
allowed for the relaxation of some assumptions – for example, epistemic 
communities are not a necessary condition in the short run for learning the path 
to a more integrated and legitimate Europe when decisions take place in 
intracrisis settings and the convergence of beliefs among decision makers is not 
indispensable for paradigmatic change to happen.  
Overall, the findings suggest that contingent learning passes the plausibility 
test. Moreover, to further strengthen the empirical proof, the contingent learning 
mechanism will be plotted against the accounts of the crisis provided by 
standard theories of European integration in the conclusive chapter. This 
comparison will arguably demonstrate that an explanation based on contingent 
learning is able to ease several of the shortcomings of neo-functional and liberal 
intergovernmental accounts. However, the aim is not to challenge integration 
230 
 
theories, but rather to use new insight about contingent learning to complement 
and enrich those causal accounts.  
To sum up, this chapter has theorised and put to a preliminary test a novel and 
original learning mechanism that has shown a good deal of internal validity with 
regard to the specific case study. Nonetheless, by characterising the crisis 
according to established literature, the case-specific mode of learning treated in 
this chapter has the potential to be generalized to the class of phenomena 
whereby a long shadow crisis pushes actors to engage in intracrisis decision 
making.  
Finally, one of the implications of the contingent learning mechanism is that 
while in intracrisis management change is driven by associative, low-cognition 
forms of learning, conventional mechanisms of learning do not disappear, but 
they anchor and lock change in ex post. In other words, they intervene once 
fast-brushed change has been enacted and crisis management can rely on a 
more relaxed timeframe for sense-making, knowledge accumulation and 
inferential learning. By dealing with the long term measures adopted to 
guarantee the long term sustainability of EMU after the acute crisis of May 
2010, the following chapter will seek to test this implication. 
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Chapter 8. The Influence of Internal Epistemic Actors on the Expansionary 
Consolidation Paradigm 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This final empirical chapter concludes the diachronic learning-informed analysis 
of fiscal policy coordination under EMU. It roughly picks up from the tumultuous 
events of Spring 2010 when market pressure led Greece to the brink of default 
and EMU decision makers decided to scrap one the key architraves of its 
governance architecture by de facto reneging on the no bail out clause for euro 
area Member States and therefore agreeing on a (strictly conditional) package 
of financial assistance for the Hellenic country. Since then, building upon that 
sudden shift and with the aim of cushioning further immediate risks and 
guaranteeing a long term response to the crisis, the EU got engaged in an 
outstanding number of additional reforms that “spanned virtually all realms of 
economic and financial policy in the euro area” (Commission 2011, p. 7). In this 
chapter I will analyse in detail four of these systemic, forward-looking (i.e. 
beyond intracrisis management) reforms, covering the period of 2010-2013. 
These reforms were chosen because they targeted and revolutionized the fiscal 
policy coordination regime, our key object of inquiry. They are, in chronological 
order of approval/ratification: the European Semester, the Six-Pack Rules, the 
Two-Pack Rules and the Treaty on Stability Coordination and Governance 
(TSCG, also known as “Fiscal Compact”).  
Although in this chapter I will continue to focus on the fiscal dimension of policy 
coordination and surveillance under EMU, being limited to such a domain will 
become increasingly harder. In fact, one of the key effects of the crisis has been 
to unveil a number of interdependencies and nexuses across economic policy 
areas that were substantially unknown or underplayed, and hence neglected, in 
the existing EMU framework (Copelovitch et al. 2015; Jones et al. 2016).  
As we shall see in greater detail in Section 4, these interdependencies, and the 
resulting loopholes and asymmetries, are important factors to understand how 
the regime for fiscal policy coordination changed, i.e. by expanding to other 
policy areas (e.g. macroeconomic imbalances and structural reforms) besides 
becoming more coercive. For now, it is enough to note that the overhaul of the 
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regime for fiscal and economic policy coordination did not take place in a 
vacuum but was part and parcel of a comprehensive policy response to the 
crisis and that the direction of that comprehensive response influenced (and 
was in turn influenced) by the reforms analysed in this chapter. In fact, “the 
intention to reform [economic policy coordination] is closely related to the crisis 
management of the past two years [i.e. 2008 and 2009]” (Kiss 2010, p. 40; see 
also Schwarzer 2012) and this interconnectedness also held for the various 
subsequent reforms, both intra and intercrisis. 
That being pointed out, a comprehensive account of all the reforms occurring 
within EMU as a result of and during the crisis clearly goes beyond the 
analytical purposes of an investigation focused on fiscal policy coordination. For 
the sake of the latter, it will be enough to show how the interdependencies 
between different reforms have impacted on the fiscal policy coordination 
regime, most of all in connection and with regard to the new overall paradigm 
that has emerged out of these comprehensive efforts.87  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 connects the previous case study 
(focused on short-term, intracrisis policy change) to the current one (focused on 
long term oriented and systemic institutional reforms). Given the different (and 
more canonical) decision making setting that characterised the latter, Section 3 
returns to employ the “policy learning measuring instrument” as a lens to 
categorize the prevalent mode of learning underlying the four reforms. The 
indication we draw through this typological characterisation points toward 
epistemic learning. In Section 4 I discuss one major contribution (Blyth 2013) 
that characterised the process of policy change undergone by EMU as (also) 
driven by epistemic forces, but I qualify its key argument by looking at a 
different set of epistemic actors, i.e. those that work inside the EU. By focusing 
on the latter and on their scientific production during the crisis (2009-2012), the 
section empirically corroborates the claim of an epistemic mechanism being at 
work in the process of regime change and influencing its outcomes. Section 5 
concludes by summarizing the key findings.  
 
                                                          
87 For comprehensive overviews of EMU reforms after 2010 see: Buti and Carnot 2012; Kamkhaji and 
Radaelli 2013; De Haan et al. 2014; Commission 2014; European Parliament 2015. 
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8.2 Putting the four reforms in context 
 
Before analysing the four reforms in detail through the measuring instrument 
(Section 3) a few contextual caveats and qualifications arising out of the 
previous case’s causal mechanisms are in order. This section attends to these 
tasks. 
As for the caveats, there are mainly two. The first one was hinted at in the 
previous section and consists of the fact that the reforms analysed hereafter 
need to be seen in the context of a larger EMU-wide process of policy change. 
This is less important for this and the next section, but when we unpack the 
different aspects of the new regime for fiscal and economic policy coordination 
(Section 4) we will need to refer to the border process of EMU reform to better 
grasp its paradigmatic nature.  
The second contextual caveat revolves around the fact that, although the 
decision to bail out a euro area Member States arguably represented the single 
most important measure that signalled the steadfast will of EMU members and 
institutions to rescue the eurozone, it did not serve to calm the markets in the 
short-run (Jones 2014; Matthijs 2016). In other words, although the perspective 
through which decision makers initiated the processes of institutional reform 
was surely systemic and forward-looking, resulting in intercrisis policy change, 
in actuality the crisis was still ongoing. Indeed, it had to be cushioned through 
further emergency measures in other domains of EMU, in particular the 
protracted monetary easing by the ECB (Collignon 2012; Kamkhaji and Radaelli 
2013; Torres 2013; Krampf 2016), and the progressive expansion and 
institutionalization of the vehicles designed to provide financial assistance to 
distressed EMU members (Gocaj and Meunier 2013; Chang 2013; Schwarzer 
2015). 
Given the policy background and context sketched above, we can now connect 
the process of policy change analysed in this chapter to the mechanism of 
contingent learning conceptualised for the previous case study.  
A key argument developed in the previous case study is that the decision to bail 
out a Member State of the euro area implied an accidental (and reluctant for 
some Member State – see Newman 2015) overhaul of the paradigm underlying 
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fiscal and economic policy coordination under EMU. After that, a post factum 
process of sense making and systemic policy change would solidify the sudden 
shift into a coherent institutional framework. 
While observers disagree as to whether that (unequivocally sudden) shift was 
accidental or deliberate,88 the consensus regarding the two-staged nature and 
the magnitude of the process of policy change spawned by the Greek sovereign 
crisis is fairly unanimous (Schwarzer 2012; Jones et al. 2016). The Commission 
itself neatly stated it in December 2010:  
“By now, the need to rethink the EU's fiscal framework is commonly 
acknowledged. A number of important steps have already been taken. 
Some were forced by events, such as the adoption of the financial 
stability instruments on 9 May 2010, others are part of the official reform 
process, notably two Commission communications - 12 May and 30 June 
2010 - outlining options for strengthening EU economic governance, 
followed by a comprehensive package of draft EU legislation adopted by 
the Commission on 29 September 2010 [i.e. the Six-Pack Rules].” (Larch 
et al. 2010, p. 6). 
 
In other words, on the one hand, the Greek bail out can be conceptualised as a 
pure intracrisis management intervention, whereas the process that unfolded 
after that decision, geared toward “permanent systemic responses” 
(Commission 2011, p. 7), can be seen as intercrisis policy change. On the other 
hand, with regard to the magnitude of policy change, the degree of the latter 
has by all means been substantial, involving not only technical adjustments to 
the supranational arrangements on economic policy coordination (what Hall 
would term first or second-order change), but also a paradigmatic shift (i.e. 
third-order change impinging on the belief system of the actors) that “has led to 
one of the most rapid periods of deepening of integration in EU history” (Jones 
et al. 2016, p. 1012).  
In light of these considerations, the explanatory aim of this chapter is twofold. 
First, to test the post factum implication arising from the contingent learning 
mechanism according to which actors locked in and anchored the sudden shift 
                                                          
88 That is, whether it was the fruit of change-or-die decision making without a shift in the belief system 
of the involved actors, or it was the outcome of cynical political calculations/brinkmanship about the 
burden sharing of the upcoming adjustment, or again the inevitable result of functional asymmetries 
and weaknesses enshrined in EMU (for more details on this debate see previous chapter, Chapter 9 and 
the 2015 Journal of European Public Policy Special Issue “European integration in times of crisis: 
theoretical perspectives”). 
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decided under the pressure of a long-shadow crisis through a more classical 
mechanism of learning and policy change;89 hence the return to the “policy 
learning measuring instrument” as an analytical device.90 Second, to precisely 
pin down and characterise the policy change that occurred. This is done by 
distinguishing between paradigmatic and technical aspects of change and by 
testing whether and to what extent these changes are consistent with the 
expectations of the case-specific mode of learning.  
Although, as mentioned above, the crisis was still ongoing while the reforms 
were designed, negotiated and enacted (often determining their acceleration), 
we can consider them as intercrisis management measures for at least two 
reasons. First, although the crisis was still biting, the decisions in the domain of 
the arrangements for future fiscal and economic policy coordination, as already 
argued, represented only a limited portion of the interventions taken to calm the 
markets and counteract the effects of the crisis, with the major intracrisis 
decisions instead taken at the level of country adjustment programmes, the 
establishment of the ESM, and ECB’s liquidity provision to financial institutions 
and monetary easing.  
In other words, the decisions taken in the domain of fiscal policy coordination 
and surveillance did not serve the direct purpose of cushioning the crisis in the 
heated years of 2011 and 2012, but admittedly they were always oriented to 
guarantee the long term, future sustainability of EMU public finances and to 
provide a disciplinarian framework for budgetary consolidation. 
Second, the measures analysed in this chapter are intercrisis because they 
inevitably rely on the paradigmatic trigger activated in the context of the 2010 
intracrisis decision making. In other words, these reforms were called to detail 
and solidify a paradigmatic shift that preceded them through a detailed policy 
instrumentation and hence clarification and operationalization of the new policy 
paradigm (Kamkhaji and Radaelli 2013).  
                                                          
89 Or, reversing the rationale of the argument, to test whether the decisions of May 2010 created path 
dependence (Schwarzer 2012). 
90 The contingent learning mechanism in fact predicts that after the crisis was cushioned through a 
shock therapy, more canonical processes of reform and change (and learning thereof) would have 
ensued. The four reforms analysed below indeed represent these more canonical processes. 
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The functional (but contingency-driven) evolution from a paradigm whereby 
external market discipline and the no bail out clause were the key complements 
of the fiscal policy surveillance regime to one where previously voluntarily 
neglected91 crisis resolution mechanisms became necessary, fundamentally 
altering the architecture of EMU, is vividly and clearly depicted in vivo (i.e. while 
that evolution was occurring) by a paper of the DG Ecfin (Larch et al. 2010, pp. 
5-6):  
“A scenario had opened that had not been considered by the architects 
of the Treaty and the SGP, namely that of a member of the euro area 
becoming insolvent and/or defaulting on its debt. To avert the worst, ad 
hoc measures were put in place in far from ideal conditions […] when the 
crisis hit, policy makers were confronted with a challenge that simply 
could not be met within the remit of the existing rules: actively leaning 
against the wind while respecting the fiscal rules, helping illiquid or 
insolvent countries while respecting the no-bail-out clause […] The major 
policy challenge going forward will thus be to rebalance the trade-off 
between commitment - a rule based system - and flexibility - escape 
clauses, in other words, to strengthen the bite of the rules under normal 
circumstances and increase its flexibility when it is most needed, notably 
in truly exceptional circumstances.” 
 
It is exactly this process of overhaul (EU Commission 2011) of the underlying 
paradigm of EMU and of the technical instrumentation of the coordination 
regime that we analyse in this chapter, through the “policy learning measuring 
instrument”. 
 
8.3 The “policy learning measuring instrument” in action on the four 
reforms 
 
In this section we will characterise, by looking at the analytical dimensions of 
modes of learning featured in the “policy learning measuring instrument”, the 
scope conditions of four distinct but largely overlapping and complementary 
processes of reform to the regime for fiscal policy coordination (see Table 1), 
namely the European Semester (embedded in the SGP in September 2010 and 
operational since November 2010), the Six-Pack Rules (initiated in March 2010 
and in force since December 2011), the Treaty on Stability Coordination and 
                                                          
91 In fact, “the threat of a no bail out was assumed to prevent extreme fiscal follies.” (Larch et al. 2010, 
p. 5). 
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Governance (signed in March 2012 and in force since January 2013), and the 
Two-pack Rules (initiated in November 2011 and in force since May 2013).  
The following table provides a snapshot of the key features of the reforms we 
scrutinise hereafter. 
Table 8.1 The four reforms of the regime of economic policy coordination 
Reform Launch and 
entrance into 
force 
Actor/institution 
that initiated the 
process 
Mode of 
approval/legal 
instrument 
Synthetic content92 
European 
Semester 
March 2010 / 
September 2010 
Commission / EFC Amendment to the 
SGP’s Code of Conduct 
 It “ensures that Member 
States discuss their economic 
and budgetary plans with 
their EU partners at specific 
times in the first part of the  
year, so that national action 
could be accordingly taken in 
the second part of the year, 
notably with the adoption of 
the budgets for the 
subsequent year” (European 
Commission 2016) 
 
Six-Pack Rules March 2010 / 
December 2011 
European Council / 
Commission 
Community method, 
five regulations and one 
directive 
 Reg. 1173/2011: Expands, 
strengthens and makes 
budgetary surveillance more 
coercive 
 Reg. 1174/2011: Establishes 
a sanctionative procedure for 
excessive macroeconomic 
imbalances (EIP - only for 
euro ins) 
 Reg. 1175/2011: Strengthens 
the preventive arm of the 
SGP 
 1176/2011: Enshrines 
macroeconomic surveillance 
in the preventive arm of the 
SGP (for all EU Members) 
 1177/2011: Strengthens and 
makes more biting and 
automatic sanctions under 
the EDP 
 Dir. 2011/85/EU: Establishes 
national fiscal frameworks 
 
Two-Pack Rules November 2011 
/ May 2013 
Commission / 
(Germany) 
Community method, 
two regulations valid 
only for euro area 
Member States93 
 Reg. 472/2013: Establishes 
“enhanced surveillance “ for 
those euro ins that are under 
financial assistance, EDPs or 
EIPs 
 Reg. 473/2013: Strengthens 
preventive discipline for euro 
ins 
 
                                                          
92 See Section 4 for a more detailed account of the content of the reforms. 
93 “The new procedures are based on Article 136 of the EU Treaty. This Article enables euro area 
Member States to strengthen the coordination and surveillance of budgetary policies in order to ensure 
the necessary budgetary discipline in the Economic and Monetary Union. The new legislation therefore 
only applies to the euro area.” (Commission 2013). 
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TSCG/Fiscal 
Compact 
January 2012 
(negotiations) / 
March 2012 
(signing) / 
January 2013 
(ratification) 
 
European Council / 
(Germany and 
France) 
Intergovernmental 
treaty entered into legal 
force after 16 MSs had 
ratified it 
 Enshrines balanced budget 
rules in the national systems 
at the level of constitutional 
laws 
 
 
From the outset, it is important to note that the legal instruments that conveyed 
these reforms were very different, also impinging on their agency, venue and 
timeframe.  
In more detail, the Semester was a procedural change passed by the 
Commission alone as a modification to the Code of Conduct of the SGP. The 
Six-Pack followed the Community method and consisted of five regulations and 
one directive passed through the co-decision procedure. The TSCG is an 
intergovernmental treaty involving the possibility to opt out and a particular form 
of ratification.94 Finally, the Two-Pack, passed through the Community method, 
entails two regulations only valid for euro ins. 
An in depth analysis of the design, negotiation and approval processes of the 
reforms would require writing a new dissertation. Moreover, notwithstanding the 
fact that the four reform processes were designed, negotiated and passed by 
different actors and fed into different legal vehicles, they arguably belonged to a 
single effort aimed at reforming macroeconomic and fiscal surveillance, leading 
to a quite coherent (though not fully effective) set of interlocking elements and 
arrangements. For these reasons, in the remainder of this section I will focus on 
the four dimensions of policy learning and try to qualify their scope conditions by 
looking at the four reforms jointly.  
Although this choice might attract criticism as it will inevitably blur some fine-
grained process-based detail, this analytical strategy has the advantage of 
looking at the reform process to the regime of fiscal policy coordination in a 
holistic fashion, highlighting for instance that, within their decision making 
prerogatives and through the legal means to which they are entitled, almost all 
                                                          
94 “According to article 14(2) and (3), the TSCG needs to be ratified by at least twelve euro area Member 
States to enter into force among them. When the treaty was signed the envisaged date for its entry into 
force was 1st January 2013. This objective was attained for twelve euro area Member states: Austria, 
Cyprus, Germany, Estonia, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Finland, and Slovenia.” 
(European Parliament 2013, p. 7). 
239 
 
the actors of EMU have taken part, by adding a coherent element, in the new 
governance architecture of policy coordination and surveillance.  
As is customary, we start our typological analysis by looking at the actors 
involved in the process of reform. 
8.3a. Who learns? What are actors’ certification and role in the policy and 
learning processes? How is the actor constellation shaped? 
 
Regarding the Semester, there is not much to say in terms of agency. In fact, 
the introduction of the European Semester, which envisages and configures an 
anticipated and pro-active cycle of monitoring of Member States’ 
macroeconomic and budgetary figures by the Commission, was due only to the 
Commission. Indeed, the Semester, from the legal point of view, is simply a 
procedural change to the timing and sequence of annual surveillance and, as 
such, it was prepared by the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) and 
passed by the Commission alone.95 
Although the Commission legally entrenched this new instrument on its own, i.e. 
according to its legal prerogatives in the procedural realm of SGP 
implementation, the initial push to reform the surveillance procedures had 
originated from the political impulse of the European Council. In fact, in early 
2010, while the Greek financing crisis was quickly progressing and EMU 
decision makers were puzzling over how to cushion it (see Chapter 7), the 
European Council of March 24/25 already invited the Commission to launch a 
comprehensive reform initiative of the regime of macroeconomic coordination 
and surveillance and, crucially, appointed a high-level intergovernmental task 
force to support the Commission in designing “the measures needed to reach 
the objective of […] better budgetary discipline, exploring all options to reinforce 
the legal framework.” (European Council 2010a, p. 6).  
This ad-hoc intergovernmental task force, formed by “representatives of the 
Member States [and] the rotating presidency and the ECB.” (ibid.) and named 
“Van Rompuy Task Force” (VRTF) after its Chairman (the then President of the 
                                                          
95 In more detail, the changes to the letter of the SGP’s “Code of Conduct” introducing the Semester 
were prepared by the EFC drawing on the 12th of May Commissions proposal for a comprehensive 
reform package (Commission 2010d) and officially enshrined in the coordination regime on the 7th of 
September 2010 after the Council endorsed the amendment. 
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European Council Herman Van Rompuy), started its activities in April 2010 and 
by October 2010, after four meetings, came up with a comprehensive and far-
reaching proposal for the reform of the coordination regime (European Council 
2010b). Its work took place in parallel with that of the Commission, which in the 
same period presented two different communications (Commission 2010d and 
2010e) detailing the various aspects of the reform proposals it was preparing. 
Although at times overlapping and/or ignoring each other and being slightly in 
conflict (Kiss 2010), the VRTF substantially co-participated with the Commission 
in designing the upcoming reform (the Six-Pack Rules), providing full political 
backing to the initiative of the Commission and signalling the clear will of the 
political echelon (the European Council) to bring about fast, substantial and 
broadly consensual change. Along with the European Council, the VRTF and 
the Commission, the ECB (in June 2010 – ECB 2010a), and France and 
Germany (the so-called” Deauville deal” – see European Parliament 2010) also 
presented their own proposals of reform, in both cases calling for a more 
coercive, biting and automatic surveillance framework with respect to the one 
envisaged by the Commission and the VRTF (Kiss 2010; O’Keeffe et al. 2016).  
The Commission finalized its proposals in September 2010 (Commission 2010f 
and 2010g) and, after the endorsement of the European Council (European 
Council 2010c), officially initiated the legislative process by submitting its 
legislative draft to the Council of the EU.96 Once the law-making process was 
launched, it took more than one year (to the dismay of the European Council) to 
pass the five regulations and one directive that would form the Six-Pack. This 
delay was mainly due to the EU Parliament that, in the context of the co-
decision and consultation procedures, managed to carve out for itself a little but 
significant role in the coordination framework and to preserve the new 
strengthened prerogatives of the Commission by defending the Reverse 
Qualified Majority Voting (RQMV)97 system from attacks by the Council (see 
O’Keeffe et al. 2016).  
                                                          
96 The unfolding of the Greek crisis and the decision to guarantee financial assistance to the Hellenic 
country in order to prevent its default put additional pressure on the Commission and the VRTF, greatly 
accelerating the process of reform – at least for what concerned the Commission and the Council.  
97 RQMV puts the onus of halting sanctions issued under the EDP on the Council. In fact, sanctions are 
automatically levied by the Commission unless the Council asks for an explicit vote (by qualified 
majority) to overturn the decision of the Commission.  
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The official approval of the Six-Pack Rules took place in October 2011 and 
entered into force in December 2011. The final version of the Six-Pack does not 
depart much from the September 2010 Commission’s and October’s 2010 
VRTF’s proposals, which represented a middle ground between the hawkish 
stance of the ECB, Germany and France and the more moderate position of the 
Commission and other peripheral Member States (European Parliament 2010). 
Although it represented a noticeable leap toward enhanced enforcement of 
fiscal discipline, the (delayed) entering into force of the Six-Pack at the end of 
2011 proved unable to shield EMU from further financial tensions and to restore 
markets’ perception of the sustainability of the public finances of distressed 
Member States. Indeed, the approval of the Six-Pack immediately sparked two 
new reforms, both of them initially discussed in late 2011, the Two-Pack Rules 
and the TSCG. The former, again undertaken through the Community method, 
foresaw additional commitments to macroeconomic discipline for those Member 
States adopting the common currency, while the latter, a full-fledged 
intergovernmental treaty initially negotiated and passed outside the scope of the 
aquis communitaire, engrained balanced budget rules into national legislations, 
strongly complementing the Six-Pack Directive aimed at fostering national fiscal 
frameworks. In terms of actors, the Two-Pack involved the institutions tasked 
with passing new regulations under the community method, hence again the 
Commission, the Council and the EP. On the other hand, the TSCG, an 
intergovernmental agreement, involved EU Member States under the informal 
lead of Germany and France (Craig 2012).     
The various actors involved in these reforms (basically, all the principal 
institutions of the EU and all the Member States) were all highly certified, 
interacted in highly formalised ways and were organized hierarchically into 
constellations where respective roles and functions were regulated by different 
legislative/treaty procedures. Moreover, the participation in the process of two 
additional and ad-hoc actors tell us something about the potential epistemic 
nature of the process. In fact, the appointment of an ad-hoc task force and the 
inclusion of the ECB, in its expert advisory capacity, are booth prima facie 
indicators of the fact that the decision makers needed policy-specific expertise 
to drive the reform process. Why did they need these further actors to support 
the process of policy change? The answer lies in the level of tractability of the 
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policy problem that was meant to be solved by the reforms, which leads us to 
elaborate on the following dimension of the policy learning measuring 
instrument. 
 
8.3b. What is the tractability of the problems tackled in the policy process? What 
is the content of the learning process? 
 
The level of tractability of the problem (and of the content of the policy and 
learning processes thereof) faced by the actors in the context of the four 
reforms remained low, similar to what we saw in the case of the contingent 
learning mechanism of the previous case study. This is due to two reasons.  
The first one relates to the policy interdependencies that we hinted at before. In 
fact, as the crisis continued to bite all along the four reform processes, the 
attention of market participants was increasingly focused on long-term debt 
sustainability and domestic imbalances.98 In other words, it proved hard for 
markets to be reassured by calls to future strengthened fiscal discipline. 
Instead, to price country risk, they started looking more closely at parameters 
and factors that were left outside the original monitoring scope of the SGP (not 
only debt stocks, but also trade imbalances, differential labour productivity, 
private sector indebtedness, etc. – Amisano and Tristani 2011). 
This circumstance represented a mutually reinforcing/feedback mechanism 
(recall the feedback conditions of Chapter 7) that drove the content and nature 
of policy change and learning thereof. In practice, Member States and EU 
actors became aware during the crisis (and thanks to the markets) that the 
deficit-to-GDP ratio was an imperfect measure of fiscal discipline and health of 
public finance, and hence started looking as well at different parameters that 
would work as early signals that the public finances of a given country were on 
a deteriorating path. Ongoing research within the ECB and the Commission 
during the crisis clearly indicated that the determinants of bond spreads were 
many more than the sole deficit-to-GDP ratio covered by the EDP (Amisano and 
                                                          
98 “Swings in perceptions of sovereign risk propagate across euro area countries, despite possibly stark 
differences in their macroeconomic fundamentals.” (Amisano and Tristani 2011) 
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Tristani 2011) and as a consequence the reform process actively tackled these 
further dimensions of coordination. 
Second, and clearly connected the first point, the progression of the crisis, with 
its increased awareness and understanding of EMU asymmetries, activated 
functional spillovers that steered the direction of policy change towards the 
expansion of the areas covered by the coordination regime (Salines et al. 2012; 
see also Jones et al. 2015 for a similar argument applied to financial 
governance) and the strengthening of its surveillance and enforcement tools.99  
The reforms were indeed enacted to respond to these multiple and, to a great 
extent, novel challenges that had already led EMU in the uncharted territory of 
sovereign financial assistance. Further supporting the idea of low problem 
tractability, we should consider that one thing is to deal with a Member State’s 
non-compliance with the coordination regime (the policy problem actors were 
dealing with during the course of SGP implementation – see Chapter 5), while a 
totally different thing is to establish and design sovereign rescue packages in 
the context of a currency union with decentralised economic policies and an 
independent central bank (the problem spawned by the Greek crisis of May 
2010 – see Chapter 7), and yet another to update and rewrite the regime of 
economic policy coordination to include new policy areas through new 
institutional arrangements under its surveillance umbrella. 
In this respect, the very fact that four successive reforms, all with the same aim, 
were passed in less than two years is indicative of low problem tractability and 
learning-by-doing and by trial-and-error, i.e. learning while managing a still 
ambiguous policy coordination crisis. 
                                                          
99 The presence and influence of functional spillovers in the context of the reform of the regime for fiscal 
and economic policy coordination is not to be seen as alternative to the causal role played by 
intergovernmental bargaining. By expanding our focus to also cover reforms taking place in other 
economic domains of EMU, we do not in fact only find corroborating evidence of the low tractability of 
the problem of securing the long-term sustainability of EMU, but we can also appreciate how different 
causal drivers and mechanisms were at play at the same time. In fact, it is not incorrect to say that 
bargaining elements were kept at a low level in the context of the reforms analysed in this chapter 
because the big distributive game was taking place elsewhere, that is, in the context of the design of 
adjustment programmes for countries under financial assistance and, most of all, in the context of the 
negotiations for the creation and functioning of the ESM and of the banking union – i.e. in those areas 
where the burden-sharing of the EMU-wide adjustment was actually established. 
In a way, the reform of the surveillance regime, granted that all actors broadly approved it in principle, 
was not the locus of interstate bargaining, but rather that where technical expertise was deployed to fix 
a crisis of enforcement, credibility and limited scope of the surveillance framework. 
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Indeed, the appointment of an ad-hoc task force and the increasing policy 
involvement of the ECB are also indicative of both the contribution of always 
more certified and expert actors in the reform process and the need to deploy 
all the possible expertise in the re-design of a system that needed to cushion 
future risks of default and an unprecedented deterioration of public finances and 
market confidence in a systemic way. 
Granted that the detail of the reforms will be provided in the empirical section 
(where I will detail and categorize the content of the reforms according to their 
paradigmatic or technical nature), the key takeaway of this sub-section is that 
the policy problem tackled by the four reforms was characterised by low 
tractability. 
Finally, reasoning on the content, one has to ask whether it was mainly 
technical or also paradigmatic. The answer is mixed. Certainly, the technical 
part was important (if not predominant) but the paradigmatic aspects should not 
be underplayed. In particular, as we shall see more diffusely in the next section, 
the TSCG, the Two-Pack and the Directive on national fiscal frameworks of the 
Six-Pack (but also the Semester) substantiated a paradigmatic change 
according to which supranational policy coordination turned more intrusive and 
national by impinging more directly, actively and timely on domestic budgeting 
processes.  
Let us now briefly look at the (institutional) venues and timeframe of the four 
reforms. 
 
8.3c. What is the venue and mode of interaction among actors? Is it formal 
(hierarchically organized) or informal (horizontal and deliberative)? 
 
As easily inferable form the analysis of the agency and from the different legal 
means through which the reforms were passed, the venues where actors got 
together to tackle the complex policy problem detailed above were multiple, 
involving official ones (European Council meetings, Council’s EP’s sessions, 
etc.), but also less formal ones whereby decisions makers consulted task 
forces, experts (see the next session for a discussion of the much controversial 
participation of Professor Alberto Alesina in a Council session in April 2010) and 
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actors, like the ECB, that lacked decisional prerogatives but were endowed with 
highly relevant expertise. The discourse within these venues remained mainly at 
the technical level, ruling out social learning (although the public sphere 
became increasingly interested in economic policy coordination – Zeitlin and 
Vanhercke 2014) and also bargaining arenas, since the low tractability of the 
problem and the long-term orientation of the reform curtailed strategic behaviour 
(see also Footnote 99).  
 
8.3d. Are the policy interactions observed in the regime one-shot or iterated? 
How frequent and formalized are the iterations of the interactions? 
 
The time-frame of the reforms was yet again multiple. There were major 
pressures (quite unattended to) emerging from the European Council to swiftly 
pass the Six-Pack in order to signal to the markets the commitment of EMU to 
fiscal and budgetary discipline. When the Six-Pack was still pending 
parliamentary approval, EMU decision makers (pressured by negative risk 
premia developments) perceived that something more was needed for euro ins, 
leading to the comparatively faster approval of the Two-Pack. But this was not 
enough. With the intent of signalling country-specific and not multilateral (i.e. 
enshrined/entrusted in EU law) commitments to fiscal discipline, consolidation 
and austerity, a group of fiscally-conservative EMU members decided to 
negotiate and sign the TSCG in less than three months (from January 2012 until 
the signing in March 2012 – Craig 2012).100 In sum, the process of policy 
change took place over a limited horizon of time and under the shadow of 
adverse macroeconomic circumstances, yet it has been iterative and actors had 
enough time to puzzle over the content of the reforms – a condition that did not 
hold true for the approval of the Greek bail out in May 2010. 
In sum, after having swiftly (i.e. concisely but precisely) applied the “policy 
learning measuring instrument” to the four reforms that overhauled the regime 
for fiscal policy coordination, we can conclude that the prevalent mode of 
learning of this systemic reform process was epistemic. We say this because all 
the actors that took part, with different roles, the reform of the regime were 
                                                          
100 Arguably, this short time-frame indicated that the reform was dictated more by the progression of 
the crisis, rather than by deliberation on the one hand or bargaining dynamics on the other. 
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highly certified, whether de jure (i.e. owing to their legal policy making 
prerogatives) or de facto (i.e. owing to their technical expertise -see the ECB- or 
to their central political role -the European Council and Germany/France). 
Moreover, the problem they dealt with while reforming the coordination 
arrangements was a highly complex one, involving and requiring new expertise 
and novel technical and paradigmatic recipes. The venue of interactions were 
multiple, but always informed by the learning imperative of a crisis that was still 
ongoing and was increasingly showing its spillovers in terms of interdependency 
among policy areas. Bargaining arenas have been at work during the course of 
the policy responses to the crisis, but they were located mainly outside the 
scope of the reforms intended to reform the regime of economic policy 
coordination. I refer namely to: the negotiations over the ESM and the sharing 
of the burden of the adjustment thereof (Gocaj and Meunier 2013; Schwarzer 
2015); the design and management of country-specific adjustment programmes 
involving bailed Member States and the Troika; and the many (resisted) 
attempts to advance unified banking supervision (Jones 2015) and an 
embryonic fiscal union through highly controversial instruments like the so-
called Eurobonds (Matthijs and McNamara 2015).  
The low salience of bargaining and the technical/epistemic profile of the policy 
interactions analysed here vis-à-vis more controversial reforms is also 
corroborated by the limited time-frame for designing, discussing and approving 
the reforms. Let us recall that this is in line with the scope conditions indicative 
of epistemic learning: epistemic actors typically take part in the policy process in 
a temporary, ad-hoc fashion and the limited amount of time for policy making 
curtails the possibilities to engage in cumulative distributive bargaining. 
 
8.4 Empirical analysis 
 
8.4a. Implications of epistemic learning and a critique of Blyth 
 
The analysis of the scope conditions of the four reforms conducted in the 
previous section has led us to conclude that the prevalent mode of learning of 
this multipronged process of policy change was epistemic. 
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The key task of this empirical validation section is hence to test the observable 
implications of epistemic learning on policy outcomes. In more detail, what are 
the key observable manifestations that signal that a mechanism of epistemic 
learning was not only present in the process of reform but also informed its 
outcomes? First and foremost, we expect that epistemic actors actively took 
part in the process of policy making and change. Second, we expect that they, 
though their specialized and policy-specific expertise, filled a gap in the 
knowledge base of the decision makers, helping them to cope with a policy 
problem characterised by low tractability. Third, we expect that the additional 
knowledge brought by epistemic actors into the process of reform informed its 
outcomes, i.e. the nature and content of policy change. In other words, we 
expect that the new coordination and surveillance regime for fiscal and 
economic policy conforms, to a larger or smaller extent, to the lessons that 
epistemic actors have inferred from their research and then recommended to 
decision makers. 
In sum, the key implication of epistemic learning that we want to test in this 
empirical section revolves around the substantive influence of epistemic actors 
and lessons on the process and content of policy change, i.e. on the features of 
the new coordination regime arising out of the combined effect of the four 
reforms analysed in the previous section. 
To test this expected implication I have to elaborate in greater detail on the 
innovations (paradigmatic and technical) to the regime for fiscal and economic 
policy coordination and surveillance and match them with the research, policy 
advice and guidance emerging from the scientific production of the ECB and 
DG Ecfin - the epistemic actors surveyed in this chapter.  
The obvious question that arises out of the latter choice is why to focus on the 
ECB and DG Ecfin as epistemic actors. The first answer to this question is 
straightforward: because, as is shown in the previous section, they indeed took 
active part in the process of policy change (the first necessary empirical 
manifestation of epistemic learning). Yet, this does not exclude that other 
external epistemic actors also weighed in. Therefore, in order to motivate the 
focus on internal epistemic actors, I will have to (critically) review one of the 
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most popular101 accounts of EMU’s crisis-induced change that also resorts to 
epistemic explanatory drivers: Mark Blyth’s “Austerity” and related literature.   
In fact, the claim that the process of policy change undergone as a result of the 
crisis by EMU in general, and by the institutional arrangements for economic 
policy making and coordination in particular, also has a learning and/or 
epistemic nature is not new (besides Blyth 2013 see also Dellepiane-
Avellaneda 2015 and Helgadóttir 2016) and is also acknowledged by the actor 
that drove a large part of this process - i.e. the Commission.102 
On the academic side, Blyth (2013) has conducted a thorough investigation of 
the intellectual history and background of the so-called austerity paradigm that 
arguably informed the process of policy change leading to the new economic 
policy framework of EMU and the euro area. He defines austerity as “a form of 
voluntary deflation in which the economy adjusts through the reduction of 
wages, prices, and public spending to restore competitiveness, which is 
(supposedly) best achieved by cutting the state’s budget, debts, and deficits” 
(ibib., p. 2). As for the emergence of such an economic policy making paradigm 
in EMU, Blyth’s conclusion is that influential actors (most of all Germany and the 
ECB – see also Krampf 2014, Newman 2015 and Matthijs 2016) have cynically 
exploited the crisis and sold it as a sovereign debt crisis (whereas it was and 
has always been a financial one) to impose the austerity iron curtain over the 
euro area. Key to this outcome is a multilevel bargaining perspective and the 
availability of a suitable alternative template of economic policy making and 
coordination.  
As for the former driver, the argument works as follows. Germany and other 
fiscally-conservative EMU actors substantially conceded on sovereign bail outs 
due to a contingency and emergency-driven process of policy change whereby 
                                                          
101 According to Google Scholar, Blyth’s book has been cited more than 1100 times since its publication 
in 2013. 
102 “Crises are catalysts of reform and change – they initiate a process of policy learning. This is also true 
for the Great Recession. In its wake an intensive debate started in both the political and the academic 
arena on how to redress the shortcomings found in the economic and financial system that may have 
caused the crisis and contributed to its fast and extensive propagation. This debate also encompasses 
the role of fiscal policy and, in the European context, the role of EU fiscal surveillance in a monetary 
union.” 
“…history tells us that deep economic crises initiate a learning process – a search for new policies to 
avoid future economic calamity. EU is now in the middle of such a learning process.” (Larch et al. 2010, 
pp. 26 and 45). 
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neat preferences and distributional impacts were somehow obfuscated by the 
novelty and acuteness of the policy problem and by the need to take action, as 
portrayed in the previous chapter. Yet, once that fast-brushed, reluctantly 
approved and oscillating (Gocaj and Meunier 2013; Newman 2015) quantum 
leap had settled in, still under the pressure of the crisis but with a much clearer 
picture of winners and losers, Germany and its allies pretended in exchange to 
strengthen the budgetary and macroeconomic surveillance framework so to 
make fiscal indiscipline and the possibility of resorting to debt relief plans highly 
unpalatable for Member States. Besides imposing strict 
conditionality/sovereignty suspension for those countries in need of financial 
assistance (Schwarzer 2015), in terms of institutional change this translated into 
a stricter, more automatic and austere coordination regime whereby the hands 
of governments in the fiscal domain would be seriously tied, inevitably leading 
them to protracted budgetary consolidation. This was achieved, as we saw in 
the previous section, by imposing debt brake/balanced budget rules and 
independent fiscal supervision of national legislations (TSCG and Six-Pack 
Directive on National Fiscal Institutions), by tightening and making more 
synchronized and automatic (and expanding the scope of) the surveillance and 
sanctioning frameworks (Semester and Six-Pack), and by requiring additional 
commitments to disciplined macroeconomic policies to euro ins (Two-Pack). 
Nonetheless, this is only a part of Blyth’s explanatory account of why austerity 
happened. In fact, pure power politics and bargaining would not have been 
enough to inflict a continent-wide internal deflation. Germany and other pro-
austerity EMU actors had to find a suitable alternative paradigm and epistemic 
allies for their endeavour to succeed (Jabko 2013), and they found them in plain 
sight within an influential portion of the economic profession. Indeed, according 
to Blyth, the set of ideas and conceptual models that substantiate the austerity 
paradigm has had its modern intellectual centre of gravity in the work of the so-
called Bocconi economic school, whose most prominent mouthpiece is 
Professor Alberto Alesina from Harvard University, an habitué in EU policy 
circles (Helgadóttir 2016).  
Together with a group of fellow scholars, all formed in Milan and currently active 
in US academia, Professor Alesina is considered to be the modern father of a 
paradigm of macroeconomic policy making according to which democracies 
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have a built-in political bias toward inflation and fiscal profligacy that needs to 
be curtailed (Alesina and Tabellini 1990; Giavazzi and Pagano 1992a). In 
parallel with the praising of the benefits of constraining politicians’ discretion in 
economic policy making, the same model consequently heralds the virtues of 
fiscal conservatism. In fact, budgetary consolidation and permanent expenditure 
retrenchment, under specific assumptions (see Alesina and Perotti 1995; 
Alesina and Ardagna 1998; Von Hagen and Strauch 2001), have “undisputed 
benefits” (ECB 2010a, p. 84) in terms of expansionary effects on GDP growth 
during the medium/long-run.  
Put differently, this tenet of economic policy making, that beyond Alesina and 
his network has found in the prominent book of Reinhart and Roggoff (2009) 
“This time is different” a crucial epistemic associate, maintains that fiscal 
activism (most of all if expenditure-based) is ineffective and distortionary and 
that budgetary consolidation is a more suitable way to stimulate the economy, 
most of all in the aftermath of financial crises and when a country is already 
highly indebted. Therefore, for sustainable public finances’ outcomes to occur in 
the long-run, on the one hand fiscal activism needs to be effectively constrained 
both at the national level (through independent fiscal institutions and rules – 
Hallerberg et al. 2007) and, when a country is engaged in a monetary union, at 
the supranational level (through coercive surveillance regimes that “tie 
governments’ hands” – Giavazzi and Pagano 1992a – by imposing a vincolo 
esterno – Dyson and Featherstone 1996). On the other hand, budgetary 
consolidation and austere expenditure polices have to be promoted. 
To sum up, put together: the wish of Germany and other EU Member States 
and institutions to conceal and underplay the true financial nature of the crisis 
(for which they have major responsibilities – Blyth 2013, Jones 2014 and 2015, 
Matthijs 2016) and their reluctant acceptance of sovereign bail outs (Newman 
2015); the soaring risk premia required by the market participants for the bonds 
of a number of peripheral and highly indebted EMU countries; the fast and 
massive deterioration of public finances caused by banks’ bail outs and 
shrinking GDPs; and, crucially, the availability of an economic policy making 
paradigm supposedly able to ensure a relatively fast recovery through balanced 
budgets, expenditure cuts and ambitious consolidations (Dellepiane-Avellaneda 
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2015); and this is how EMU ended up with a new paradigm of macroeconomic 
policy making, coordination and surveillance: austerity.103 
The scope of Blyth’s study is definitely broader than ours. Indeed, his work is in 
the Peter Hall tradition in that it takes stock of the historical shift occurring in the 
overarching paradigm of macroeconomic policy making due to the crisis – also 
going beyond the EU and EMU. Moreover, one of his key arguments is that the 
true nature of the crisis was financial and that its spillovers on public finance 
were an effect rather than a cause (pp. 71-74).104 Such an interpretation of the 
crisis that puts its financial dimension at centre stage is also in line with recent 
political economy scholarship (Jones 2015). 
This study looks at the fiscal side of EMU policy making and coordination. In 
other words, the ambition and scope of this investigation is much narrower, that 
is, looking at the way EMU Member States and institutions have created, 
implemented and changed regimes for coordinating their economic policy 
making in the context of a monetary union and without full delegation. That 
being clarified, the epistemic part of Blyth’s comprehensive reading of the crisis 
is of great interest for us. In fact, prima facie, it argues that the austerity 
paradigm has been engrained into EMU through an opportunistic political 
process driven by the long term preferences of Germany, the ECB and other 
fiscally-conservative actors (Jabko 2013; Matthijs 2016), authoritatively 
mediated by the technical advocacy of external epistemic actors, especially 
those of the Bocconi school. 
The influence exerted by external epistemic actors for the emergence of 
austerity has also been explored by Helgadóttir (2016, p. 392, emphasis 
added), who argues that “a network of economists from Bocconi University, 
Milan, came to play an important role in shaping European policy responses to 
the Great Recession and establishing the doctrine of ‘expansionary austerity’.” 
                                                          
103 “The notion of expansionary contractions has helped policymakers frame and respond to the 
economic problems of the time”, or, more bluntly, “politicians, from both left and right of the political 
spectrum, are always eager to buy ‘magical’ solutions to economic problems.” (Dellepiane-Avellaneda 
2015, p. 399). 
104 Although, in fairness, pro-cyclical policies run vis-à-vis revenue windfalls are an aspect that cannot be 
ignored when looking at the unpreparedness of EMU public finances when the financial crisis started to 
hit, hence somehow downplaying the pure financial genesis of the crisis.  
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These accounts are highly compelling but empirically they draw on a rather thin 
evidence base, like the highly publicized (but anecdotal and hardy all-
explanatory) participation of Alesina at an Econfin Council meeting in April 
2010, where he presented the key principles of expansionary consolidation to 
EU ministers of finance and economy (Alesina 2010; Blyth 2013, pp. 175-176; 
Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2015, p. 400-401). The same can be said of 
Helgadóttir’s analysis of Alesina’s network of co-authors and its “prominence” 
within EU institutions due to their “revolving doors” (2015, pp.402-404). The 
tentative wording of her conclusion is telling of a yet seductive but not fully 
empirically backed argument: “It seems reasonable to assume that tightly knit 
network served as a ‘transmission mechanism’ to further the vision of 
expansionary austerity” (ibid., p. 404, emphasis added). 
When we instead depart from a fully ideational and macro perspective, narrow 
our focus to the empirical domain of this dissertation and, looking at the policy 
process, slightly broaden the perimeter of the epistemic community supporting 
austerity beyond the Bocconi School, we find that agency (and causality 
thereof) worked in a different way. In fact, a key aspect disregarded by the 
above cited contributions is that EU institutions and actors did not play the role 
of lesson drawers of external epistemic recipes but were rather full-blown 
crafters of the latter (as implicitly argued by Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2015).  
In other words, the influence of the Bocconi thinking has been relevant at the 
ideational, discipline-wise and macro level but empirically the most important 
“teaching” role of the austerity paradigm has been played by the internal 
epistemic actors of the EU that, besides having reached a broad consensus on 
expansionary consolidation on their own, i.e. beyond the advocacy of the 
Bocconi boys, carried out crisis-related research during the crisis, providing 
additional (and crucial) evidentiary foundations to the novel paradigm.  
This reading qualifies the theory of transmission belts of economic ideas 
(Helgadóttir 2016) by showing how these mechanisms of ideational diffusion 
were endogenous to the EU. In particular, tracing the scientific production of two 
key EU actors (the ECB and the DG Ecfin of the EU Commission) unequivocally 
reveals that they were givers rather than takers of the consensus for austere 
ordo-liberal policies. In more detail, by looking in vivo at their scientific 
production during the crisis we will find that: 
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 The consensus for prudent/non-discretionary fiscal policy, expenditure 
restraint, structural reforms and national/supranational budget constraints 
(the bulk of austerity, see also Box 1) pre-dated the crisis and was a crucial 
element of the ideational repertoire of internal EU epistemic actors and of 
EMU itself.  
 These actors informed their research agenda to the policy necessities of 
their principals.105 
 The evidence, findings and policy advice arising from their research has 
been nothing less than essential in shaping the institutional response to the 
crisis in the domain of macroeconomic and fiscal policy coordination. 
In conclusion, since the above cited contributions have already focused at 
length on the transmission belt phenomenon that arguably connects external 
epistemic and academic actors to EMU policy change, I will instead focus on 
the (understudied) internal epistemic communities of the EU, namely the ECB 
and the DG Ecfin.  
Proving that the shape and ethos of the new regime chimes and even coincides 
with the evidence, lessons and policy guidance emerging in the specialized 
economic publications of these two actors will not allow us to claim full 
explanatory leverage. Yet, it will add a crucial piece of evidence to the puzzle of 
the emergence of austerity, complementing and better qualifying 
explanations/drivers like intergovernmental bargaining and German hegemony 
on the one hand, and problematizing the transmission belt argument by 
showing that the EU can deploy its own epistemic weapons to motivate, solidify 
and justify a new stricter economic policy making paradigm without the need to 
necessarily draw on external expertise. In a word, we will show that the EU “can 
paradigm” and that, far from being the end point of the transmission belt, it 
                                                          
105 In a keynote address at the DG Ecfin Annual Research Conference, the Director General Marco Buti 
stated the following: “The crisis has […] impacted on the research agenda of the economics profession, 
in particular of those economists who work on policy related issues concerning stabilisation, economic 
growth and structural reforms. The research program of DG ECFIN has paid great attention to the 
causes, consequences and cures of the current crisis. […]  Our research work continues. For this reason, 
the crisis was in the centre of DG ECFIN's 6th Annual Research Conference on "Crisis and Reform" […] 
The conference was attended by about 200 researchers from academia, central banks, international 
organisations and other institutions […] sessions dealt with the political economy of reform, the design 
of financial systems and issues related to the economic paradigm.” (Ecfin Economic Brief 6, February 
2010). 
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worked rather as one of the global engines of the belt that connects economic 
science to the formation of new “ideas” and policy change thereof.  
 
8.4b. The new paradigm 
 
In order to demonstrate the influence of internal epistemic forces in the 
emergence of the new ideational and technical paradigm of economic and fiscal 
policy coordination it is worth elaborating on the conceptual nature of the 
“austerity paradigm”, which is in any case more appropriately defined as 
“expansionary consolidation”. To this end, let us look at Box 1 below. 
 
Box 8.1 The austerity/expansionary consolidation paradigm 
The starting point of the ideational paradigm is the belief that economic policy making in democratic 
settings has a built-in bias towards inflation and fiscal profligacy and hence debt accumulation that 
depresses the long-term growth potential of the economy. Key to this distrust toward fiscal policy as a 
stabilisation tool (besides the evidence of constantly growing debt stocks in Western democracies – 
Alesina and Tabellini 1990) is the influence of the expectation channel that leads households to react 
in a Ricardian way to variation in their disposable income. Ricardian here means that households 
actively engage in consumption smoothing, i.e. they modify their consumption and saving 
habits/propensities according to the expectations that fiscal expansions or contractions generate on 
their future streams of income. In practice, if faced with an increase in income due to a permanent 
fiscal expansion, households will lower their propensity to consume the additional disposable income 
and save more anticipating a future raise in the taxation to counterbalance the deficit created by 
additional expenditures/lower taxes. Like this, fiscal expansions are crowded-out, making their 
multipliers too low to prompt a stabilisation and growth of the GDP over the medium/long-run. These 
so-called non-Keynesian or wealth effects of fiscal expansions (most of all if performed on the current 
expenditure side) militate against counter-cyclical fiscal activism during recessions, indeed 
representing a strong call in favour of the working of automatic stabilisers and against discretionary 
fiscal expansions.  
The effects of the expectation channel are not limited to depressing the multipliers of fiscal expansions. 
In fact, the same causal mechanism is at work in cases of consolidation, i.e. restrictive fiscal policies – 
even in cases where they are pro-cyclical, that is, when they occur during negative economic 
cycles/output gaps. In simple terms, the causal chain is the following. If a country is facing a negative 
economic cycle/output gap and, most importantly, a debt sustainability crisis (like a number of EMU 
members were during the crisis), given that classical Keynesian deficit-spending is ineffective on the 
GDP due to the working of the Ricardian equivalence and can even be counterproductive in terms of 
further debt accumulation, the policy solution is to consolidate (by cutting expenditure), regardless of 
the counter-cyclical Keynesian tenet. This policy is poised to have a depressive effect in the short-run 
(due to a decrease in disposable income), but after initial hardships households will embed the 
expectations of improved public finances and decreasing debt stock in their multi-period budget 
constraint and, anticipating a future drop in the taxation due to lesser costs to service decreasing debt 
and improving public finances, will increase their consumption and investment in the medium-run and 
boost GDP in the long-run thereof. 
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As a corollary to this recipe, supply-side structural reforms aimed at liberalizing the labour market and 
deregulating the economy interplay with budgetary consolidation and further foster growth potential. 
On the institutional side, the whole conceptual architecture of expansionary consolidation represents 
a strong call in favour of domestic and external constraints on fiscal discretion, to be achieved through 
different instrumental recipes. 
The following publications represent an essential (though surely non-exhaustive) list of early 
expansionary consolidation readings: Alesina 1988, Alesina and Tabellini 1990, Alesina et al. 1991, 
Giavazzi and Pagano 1992b, Alesina and Perotti 1995 and 1996, Alesina and Bayoumi 1996, Alesina and 
Ardagna 1998. For more recent contributions see the following section.  
 
 
The empirical test of these claims and mechanisms belongs to the discipline of 
economics. Furthermore, the debate over the benefits or damages of austerity 
is of limited relevance to our enquiry of how and why a new paradigm came 
about. For the sake of it, the focal point is that blaming the so-called Bocconi 
School for the emergence and diffusion of the expansionary consolidation 
paradigm during the euro area crisis represents a misleading and surely 
incomplete characterisation. While it is true that Alberto Alesina (2010) 
delivered a working paper detailing the crucial elements of the austerity 
paradigm to a crucial Ecofin Council meeting in April 2010 (right before the 
decision to bail out Greece), it is also true that a senior economist working at 
the ECB (Ludger Schuknecht), while acting as a discussant to a working paper 
presented by OECD economists at a DG Ecfin conference on public finance in 
January 2008 (that is, well before the sovereign debt crisis), stated the 
following:  
“I would like to start my comment on this impressive paper by pointing to 
some conceptual and normative priors on fiscal consolidation. There has 
been significant theoretical and empirical research in recent years by 
economists from international organisations and academia in the domain 
of fiscal consolidation and sustainability. This has forged a broad 
normative consensus on the appropriate course of fiscal policies and the 
way to achieve it. 
First, sound fiscal policies aim to attain sustainable public finances which 
are good for growth, stability and cohesion in Europe. 
Second, if sound fiscal policies are achieved or an appropriate strategy 
towards such a position is in place, automatic stabilisers (rather than 
discretionary policies) should contribute to economic stabilisation. 
Third, fiscal consolidation and reform towards sustainability are best 
conducted as part of a medium term-oriented, ambitious and 
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comprehensive strategy that emphasizes expenditure restraint and 
supply-side incentives so as boost confidence and growth. 
Fourth, consolidation should be accompanied by reforms of fiscal 
institutions that subject fiscal policies to spending and deficit constraints 
and a medium term budgetary framework. 
These principles are also embedded in the EU’s institutional framework, 
notably the Stability and Growth Pact and the Lisbon process. They have 
been reconfirmed in recent communication by the Eurogroup (spring 
2007) and the ECOFIN Council (autumn 2007).” (Larch (ed.) 2009, p. 
88). 
 
This is just a quote out of many similar ones put forth by economists working at 
either the ECB or at the DG Ecfin. Per se, it can be considered as anecdotal 
evidence, as much as 2010 Alesina’s presentation. Yet, as Dellepiane-
Avellaneda (2015) and the following pages show, this is not a casual statement. 
In fact, if it is true that the intellectual paternity of the modern version of the 
expansionary consolidation paradigm may well belong to Alesina and his 
network of co-authors that introduced the concept in policy circles in the 90s 
(ibid.; Blyth 2013 pp. 165-173 and 205-212), it is also true that economic 
scholarship at the ECB and at the Commission has played a major role in 
shaping and expanding the academic consensus toward this paradigm. Indeed, 
they did not limit to support it, but they crucially qualified it empirically through a 
massive number of publications and studies focused on EMU and eventually 
operationalized it in the context of the crisis. 
Therefore, before looking systematically at the scientific production of these 
internal epistemic actors during the years of the crisis (2009-2012), it is worth 
making again the following, central point – that further motivates the focus on 
internal epistemic actors. The Bocconi school, Reinhart and Rogoff prominent, 
successful and highly controversial articles and book (2009, 2010 and 2011), 
economists at the International Monetary Fund (but with some nuance and 
critical outlook, see: IMF 2012; see also Blanchard and Leigh 2013 for a partial 
refutation of the paradigm due to the underestimation of fiscal multipliers during 
the crisis) and, at a systemic level, the whole New Neoclassical Synthesis106 
scholarship have all been central actors of the broad scientific consensus for 
expansionary consolidation (Blyth 2013; Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2015). It is also 
                                                          
106 See footnote 70.  
257 
 
important to show how this consensus has influenced from the outside 
influenced paradigm formation and policy change in EMU – and this is what 
Blyth’s and Helgadóttir’s studies have done.  
Yet, overlooking the fact that the internal epistemic actors of the EU had bought 
into this paradigm at least a decade before the eurocrisis (Dellepiane-
Avellaneda 2015, pp. 396-399) and since then promoted and further developed 
this set of ideas all along EMU’s saga overshadows the crucial fact that the 
“new” paradigm did not brusquely originate from alien and peripheral 
economists (Helgadóttir 2016, crucially building upon Blyth 2013) that exploited 
a window of opportunity, like that offered by the crisis, to sell their economic 
creed to opportunistic politicians. In actuality, that creed was already 
endogenously engrained in the policy practice and research of the ECB and the 
Commission (Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2015). Let us now see how in more detail.  
 
8.4c. Data collection – some details 
 
In order to empirically test the key implications of epistemic learning we now 
look systematically at the scientific production of the internal epistemic actors of 
the EU (namely, the ECB and the DG Ecfin of the Commission) during the 
period of 2009-2012.107 In practice, I will match their scientific outputs to the 
different changes (paradigmatic and instrumental/technical) that were 
introduced by the four reforms. 
Both the actors are by all means sui generis if compared to their equivalent in 
national political systems. The ECB is a sui generis central bank that, lacking a 
fiscal and political sounding board, is much more engaged in analysing, 
discussing and participating to the debate on fiscal policies than other central 
banks (Allard et al. 2012).108 Moreover, in the context of the crisis, the ECB has 
                                                          
107 Although the process of reform traced in the previous section started in 2010, I decided to also 
include 2009 in the analysis for two reasons. First, to show how the switch from the Keynesian tenet of 
the EERP of 2008/2009 to the consolidation mantra of 2010 is reflected in the epistemic outputs. 
Second, to show that the prominence of fiscal conservative thinking within EU scientific circles pre-
dated 2010. 
108 “Our findings indicate that the ECB communicates intensively on fiscal policies in both positive as well 
as normative terms […] The empirical analysis also indicates that the financial crisis has overall increased 
the intensity of central bank communication on fiscal policy” (ibid., p. 1). 
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extended its consultative/advisory activities (ibid.; Lambrinoc 2009) and 
assertively assumed a somehow new (and at times contested) role of full-blown 
decision and policy maker (Collignon 2012; Krampf 2016).109  
The Commission is instead a decision making institution (a sui generis 
executive) that does not only play the role of agenda setter, but also of policy 
entrepreneur and epistemic actor (Verdun 1999; Radaelli 1999; Zito 2001). 
Moreover, as we saw in the previous section, the Commission played a major 
role in the design and approval of at least three of the four reforms analysed 
herein.110  
The epistemic role that they play and that ensues from their sui generis position 
with the EU has been the object of a number of studies in the field of public 
policy (see, for recent examples, Metz 2015 and Littoz-Monnet 2017). 
Nonetheless, I am not aware of any scholar that has looked at their epistemic 
role during the crisis by systematically taking stock of their scientific production 
(for a partial exception see Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2015). The following analysis 
fills this gap and complements both Blyth’s ideational attribution of austerity and 
Helgadóttir’s the transmission belt account, whereby the epistemic source of the 
new economic policy making paradigm is set outside the EU institutions. 
Before matching the policy advice put forth by the scientific papers produced by 
the ECB and DG Ecfin to actual policy changes, a brief look at the practical side 
of this data collection and analysis is in order (see Box 2 below). 
 
Box 8.2 Economic papers as data 
Both the ECB and the DG Ecfin have a large number of publication series, some statutory (e.g. the 
“Monthly Bulletins” of the ECB and the Commission’s “Public Finances in EMU” annual report) and 
some research-oriented, like occasional and working paper series. In order to pin down the technical 
                                                          
109 In this respect, it is worth considering the ECB’s role in the process of reform of financial regulation 
and baking supervision, its participation in the so-called Troika in the context of adjustment 
programmes and its resort to a vast array of non-conventional monetary instruments that, according to 
some observers, marked a creeping expansion of its de facto inflation targeting mandate in favour of a 
more interventionist and non-neutral role in monetary policy (Krampf 2016). 
110 When it comes to evaluating its role in the process of crisis-driven policy change, as noted in Chapter 
6, the literature diverges with some authors who consider it to be side-lined by the increased 
importance of the European Council (Bickerton et al. 2015) and some others who argue that it managed 
to extend its prerogatives under the new framework for economic governance (Bauer and Becker 2014). 
For the present analysis, what matters most is that the Commission initiated and substantially designed 
(and even passed, in the case of the Semester) both the Six and Two-Pack measures. 
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lessons arising out of the research activity of the two institutions I mainly focused on the latter (the 
actual scientific production) but I also analysed the former since they, most of all ECB’s Monthly 
Bulletins (featuring also dedicated boxes and op-ed articles111) and Commission’s annual “Public 
Finances in EMU” and “Quarterly Reports on the euro Area”, often provide a very useful synthesis of 
the ongoing research, clarify the epistemic, evidence-based consensus on a topic and provide flat-out 
advice, i.e. implications stemming from research and policy guidance thereof.  
Obviously, I only selected and analysed papers related to the conduct of fiscal and macroeconomic 
policies, disregarding papers dealing with other topics like monetary policy, labour economics or asset 
pricing.112  
As for the ECB, the role of its research units and activities is the following: “The goal of economic 
research at the ECB is to provide a strong conceptual and empirical basis for policy-making and to 
better communicate policy to the markets and the public. High-quality research is essential to ensure 
that the ECB is well equipped to cope with the unprecedented challenges associated with conducting 
a single monetary policy for a group of sovereign countries. The most important task of economic 
research within the Eurosystem is to increase knowledge of the functioning of the euro area economy 
and, more specifically, to provide models, tools and analyses relevant to the conduct of monetary 
policy and the fulfilment of other tasks of the Eurosystem”.113 This needs to be qualified by noting that 
the ECB, during the crisis, expanded its formal policy making and informal advisory roles, namely 
representing a crucial voice in the debate over the reform of the coordination regime (Kiss 2010; Allard 
et al. 2012). 
The largest number of ECB papers analysed belongs to the Working Paper Series that is meant to 
“disseminate economic research relevant to the various tasks and functions of the ECB, and provide a 
conceptual and empirical basis for policy-making. The Working Papers constitute ‘work-in-progress’. 
They are published to stimulate discussion and contribute to the advancement of our knowledge of 
economic matters. They are addressed to experts, so readers should be knowledgeable in 
economics”.114 
Another important ECB outlet is the Monthly Bulletin which “presents the economic and monetary 
information which forms the basis for the Governing Council's policy decisions. It is released eight times 
a year, two weeks after each monetary policy meeting. The Bulletins in March, June, September and 
December provide comprehensive analysis of economic and monetary developments including an 
integrated discussion of the staff macroeconomic projections on inflation, growth, public finances, and 
external trade”.115  
In Monthly Bulletin issues we do not only find information/data, but also boxes/focuses (that 
summarize recent evidence on a  specific topic and/or spell out policy guidance) and un-authored 
papers that represent kind of ‘op-eds’ expressing the policy vision of the ECB’s Executive Board. 
As for the DG Ecfin, its research function has very similar aims to that of the ECB. The two outlets that 
feature more often in the following analysis are Economic Papers and Quarterly Reports. The former 
“are written by the staff of the [DG Ecfin] or by experts working in association with them. The series 
intends to increase awareness of the analytical work done on EU economic issues and to seek 
comments and suggestions for further analyses.”116 The latter, instead, “intend to contribute to a 
                                                          
111 Un-authored articles published in the capacity of the ECB’s Executive Board. 
112 Nonetheless, with regard to the latter topic, the papers dealing with sovereign bond spreads were 
clearly included in the analysis.  
113 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-research/html/index_content.en.html  
114 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/research/working-papers/html/index.en.html  
115 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/economic-bulletin/html/index.en.html  
116 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/economic_paper/index_en.htm  
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better understanding of economic developments in the euro area and to improve the quality of the 
public debate surrounding the area's economic policy.”117 
A few details on my data selection strategy are on order. First, the access to this kind of publications is 
totally free, making my data collection task much easier and fully replicable. Second, I started looking 
at first into research publications, most of all the ECB’s “Working Paper Series” and “Occasional Paper 
Series”, and the DG Ecfin’s “Economic Papers” and “Occasional Papers”. I downloaded and read all the 
abstracts of the papers published in these series in the period 2009-2012 and then looked for the 
following keywords in there: adjustment, bond, borrow, borrowing, budget, budgetary, consolidation, 
contraction, contractionary, crisis, cut, cycle/cyclical, deficit, debt, discretion, downturn, expansion, 
expansionary, expenditure, fiscal, fiscal policy, growth, imbalance, income, Keynesian/non-Keynesian, 
macroeconomic, multiplier, pact, public, public finance, recession, retrenchment, revenue, Ricardian, 
sovereign, spending, spread, stabilisation, stabiliser, stability, structural, sustainability, tax and 
taxation. I then downloaded the papers featuring these keywords in their abstracts, read them and 
eliminated from the sample those that were not relevant. The criterion for relevance I employed 
consisted of including in the dataset only those papers whose findings had clear implications for the 
conduct and coordination of fiscal policies in the euro area (even when explicit policy advice/guidance 
was lacking). I then replicated the same series of tasks with minor paper series such as the ECB’s “Legal 
Working Papers Series” and the DG Ecfin’s “European Economy”.  
I then turned my attention to statutory publications and downloaded all the ECB’s Monthly Bulletins 
published in the considered period looking for relevant un-authored articles (see footnote 111) and 
boxes/focuses. ECB’s Monthly Bulletin issues revealed to be extremely relevant, most of all those that 
featured a dedicated section on fiscal developments (March, June, September and December issues). 
I also perused the three annual issues of the ECB’s Research Bulletin although only few of them turned 
out to be relevant. I applied a similar strategy to DG Ecfin’s statutory publications where a prominent 
role is played by the annual report “Public Finances in EMU” that besides providing data on fiscal 
developments systematically include research articles/chapters and extremely insightful editorials and 
extended summaries of economic and political developments. Finally, I also looked into and selected 
relevant DG Ecfin’s “Quarterly Reports on the euro area” issues, which play a similar role with respect 
to ECB’s Monthly Bulletins. 
The following table provides details on the number, type and year of publication of the papers 
published by the ECB and DG Ecfin (the universe) and of those analysed in this chapter (the sample).118 
 
Table 8.2 Universe and sample of ECB and DG Ecfin papers  
 ECB’s papers – 
universe 
 
ECB’s papers - sample DG Ecfin’s papers - 
universe 
DG Ecfin’s papers - 
sample 
2009 155 Working papers 
(WPs) 
 
8 Occasional Papers 
(OPs) 
 
12 Monthly Bulletin 
Issues  
 
 
 
3 Legal Working 
Papers (Legal WPs) 
 
3 Research Bulletin 
Notes (RB Notes) 
 
16 WPs 
 
 
0 OPs 
 
 
4 Monthly Bulletin 
Issues (including 2 
articles and 5 
focuses/boxes) 
 
 
1 Legal WP 
 
 
0 RB Notes 
1 Public Finances in 
EMU  
 
42 Economic Papers 
(EPs) 
 
14 Occasional Papers 
(OPs) 
 
4 Quarterly Reports 
on the euro area 
(QRs) 
1 Public Finances in 
EMU  
 
5 EPs 
 
 
2 OPs 
 
 
2 QRs 
 
 
Other publications: 
2 European Economy 
Issues 
                                                          
117 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/qr_euro_area/index_en.htm  
118 Please, note that  
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2010 138 WPs 
 
14 OPs 
 
12 Monthly Bulletin 
Issues 
 
 
1 Legal WP 
 
3 RB Notes 
12 WPs 
 
2 OPs 
 
4 Monthly Bulletin 
Issues (including 2 
articles and 7 
focuses/boxes) 
 
0 Legal WP 
 
1 RB Note 
 
1 Public Finances in 
EMU  
 
38 EPs 
 
17 OPs 
 
4 QRs 
1 Public Finances in 
EMU  
 
6 EPs 
 
1 OPs 
 
No QRs 
 
Other publications: 1 
Economic Brief 
2011 128 WPs 
 
11 OPs 
 
12 Monthly Bulletin 
Issues 
 
 
2 Legal WPs 
 
3 RB Notes 
11 WPs 
 
3 OPs 
 
4 Monthly Bulletin 
Issues (including 3 
articles and 5 
focuses/boxes) 
 
0 Legal WP 
 
2 RB Notes 
 
1 Public Finances in 
EMU  
 
11 EPs 
 
16 OPs 
 
4 QRs 
1 Public Finances in 
EMU  
 
3 EPs 
 
0 OPs 
 
1 QR 
2012 91 WPs 
 
7 OPs 
 
12 Monthly Bulletin 
Issues 
 
 
0 Legal WP 
 
3 RB Notes 
 
8 WPs 
 
0 OPs 
 
3 Monthly Bulletin 
Issues (including 3 
articles)  
 
 
0 Legal WP 
 
0 RB Notes 
1 Public Finances in 
EMU  
 
29 EPs 
 
35 OPs 
 
4 QRs 
1 Public Finances in 
EMU  
 
7 EPs 
 
3 OPs 
 
0 QRs 
Total  412 WPs 
 
40 OPs 
 
48 Monthly Bulletin 
Issues 
 
 
6 Legal WPs 
 
12 RB Notes 
47 WPs 
 
5 OPs 
 
12 Monthly Bulletin 
Issues (including 10 
articles and 17 
focuses/boxes) 
 
1 Legal WP 
 
3 RB Notes 
 
4 Public Finances in 
EMU  
 
120 EPs 
 
72 OPs 
 
16 QRs 
 
 
 
4 Public Finances in 
EMU  
 
21 EPs 
 
6 OPs 
 
3 QRs 
 
3 Other publications 
  
 
 
 
 
8.4d Data analysis and findings 
 
Admittedly, analysing these considerable number of papers has been an 
intimidating task,119 but the evidence they provide us with is invaluable and 
strongly confirms, corroborates and even brings forward the points made by the 
ECB senior economist quoted above. Overall, in fact, the review of the 
economic scholarship of the ECB and DG Ecfin during the crisis renders a 
                                                          
119 A background in macroeconomics has been an instrumental asset to carry out a systematic analysis 
of this highly technical literature. 
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picture of a clear and coherent paradigm of economic policy making and 
supranational policy coordination. 
In order to match policy innovations with epistemic inputs, I will subdivide the 
former into seven different typologies. The first two (A1 and A2) revolve around 
changes of a paradigmatic nature (representing what Hall would term third-
order changes), while the last five (B1 and B2) regard more 
technical/instrumental innovations (akin to first and second-order changes). 
 
Table 8.3 The nature of policy change(s) 
 
Paradigmatic changes 
 A1. The sudden stop and reversal of a short-lived Keynesian re-infatuation 
 A2. Debt sustainability as an imperative and (expansionary) consolidations as the way to achieve it 
 
Instrumental changes 
 B1a. Stricter/more coercive coordination and surveillance framework with enhanced enforcement, 
including debt surveillance  
 B1b. Broadening of the coordination regime, including expenditure monitoring 
 B1c. Broadening of the coordination regime, including the monitoring of Europe 2020 objectives - 
structural reforms  
 B1d. Broadening of the coordination regime, including the monitoring of macroeconomic imbalances 
 B2. Strengthening of national fiscal governance  
 
This categorization serves the purpose of making the matching exercise 
systematic, although paradigmatic and instrumental innovations are highly 
intertwined, most of all if we look at them under the perspective of systemic 
overhaul of EMU governance architecture (see Kamkhaji and Radaelli 2013 for 
a systematic categorization of policy innovations under the crisis).  
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Table 4 below matches each innovation with both the legal instruments through 
which it was included in the new regime and the ECB’s and DG Ecfin’s papers 
that provide essential advice about it.120  
 
 
                                                          
120 Note that a single paper can provide input on different aspects of policy change and hence match 
different typologies. Clear examples are Van Riet (ed.) 2010, Larch (ed.) 2009 and Larch et al. 2010. 
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Table 8.4 Categorising and matching policy changes to legal provisions and epistemic input121 
 
Paradigmatic changes 
 
Substantial nature of change Legal instrument/vector of the 
change 
 
ECB Papers122 DG Ecfin papers 
 
A1. The sudden stop and reversal of 
a short-lived Keynesian re-
infatuation 
 Revival of the EDP through 
ambitious MTOs (while waiting 
for the Six-Pack Rules to be 
passed) 
 Afonso and Sousa 2009 
 ECB M.B. 03/2009 
 ECB M.B. 03/2009, Box 7 
 ECB M.B. 07/2009 
 Cogan et al. 2009 
 Burriel et al. 2009 
 Van Riet (ed.) 2010 
 Afonso et al. 2010 
 ECB R.B. 06/2010 
 ECB M.B. 07/2010 
 ECB M.B. 07/2010, Article pp. 67-83 
 Cwik and Wieland 2010  
 Dieppe et al. 2011 (in disagreement) 
 Afonso et al. 2011 (in disagreement) 
 Cimadomo et al. 2011 
 Schuknecht et al. 2011 
 Coenen et al. 2012 (in disagreement) 
 Public Finances in EMU 2009 and 
2010123 
 Roeger and in 't Veld 2009 (in 
disagreement)  
 Larch (ed.) 2009 
 Barrios et al. (eds.) 2009 
 EU Commission Q.R. 06/2009 
 Commission 2009b 
 Commission 2009c 
 EU Commission Q.R. 12/2009  
 Barrios and Rizza 2010 
 Roeger and in 't Veld 2010 
 Larch et al. 2010 
 Public Finances in EMU 2011 
 Lendvai et al. 2011 
 in't Veld et al. 2012 
 Public Finances in EMU 2012 
                                                          
121 Legend: M.B.: Monthly Bulletin; R.B.: Research Bulletin; Q.R.: Quarterly Report. 
Boxes and articles featured in ECB Monthly Bulletins are of particular relevance because they represent a synthesis of ongoing research and provide straightforward policy 
advice thereof. 
122 The precise references to the papers cited in this table and in the section below are featured separately in the Appendix to avoid excessive confusion. The same 
rationale applies to the format of referencing employed throughout the table. Finally, note that not all of the 132 analysed publications feature in the table. This is because 
some of them did not provide straightforward policy advice, or contributed to the methodological rather than to the policy debate. In any case, all the papers including 
policy advice were listed, also those (quite few, actually) that were in disagreement with the overall “sentiment” captured by my analysis. 
123 As noted also in Chapters 6 and 7, these two reports are extremely important to track the change of sentiment at the Commission about fiscal stimuli and the 
unreformed SGP. Fiscal policy, in one year only (see also Skidelsky 2009 for the elusive return of Keynesism in 2008/2009), changed its status from a fundamental tool for 
stabilisation and recovery (yet, to be used temporarily) to a peril for public finances’ sustainability to be rolled back in order to swiftly implement (ambitious) consolidation 
plans. Similarly, the SGP was considered as of 2009 to be key to ensuring sound public finances, while (as documented in Chapters 6 and 7) in 2010 it is seen by the 
Commission and all EU actors as in need of substantial reform, even a “quantum leap”, according to the ECB. 
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 Coenen et al. 2012b  
 ECB M.B. 12/2012, Box 6 
 
A2. Debt sustainability as an 
imperative and (expansionary) 
consolidations as the way to achieve 
it 
 TSCG provisions 
 Regulation 1175/2011 of the Six 
Pack Rules 
 European Semester provisions 
 
 Balassone et al. 2009 
 ECB M.B. 03/2009, Box 7 
 ECB M.B. 06/2009 
 ECB M.B. 09/2009 
 ECB M.B. 09/2009, Box 10 
 ECB M.B. 12/2009 
 ECB M.B. 12/2009, Box 8 
 Cogan et al. 2009 
 ECB M.B. 03/2010 
 ECB M.B. 03/2010, Box 9 
 Van Riet (ed.) 2010 
 ECB M.B. 05/2010, Boxes 4 and 6 
 Afonso et al. 2010 
 ECB M.B. 06/2010 
 ECB M.B. 06/2010, Box 6 
 ECB M.B. 07/2010, Article pp. 67-83 
 Checherita and Rother 2010 
 Nickel et al. 2010 
 ECB M.B. 09/2010, Box 7 
 Cwik and Wieland 2010 
 Rother et al. 2010 
 ECB M.B. 12/2010 
 Rieth 2011 
 ECB M.B. 03/2011 
 ECB M.B. 03/2011, Box 10 
 ECB M.B. 03/2011, Article pp. 99-119 
 ECB M.B. 04/2011, Article pp. 61-77 
 ECB M.B. 06/2011 
 ECB M.B. 06/2011, Box 8 
 Salines et al. 2011 
 Schuknecht et al. 2011 
 ECB M.B. 09/2011 
 Hartwig et al. 2011 
 Afonso and Jalles 2011 
 Amisano and Tristani 2011 (R.B. 
Autumn 2011) 
 Baum et al. 2012 
 Afonso and Jalles 2012 
 Larch (ed.) 2009  
 Commission 2009c 
 EU Commission Q.R. 12/2009 
 Hobza and Mourre 2010 
 Roeger and in 't Veld 2010 
 Public Finances in EMU 2010 
 Larch et al. 2010 
 Iara and Wolff 2010 
 Public Finances in EMU 2011 
 EU Commission Q.R. 04/2011 
 Boussard et al. 2012 
 in ‘t Veld et al. 2012 
 Public Finances in EMU 2012 
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 Checherita-Westphal et al. 2012 
 ECB M.B. 04/2012, Article pp. 55-69 
 ECB M.B. 05/2012, Article pp. 79-94 
 ECB M.B. 12/2012, Box 6  
 
 
Technical changes 
 
Substantial nature of change 
 
Legal instrument/vector of change 
 
ECB Papers DG Ecfin papers124 
B1. Stricter/more coercive 
coordination and surveillance 
framework with enhanced 
enforcement including debt 
surveillance 
 
 
 Regulations 1173, 1175 and 
1177/2011 of the Six Pack rules 
(including the RQMV provision 
for the issuing of sanctions) 
 Regulations 472 and 473/2013 of 
the Two-Pack rules 
 TSCG provisions (including the 
involvement of the ECJ in 
sanctioning non-compliance) 
 European Semester provisions 
 
 
 
 ECB M.B. 03/2009, Box 8 
 Afonso and Hauptmeier 2009 
 Morris et al. 2009 
 Agnello and Cimadomo 2009 
 Attinasi et al. 2009 
 Schuknecht et al. 2010 
 ECB M.B. 03/2010, Box 9 
 Van Riet (ed.) 2010 
 Hughes-Hallett et al. 2010 
 ECB M.B. 07/2010 
 Checherita and Rother 2010 
 Hauptmeier et al. 2010 
 ECB M.B. 12/2010 
 Sahm et al. 2011 
 Rieth 2011 
 ECB M.B. 03/2011, Box 10 
 ECB M.B. 03/2011, Article pp. 99-119  
 ECB M.B. 04/2011, Article pp. 61-77 
 Ioannou and Stracca 2011 
 Salines et al. 2011 
 Schuknecht et al. 2011125 
 Hartwig et al. 2011 
 Afonso and Jalles 2011 
 Checherita-Westphal et al. 2012 
 Barrios et al. (eds.) 2009 
 Commission 2009c 
 Public Finances in EMU 2010 
 Larch et al. 2010 
 Public Finances in EMU 2011 
 Arghyrou and Kontonkias 2011 
 Medeiros 2012 
 Public Finances in EMU 2012 
                                                          
124 The Commission published a number of memos and communications detailing its legislative proposals for the reform of the SGP throughout the period analysed. They 
were not included here as it is limited to reporting on research publications indicating the evidentiary basis for these proposals, rather than the proposals themselves. 
125 In disagreement, the paper also featuring Jürgen Stark as a co-author laments the lack of a quantum leap in the Six-Pack and calls for an even stronger surveillance 
framework. 
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 ECB M.B. 04/2012, Article pp. 55-69 
 ECB M.B. 05/2012, Article pp. 79-94 
B1b. Broadening of the coordination 
regime including expenditure 
monitoring 
 Regulation 1173/2011 of the Six-
Pack Rules 
 TSCG provisions 
 
 Afonso and Sousa 2009 
 ECB M.B. 03/2009, Box 7 
 Afonso et al. 2009 
 ECB M.B. 09/2009 
 ECB M.B. 09/2009, Box 9 
 Agnello and Cimadomo 2009 
 Burriel et al. 2009 
 Holm-Hadulla et al. 2010 
 Van Riet (ed.) 2010 
 ECB R.B. 06/2010 
 Hughes-Hallett et al. 2010 
 Nickel et al. 2010 
 ECB M.B. 09/2010, Box 7 
 Hauptmeier et al. 2010 
 Cwik and Wieland 2010 
 Sahm et al. 2011 (in disagreement)126 
 ECB M.B. 04/2011, Article pp. 61-77 
 Schuknecht et al. 2011 
 ECB M.B. 09/2011 
 Afonso and Jalles 2011 
 Christoffel et al. 2011 
 Afonso and Jalles 2012 
 
 Public Finances in EMU 2009 
 Larch (ed.) 2009 
 Barrios and Rizza 2010 
 Barrios and Fargnoli 2010 
 Public Finances in EMU 2010 
 Larch et al. 2010  
 Public Finances in EMU 2011 
 Vogel et al. 2012 
 Ayuso-i-Casals 2012 
B1c. Broadening of the coordination 
regime, including the monitoring of 
Europe 2020 objectives/structural 
reforms 
 European Semester provisions 
 (Europe 2020) 
 Balassone et al. 2009 
 ECB M.B. 04/2009, Article pp. 91-99 
 ECB M.B. 06/2010, Box 6 
 Van Riet (ed.) 2010 
 Nickel et al. 2010 
 Gomes et al. 2011 
 ECB M.B. 08/2012, Box 5 
 EU Commission Q.R. 06/2009 
 European Economy 7, 2009 
 EU Commission Q.R. 12/2009 
 Hobza and Mourre 2010 
 Larch et al. 2010 
 EU Commission Q.R. 04/2011 
 Vogel 2011 
 
                                                          
126 In this paper, authored by scholars working at the Federal Reserve and a prominent US academic (Joel Slemrod), one of the findings is that raising expenditures rather 
that cutting taxes is a more effective way to conduct a fiscal stimulus. This is in contrast with the other literature surveyed here. This discrepancy could be due to the fact 
that the study analyses the effects of the American stimulus and, most of all, because the assumption of Ricardian households is relaxed by allowing for a share of credit 
and liquidity-constrained (i.e. non-Ricardian) households. 
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B1d. Broadening of the coordination 
regime, including the monitoring of 
macroeconomic imbalances 
 Regulations 1174 and 1176/2011 
of the Six Pack 
 Regulation 472/2013 of the Two-
Pack 
 Nickel et al. 2009 
 Van Riet (ed.) 2010 
 Gomes et al. 2010 
 ECB M.B. 04/2012, Article pp. 55-69 
 
 Public Finances in EMU 2009 
 EU Commission Q.R. 06/2009 
 Commission 2009c 
 EU Commission Q.R. 12/2009 
 Public Finances in EMU 2010 
 Larch et al. 2010 
 Public Finances in EMU 2011 
 Lendvai et al 2011 
 Berti et al. 2012 
 
B2. Strengthening of national fiscal 
governance 
 Directive 2011/85/EU of the Six 
Pack 
 TSCG provisions 
 Regulation 472/2013 of the Two 
Pack 
 Agnello and Sousa 2009 
 Afonso and Hauptmeier 2009 
 ECB M.B. 09/2009, Box 9 
 Van Riet (ed.) 2010 
 Hauptmeier et al. 2010 
 Castro et al. 2011  
 ECB M.B. 04/2011, Article pp. 61-77 
 Schuknecht et al. 2011 
 ECB M.B. 09/2011 
 Afonso and Jalles 2011 
 Cimadomo et al. 2011 
 Checherita-Westphal et al. 2012 
 
 Public Finances in EMU 2009 
 Larch (ed.) 2009 
 Barrios and Schaechter 2009 
 Commission 2009c 
 Public Finances in EMU 2010 
 Larch et al. 2010 
 Iara and Wolff 2010 
 Vogel 2011 
 Public Finances in EMU 2011 
 Ayuso-i-Casals 2012 
 Vogel et al. 2012 
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8.4e Paradigmatic changes127 
 
A1. The sudden stop and reversal of a short-lived Keynesian re-infatuation. Or, 
the re-discovery of the ineffectiveness of fiscal expansions and how to phase 
them out  
 
The first paradigmatic change is a sudden stop and reversal of the (admittedly 
mild) Keynesian consensus (Skidelsky 2009; Public Finances in EMU 2009) 
that characterised the launch of the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) 
in 2008 and its implementations in 2009 that is a swift return to a view whereby 
discretionary fiscal policies are affected by “notorious flaws” (Larch et al. 2010, 
p. 5) after a temporary and regretted Keynesian re-infatuation: “The call for 
expansionary fiscal policies included in the European Economic Recovery Plan 
adopted by the Commission and endorsed by the Council at the end of 2008 
was in conflict, probably not with the spirit, but certainly with the letter of the 
Pact.” (ibid.)  
Aside from a change of sentiment, key to this return to fiscal conservatism is the 
rapid and steady deterioration of public finances (as duly reported in the 
2009/2010 ECB Monthly Bulletins) and soaring risk premia on newly issued 
government bonds of peripheral EMU members, crucially linked to worsening 
macroeconomic and public finances’ fundamentals (ibid.). 
Within the sample of 132 papers analysed, 33 of them deal with the effects of 
expansionary fiscal policies, most of them written in 2009 and 2010, i.e. when 
the EERP was still ongoing. Some of them (Van Riet (ed.) 2010, ECB M.B. 
07/2010 Article, Cwik and Wieland 2010, Rother et al. 2010, Schuknecht et al. 
2011) directly analyse the macroeconomic effects of the EERP. Despite four of 
them (see Table 4, entries marked as “in disagreement”) present evidence in 
favour of substantial multipliers linked to EERP-related stimuli, the sheer 
majority of the papers show little and short-lived expansionary effects of fiscal 
stimuli (mainly because they were not perceived as temporary, therefore 
                                                          
127 The precise references to the papers cited in this sections (and in the table above) are featured 
separately in the Appendix to avoid excessive confusion. The same rationale applies the format of 
referencing employed throughout the section (see footnotes 121 and 122).  
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triggering Ricardian behaviours), and a sharp deterioration of debt-to-GDP 
ratios due crucially, among other factors,128 to deficit spending.  
The main takeaways/findings of this group of papers have fed almost 1-to-1 into 
the advice featured in statutory documents and then into policy making and 
change. Namely, drawing on a (revived) distrust toward discretionary fiscal 
activism, these papers broadly acknowledged that the Keynesian fiscal 
expansions coming with the EERP had somehow helped in stabilizing the cycle 
but, mainly drawing on model-based analyses, immediately call for its swift 
reversal in the form of sustainable exit strategies.129 The latter are meant to 
impinge on the expectation channel and therefore not endanger the market’s 
perception of long-term debt sustainability, besides making the expansions 
themselves more effective in terms of GDP stimulus. This policy advice (that 
can be summarised in the notion of “consolidating after temporary fiscal 
expansions”) is to be applied differentially to EMU Member States according to 
their “fiscal space”. In other words, for highly indebted Member States - i.e. for 
those EMU members with small fiscal space - consolidation had to start 
immediately (implying a swift reversal/exit strategy from the EERP measures) 
and needed to be ambitious, credible and front-loaded (Cwik et al. 2009; Cwik 
and Wieland 2010; Van riet (ed.) 2010; ECB M.B. 07/2010, Article). Key to this 
call to retrench is also the negative dynamic of bond risk premia, which by 2009 
had already started to sharply differentiate among EMU Member States due to 
the status and prospective health (read: long-term sustainability) of their public 
finances (ibid.; ECB M.B. 06/2010 Box 6). 
In short, the epistemic lesson that fed into policy making revolved around 
expansionary fiscal interventions abiding by the principles of the three “T”’s: 
they should be timely (i.e. countering the cycle as soon as it reverses), targeted 
(i.e. avoiding rises to unproductive current expenditures and focusing on tax 
reductions and public investment) and, most of all, temporary (i.e. swiftly 
reversed when the cycle comes back to be positive in order not to trigger non-
                                                          
128 Namely, the financial liabilities assumed by governments to rescue banks and the effect of automatic 
stabilisers. 
129 According to Cwik et al. (2009), the multiplier of a discretionary fiscal stimulus can be six times 
smaller when measured through a New-Keynesian model including price rigidities and rational agents’ 
expectations rather than when it is measured through a fully Keynesian model. As a result, a 
discretionary fiscal stimulus can even have negative medium-term impacts on the GDP and consistently 
crowd out private consumption and investment. 
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Keynesian effects of permanent fiscal expansions and excessive debt 
accumulation).130  
Form the point of view of concrete policy measures, this paradigmatic change 
translated in an EMU-wide tightening of fiscal stances (through the phasing out 
of EERP measures) channelled through a revival of the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (remember that by 2010 all EMU Member states were under one) 
and ambitious Mid-Term Objectives set within them. Although not directly 
reflected in the four reforms analysed, we can safely consider this change of 
sentiment toward the Keynesian macroeconomic paradigm as one of the most 
important ideational triggers to the reforms of the coordination framework. 
 
Box 8.3 Findings and advice on reversing Keynesian stimuli 
 
“The overall lesson from the crisis is that governments must strengthen fiscal discipline to ensure the 
longer-term sustainability of public finances […] A genuine fiscal exit strategy should thus cover the 
question of how to scale back again the role of the state in the economy to sustainable and efficient 
proportions” (Van Riet (ed.) 2010, p. 69). 
“Any fiscal stimulus package in an economic recession should meet the above criteria [the three “T”] 
for success and be designed in such a way that it stabilises the economy and at the same time supports 
a self-sustaining recovery” (Van Riet (ed.) 2010, p. 34). 
“We find that expecting low income growth over the next year predicts mostly saving the stimulus 
payment. Hence, at least under the circumstances of 2008 and 2009, it proved difficult to jump-start 
the economy by providing cash to those whose economic circumstances had declined or were 
worsening” (Sahm et al. 2011, p. 21). 
“While in 2009, the balance tilts towards strongly expansionary fiscal policy, it changes in 2010 and 
beyond, gradually calling for increasing budgetary caution while avoiding excessively tight budgetary 
policies choking the nascent recovery.” (Commission Q.R. 06/2009, p. 25). 
 
 
 
                                                          
130 Fiscal stimuli should take into account country-specific budgetary “room for manoeuvre”, i.e. the initial fiscal 
position. 
To work efficiently in the short-run without imposing long-term liabilities, fiscal stimuli need to be timely (i.e. able 
to avoid typical fiscal lags and reach the economy while the crisis is still ongoing), well targeted (i.e. oriented toward 
liquidity and credit-constrained households that would consume the extra income rather than saving it) and 
temporary (i.e. such not to worsen long-term fiscal imbalances/sustainability and crowd out private investment and 
consumption via Ricardian behaviours).  
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A2. A “new” paradigm kicks in: Debt sustainability as an imperative and 
(expansionary) consolidations as the way to achieve it  
 
As we saw, by late 2009/early 2010 the EERP’s stimuli had already been 
largely phased out due to a reversal of the Keynesian climate that prevailed in 
the period 2008-2009 and to adverse and worsening macroeconomic 
circumstances. Indeed, in March 2011 the overall EMU debt-to-GDP ratio 
peaked to 88.4% with respect to the 66% ratio of 2007 (ECB M.B. 03/2011). 
After having produced a large deal of evidence in favour of orderly exit 
strategies from fiscal stimuli, the new central theme of research of the ECB and 
DG Ecfin was, closely in line with policy developments focused on institutional 
reform, debt sustainability and how to return to healthy public finances in the 
medium-run.  
The new focus was dictated by adverse macroeconomic circumstances and 
most of all by the decision to allow for debt relief packages for Greece and, 
shortly thereafter, for Ireland and Portugal. As we saw in Chapter 7, this single 
decision prompted a profound change in the overall architecture of EMU, 
calling, post-hoc, for a review of the overall paradigm of policy making and 
coordination. It is at this juncture, driven by exogenous conditions, political 
factors and, on the puzzling side of the policy change equation, by epistemic 
forces that a full-blown process of paradigmatic and institutional change fully 
kicked in.  
As we argued, the paradigmatic change toward (expansionary) consolidation 
invested almost all the policy domains covered by EMU. When it comes to the 
conduct of fiscal policies and their coordination regime, it translated into two 
major elements. First, the strict policy conditionality imposed to those Member 
States that required financial assistance. Second, the launch of a process of 
reform and strengthening of the coordination regime analysed in this chapter.131 
Both these policy manifestations/changes were underpinned by a steadfast 
                                                          
131 Interestingly, and corroborating the argument and implications of the previous chapter, right after 
the Greek bail out, by turning hindsight into insight, the SGP and the policies it allowed were openly 
denounced as in need of profound reforms, whereas before they were considered fit for purposes (cfr. 
Commission 2009a and 2010a). 
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(and paradigmatic) commitment to ensure budgetary discipline, consolidation 
and fiscal restraint regardless of the economic cycle. In a word, by austerity. 
Seamlessly matching policy change, in the 2010/2011 publications of both the 
ECB and the Commission (see Table 4) the necessity to consolidate became 
the new key focus and expansionary consolidation the new chance not to be 
missed. The importance of the contributions of the Bocconi School and of 
Reinhart and Rogoff was widely acknowledged by the scientific papers of the 
ECB and DG Ecfin, most of all the literature dealing with episodes of successful 
consolidation (see Box 8.1). Yet EU scholars went much further than endorsing 
and backing the findings of their colleagues. In fact, they produced their own 
evidence, at times through extremely methodologically sophisticated (and 
rigorous) analyses - a textbook case of epistemic awareness rather than hubris 
(Blyth 2013, p. 91). This is the case of a number of outstanding and highly 
technical papers published in late 2010 by the ECB which can be considered, 
together with the collections of essays edited, respectively, by Van Riet (2010) 
and Larch (2009), and with later pieces of the DG Ecfin (see below and Table 
4), as the manifestos of EMU expansionary consolidation paradigm. These 
papers are Nickel et al. 2010, Checherita and Rother 2010, Rother et al. 2010, 
Cwik and Weiland 2010, Checherita-Westphal et al. 2012 and Baum et al. 2012 
for the ECB, and Roeger and in ’t Veld 2010, in ‘t Veld et al. 2012 and Boussard 
et al. 2012 for the DG Ecfin. Put together, the findings and policy advice arising 
from these articles represent a sturdy (and evidence-based) epistemic call in 
favour of consolidation and of its expansionary effects in the medium-run.  
In particular, Checherita and Rother (2010) and Baum et al. (2012) deal with the 
relationship that exists between levels of indebtedness and economic growth. 
Their findings point to the differential effectiveness of fiscal policy (both 
expansionary and contractionary) under different debt-to-GDP ratios. 
Countering the allegation of linearizing a non-linear process (Blyth 2013, pp. 10-
13), that is, budget deficits/surpluses and debt accumulation, these authors 
qualify the existing literature by proving the existence of a non-linear concave 
relationship between levels of indebtedness (both their stock and flow) and per-
capita GDP growth. In particular, debt-to-GDP ratios above 90% were found to 
have highly significant negative effects on GDP growth. The implication for 
fiscal policy is straightforward and indicates that deficit spending at high levels 
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of indebtedness (the situation of a number of EMU members) is ineffective in 
the short-run and damaging in the long-run. This effect is due to a set of 
channels such as soaring costs of servicing and refinancing the debt, 
wealth/non-Keynesian effects on consumption and the crowding-out of private 
investment.132 Conversely, fiscal tightening under the same scenario of high 
indebtedness, by lowering the yield curve of the debt and impinging on the 
expectation channel has neutral (or even slightly positive) effects in the short-
run, while boosting confidence, consumption and GDP growth thereof in the 
medium/long-term.  
The above cited group of articles (and those featured in the dedicated column in 
Table 4) came to very similar conclusions and policy guidance, which is aptly 
summarized by Rother et al. (2010, p. 20) as follows:  
“It should be noted that the positive fiscal multiplier established in the 
literature on expansionary fiscal policies should not be interpreted as 
evidence for the opposite case, i.e. for the growth-reducing effects of 
fiscal consolidation. First, what is needed is a permanent improvement in 
fiscal sustainability. […] Notably, expectation effects are likely to work in 
a growth-supporting direction in both cases, i.e. supporting the impact on 
growth of fiscal loosening but offsetting the negative demand effect of 
fiscal tightening. The positive expectation effects will be particularly large 
under the following conditions […] : i) the fiscal starting position is weak, 
so consolidation is expected to lead to a significant improvement in 
sustainability and overall stability; ii) the fiscal consolidation plan is 
ambitious and credible, possibly part of an overall structural reform 
agenda, so that the expectations of lasting improvement in the fiscal 
situation rise; iii) the composition of the adjustment focuses on reducing 
disincentives to work and save, enhancing expenditure efficiency and 
protecting growth-friendly expenditure so that the supply conditions in the 
economy improve swiftly; iv) the share of households that can adjust 
their saving in response to the fiscal consolidation (i.e. Ricardian 
households) is high, and v) part of the consolidation impact is offset via 
the exchange rate or low interest rates.” 
                                                          
132 “We find that the annual change in the government debt-to-GDP ratio is highly statistically significant 
and negatively associated with the economic growth rate.”  
“The fact that the change in the debt ratio and the budget deficits are linearly and negatively associated 
with growth (and with the long-term interest rates) may point to a more detrimental impact of the 
public debt stock even below the threshold [90% debt-to-GDP ratio]. Hence, targeting a higher debt 
level to support growth is not a policy option. Any policy with such a target would reduce the leeway of 
governments before the debt burden has an unmistakably adverse growth impact. 
In the current economic environment, the results represent an additional argument in favour of swiftly 
implementing ambitious strategies for debt reduction. If policy makers let high debt ratios linger for fear 
that fiscal consolidation measures will be unpopular with voters, this will undermine growth prospects 
and thus will put an additional burden on fiscal sustainability. This debt-based argument thus adds to 
the positive growth effects of fiscal deficit reduction found in the literature for the long term and 
frequently also in the short term.” (Checherita and Rother 2010, p. 15 and 23-24). 
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Similarly, the ECB stated in 2010: ““if fiscal consolidation gives rise to some 
negative short-run effects on real GDP growth, unduly delaying fiscal 
consolidation will ultimately result in even greater adjustment costs as the 
government debt accumulated in the interim will necessitate an even more 
pronounced fiscal correction later on. Overall, the longer-run benefits of fiscal 
consolidation are largely undisputed” (ECB M.B. 06/2010, Box 6, p. 84; 
emphasis added). 
In sum, the advice emerging from the 2010/2011 papers matched and 
supported in a very precise and timely way the observed paradigmatic change 
in EMU. By providing a fundamental evidence-based backing to the new 
austere paradigm, the internal epistemic actors of the EU gave a unique 
contribution to the mainstreaming of the concept that consolidation was not only 
a necessity, but most of all an opportunity to adjust long-term macroeconomic 
imbalances and grow thereof. These papers indeed represented the in vivo 
epistemic response to a concrete policy problem whose response was actively 
sought by EU institutions in their process of reform of EMU economic paradigm 
and governance after the much debated and problematic concession of 
sovereign bail outs. 
Yet again, this does not mean that epistemic drivers had full explanatory 
leverage. Nonetheless, the fact that they matched in a very substantial way the 
drive of the enacted policy changes cannot be disregarded when conceiving a 
multi-causal account of crisis-induced outcomes. 
To sum up and proceed, the findings and policy guidance emerging from these 
papers are the EU/EMU version of the expansionary consolidation paradigm 
that then was translated into the balanced budget rule of the TSCG, the 
provisions of the Two-Pack and the inclusion of the debt criterion in the 
corrective arm of the SGP as reformed by the Six-Pack. Interestingly, this EU 
version of expansionary consolidation is more nuanced than Blyth and other 
opponents of austerity want us, at times, to believe. In fact, the argument that 
the new paradigm entails that all EMU Member States have to consolidate at 
the same time and to the same extent (making the recovery most difficult – 
Blyth 2013, pp. 8-9) is factually incorrect. The new coordination paradigm 
instead called for differential paths of consolidation, based crucially upon the 
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level of existing debt, in line with the findings of the ECB papers discussed in 
this section and as reflected by the new rules for the surveillance of fiscal 
policies, which is the next (technical) innovation we are going to look at.  
 
Box 8.4 Findings and advice on expansionary effects of fiscal consolidations 
 
“All in all, there are good reasons to believe that the short-term negative demand effects of well-
conceived fiscal consolidation are likely to be small if, indeed, they are negative at all” (Rother et al. 
2010, p. 22). 
“New-Keynesian DSGE models, however, generate a strong normative prescription. Properly designed 
government savings packages announced with sufficient lead time can provide significant short-run 
stimulus. If such a plan had been announced in the beginning of 2009 it could have boosted private 
spending in 2009 and 2010” (Cwik and Wieland 2010, p. 40). 
“The short-run costs of fiscal consolidation are limited, and they are further reduced when positive 
expectation effects are taken into account” (Rother et al. 2010, p. 21). 
“The announcement and implementation of credible and ambitious consolidation plans, focusing on 
the expenditure side and combined with structural reforms, is likely to bring about beneficial effects 
in the longer run that offset the short-term costs in terms of lower economic growth” (ECB M.B. 
06/2010, p. 83). 
“Permanent improvements in fiscal balances, when anticipated by households and firms, can lead to 
positive expectation effects that mitigate the short-run costs of fiscal consolidation […] The short-run 
costs of fiscal consolidation are typically small relative to the permanent gains [e.g. permanent 
reduction in financing costs anticipated by forward-looking agents]” (ECB M.B. 07/2010, Article p. 80). 
“From a policy perspective, the results provide additional arguments for debt reduction [i.e. ambitious 
debt reduction through fiscal consolidation] to support longer-term economic growth prospects” 
(Checherita and Rother 2010, p. 5). 
 
 
8.4f Technical changes 
 
Similarly to the paradigmatic innovations, Table 4 matches the five technical 
changes133 with the ECB’s and DG Ecfin’s publications that corroborated them 
empirically when the processes of reform was ongoing and with the legal 
provisions that ensued from it.   
                                                          
133 Strictly on the technical side of policy coordination and surveillance, and linked to the aim of 
improving national and supranational fiscal frameworks, a number of papers have also addressed the 
issues of statistical governance, the use of real time data for the sake of MTOs and the unsuitability for 
monitoring purposes of the cyclically adjusted budget. They are not discussed here merely for reasons of 
space. 
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B1a. Stricter/more coercive coordination framework with enhanced and 
expanded enforcement, including debt surveillance  
 
As we saw in the previous section, the first set of measures undertaken by the 
EU to guarantee the implementation of ambitious fiscal consolidations by 
Member States tackled the SGP. From the point of view of legal instruments, 
the SGP had already been substantially reformed via the procedural innovation 
represented by the European Semester; yet it was the comprehensive set of 
regulations of the Six-Pack that morphed the coordination regime. The key 
novel aspects that operationalized and embedded the commitment to budgetary 
consolidation into the coordination framework were hence the synchronization 
of the supranational monitoring conducted by the Commission with the national 
budgetary sessions (Semester), the strengthening of the coercive dimension of 
the preventive arm of the SGP (Six-Pack Regulation 1175/2011) and, most of 
all, the extension of the EDP to cover cases of non-compliance with the debt 
criterion134 and the increased automaticity of the sanctions related to protracted 
non-compliance with the Commission’s corrective recommendations (Six-Pak 
Regulation 1177/2011). The new fundamental tool to enforce the corrective 
provisions was the RQMV that allows the Commission to impose financial 
sanctions on Member States that do not respect their obligations under the EDP 
unless a qualified majority of Member States within the Council vote against it.   
These innovations were clearly in line with the new consolidation mantra and 
were backed by at least 34 of the 132 articles analysed (26 of the ECB and 8 of 
the DG Ecfin – see Table 4). The key publications supporting these technical 
innovations are, among others, the usual Van Riet (ed.) 2010 and Larch et al. 
2010, Hughes Hallett et al. 2010, Checherita and Rother 2010, Schuknecht et 
al. 2011, Rieth 2011, Ioannou and Stracca 2011, Arghyrou and Kontonkias 
2011, Salines et al. 2012 Checherita-Westphal et al. 2012 and Medeiros 2012. 
 
 
                                                          
134 The new Six-Pack regulation amending the EDP foresees that “if the 60% reference for the debt-to-
GDP ratio is not respected, the Member State concerned will be put in excessive deficit procedure […] if 
the gap between its debt level and the 60% reference is not reduced by 1/20th annually (on average 
over 3 years).” (EU Commission 2011, MEMO/11/898). 
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Box 8.5 Findings and advice on debt surveillance 
 
“The paper proposes a legal restriction in the form of a soft borrowing constraint on sovereign debt 
which is modeled as a proportional fine on excessive debt and resembles features of the SGP. The 
constraint prevents excessive borrowing in the long run and thereby eliminates most of the welfare 
costs of myopic fiscal policy […] Thus, the paper supports the views of those who like to strengthen the 
rules of the SGP. It also provides an argument for the inclusion of a debt break into the German 
constitution or for the advocates of balanced budget rules” (Rieth 2011, p. 38). 
“We need to draw out the connection between deficit and debt surveillance within the SGP rules. Both 
parts need to be monitored if we are to fulfil the purpose behind the SGP – and create fiscal policies 
that are sound in the long run” (Hughes-Hallett et al. 2010, p. 6). 
“Debt sustainability should get a very prominent and explicit role in the surveillance procedures under 
the EU Stability and Growth Pact” (Chehcerita and Rother 2010, p. 8). 
 
 
B1b. Broadening of the coordination regime including expenditure monitoring 
 
As we saw, one of the main macroeconomic culprits of the unpreparedness of 
EMU Member States vis-à-vis the crisis (remember the pro-cyclical reactions to 
revenue windfalls before the crisis) and one of the most important channels that 
leads to crowding out (in) effects of fiscal expansions (contractions) is current 
expenditure. In other words, successful (expansionary) consolidations are 
crucially channelled through substantial cuts in primary expenditures. 
Obviously, to fully implement the lessons of expansionary consolidation, 
restraint and surveillance on the side of expenditure was indispensable. This 
kind of policy advice fed into the provisions of the Six-Pack that introduced an 
explicit country-specific expenditure benchmark in the preventive arm (Six-Pak 
Regulation 1175/2011).135  
30 papers within the analysed sample present evidence and express explicit 
advice in favour of expenditure rules (22 from the ECB and 8 from DG Ecfin), 
most prominently Holm-Hadulla et al. 2010, Hauptmeier et al. 2010, Vogel et al. 
2012 and Ayuso-i-Casals 2012. 
                                                          
135 “Th[e] expenditure benchmark places a cap on the annual growth of public expenditure according to 
a medium-term rate of growth. For Member States that have not yet reached their MTO, the rate of 
growth of expenditure should be below this reference rate in order to ensure adequate progress.” (EU 
Commission 2011, MEMO/11/898) 
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Box 8.6 Findings and advice on expenditure monitoring 
 
“We find that government spending reacts pro-cyclically to surprises in the output gap and that strong 
expenditure rules serve to mitigate this tendency. Thus, from a policy perspective the results confirm 
both the need for institutional restrictions to expenditure policy and their effectiveness” (Holm-
Hadulla et al. 2010, p. 20).136 
“Simple and prudent rules-based spending policies could have led to much safer fiscal positions much 
more in line with the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact rules […] From the policy perspective of creating 
sound fiscal institutions in Europe, the paper recommends expenditure rules with an added margin of 
prudence for guiding public budgets” (Hauptmeier et al. 2010, pp. 4 and 6). 
 
 
B1c. Broadening of the coordination regime, including the monitoring of Europe 
2020 objectives - structural reforms 
 
Another salient ingredient of the austerity’s policy mix is complementing 
demand-side policies (actually, the lack of demand-side active policies) with 
supply-side structural reforms (i.e. reforms in labour and product markets) that 
are supposed to create more conducive conditions for private agents and 
complement the benefits, in terms of GDP stimulus, of healthier public finances 
related to consolidation and unproductive expenditure restraint. This vision was 
reflected in the inclusion within the European Semester’s cycle of surveillance 
of a (soft) monitoring of the targets of Europe 2020. The latter, which is the new 
Lisbon agenda of the EU, got its final endorsement exactly on the occasion of 
the March 2010 European Council that launched the reform of the SGP.   
From the epistemic point of view, evidence of the healthy interplay between 
consolidation measures and structural reforms features in 14 publications, 7 of 
the ECB and 7 of the Commission. The most straightforward case for 
supranationally monitored and coordinated (see Gomes et al. 2011) structural 
reforms is made in: Van Riet (ed.) 2010, ECB M.B. 06/2010, Box 6, and, most 
of all, Hobza and Mourre 2010, Gomes et al. 2011 and Vogel 2011. These last 
                                                          
136 In other words, also implementing the advice stemming from the econometric literature on fiscal 
policies during good times, the new coordination framework should include dedicated surveillance on 
the growth of expenditures to avoid wasting revenue windfalls and, in turn, allow for the accumulation 
of buffers/fiscal space to be used when the cycle would invert and the windfalls become shortfalls. 
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three articles in particular explicitly estimate the impact in terms of growth of 
fully implementing the targets of Europe 2020. Importantly, they come up with 
converging conclusions about the benefits of accelerated structural reforms, 
most of all if carried out in conjunction with and to support consolidation: 
“Europe 2020-like reforms have a potential to deliver significant gains in terms 
of additional output and new jobs”.  
However, the extent of these benefits will naturally depend on the depth as well 
as breadth of the reforms undertaken: if the EU succeeds in generating the 
reform momentum necessary to materialise the Europe 2020 vision, the gains 
could be considerably higher than in the case of piecemeal and shallow reform. 
The model simulations presented also document that fiscal consolidation efforts 
are crucial to rein in public debt increases. An ambitious fiscal consolidation will 
not negatively affect GDP growth: it will even bring about a slight increase in 
GDP by 2020. Progress with structural reforms, increasing potential growth and 
expanding tax bases, can significantly help these efforts.” (Hobza and Mourre 
2010, p. 22). 
 
Box 8.7 Findings and advice on implementing structural reforms 
 
“Governments should favour redirecting Public expenditure towards more productive, growth-
enhancing activities by increasing the importance of the accumulation of capital – both physical and 
human – and supporting research, development and innovation […] Improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public spending will help to combine the fiscal discipline demanded by the Stability 
and Growth Pact with the structural reform agenda of the EU’s Lisbon strategy” (ECB M.B. 04/2009, p. 
99). 
“Competition-friendly reforms and fiscal reforms in euro area regions can interact in the context of a 
policy strategy aimed simultaneously at consolidating public finance and increasing potential output in 
the euro area” (Gomes et al. 2011, p. 23). 
 
 
B1d. Broadening of the coordination regime, including the monitoring of 
macroeconomic imbalances 
 
Although not directly related to the austerity paradigm and ensuing rather from 
the lessons that the crisis disclosed with regard to macroeconomic 
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interdependences and nexuses (Nickel et al. 2009; Jones et al. 2016), the EU’s 
decision to equip the new coordination regime with a mechanism to monitor 
macroeconomic imbalances (through a dedicated procedure based on a 
scoreboard and foreseeing, similarly to the EDP, a preventive and a corrective 
arm - Six-Pack Regulations 1174/2011 and 1176/2011) nonetheless followed 
epistemic expert advice. 
The expert guidance for adding this new layer of monitoring into the 
coordination framework emerges from 13 of the analysed papers (4 of the ECB 
and 9 of the DG Ecfin), most prominently: Nickel et al. 2009, Gomes et al. 2010, 
Hughes Hallett et al. 2010 and Berti et al. 2012. 
 
Box 8.8 Findings and advice on monitoring macroeconomic imbalances 
 
“Clearly, one of the lessons taught by the crisis is that fiscal and macro-financial imbalances cannot be 
looked at separately, but should rather be jointly analysed and monitored […] Main result of our 
analysis is that financial competitiveness variables appear to perform well, better than fiscal variables, 
in the early detection of fiscal stress, based on historical data. Their signalling power is generally 
significantly higher, while the share of missed past fiscal stress episodes is substantially lower. 
Financial-competitiveness variables should therefore enter the analysis, together with fiscal variables, 
when the aim is to early detect fiscal stress. The variables common to the scoreboard for the 
macroeconomic imbalance procedure (MIP) perform particularly well in terms of fiscal stress 
prediction […] This clearly speaks in favour of introducing such variables in an early-warning index for 
fiscal stress” (Berti et al. 2012, p. 3 and 18-19).  
 
 
B2. Strengthening of national fiscal governance  
 
National fiscal institutions were another key aspect of the reforms and also a 
central theme of research at the ECB and DG Ecfin during the crisis. 
Institutionalized through the TSCG’s provisions on balanced budget rules and 
the Six-Pack Directive on national fiscal governance, national fiscal institutions 
and rules are in a way the domestic version of the vincolo esterno (indeed a 
vincolo interno) against fiscal profligacy, fully in line with the austerity 
paradigm’s prescriptions. 24 papers brought into the policy process converging 
and compelling evidence of improved budgetary and macroeconomic outcomes 
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and performances when national fiscal governance, rules and institutions are in 
place (also in line with the decade-long scholarship and findings of prominent 
EU political economists like Van Hagen, Strauch and Hallerberg that 
consistently linked national fiscal performances to country-specific forms of 
fiscal governance – see, as an example, Hallerberg et al. 2004, not accidentally 
published in the ECB Working Paper Series). The most important and vocal of 
these 24 publications are: Agnello and Sosua 2009, Afonso and Hauptmeier 
2009, Iara and Wolff 2010, Castro et al. 2011, Ayuso-i-Casals 2012 and Vogel 
et al. 2012. 
 
Box 8.9 Findings and advice on strengthening national fiscal frameworks 
 
 “The observed failures in attaining sound and sustainable fiscal positions in a large number of EU 
countries in the pre-crisis period can largely be attributed to the significant weaknesses in the national 
fiscal governance structures across EU Member States […] Fiscal rules should be defined in such a way 
to promote simultaneously budgetary discipline and macroeconomic stabilization, and their design 
should include key elements such as timely monitoring mechanisms and appropriate corrective 
procedures in order to ensure their effectiveness” (Ayuso-i-Caslas 2012, p. 2). 
“National fiscal rules are found to be beneficial for market assessments of governments' ability and 
willingness to timely service debt: they could thus provide an effective way to implement fiscal 
discipline” (Iara and Wolff 2010, p. 1). 
 
 
8.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has looked into the four reforms that substantiated a new regime 
for fiscal and economic policy coordination and surveillance under EMU. These 
institutional, forward-looking reforms served the purpose of providing an 
intracrisis, long-term response to the turmoil that hit the euro area starting from 
late 2009. Building upon the sudden and accidental paradigmatic shift of May 
2010, when EMU disposed its no bail out clause, these reforms represented a 
process of sense making and anchoring of a new policy and coordination 
paradigm into operational arrangements.  
Bargaining dynamics also surfaced in the context of these institutional reforms. 
Yet, the bulk of the distributive conflict within the process of systemic policy 
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change ensued by the crisis took place in other domains, namely in the 
establishment of the ESM and in the design and implementation of adjusting 
programmes for those countries that were bailed out.  
In the context of the institutional reforms analysed in this chapter instead, the 
low problem tractability of the novel collective action problem of EMU (how to 
ensure fiscal discipline and ambitious consolidation vis-à-vis reawakened 
markets and the possibility for Member States to be bailed out), the technical 
nature of the new coordination arrangements and the typology of agency 
observed in the policy change process triggered a mechanism of epistemic 
learning. 
As the claim that epistemic forces were at play in the process of paradigmatic 
change within EMU had already been advanced in the literature, I tried to better 
qualify it by analysing the influence of an understudied epistemic community, 
that is, the research units active within the ECB and the DG Ecfin of the 
Commission.  
By looking in detail into the changes prompted by the four reforms, I have been 
able to show that their content was both paradigmatic and technical and that 
internal epistemic actors of the EU substantially influenced both levels of 
change through the policy advice stemming from their research. 
This evidence problematizes the existing accounts on the genesis of the 
austerity paradigm within EMU by showing that decision makers did not need to 
mobilize external expertise to frame a new policy and coordination paradigm 
since the scientific production of the internal scholarship of the EU generated 
and provided a solid, consistent and sufficient input to policy makers. 
The influence of external epistemic forces was surely prominent at a macro and 
systemic level, but when it comes to the policy change observed in EMU in the 
period of 2010-2013, political principals drew the lessons of expansionary 
consolidation from their own scientific agents. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusions 
 
9.1 Wrapping things up 
 
This dissertation has employed the construct of learning as an ontological key 
of policy making and has operationalised this ontology by resorting to modes of 
policy learning as epistemological devices. In particular, different modes of 
policy learning have been equated to distinct causal mechanisms. 
The review of the literature on policy learning (Chapters 2 and 3) has pinned 
down the specific scope conditions for each dimension of variation of modes of 
policy learning, allowing us to construct a “policy learning measuring instrument” 
– the fundamental tool used to empirically categorise the case studies. Besides 
spelling out which empirical scope conditions need to be satisfied for a case 
(i.e. a set of regime-specific policy interactions) to be characterized by one or 
another mode of learning, the measuring instrument has also revealed a 
number of observable implications attached to each mode of learning. These 
mode-specific expected implications were then tested empirically for each case 
study. 
This is in short the analytical infrastructure employed to diachronically tackle 
more than twenty years of fiscal policy coordination under EMU. In the period 
surveyed (1994-2013), three distinct policy regimes have been detected and 
analysed through the measuring instrument.  
The necessity to coordinate (and hence monitor at the supranational level) the 
conduct of domestic fiscal policies first surfaced in the context of the EMU 
convergence process meant to lead to monetary unification (1994-1998). 
Therefore, the coordination regime substantiated by the fiscal provisions of 
Stage II of EMU has been the first case study (Chapter 4). Tracing the scope 
conditions for learning of that regime led to the conclusion that the prevalent 
mode of learning was hierarchical. Therefore, I have looked at the official 
sources and reports that constituted the main form of actors’ interaction of that 
regime to seek for evidence that corroborated the expected implications of 
learning under the shadow of hierarchy. The main conclusion pointed toward 
the presence and causal influence of instrumental learning that supported the 
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process of macroeconomic convergence and contributed to the successful 
establishment of the common currency. 
After the provisional/temporary coordination regime emerged during the 
convergence process, that is, once the monetary union had been effectively 
established, EMU decision makers decided to permanently entrench fiscal 
policy coordination into the architecture of EMU. To this effect, the SGP was 
agreed and entered into force in 1998, substantiating a new policy coordination 
regime, which was the second case study (Chapter 5). Yet again, by tracing the 
regime-specific scope conditions I detected a prevalent mode of learning, that 
is, learning via bargaining. The observable implications of that mode of learning 
were tested empirically through a narrative form of validation leading to the 
conclusion that actors did not just bargain over the implementation of the SGP 
but gradually learned how to bargain and how to progressively increase their 
strategic sophistication in the context of regime implementation. The internal 
crisis of the SGP of 2003 and its reform of 2005 were also portrayed as 
implications of “learning via bargaining”, that is, as manifestations of a process 
of “defying-by-doing” whereby actors grew increasingly aware of the non-biting 
nature of the Pact and learned how to defy and even water it down without 
suffering sanctions. 
The reformed SGP survived on paper until 2010, but by 2008 its implementation 
was already merely figurative. In fact, the global financial crisis was initially 
faced by the EU through a mild Keynesian response, the European Economic 
Recovery Plan launched in late 2008. The latter, besides prompting a short-
term stabilisation (jointly with automatic stabilisers), resulted in all EMU Member 
States (except Luxemburg and Finland) being involved in symbolic Excessive 
Deficit Procedure by 2009. In the words of a senior economist of the 
Commission: “The call for expansionary fiscal policies included in the European 
Economic Recovery Plan adopted by the Commission and endorsed by the 
Council at the end of 2008 was in conflict, probably not with the spirit, but 
certainly with the letter of the Pact.” (Larch et al. 2010, p. 5).  
The perfect storm was indeed brewing. The burden of fiscal easing, the financial 
liabilities linked to the support that a number of EMU members provided to their 
financial institutions, the sudden awakening of sovereign bond markets that 
started requiring increasing risk premia to buy the debt issuances of several 
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Member States, and the steadily negative growth rates observed in the 
periphery of the Union conjured to bring about a systemic crisis of EMU. The 
first victim of this multifaceted crisis was Greece, one of the major fiscal sinners 
of EMU, soon followed by Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy (Chapter 6). 
At that critical juncture, vis-à-vis concrete dangers to the sustainability of a 
Member State and the risk of a disastrous sovereign default within EMU, a 
multi-pronged process of policy and regime change, both inter and intracrisis, 
ensued. These two dimensions of crisis-induced policy change have been, 
respectively, the third (Chapter 7) and fourth case (Chapter 8) studies of this 
dissertation. 
To make sense of the sudden intracrisis policy change prompted by the Greek 
bail out of May 2010, I resorted to an ad-hoc learning mechanism (Chapter 7). 
This was because the exogenous nature of the crisis led to a sudden change in 
the problem tractability of supranational fiscal coordination whose management 
could not be explained though a canonical causal chain going from crisis to 
learning to change. Drawing on the empirical insight that policy change took 
place abruptly, that is, in absence of a proper process of puzzling and sense 
making and mainly as a reaction to adverse exogenous pushes, I resorted to a 
case-specific causal mechanism whereby change precedes canonical 
inferential learning: this is the “contingent learning” mechanism. A plausibility 
probe indicated that such a mechanism could potentially explain why and how 
the EU came up with such a profound paradigmatic shift in the absence of 
ideational convergence and proper puzzling. 
Although the crisis was all but halted by the sudden Greek bail out of May 2010, 
the latter worked as a crucial game changer (Schwarzer 2012) that kick-started 
a process of systemic and comprehensive reform of EMU’s architecture. 
Building upon that unexpected and emergency-driven crasis (that altered the 
very nature of the coordination problem that the SGP was meant to deal with 
and “created path dependencies which made euro area member governments 
start seeking a permanent solution only weeks after the temporary [bail out] 
mechanism was created”, ibid., p. 39), a process of intercrisis institutional and 
regime change was launched in line with the predicted implication of intracrisis 
contingent learning. This process involved both paradigmatic and instrumental 
changes meant to anchor the decision of May 2010 within a new coherent 
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policy coordination regime. From a legal point of view, this profound change 
was conveyed by successive reforms137 that impinged on and transformed the 
regime of supranational coordination and monitoring of fiscal and economic 
policies. By analysing this multipronged process of reform through the “policy 
learning measuring instrument”, and by drawing on existing accounts of that 
shift toward austerity, I was able to claim that the learning mechanism 
underpinning the reforms of the SGP was epistemic.  
Once having categorised this complex and multipronged case of policy change, 
by analysing the internal epistemic sources of the EU (those that most directly 
participated to the reform processes) I showed that the fundamental expected 
implication of epistemic learning, that is, the influence of expert advice on the 
nature of policy change, was strongly corroborated empirically. In greater detail, 
by analysing more than 130 papers produced in the period of 2009-2012 by 
economists at the ECB and at the DG Ecfin of the Commission I demonstrated 
that almost all the different aspects (both paradigmatic and instrumental) of the 
four reforms were strongly supported by the scientific production and resulting 
expert advice of the internal epistemic communities of the EU. Furthermore, the 
analysis of internal epistemic sources also qualified the common wisdom about 
the origins of austerity by proving that the new paradigm was endogenously 
crafted within the EU itself rather than borrowed from external epistemic actors. 
 
9.2 Discussion and contextualization of the findings 
 
9.2a Stage II of EMU and the SGP: Learning as a by-product 
 
What have we learned through this diachronic learning-informed account of 
twenty years of fiscal policy coordination under EMU?  
First of all, let us clearly spell out one of the key limitations of this study – that in 
a way is also one of its strengths. I do this by borrowing the insightful words of 
Daniela Schwarzer (2015, p. 623): 
                                                          
137 Namely, the European Semester, the Six-Pack Rules, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance, and the Two-Pack Rules. 
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“While learning approaches so far have mainly been incorporated into EU 
governance studies […] learning processes may have high relevance for 
institution-building and change […] While the learning lens cannot claim, for 
instance, to replace approaches focusing on bargaining processes, it can add to 
the understanding of why consensus around certain policy options emerged in a 
situation of high insecurity and previous choices came to be revised.” 
In other words, my learning-informed analytical approach, in line with 
Schwarzer’s one, does not claim full explanatory leverage but has to be seen as 
a complement to power-based causal accounts. This perspective has deep 
methodological and explanatory implications. As for the former, seeing learning-
based explanations as complementary and interlocked to power-based ones 
means that causal mechanisms need to be non-exclusive, but complementary 
and overlapping. In the light of this stance, empirically demonstrating the 
presence of the observable implications typical of one or another mode of 
learning does not exclude that, under a multiple causation perspective, other 
mechanisms of causation run in parallel to or overlap with it, jointly contributing 
to the emergence of the observed outcomes. But how should we evaluate the 
independent causal influence of learning mechanisms if they are intertwined 
with other explanatory drivers? 
A crucial indicator of the relative weight and strength of learning-informed 
causation over outcomes is problem tractability. As is already made clear at 
length in the dissertation, when problem tractability is high (i.e. when the policy 
problem dealt with in regime-specific interactions is not source of strategic 
uncertainty and the mechanism of learning takes place under the shadow of 
hierarchy or via bargaining) the influence of learning is poised to be less 
evident. To use the wording that prevails in the literature, in these instances 
learning is a by-product of the policy process (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013).  
Nonetheless, although policy interactions revolving around highly tractable 
policy problems typically see a prevalence of the strategic dimension, 
mechanisms of learning that run in parallel with power-informed mechanisms 
can still influence (accelerate or deter) the latter. This was the case of the first 
two regimes analysed in this dissertation. In the first one, the hierarchical, rule-
based nature of policy interactions led to a form of instrumental learning that 
sustained convergence. In the second case, learning mechanisms reinforced a 
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perverse dynamic that muted the rule-based nature of the SGP framework in 
favour of political discretion. 
In more detail, we saw how under Stage II of EMU the incentive structure 
nudged actors toward compliance and hence toward specific forms of 
hierarchical/instrumental learning, i.e. “learn how to comply” (Chayes and 
Chayes 1993). On the contrary, under the SGP actors were playing a different 
coordination game where defection could (and actually did) emerge as a 
dominant strategy, granted no tit-for-tat. Under such a scenario, the content of 
the learning process, consisted in practice of actors refining their capacity to 
successfully implement their desired strategy. Since the dominant strategy was 
defection to a regime’s rules, most of all for large Member States (De Haan et 
al. 2004), actors indeed learned “how to defect”, or to be more precise, how to 
better attain the highest payoffs in a world of horizontal bargaining without 
retaliation. The strictly instrumental content observed under the hierarchical 
mode got substituted by an object of learning consisting of increased strategic 
sophistication aimed at achieving unilateral and disjucnt policy goals. In other 
words, Member States got engaged with a gradual learning process that was 
dysfunctional with regard to the objectives of the coordination regime. 
This leads us to learning processes like those captured by May’s political 
learning (1992) and those conceptualized by Sabatier’s attainment of near core 
beliefs and focusing on secondary aspects of the policy (1988).138 
Empirically demonstrating that learning mechanisms can also tilt toward policy 
endarkenment (Dunlop and Radaelli 2017) mends one of the key shortcomings 
of the learning scholarship that are commonly blamed for attaching a positive 
normative value to the manifestations of learning. Instead, as should be the 
case for all the causal mechanisms, their empirical manifestations need to be 
normatively neutral in terms of outcomes, that is, they need to be theorised as 
leading either to improved policy or to failure. The latter was surely the case for 
                                                          
138 A formal conceptualization of this form of learning to defect over time can be found in the game 
theoretical literature, for instance in iterated prisoner’s dilemmas whereby grim trigger strategies are 
dominant and lead to protracted non-cooperative equilibria (Friedman 1971). Grim trigger is a strategy 
typical of repeated non-cooperative games whereby a player, faced with two options (cooperate or 
defect), choses to cooperate as long as the other player cooperates too. As soon as the opponent 
chooses to defect, the player will defect in all the successive iterations of the game, bringing about a 
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium of mutual defection. 
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the learning via bargaining mechanism that prevailed in the context of SGP 
implementation.  
 
9.2b Comparison of case one vs case two 
 
To account for the findings of the first two cases in a dynamic way, that is, to 
better gauge both the shift between policy regimes and their modes of learning, 
it is useful to compare the implications stemming from the hierarchical mode of 
learning prevalent under Stage II with those observed under the SGP. 
Why did the mechanism leading instrumental and two-stage learning in Stage II 
of EMU not apply anymore to the SGP? First, instrumental learning, i.e. learning 
how to comply, cannot go on forever. Already during the convergence process, 
implementing actors learned how to produce reliable statistics, how to prepare 
consistent convergence/stability programmes and how to efficiently interact with 
monitoring actors on formal terms. Drawing on this useful experience, 
instrumental learning had been practically exhausted under the SGP - this also 
explains why the problem tractability of SGP implementation remains high, even 
higher than before: actors had effectively learned the rules of the game, the 
“how” part.  
And what about the ideational convergence that led to the TEU (McNamara 
1998) and that fostered hierarchical learning under Stage II? Did it disappear? 
First, actors were much more inclined to buttress the ideational convergence 
that preceded and spawned the Maastricht framework when they were subject 
to healthy conditionality, threat of exclusion and hence hierarchical constraints 
during implementation. As odd as it might look to certain advocates of social 
and experimental governance, very often sound rules and incentives create 
conducive conditions and allow for efficient and functional learning processes 
and outcomes. Conditionality and hierarchy were not only effective incentives 
for compliance itself but also represented sound drivers for instrumental 
learning.  
On the contrary, under the SGP, hierarchy and incentives for compliance were 
much vaguer than under Stage II of EMU. This opened doors to free riding that 
before did not exist or, at least, were regulated by the (costly) exclusion from 
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the common currency. Maastricht’s “consolidation fatigue” (Von Hagen et al. 
2002; Fatás  and Mihov 2003), that is, the slackening of fiscal consolidation 
observed under the SGP, can be understood as being motivated by the fact that 
budgetary restraint was costly, and bearing its cost was meaningful only 
inasmuch as benefits were conditional on this cost. Since benefits could also be 
reaped without effort (i.e. fiscal discipline), room for moral hazard and non-
compliance not only opened, but these strategies even became dominant.   
Under the SGP, the benefits of the currency union (e.g. lower interest rates and 
financing costs) became non-excludable, while sanctions for non-compliance 
were subject to the political discretion of the Council, hence constituting an 
imperfect and much less credible substitute of exclusion. Furthermore, the other 
external disciplinarian device - i.e. market-based discipline - did not “bite” under 
the SGP, and so it was until the financial crisis unfolded in 2007/8. All of these 
conditions seriously threatened the credibility of the coordination regime, 
leading to a progressive dismissal of the coordination framework and to the 
grand bargaining that eventually led to the collapse of the regime.  
The implications for learning were stark. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the 
discomfort of Member States with the surveillance framework grew with time, as 
well as their violations to the regime’s rules in a sort of herding/snowball effect 
driven by domestic motives. Over time, Member States learned how to muddle 
through in the Eurogroup, side-line the Commission, avert early warnings and 
EDPs and ultimately water down the foundations of the coordination framework 
according to their political expediency and establish a new one more 
accommodative of voluntary violations of fiscal discipline. This dynamic evolved 
according to national interests but also happened through a gradual process of 
learning at the supranational level over the implementation practices of the 
SGP. In other words, the non-biting nature of the Pact was not only engrained in 
the regime’s structure, but it was also socially constructed by a process 
whereby the Member States gradually learned how to act strategically during 
the course of implementation and even, at a later stage, to reform the regime’s 
framework to make it conform more to their preferences. 
This is a useful finding for two reasons. First, under high problem tractability and 
in domains where coordinated/collective action is costly learning does not 
disappear but is coupled with the implementation practices, reinforcing them. 
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When incentives are sound, learning takes the form of instrumental technical 
knowledge accumulation for the sake of proper regime implementation. On the 
other hand, when incentives are weak and non-compliance prevails, learning 
mechanisms reinforce mutual adaptation and the sophistication of unilateral 
action.  
This leads us into the second point. When in a policy regime/case powering 
motives prevail over puzzling, learning is a by-product of the policy interaction 
and is a function of it, a sort of intermediate variable that accelerates the 
occurrence of certain outcomes (a sort of policy “replicator dynamic”). In the 
light of this, the learning lens (and ontology) is vindicated of its alleged 
normative bias. Indeed, accumulating knowledge during the policy process does 
not necessarily improve the latter, most of all if puzzling is not the central aim of 
a policy regime and collective action is resisted. In those very frequent 
instances learning is overshadowed by the prevailing strategic dynamic but it 
does not disappear, it simply co-moves with policy implementation, resulting at 
times in hiding behind it. And, crucially, when implementation is dysfunctional, 
the prevailing learning mechanism will also be so. 
Putting these findings in the broader context of EU integration theories is rather 
straightforward. In fact, the instrumental learning observed in the first case 
study can be seen as a long-term by-product of the neo-functional process that 
led to the signing of the TEU, while the dysfunctional learning mechanism that 
was at work under the SGP can be seen as linked and germane to the 
intergovernmental bargaining dynamics that governed the political 
implementation of the Pact. 
Moving to the third and fourth case studies, the occurrence of an exogenous 
crisis of unprecedented dimensions that changed the very nature of economic 
policy making under EMU and the tractability of the collective action problem 
tackled by the coordination regimes led us in territories where the puzzling 
dimension of policy making prevails over the powering one. As highlighted by 
Schwarzer (2015), this is the natural domain of policy learning, i.e. the empirical 
area where learning-informed causal mechanisms are not a by-product of 
power-based policy interactions but are their key motive/component and 
strongly influence and explain policy change.  
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While the first two case studies showed that learning-informed causation can 
also occur in those instances where the bargaining/hierarchical dimensions are 
neatly prevalent, the crisis (intended as an intervening variable impinging on 
problem tractability) brought us into empirical domains where the puzzling 
dimension of policy making is indeed essential, rather than an accessory, in 
explaining policy outcomes.  
 
9.2c Intra and intercrisis policy change: learning as the main product – and its 
relationship with integration theories 
 
Let us now reflect on the findings of the last two case studies, those where 
learning mechanisms gained enhanced explanatory leverage due to the change 
in problem tractability prompted by the crisis. As we saw in the previous 
sections, while in the context of “everyday policy making” (Hall 1993) within 
“high stakes policy domains” (Hodson 2015) learning is somewhat constrained 
and accompanies integration theories and mechanisms rather than challenging 
them, vis-à-vis crises and policy change learning processes take centre stage 
and interact with mainstream integration theories by qualifying and 
problematizing their explanatory accounts.  
In fact, although integration theories do not have the aim of explaining crises, 
they still offer the most important conceptual apparatus to make sense of the 
direction of European integration. Let us hence put the findings of the last two 
case studies in the context of broader integration theories and their 
interpretation of the outcomes and changes that occurred as a result of the 
crisis.  
For scholars belonging to the neo-functionalist (NF) tradition, the euro area 
crisis was in great part an endogenous effect of the asymmetries of EMU’s 
architecture involving a centralized (integrated) monetary policy vis-à-vis 
decentralized (coordinated) fiscal and macroeconomic policies and financial 
surveillance. The new integrative steps devised to cope with possible European 
disintegration were somehow functionally written in EMU: “the developments 
towards deeper economic integration can be explained as steps taken in order 
to alleviate functional pressures arising from an incomplete architecture created 
at Maastricht” (Niemann and Ioannou 2015, p. 201). I broadly agree with this 
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general explanation, yet the learning-informed analysis of the last two case 
studies challenges this account on the basis of two arguments: uncertainty, and 
timing/sequencing of the decision making and change thereof.  
First, the NF understanding of crisis management overlooks the causal 
influence of the profound uncertainty triggered by the financial and sovereign 
debt crises that hit the EU. For example, no functional tension within EMU’s 
architecture predicted the emergence of a concrete risk of sovereign 
insolvencies fuelled by the so-called fiscal-financial nexus. Indeed, if the 
monetary-fiscal asymmetry of EMU was fully understood from a functional 
perspective, many other aspects and effects of the crisis (most of all the 
financial ones) led the EU into uncharted territories (Jones 2010a and 2010c, 
2014 and 2015; Parsons and Matthijs 2015; Copelovitch et al. 2016).139 A 
functional understanding of EMU inherent deficiencies was of little help in these 
uncharted territories and for these novel challenges that instead called for 
innovative policy solutions beyond the typical calls for strengthening the 
corrective arm of the Pact or improving the stabilisation capacity of the EU 
budget.  
Second, with regard to the time dimension, “all these steps deepened to a 
remarkable degree European economic integration within a relatively very short 
period of time” (Niemann and Ioannou 2015, p. 200, emphasis added). 
Furthermore, “In terms of European integration, these achievements are 
remarkable, not only for their scale and scope but also the speed with which 
they were adopted and put into place” (Ioannou et al. 2015, p. 164). And yet, for 
functional pressures to translate into political spillovers it is necessary that 
“(national) élites come to perceive that problems of substantial interest cannot 
be effectively addressed at the domestic level. This should lead to a gradual 
learning process whereby élites shift their expectations, political activities and 
[…] even loyalties to a new European centre.” (Ibid., p. 198, emphasis added). 
As shown in Chapter 7, however, the fast speed of crisis development did not 
allow us to make the case for a gradual learning process, thus muting political 
spillovers.140 Moreover, a gradual learning process also involves a certain 
                                                          
139 This is shown in Chapter 8 when discussing the interdependencies across economic policy areas 
disclosed by the crisis. 
140 Moreover, the other typology of supranational spillovers (the “cultivated ones”) postulates a visible 
entrepreneurship by EU institutions that was not observed empirically. 
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degree of ideational convergence that was instead not found empirically at the 
time of the Greek bail out (Van Esch 2015, see also below for a clarification of 
this point).   
These interrelated arguments are reinforced also by the observation of the 
discursive dimension. True, we can and have shown in Chapter 8 that the 
functional discourse was dominant by 2011/2012 (Niemann and Ioannou 2015: 
204). But it is much harder to hold that this was the case in 2010, that is, when 
the crisis started to spread its unexpected cues and major pro-integration 
measures were swiftly laid down in a virtual vacuum, in both the discursive and 
strategic dimensions. As Niemann and Ioannou (2015, p. 197) argue, “most 
political actors tend to be incapable of long-range purposive behaviour, since 
decisions on integration are normally taken with very imperfect knowledge of 
their consequences and frequently under the pressure of deadlines”.  
Thus, from our own learning-informed perspective, the scenario of 2010, when 
key reforms were swiftly agreed on under objective existential threats for the 
euro area, was one of decision-making wherein political actors did not have the 
time to consciously engrain functional pressures in their discourses, cognitive 
maps and behaviours (Jones 2010c). These findings concur with the NF logic if 
the latter assumes that the functional tensions are not known to the actors. 
These are the classic spillovers generated by institutions and the responses of 
markets, rather than being cultivated or acted upon by strategic actors. 
Intense uncertainty is also vividly depicted by liberal intergovernmentalist (LI) 
accounts of the crisis (see, most prominently, Schimmelfennig 2015).  
Nonetheless, assuming that a neat and unproblematic process of preference 
formation - crucial for LI causation - took place amid the 2010 storm is the result 
of hindsight, not insight. In fact, as proved by Van Esch (2014) through 
comparative cognitive mapping, the key decision maker singled out by the LI 
approach, Chancellor Angela Merkel, held no specific beliefs about 
benefits/disadvantages of deeper integration before the unfolding of the 
sovereign debt crisis in late 2009.141 The events of spring 2010 - as narrated by 
Schimmelfennig (2015: 181-183) - can be understood in terms of hard 
                                                          
141 “Prior to the outbreak of the Euro-crisis, the Chancellor makes few references to European 
integration and hardly mentions European economic and monetary integration” (Van Esch 2014, pp. 
293-294). 
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bargaining and brinkmanship, but this presupposes that actors have gone 
through a process of steadfast preference formation.  
Yet, the timeframe of critical events, plagued by systemic uncertainty and 
inconsistent exogenous pressures arising from the markets, did not allow actors 
to factor all of the ambiguous implications of the crisis into their utility functions. 
LI allows for bounded rationality, but to generate explanatory leverage it must 
assume that preferences are connected to clear, ranked payoffs of alternative 
courses of action. Instead, during the most critical moments of spring 2010, the 
key decision makers (Germany, France, the Council and the Commission), 
facing unknown and unexpected contextual factors and constrained by the 
scarcity of time to go through sense-making, could not form neat preferences 
(i.e. preferences with clear, pre-determined payoffs) on alternative courses of 
actions and bargain in a game of full information: “rational choice approaches 
tend to derive optimal policy conclusions from a static analysis of preferences 
assumed to be stable and of single events. They do not place processes or 
highly dynamic situations and their impact on actors’ perceptions and derived 
policy choices at the centre of analysis” (Schwarzer 2015, p. 603, emphasis 
added).  
The generalized uncertainty over alternative options to solve the Greek turmoil 
and related payoffs is indeed uncontroversially documented by different sources 
(ibid.; Jones 2010a; Gocaj and Meuinier 2013; Van Esch 2015; Parsons and 
Matthijs 2015; Schwarzer 2015; Matthijs 2016). 
Put together, the circumstances sketched above and analysed in depth in 
Chapter 7 clearly militate against conventional NF and LI wisdom that carefully 
envisaged functional spillovers or staunch brinkmanship based upon rigid and 
stable preferences led to the establishment of the European Financial Stability 
Facility in 2010 that, on the contrary, “emerged in [an] atmosphere of confusion, 
panic, and desperation” (Gocaj and Meunier 2013, p. 243).   
I do not contend that by 2011/2012 (i.e. when major reforms had already been 
shaped and agreed upon - see Chapter 8) the mixed motives and distributive 
dimension underlying the bail outs and the subsequent institutional reforms 
were identifiable, but I cast serious doubts that in 2010 this could have been 
possible in the clear-cut terms postulated by LI. Again, the fast nature of crisis 
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development, the uncertainty about unexpected causal relationships and the 
exogenous pressures of the markets calling for immediate measures limit both 
NF reasoning on long-term functional pressures and LI claims on preference 
formation.  
In particular, if it is true that exit costs were broadly considered to be untenable 
by all the players (Schimmelfennig 2015: 181-182 and 186-188), it is hindsight 
that informs us about the distributive nature of the integrative steps decided, not 
contextual and contingent insight present at the time of decision making in 
2010. True, dramatic changes in the position of the German government in 
spring 2010 about the Greek bailout can indeed belong to the logic of a chicken 
game and to the resort to brinkmanship. Nonetheless, given the extreme high 
stakes of the game played, they are more likely the fruit of acute uncertainty 
about the outcomes of different courses of actions and the result of adaptive, 
associative responses to the huge exogenous and unprecedented pressures 
coming from the markets. The findings of Van Esch (2014 and 2015) regarding 
the preferences and beliefs of major decision makers during the crisis 
corroborate this view.  
Schimmelfennig (2015: 182) himself acknowledges this in part by stating that “in 
a situation rife with uncertainty, Merkel ultimately decided against taking the risk 
of Grexit. This debate shows that the preferences of Germany, a core actor, on 
Grexit, a core policy issue, were not unitary, fixed or internalized”. Indeed, 
detailed accounts of the process that led to the Greek bail out (Gocaj and 
Meunier 2013, p. 243) colourfully depicts the decisional context of May 2010 as 
follows: “Faced with multiple equilibria and a range of possible paths, confused 
as to their own preferences, while conscious of a sense of urgency, policy-
makers are disoriented”, that is, the description of a situation rife with 
contingencies and uncertainty rather than a rational choice constellation. 
A final factor that cast doubts about the LI account of crisis-driven reforms is 
that they would, in large part, reflect the preferences of Germany. Even without 
a careful reconstruction of the events, this argument is inevitably based on an 
ex-post assessment. Back in 2009, few observers would have argued that 
reneging on the bail-out clause and establishing EU financial assistance 
facilities, allowing the ECB to buy (first indirectly and the directly) shares of 
sovereign debts acting as a typical lender of last resort, and engraining at 
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constitutional level a monitoring function over national budgeting for the 
European Court of Justice, would have been in line with German long-term 
preferences over economic policy making and coordination (see also Matthijs 
2016 for a similar argument. For a somewhat different interpretation see Jones 
2013). 
The contingent learning approach offers a more fine grained understanding of 
the process that led first to the emergency measures of 2010 (driven more by 
contingency than by functional pressures or rational calculations) and then only 
afterwards to the sense-making process that followed in 2011 and 2012, as 
analysed in the last empirical chapter.  
It is in the context of these institutional reforms that functional pressures arising 
out of the EMU architecture (NF) and national preferences and 
intergovernmental bargaining dynamics (LI) played a more important role. As is 
quite obvious, the learning-informed account of the systemic institutional 
response of EMU to the crisis, which draws on an epistemic mechanism, is 
closer to a functional understating of policy change. Nonetheless, I hope I made 
clear that interstate bargaining took place in other parallel areas of reform, 
leading to the conclusion that, as I strongly believe is to be expected in EU 
integration, different causal mechanisms concurred in delivering the observed 
outcomes. 
The findings arising out of this learning-informed perspective (that seeks to 
combine dynamically LI and NF causal drivers) are surely conversant with a 
recent account of the crisis - that implies as well broader and far-reaching 
implications for European integration altogether. I refer namely to the “failing 
forward” argument put forth by Jones et al. (2016). Although the two 
approaches differ in several aspects (namely, the understanding of the 
mechanisms of preference formation during existential crises and the attribution 
of the exogenous/endogenous nature of the financial and sovereign debt 
crises), they are conversant since they broadly share the same goal of providing 
a fuller and less partisan explanation to the erratic path of European integration 
vis-à-vis the crisis.142 Moreover, they both seek to achieve this goal by 
eclectically drawing on LI and NF classical casual chains and employing them in 
                                                          
142 It is worth noting, however, that Jones et al. (2016) use the euro crisis as an illustration since their 
“failing forward” argument is poised to apply to the dynamics of European integration at large.  
299 
the context of a third analytical framework (policy learning in my case and 
historical institutionalism in Jones and colleagues’ contribution).  
Within an historical institutionalist framework that characterizes the pattern of 
policy change in the EU as driven by path dependence and incrementalism, 
Jones et al. (2016) elegantly and dynamically intertwine intergovernmental and 
functional mechanisms of causation. The former mechanism applies to and 
informs episodes of policy change triggered by crises, while the latter operates 
in-between policy change and triggers the successive crisis. In a way, to use 
the jargon of the crisis management literature, LI motives intervene in intracrisis 
situations and leads systematically to “lowest common denominator solutions” - 
chiming with joint-decision trap outcomes. NF drivers intervene instead in 
intercrisis settings and manifest themselves as growing functional pressures 
over the piecemeal, incomplete and asymmetric policy solutions adopted in 
intracrisis management due to mixed motives and dynamically inconsistent 
preferences. This leads then to a loop whereby new radical policy change would 
be required, but interstate bargaining driven by disjucnt preferences ensue 
instead, leading yet again to sub-optimal and incomplete policy arrangements 
that activate functional spillovers and novel policy change. 
In this way, the “failing forward” argument unearths both the roots and 
consequences of policy change within the EU, managing to make sense of its 
inconsistent and harmonic motion toward more delegation of core state 
functions to supranational institutions.  
The policy learning perspective I employed may well lead to similar conclusions 
if extended to EU integration in general. In fact, when intergovernmental 
bargaining is the prevalent form of actors’ interaction, learning dynamics are 
inevitably constrained and limited by the high stakes at play (this mostly applies 
to EMU’s policy domains) and by actors’ self-interest. As a result, learning - 
intended as knowledge accumulation and improved problem solving capacity - 
is curtailed and becomes a by-product of the power-based policy interaction and 
its destiny, together with that of the resulting policy outcomes, and crucially 
depends on the features of the strategic interaction within the actor 
constellation.143 In other words, settings governed by strategic 
                                                          
143 Such features, if the nature of the bargaining underlying the policy interaction is cumulative, are 
likely to lead to outcomes similar to those observed in the SGP case study. 
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intergovernmental interactions, lacking proper coercive incentives toward 
cooperative behaviour or the presence of cumulative bargaining, do not allow 
the benefits of collective puzzlement and learning thereof to be reaped.  
On the other hand, when the policy interaction is oriented toward problem 
solving and draws on functional pressures, the resulting policy outcomes are 
more likely to be influenced and informed by the recognition of incompleteness 
and asymmetries in policy design, leading to solutions that try to fill those 
gaps144 - and I say “try” because, in any case, collective problem solving is 
(path) dependent on previously taken decisions (see also Schwarzer 2012 and 
Salines et al. 2012 that similarly employ an historical institutionalist framework 
to explain the policy change spawned by the crisis). 
This is exactly the case of the last case study that, besides enriching the 
accounts of the NF scholarship, allowed us to achieve three goals. First, to 
assert strong, case-specific explanatory leverage (the fit between the epistemic 
policy input and the policy change implemented is indeed very good); second, 
to claim, in line with the “failing forward” argument, that the nature and direction 
of long-term, forward looking policy change is dependent on the decision 
making (whether driven by contingency or by intergovernmental bargaining) that 
triggered it; and third, to open a dialogue with the ideational scholarship (see 
Blyth 2013, most prominently). Indeed, the findings of the last chapter critically 
integrate those of that tradition and also represent a call for a future research 
agenda that takes endogenous paradigm formation within EU institutions more 
seriously and departs from the assumption that the EU is an opportunistic taker 
of external (whether national or academic) ideational repertoires. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
144 There is also a role for Slembeck’s (1998 and 1999) condition about feedback mechanisms that lock-
in the effects of learning and endogenise them. Feedback re-organizes the beliefs of policy-makers, 
making them learn how to operate within the new circumstances that become the new taken-for-
granted context. This finding opens another pathway of conversation with historical institutionalism. 
Further research should explore how behavioural, contingent mechanisms relate to the macro-historical 
mechanisms and types of changes described by Mahoney and Thelen (2010). 
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9.3 Limitations and future research 
 
The key limitation of this dissertation lies in the fact that the tested causal 
mechanisms are not exclusive and hence full explanatory leverage cannot be 
claimed. Moreover, the conceptualized mechanisms work at a macro, and to a 
certain extent, abstract level and hence cannot be directly observed. This in turn 
implies that the only feasible way to test their explanatory influence is indirect, 
that is, achieved by matching theoretically postulated manifestations to those 
observed empirically. 
Furthermore, the employed analytical approach, focusing on macro level 
learning mechanisms occurring at the supranational level, somehow set aside, 
by design, the influence of national/domestic motives on the observed 
outcomes.145 Yet, this limitation has to be qualified. First, it is the fruit of a 
deliberate analytical focus that is motivated both by an ontological perspective 
on learning in policy making and by the fact that the literature dealing with 
interstate bargaining in economic policy coordination is already abundant. 
Second, since the very beginning it was made clear that the sort of causation 
theorised and tested in this dissertation is not alternative to other explanatory 
factors but it integrates them. 
This consideration leads us to suggestion for future research. A first, obvious 
pathway is to tackle the same case studies analysed in this dissertation by 
looking more consistently and systematically at how the learning dimension 
interacts with interstate bargaining and powering.  
Another obvious avenue for further learning-informed research on fiscal policy 
coordination under EMU is to analyse the implementation courses of the regime 
arising out of the reforms analysed in Chapter 8 through the “policy learning 
measuring instrument”. The hypothesis one should test, drawing on how the 
regime was reformed, is that the crisis led to a return to the healthy 
conditionality and instrumental learning that characterized the Maastricht 
convergence process. This is because the new regime engrained a vast array 
of provisions meant to strengthen coordination, monitoring and, ultimately, 
discipline. That being said, even a casual observation of the implementation of 
                                                          
145 Although the policy learning measuring instrument is also designed to embed strategic aspects into 
the analysis of learning processes and mechanisms (see Chapter 3, Section 3). 
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fiscal coordination since 2011 yet again points toward the prevalence of political 
discretion (Hallerberg et al. 2011), perhaps offering the ultimate proof that 
without a watertight threat of exclusion from the benefits of monetary union, 
compliance with coordination arrangements (even hard and strengthened) will 
always be perceived as politically negotiable. 
Finally, another pathway for future research consists of longitudinally analysing 
the scientific production of the ECB and the Commission, that is, extending the 
analysis performed in Chapter 8 to the whole lifespan of EMU. Such a research 
project would seek to systematically and diachronically pin down the policy 
advice stemming from the internal scientific outputs of EU actors and evaluate 
to what extent the shifts, reforms and changes undergone by EMU were related 
to the solutions proposed by internal experts/epistemic actors. Quite 
surprisingly, political science and EU scholarship, have shown relatively little 
interest in this typology of policy input. This is unexpected for at least three 
reasons: first, the ECB is a sui generis central bank that, lacking a political 
counterpart, is active in different fields of economic policy making, well beyond 
its mandate on monetary policy. Second, the creeping task expansion and 
increased strategic role pursued by the ECB during the crisis (Schwarzer 2012; 
Torres 2013; Kamkhaji and Radelli 2013) makes this kind of investigation 
extremely significant. Third, EU integration studies put ideas at centre stage, yet 
ideas seem to emerge only from national preferences or supranational 
functional drivers. The new line of research would aim to complement the 
literature on the role of ideas in the context of EU economic integration by 
looking at the rich and varied policy input and advice that emerges from the 
internal scientific production of the EU.  
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